Posted on 03/10/2005 7:10:45 AM PST by rcocean
Our awe at the bravery of the Marines and their Japanese adversaries should not cause us to overlook the stupidity that forced them into this unnecessary meat grinder. Selective memories of World War II, which record only inspiring deeds and block out all waste and folly, create an impossible standard of perfection against which to judge contemporary conflicts.
(Excerpt) Read more at latimes.com ...
Fair question Ray.
As the Marines waded in through Iwo, they were hit from all different directions. NO trees, NO foliage, NO screens. Buck naked.
It may just be that this was an miscalculated plan in the first place...with NO option "B".
But isn't Max Boot essentially agreeing with you?
Selective memories of World War II, which record only inspiring deeds and block out all waste and folly, create an impossible standard of perfection against which to judge contemporary conflicts....
In modern parlance, you might say that Iwo Jima was a battle of choice waged on the basis of faulty intelligence and inadequate plans. If Ted Kennedy had been in the Senate in 1945 (hard to believe, but he wasn't), he would have been hollering about the incompetence of the Roosevelt administration, which produced many times more casualties in five weeks than U.S. forces have suffered in Iraq in the last two years.
No such criticism was heard at the time, in part because of the rah-rah tone of World War II press coverage but also because Americans back then had a greater appreciation for the ugly, unpredictable nature of combat. They even coined a word for it: snafu (in polite language: "situation normal, all fouled up").
That is about the same number that Ollie North used in his latest book about how many air crews were saved...as many saved as were casualties on the Island.
Not when you regard your men as expendable cannon fodder.
"Sorry, but the costs of a defeat at Iwo, would have been far higher then the costs of the win."
It's a matter of fighting or NOT fighting; That was a given.
A) U.S. Marines ran into an unexpected buzz-saw.
B) That were ill-prepared to handle the underestimated enemy numbers and tactics with no apparent 'Plan "B"' given to fall back on.
C) They won the battle at great costs
D) The planners of the battle were sloppy, and the "strategy" to deem Iwo "critical" to the war at the pre-calculated "acceptable" cost was a huge gaff.
Yes, even the U.S. Military planners screw up sometimes. Happened in this case.
If he does, he's an idiot.
mistake....tell that to any B-29 crew who had to make that emergency landing...they are forever grateful to the marines and thier sacrafice
Two points:
(1) Burrell's article refutes the aircrew numbers. The actual number of aircraft in peril was much lower. In order to boost the numbers, the USAAF included every airman who landed on Iwo for any reason as a "saved" airman.
(2)Ollie North does not have two brain cells to rub together.
True, but irrelevant to the thesis advanced by Boot and other military historians. The alternative wasn't to loose the fight. The alternative was to bypass Iwo entirely, or, if not, to have devoted more bombing and bombardment resources to the fight.
I find your comments so neat, crisp, and fairly irrelevant. No Plan B? That's absolutely absurd. It's easy to criticize when it's over.
Much as I like Ollie's general attitude, I have to agree. Don't forget he has a bad history with numbers, like those of bank accounts in Brunei. Although pulling for his "side," I was among those not cheering Ollie unreservedly during the Iran-Contra hearings. His eagerness to volunteer as public hero #1 seemed more than a bit unseemly considering that he was the one who "screwed the pooch" (on multiple counts) and exposed the operation.
Your speculation is far off the mark. Max Boot is a strong conservative and a strong supporter of Bush and of the WOT. He was (still is?) Editorial Features editor of the Wall Street Journal's editorial page, the country's premier conservative editorial page.
As I recall from my reading (way too many years ago) the planners underestimated the number of Japanese who would survive the pounding that we gave the Island and that notion was reinforced when we were allowed to more or less stroll onto the beach. It led them to believe that the bombardment was more effective than it actually was. I am still of the opinion that a retreat at that point would have been as bad or worse with no good in return.
Perhaps avoidance altogether would have been the wiser decision, but once committed I think that it makes more sense to continue and that includes not only the strategic and tactical reasons, but also the positive psychological effects for us and the reverse for the Japanese.
Read what I wrote again.
Read the commentary.
My speculation was right, but it seems that the assumption in that speculation may be wrong. That doesn't seem to be resolved with many still arguing for their interpretation of the article. I will read the article if it is published elsewhere. I will not go to the LA Times to read it.
" He had not yet even learned to drive..."
Still hasn't
"One more point, MacArthur was also a critic of how Iwo Jima and Okinawa were attacked"
MacArthur was Army, nuff said
Interesting link: The High Cost of Faulty Intelligence (at Iwo Jima):
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NH_0205_Intel-P1,00.html
You read well.
Are you criticizing MacArthur and his tactics?
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