I think VDH is right when he says the south didn't apprectiate the north's potential. Grant and Sherman eventualy showed them what's for.
Bill Tecumsah is one of my heros. Destroy the infrastructure to trap your enemy.
In the South's defense, there was no way for them to appreciate the nature of the new type of war they were about to wage. Lee might have been the greatest general of the Napoleanic era, but Grant and Sherman were the first generals who really understood the new age of total war.
Jefferson pointed out, accurately, that slavery tends to create arrogance in the masters. The South over-estimated its own prowess and under-estimated that of the North. But it was a very close thing. The South could easily have won.
Interestingly, the war took place during a very narrow window of opportunity for a long, bloody war.
In 1850 the infrastructure, especially railroads and industry, necessary to support the invasion of the South did not yet exist. And the disproportion in manpower was significantly less. The South wins in a rather short war.
By 1870 the preponderance of power on the Union side would have resulted in a short war, with the Union winning.
This is actually the most logical reason that you can come up with for secession. Southern leaders could read the handwriting on the wall -- it was now or never. Their chance of success could only deteriorate. This is also perhaps the major reason Germany flung itself into WWI, leading to the conclusion that wars launched for this reason have a habit of turning out to be a poor idea.
"Grant and Sherman eventualy showed them what's for."
Yeah, sure did, but at what cost? The North lost 365,000 battle dead to the South's 235,000.
Stupid remarks like yours is what leads to stupid remarks like this one of mine.
Did they really? I mean, when you have an overwhelming advantage in men and materials, how brilliant do you have to be as a commander.
For example, there was nothing special at all about Grant's moves against Lee in the last year of the war, starting with the Wilderness. How much skill does it take for a commander to crash his numerically superior force into the reinforced, entrenched lines of a numerically inferior force, lose more men than your opponent at about a 3:1 clip, move to the left flank, and try again?