Who Won the Battle of Fallujah

Enemy insurgents defending Fallujah were formidable because many of them were willing to fight to the death. In general, however, they were an indifferently armed rabble who could inflict casualties because of the nature of urban warfare and U.S. sensibilities. What if our forces find themselves facing well-trained Syrian commandos or Hezbollah guerrillas?

Was Fallujah a battle we lost in April 2004, with ruinous results? Or was it a battle we won in November? The answer is yes. If that sounds awkward, it is because Fallujah was an awkward battle without an easy parallel in U.S. military history. It is hard to say whether the drawn-out process of securing that medium-sized Iraqi city was a one-time event or the beginning of a trend. I hope it is the former. And to make that outcome probable, I will objectively evaluate the battle here and offer comparisons of Marine Corps and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) doctrine and operations.

U.S. MARINE CORPS (KENNETH MADDEN III) In Operation Valiant Resolve, the Marines—here, an infantryman takes aim from a rooftop—fought impressively and with exceptional regard for civilian lives and property. But concern for minimizing casualties and damage quickly limited the scope of their advance.

The United States is likely to face more Fallujahs in the near future. The Marine Corps’ reputation as an elite and feared combat force will ride in part on how Fallujah and similar battles are perceived at home and abroad. In evaluating the battle, I considered the differing objectives of the two opposing forces and how close each came to achieving those objectives. One side’s objectives were more limited than the other’s. Third parties, such as Syria and Iran, may perceive the battle differently. Reaching honest answers to these questions requires looking beyond convenient bromides that recount U.S. heroics or anticipate favorable outcomes that remain largely unpredictable.

After its impressive initial victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) returned to Iraq in 2004 to replace Army forces in parts of central and western Iraq. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (1/5), was sent to Fallujah to relieve troops of the 82d Airborne Division. On 31 March 2004, four U.S. contractors driving through that city were ambushed and killed by Iraqi insurgents; their bodies were mutilated and displayed publicly before frenzied crowds in a scene reminiscent of the Battle of Mogadishu. A forceful response was vital and anticipated widely. Accordingly, 1/5, along with the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1), and supporting Army and Air Force special operations units were ordered to enter Fallujah for an operation dubbed Valiant Resolve. Their mission was to find and eliminate—or apprehend—the mujahadeen and any accomplices who had perpetrated the ambush. Resistance was expected. Rather than a stability and security operation, Valiant Resolve was to consist of deliberate assaults on prepared defenses.1

When the attack commenced 5 April 2004, lead Marine elements were engaged quickly by well-armed and organized enemy units effectively using hit-and-run urban warfare. Despite heavy resistance, the Marines limited their firepower, relying mostly on rifles, machine guns, and snipers. They restricted air support to Cobra attack helicopters and AC-130 gunships.2 On a few occasions—only after considerable deliberation—fixed-wing aircraft dropped guided bombs on insurgent targets, including a mosque used as a center of resistance.3 In general, Marine units fought with impressive skill and with exceptional care for civilian lives and property. This solicitude, however, quickly limited the scope of the advance to outlying areas of the city. They did not attempt to penetrate the heart of the city, apparently because U.S. casualties would have been excessive, as would casualties among the inhabitants. The Marines did not want to “rubble the city.”4

On 1 May 2004, Iraqi insurgents took to the streets of Fallujah to declare victory over the Marines. “We won,” an Iraqi insurgent told a reporter, explaining they had succeeded by keeping U.S. forces from taking the city.5 Newspaper and televised reports showed Muslim gunmen celebrating their “triumph” with weapons, flags, and victory signs. U.S. authorities explained that a new Iraqi Fallujah Brigade would assume security duties in the city and ultimately accomplish the mission.

According to the 1st Marine Division, by 13 April 2004, 39 U.S. Marines and soldiers had died in the battle, along with approximately 600 enemy fighters.6 In much of the Arab and Muslim world, the Marines’ withdrawal was viewed as a U.S. defeat, an outlook encouraged by Al Jazerra television and other Islamic media.

In some important respects, the initial push into Fallujah violated guidelines in the Corps’ urban warfare manual, MCWP 3-35.3. Often cautionary, the manual discusses 22 examples of modern urban warfare in detail and warns, “regardless of the size or quality of defensive forces, the defender usually extracts large costs from the attacker in time, resources, and casualties.”7 Located 40 miles west of Baghdad, Fallujah is a city of about 300,000 people and 30 square kilometers of area. Its western edge lies along the Euphrates River. The Marines faced a mixed bag of urban guerrillas with few heavy weapons, but nonetheless they were armed for close-quarter combat. Before the battle, the enemy force was estimated to be 2,000.

Marine Corps doctrine calls for isolating cities before the assault. “No single factor is more important to success than isolation of the urban area.” In all the examples provided in MCWP 3-35.3, “the attacker won all battles where the defender was isolated.”8 The two battalions assigned the mission also were to cordon off the city: 2/1 from the north and 1/5 to the south and east. Although both cordoning and attacking a city of this size was a demanding task for two battalions, it appears the Marines effectively isolated the city early in the operation.9

In addition to isolation, “overwhelming superiority is needed if all costs are to be minimized.” Here it may be that the objectives and means of Valiant Resolve became incompatible. Two reinforced battalions were tasked with isolating and attacking a medium-sized city. MCWP 3-35-3 notes, “in an attack on a built-up area (population of 100,000+), the GCE [ground combat element] of a MEF would be a Marine division.”10 Fallujah’s population exceeds 100,000, but it is not Shanghai. Thus, while a division (normally composed of three infantry regiments and supporting units) was not needed to cope with the insurgent force in April, the Marines were at less than regimental strength.

During the battle of Jenin in 2002, two Israeli infantry battalions engaged several hundred Palestinian guerrillas. Jenin’s population of about 26,000 was much smaller than Fallujah’s. According to Randy Gangle, director of the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (a private concern in partnership with the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory), the Marines would have operated in Jenin with a single battalion, given its one square mile area.11 The refugee camp where the main battle was waged is smaller still and densely populated. A Marine battalion probably would have done as well as the Israelis in Jenin. The tasks assigned to 1/5 and 2/1 in Fallujah, however, were of a different magnitude and beyond their capabilities—at least within what were deemed to be acceptable limits of friendly and civilian casualties and property destruction. Superiority does not necessarily entail a numerical advantage in men. At the same time, urban warfare marginalizes traditional Marine attributes, such as superior training and discipline.

Depending on the tactical situation, manpower shortages may be compensated for by increased firepower, which Marine commanders were unwilling—or unable—to apply in Valiant Resolve. Indeed, it appears that leaders at the scene quickly came to this conclusion. The operation never progressed beyond the foothold stage. Marines gained access to the urban area (in that case, outlying industrial neighborhoods), but did not penetrate to the heart of the city, much less take it. After a few days of active combat, Marines cordoned off the area and the matter was “resolved” politically by establishment of the Fallujah Brigade. The bulk of the enemy force remained at large in the city and was reinforced. Fallujah became an insurgent stronghold and base for kidnappings, murders, and attacks that would cost the coalition dearly in the following months.

Between April and November 2004, both sides busily prepared for a rematch. Iraqi insurgents and foreign mujahadeen dug tunnels, emplaced mines and booby-traps, and improved their defenses. Meanwhile, most of Fallujah’s civilian population fled the city, which greatly reduced the potential for noncombatant casualties. The emptying city invited greater applications of air power. U.S. warplanes and artillery launched highly selective attacks, weakening insurgent defenses, hitting leadership targets, and laying the groundwork for a renewed assault. Although some estimates put insurgent strength before al-Fajr as high as 5,000, many of them—including most of their top leadership—fled before the battle. When U.S. troops crossed the line of departure, it is estimated that 2,000-3,000 insurgents remained in the city.

The combined Marine-Army-Iraqi force for Operation al-Fajr was many times larger than the force employed in April 2004. Numerous press reports placed the total size of coalition forces at 10,000-15,000. The actual assault element comprised about 6,000 U.S. troops in four Marine battalions (3/1, 1/3, 3/5, 1/8) and Army Task Force 2-2 (two mechanized battalions).12 About 2,000 Iraqi troops bolstered the assault force, which was supported by aircraft and several Marine and Army artillery battalions.

With Fallujah cordoned by the remaining troops, the assault force struck from the north on 8 November 2004, quickly breaching insurgent defenses and reaching the heart of the city. Although fighting was at times severe, by 12 November, U.S.-Iraqi forces controlled 80% of the city.13 Combatants and observers recognized a heavier and broader application of firepower. By 10 November, U.S. artillery batteries had fired at least 800 rounds into the city; a frequently cited report claimed 24 sorties were flown over the city on the first day of combat and a total of four 500-pound bombs was dropped.14

Fallujah is sometimes called “the city of mosques”; and insurgents made heavy use of them as command posts, arms depots, and defensive positions. Inside the Saad Abi Bin Waqas Mosque in central Fallujah, Marines found small arms, artillery shells, and parts of missile systems. Marines and soldiers engaged insurgents emplaced in mosques, but always with great caution and often using Iraqi troops to finish off assaults. It took Company B, 1/8, fighting on foot, 16 hours of house-to-house combat to capture the Muhammadia Mosque, during which time they were attacked with everything from rocket-propelled grenades to suicide bombers.15

Resistance stiffened in southern Fallujah as the assault force faced sometimes uniformed opponents who fought with increased professionalism and discipline. “When we found those boys in that bunker with their equipment, it became a whole new ballgame” said one soldier. He continued, “The way these guys fight is different than the insurgents.”16 Nonetheless, by 20 November, the attackers had routed the remaining insurgents and taken the city.

U.S. casualties in Operation al-Fajr were 51 killed and 425 seriously wounded; Iraqi government troops suffered 8 dead and 43 wounded; and as many as 1,200 insurgents were reported killed. Some knowledgeable analysts described these losses as historically light for an urban battle of Fallujah’s scale—and there is a sound basis for this claim. The U.S. forces avoided major disasters like the Soviets suffered in Grozny, and even more limited reversals, such as the IDF suffered in Jenin, when most of a platoon was destroyed in an ambush.17

Yet despite the superb performance of Marines and soldiers in Fallujah, there is reason for concern. The 476 U.S. casualties represent about 8% of the total assault force, a low but not insignificant loss for less than two weeks’ combat.18 Moreover, a surprising number of U.S. troops are wounded and returned to duty in Iraq—about 45% overall. For example, as of 12 November 2004, I MEF Commander Lieutenant General John Sattler reported that, while 170 troops had been wounded seriously, another 490 Marines and soldiers suffered wounds but were able to return to duty.19 Extrapolating U.S. losses based on a 45% rate of wounded returning to duty, actual wounded in Fallujah might have been 616. Considering General Sattler’s actual figures, total wounded might have been more than 1,200 men (about 20% of the assault forces), a casualty rate that is not significantly lower than historical precedents. It is gratifying that U.S. troops are willing and able to fight on despite their wounds, but it is cause for concern when they are expected to take considerable casualties to spare civilians and infrastructure and appease the U.S. and international media.

In many respects, the U.S. approach in Fallujah resembled Israeli tactics in the West Bank and Gaza. This is not surprising because numerous sources indicate that Marine and Army officers studied Israeli tactics prior to OIF. Israeli urban warfare tactics are sophisticated, effective, and well practiced. In many respects, however, the IDF has different operational and strategic objectives from U.S. forces. In addition, the IDF historically—for example, in Jerusalem in 1967, Beirut in 1982, and Jenin in 2002—has proved willing to take high casualties in urban warfare.

Dating from the siege of Beirut in 1982, Israel has practiced a complex and limited form of urban warfare. In Beirut, this involved a cordon around the city, accompanied by limited attacks with artillery, ground, and air forces to put pressure on the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syrian forces inside. The IDF did not launch a general assault on the city; it awaited a political solution that resulted in evacuation of enemy forces under the auspices of outside powers. Despite the IDF’s restraint, it was depicted as little short of barbaric by much of the international media. The PLO’s evacuation was treated as a victory parade, rather than the retreat it was, and the PLO lived to fight another day. The battle was a tactical victory for Israel, but a strategic defeat.

The Beirut experience and ongoing domestic and international pressures color Israeli doctrine. Throughout the current struggle, the IDF generally has not occupied Palestinian cities, a notable exception being seizure of the Jenin refugee camp. (The Jenin operation is the exception that proves the rule: the IDF was castigated for its assault on Jenin and falsely accused of perpetrating a massacre.) IDF urban warfare doctrine effectively bans the use of fixed-wing aircraft and artillery in support of ground operations. Troops rely on attack helicopters and direct fire weapons—usually only small arms and machine guns. Israeli units cordon Palestinian cities and towns, seize a few key buildings or areas, and launch raids against suspected terrorists. Although these operations tend to be quite effective tactically, they result in strategic stalemate because Palestinian forces are left in place after the IDF withdraws.

Tactically and operationally, fighting Israeli-style in an urban setting requires a heavy commitment of ground troops to make up for reduced fire support, and to intimidate rather than confront enemy forces. This allows Israeli units to achieve limited objectives. In June 2004, the IDF’s tunnel raids in Rafah, a small city in Gaza, required deployment of almost a division of Israel troops. (Israeli divisions are somewhat smaller than their U.S. counterparts, and the force in Rafah would have operated without artillery and other supporting elements.) Rafah has about half the population of Fallujah (167,000) and it is tiny in comparison: 5-6 square kilometers.

In Valiant Resolve, U.S. tactics and highly restrictive rules of engagement closely mirrored Israeli techniques. Owing to these restrictions and too small a force, the operation was aborted, with arguably disastrous results for U.S. policy in Iraq. Many mistakes were corrected during al-Fajr. Heavy armor was employed, and air and artillery strikes were more liberally authorized. Even so, dropping four 500-pound bombs on the first day of a major assault remains an extremely selective application of firepower. Despite predictable claims that Fallujah was devastated, photos reveal superficial damage to most buildings and an occasional structure demolished. Television coverage of Marines engaged in harrowing room-to-room combat belie hysterical stories that entire city blocks were leveled.

What would have happened had we met a tougher, more professional opponent in Fallujah? The insurgents were formidable because many were willing to fight to the death—but in the main, they were an indifferently armed rabble who could inflict casualties because of the nature of urban warfare and U.S. sensibilities. What if U.S. forces find themselves facing Syrian commandos or well-trained Hezbollah guerrillas?

Large ground forces are necessary when U.S. units adopt Israeli-style urban warfare tactics—which, to a large extent, the Marines appear to have done in Fallujah. To accomplish their mission in Valiant Resolve, they needed a considerably larger force to operate in the absence of heavy air and artillery support. Further, Israeli urban tactics are designed primarily for isolating selected areas, not seizing and holding terrain and buildings. If U.S. forces intend to take and clear an urban area block by block, as they did during al-Fajr, they are going to pay a heavier price. The result in Valiant Resolve was similar to what Israeli forces have achieved against the Palestinians: indecisive outcomes that keep the enemy in business. Operation al-Fajr weakened the Iraqi insurgency, but it came too late and too temperately to have broken the insurgency’s back, despite the claims of some U.S. officers. The men who killed the U.S. contractors—the act that precipitated the battle—have not been found, much less prosecuted. Many insurgents escaped Fallujah during the buildup after Valiant Resolve, and al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi remains at large.

Was the battle of Fallujah a victory or a defeat? The Marine Corps’ military operations in urban terrain doctrine recognizes that tactical success does not necessarily translate to strategic victory. It notes the Israeli’s tactical victory in Beirut was a strategic defeat—and observes the same about the Battle of Hue in the Vietnam War, when Marines defeated an enemy that sought to put up a good fight but never expected to win. Much the same can be said of Fallujah’s defenders. In spite of the beating they took in November, they will continue to assert they repelled the initial attack and fought well thereafter.

The potential problem for the Marine Corps and U.S. deterrence in general is more than just local. During a visit to Israel in the early 1980s, an Israeli acquaintance described his military service to me as “an Israeli Marine.” Israel does not have Marines; he meant he had been in the paratroops, which were the best and toughest soldiers in the IDF. He assumed that an American would understand a comparison with U.S. Marines—and I did.

At that time, the IDF could deploy paratroops to disturbances in the West Bank or Gaza who, by simply showing up in their red berets, could settle things down. Much has changed in 20 years. Today, no Israeli paratrooper would be so foolish as to wear his beret in Nablus or Ramallah. Israeli paratroopers continue to fight well. Nonetheless, a couple of decades of persistent and inconclusive combat in Lebanon and urban combat in the territories have done much to erode their regional, if not international, reputation.

One point I got from this article was that the margin of victory in the battle was insufficient. War is always the continuation of politics, diplomacy by other means and success depends a prior war of words to prepare the battlefield. In this case prior supremacy was not established, so important doctrines from the Marine urban warfare manual could not be applied. Instead the battle more closely aligned with IDF doctrine, which resulted from Israel being hammered politically for decades. Doing our bit on the home front means writing and speaking to win the battle of ideas, so military force becomes ever more coercively violent, and the words of diplomacy carry ever more weight.

They don't have a nation as a base, let alone one of the largest ones in the world. Let alone one of the richest. it is just ridiculous to analyze these things as though we aer somehow outnumbered or can't afford losses as much as they can, when the reverse is obviously true, by every objective measure. It lends an entirely fictious strength to pathetically weak opponents.

As for Nam, the NVA didn't win any war of attrition. First the VC were destroyed by it, and then the US left. The NVA had been forced to dial down the op tempo to remain in the war at all. Even after US ground forces were gone, ARVN was able to stop them when fully backed by US airpower, as the Easter offensive in 72 showed. Nor did they win by guerilla tactics. It took a full scale invasion by multiple divisions of Russian armor, and the absence of US air support for the ARVN, to defeat SVN. Nor did the US public pull support for the war. McGovern's peacenik platform lost in a landslide. Nixon lost his presidency in the watergate building, not the rice paddies. ARVN lost in the US congress.

There is nothing wrong with the American way of war as traditionally conceived and applied. It wins every time it is allowed to. It has consistently delivered lopsided exchanges in our favor against states of almost comparable power, and against lesser ones, easily so. The more firepower is allowed the truer this is, but it has regularly and reliably been the case. Firepower kills. And killing the enemy wins wars.

The disfunctional system is not the military. There is nothing wrong with what it is accomplishing in Iraq. The disfunctional system is the US political system, owing not to any military failings, but to deliberate political choices by the American left. The US military is not in charge of defeating the US left at the ballot box. We are, as citizens, as patriots, as conservatives, and (many of us anyway) as Republicans.

It is a fool's errand trying to fix the perfectly successful subsystem to make up for failures elsewhere. One, you will break the working subsystem. Two, you can never meet the standards set by the left, because they are not predicated upon military failure, but on military success. 22 fatalities are quite sufficient if the place is Somalia and our boy Bill is at the wheel. A thousand would have been quite enough for Monsieur Kerry. There is no national policy to be had, in trying to avoid even those levels of losses, by military changes. The only change that could do so is surrender, because that is the end actually desired, not clean victory. The cleaner the victory the more livid the left will get about it, because defeat is what they want, not cheap success.

The US military is the most successful in recorded history and is functioning just fine. It does not need re-engineering as though something is systematically wrong with it. Nothing is. It should not be held to a standard of perfection, and those attempting to do so are not helping matters. I understand the desire of military professionals to push the boundaries of their art, to strive to excel and improve regardless. But by any reasonable measure, they are not failing, Fallujah was a crushing victory, and they have only to keep it up. As for our political system problems, that is our duty to fix, not theirs.

If the Northern States had had the news media and politicians they have now, they would have declared the Civil War a quagmire and declared defeat the day after First Bull Run.

I don't know how much you've read about the war between the states, but actually not much was different then. On both sides.

While there were indeed Copperheads in the North, they did not dominate the major newspapers of the time such as the New York Times or Harpers Weekly and every Northern Congressional delegation was not populated by politicians in the style of Fernando Wood and Clement Vallandigham.

Today, it is difficult to find any major news outlet outside of FOX News that is not blatantly biased or even actively undermining the war effort and most Northeastern Congressmen and Senators are ready to yell "Quagmire" at the drop of a hat.

To start off with the first sentence, I didn’t compare Iraq to Vietnam. But even if it were done, that sentence is still wrong because several countries DO act as their base and one IS “among the richest”. I brought Ho Chi Minh’s statement up not because Iraq is Vietnam, but because he understood how a people living in a closed tyrannical society can attrite an outside democrat force politically rather than in a conventional military way.

I’ll read through the rest of your post tomorrow, but I haven’t read but a few paragraphs of the article yet. Priorities, but after last night’s mismatched apple/orange comparison of yours and that opening paragraph, I wanted to comment briefly.

The strongest country they actually control is Iran, which has a fifth our population and less than a twentieth of our wealth. When they had Iraq and its army - the third largest in the world at one time, in conventional equipment terms - we took it away from them inside of a month. They are pathetically weak compared to us. Democracies are vastly stronger than tyrannies for perfectly obvious reasons. And we've had plenty of times in the past where our political system has handled foreign wars just fine. That it isn't now is not due to democracy, but to sectarianism. Sects follow their ideological leaders not their country's governments, and we've got one, in spades. Same thing has happened to monarchies (and aristocracies, at times) throughout the ages, there is nothing particularly democratic about it. It is not, however, a weakness of our military or their manner of warfighting. It is our domestic political problem, to be fixed by domestic political means. It should not dictate impossible tasks to military strategists, who need to be able to worry about their own military matters not extraneous political ones, that they cannot directly alter anyway.

Okay, it looks like the author is just critical of tactical victories that don’t support strategy. You take issue and imply that success is still supported by body count metrics.

The author is just subtlety recommending more aggressive and less restrictive applications of force in order to deprive the enemy of propaganda political victories.

Most pundits I’ve seen recognize that our 20-1 kill ratio in Valiant Resolve was overshadowed by our loss of Fallujah and the Marine’s loss of their mystique as being unstoppable. Defeated militarily or politically is irrelevant. They were stopped, and militant Islam was never electrified more since 9-11.

I think the best definition of victory is to defeat the enemies’ will to fight. Five or ten more battles with kill-ratios and results like Valiant Resolve and most of Iraq would be under enemy control. And the majority of Americans would have lost our will to fight. Therefore I don’t think kill matrixes are dominate indicators of success, especially in asymmetrical war.

On the same principle, I disagree with Madden’s suggestion that al-Fajr was also a strategic loss. With 5 more instances where half the muj “escaped while putting up a good fight without ever expecting to win”, they’d be no more relevant than the Taliban.

I suspect that if our response was more brutal and took place earlier that Iraqi terrorism would be further along to defeat. And more importantly, I think Syria and others would be much more intimidated by our presence. I think that’s the central point that he’s diplomatically trying to get across, perhaps without terminating his career ;^)

He is looking for military solutions to a political problem, and there aren't any. If the Marines did something wrong on the ground it might be corrected by some change in tactics. They didn't. They were stopped by their commanders because they were killing so many terrorists so successfully on al Jaz that Iraqi politicians were getting nervous. Then there was abu-grab and all that, as well.

The rate determining step, the weak link, in our fight in Iraq is not military. And it isn't in Iraq, it is here in the US. It makes no sense to put additional strains on the US political system to change tactics to help guys who are already winning lopsidedly, do so more lopsidedly. If it relieved pressure on the US political system it might make some sense, but it doesn't. Going slow in April was the right call, because the Iraqis weren't the relevant opponents. The democrats were. As soon as the democrats were defeated, the Marines could be and were turned loose, with firepower allowed, and predictably cleared Fallujah in short order with minimal fuss.

Political problems domestically have to be solved by political means. There are no military solutions to them. More indiscrimate use of firepower would not have reduced pressure on the US political system.

The army is not broken and is not losing anything. The political system was much more severely stressed, but passed its own test, this past November. Now the terrorists are just going to lose. With no grand change in tactics required.

" He is looking for military solutions to a political problem, and there aren't any."

I don’t understand how you can say that. Nothing that Madden writes indicates that he’s looking for it, but from what you just wrote, that’s what you’re promoting.

Madden’s simply critical of some political restrictions and their erosive effect on our battlefield dominance. That’s what lost Fallujah in Valliant Resolve and gave the enemy the hope that contributed to the hard battles we fought across the country until we were ready to retake it in November. He didn’t bring political problems into his discussion.

General Conway who commanded I MEF said that he didn’t choose to go into Fallujah as we did or like the decision to halt the advance. Those orders were directing a military operation as a solution to a political problem, something that you say was right but that you also say you are against.

The political problem is not politicians directing the military. The political problem is a treasonous sect and party at home, that wants us to lose every war we are engaged in, whenever we are engaged in one. That political problem cannot be fixed by changing military tactics to make casualties impossible, in the hopes a perfectly immaculate war will retain political support. First, it is physically and militarily impossible. Second, it won't gain political support from the objecting sect, because that sect does not object to casualties but to victory.

There is nothing wrong with present military tactics being used in Iraq. Not a thing. They are working. They are delivering complete military paralysis to the other side, as far as their ability to achieve any real military objective, at very low cost in blood, and at high rates of loss to our enemies. That is quite precisely *all* that can be expected of military tactics. Expecting nuances of military tactics to make communist traitors love the victory of leading capitalist powers is not going to happen and is a fool's errand.

Depriving commie traitors here at home of their ability to control the US military and to inflict political defeats by throwing away victories the men in the field have already achieved, is not the military's job. It is our job as citizens, and supporters of patriotic rather than treasonous politicians.

Can the military do whatever the heck in likes, in a strategic situation in which the military problems we face are minor annoyances and the real problems we face are all domestic political, or diplomatic versions of the same sectarian struggle? No. Do so officers dislike that? Sure, but tough toenails. Their system isn't broken and can't fix the one that is. But must work with the broken system, not pretend it is functioning perfectly when it obviously isn't.

We don't need new military ideas. The military isn't failing and isn't broken. We do need greater political cohesion in support of national policy. The military cannot make that happen. We can. In the meantime, the military's job is to continue the excellent performance they are already delivering, and as for the political constraints they operate under, suck it the hell up and stop whining about it. It is reality, deal.

"The political problem is not politicians directing the military. The political problem is a treasonous sect and party at home"

I recognized that from the beginning. So does Madden. But you want the military directed by politician in such a way as to throttle it down rather than trusting them with more autonomy to manage their military objectives. It’s you that is promoting the use of the military to solve political objectives, not Madden.

Madden is not trying to make casualties low in order to appease the left, he is trying to make casualties low only so that more Marines don’t die. That’s how virtually all Marines want to fight this war, ratcheting up the force so that the enemy is more intimidated, but many politicians (and you) pressure them with restrictions in order to manage domestic political problems which you recognize is a losing battle, but still want done.

Reread it. Madden is speaking from a nearly pure military perspective, critical of what you claim to be against. You’re reading something into this article that doesn’t exist, arguing with ghosts and talking absolute nonsense.

Horsefeathers. He thinks strategic victory requires an aura of invincibility that he thinks can be created by entirely military means. He is completely wrong about that. He thinks it is possible to win strategically by the right military formula. He faults the achievements of present tactics because he does not see them leading automatically and on their own to a strategic victory.

There is nothing the Marines can do on the ground in Iraq that will make their enemies think they are undefeatable, when those enemies aren't expecting to defeat them on the ground in Iraq, but in elections in the US. As long as they think our domestic commies will pull the plug a few months down the line, nothing would make them give up. You could nuke ten million of them and they'd still think victory would be theirs for the asking on January 20th.

There wasn't any military victory to be had, on the ground, in Iraq, in April of last year. Failure of the tactics employed to deliver such a strategic victory, on that occasion, are not a failure. It is a windmill chase. As soon as the election was secured, the Marines had everything they needed to clean out Fallujah and they did so. There is no defeat there, anywhere. He sees one, and it isn't there. He is just wrong.

The source of his error is thinking the bar to be cleared by purely military tactics is securing strategic victory regardless of political environment. That is a common reaction of military officers to the presence of political constraints, but it is not a realistic one. It is a man with a hammer looking for nails. As a military officer giving advice on tactics, he does not have access to the actually broken subsystem - US domestic politics - so he whangs away at whatever is sticking up, even though it is working perfectly.

That the military is directed by politicians for political objectives is not a anomoly or mistake or a problem to be solved, least of all by altering military tactics rather than political goals. It is just Clauswitz chapter one, reality, deal with it. That our present political situation is bad due to domestic traitors is indeed a problem we have to deal with. But short of military coups, not one the military can help address, at all. We have to address it as citizens through the political process.

And military men need to understand that, stop trying to fix military systems that are not broken or to hold them to unrealistic and unsatisfiable standards (win so big even commies love you - ain't going to happen). Do your job, bleed the enemy as directed, stay within the op tempo limits prescribed by political authorities, stop whining, and suck it the freak up. The pols are the ones facing the real enemy and the real problems, and they don't need your moaning.

"Was the battle of Fallujah a victory or a defeat? The Marine Corps’ military operations in urban terrain doctrine recognizes that tactical success does not necessarily translate to strategic victory. It notes the Israeli’s tactical victory in Beirut was a strategic defeat...Much the same can be said of Fallujah’s defenders."

Why? Because they weren't allowed to run them over with adequate force back in April. Ergo, it was a strategic defeat. He says repeatedly, "with arguably disasterous results for the US in Iraq". He is saying Fallujah was a strategic disaster. He thinks the only outcome that wouldn't have been a strategic disaster is an extremely low casualty (lower than several hundred as in November), very high firepower, immediate and initial victory, back in April. And this is nonsense, setting a strategic political task for military tactics. And it doesn't matter how many times you repeat yourself or try to insult me. He sees a defeat where there simply hasn't been one. There was a delay to deal with a non-military problem that the military could not address by anything it could do, then a clear-cut victory, both military and political.

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