http://www.state.nj.us/sci/pdf/spca.pdf
Excerpt:
The movement [SPCA] had its roots in the efforts of Henry Bergh, a European aristocrat who, following his appointment in 1863 to a diplomatic post at the Russian Court of Czar Alexander II, championed the cause of animals against inhumane treatment. Bergh soon immigrated to America, but only after stopping in London to confer with the president of England's Royal Society. In February 1866, Bergh delivered an impassioned speech at New York City's Clinton Hall before an audience that included influencial government and business leaders.
In recounting the horrific practices in America of the inhumane treatment of animals, he emphasized that the protection of animals had neither class lines nor political boundaries. Bergh's speech was covered extensively by the press. Recognizing that anti-cruelty statutes were meaningless in the absence of enforcement, Bergh's approach was two pronged. His efforts culminated in the New York Legislature's passage of a charter incorporating the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals on april 10, 1866, and nine days later, of an anti-cruelty law that vested the society with the authority to enforce it. Bergh, whose successes were due largely to his political and social connections, was elected as the society's first president.
http://www.state.nj.us/sci/pdf/spca.pdf
Excerpt:
The Honorable Reginald Stanton, J.S.C., recognized, but refrained from ruling on, the issue of the constitutionality of the statutory scheme. His comments are compelling:
"The powers granted under the various statutes [regarding the enforcement of the animal cruelty laws, adoption of a common badge, making of arrests and carrying of weapons] are significant law enforcement powers. It is important to note that all of the members of the state society and the county societies are self-selected. They are simply private persons who are interested in protecting animals. They are not selected by the public. They are not subject to managerial control by any public. They are not subject to managerial control by any public officials. They are not subject to any publicly imposed training standards or discipline.
At an early stage in this litigation, it occurred to me that the broad grant of powers to the state society and to the county societies might involve an unconstitutional delegation of governmental powers to the private persons...
...Although I have serious misgivings about the wisdom of granting extensive law enforcement powers to private persons, there is, of course, a vital difference between what I might view as an unwise legislative policy and an unconstituional policy. Furthermore, the record in this action is particularly ill-suited for making a sound adjudication on the issue of possible unconstitutionality of the statutory scheme. I have decided to refrain from any ruling on constitutional issues in this case."