Russia: Putin, Beslan and the Limits of Rhetoric

Al Qaeda-linked militants have launched a fresh offensive against Russia, with several attacks occurring in recent days. President Vladimir Putin is struggling to determine an effective course of action that will not alienate the West. Ultimately, Russian national security demands that he launch a harsh crackdown -- or face his own political defeat.

Al Qaeda-linked militants -- both Chechen and foreign -- have launched a powerful offensive against Russia in recent days. Five successful attacks have taken place -- beginning with the blasting of two airliners in flight on Aug. 24 and culminating with more than a thousand hostages, 300 of whom were killed by militants, taken at a school in North Ossetia on Sept. 1. Russian and German intelligence services and other sources say they have evidence that al Qaeda affiliates are present in Chechnya and helping Chechen Wahhabist militants launch attacks on Russian civilian targets. Russian intelligence sources say that top Wahhabist Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev and Abu Dzeit, a top Arab commander in Chechnya -- both linked to al Qaeda -- have been responsible for the current wave of the attacks. Also, German intelligence says the Beslan school hostage-takers underwent some training in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russian intelligence officials warn that new attacks are imminent.

So far, there has been no word from Russian President Vladimir Putin to signal his response, although the spate of attacks clearly indicates that a militant war is under way in Russia. Putin's past responses to major terrorist attacks -- including a Moscow theater hostage situation that resulted in more than 100 casualties in October 2002 and a Moscow subway train bombing that resulted in about 40 deaths in February -- have been flat: Harsh rhetoric was issued at the time, but no strong action followed.

There is no evidence that Putin's response will be different this time and, in fact, he seems to be resorting once again to using rhetoric with no action. Sources close to the Russian Security Council say there no plans under consideration to move to defeat the militants anytime soon. That will not be enough to turn the tide in this war Russia is clearly losing.

Emboldened by the lack of a resolute response to their actions, Islamist militants likely will continue their campaign, with increasingly brazen acts such as the school hostage-taking in North Ossetia. Russian intelligence sources tell Stratfor that al Qaeda-linked Islamists are executing a new strategy against Moscow, taking their battle beyond Chechnya and spreading attacks throughout Russia on a regular and ongoing basis -- with special emphasis on high-impact civilian targets in Moscow.

Terrorist-style attacks would play a prime role in this strategy. Sources say intelligence data -- some of it quite specific -- points to potential attacks targeting the subway systems in Moscow and St. Petersburg, hijacking passenger planes or helicopters (intending either to guide them into high-profile targets in Moscow or destroy them in flight), suicide bombings amid large crowds or at public events, taking hostages at schools or hospitals, bombings at apartment complexes or other tall buildings, or even potentially contaminating Moscow's water distribution system.

The Islamists targeting Russia are pursuing very specific goals: to devastate the country physically and morally through multiple and continual casualties, not only forcing it to cede its fight for Chechnya, but also in the longer run forcing Russia to cede other Muslim-populated regions. This strategic goal has been confirmed by Chechen Wahhabist sources close to the militants with whom Stratfor recently had a chance to speak. According to these sources, Islamist militants say it is convenient to fight Russia under Putin's leadership. Despite rhetoric about a resurgent Russia, the president -- in their view -- restrains the military and other security forces from serious campaigns to counter them.

Specifically, these sources expressed satisfaction with the fact that Putin has not ordered security forces to root out those who act as a fifth column -- organized crime groups, segments of the ethnic Caucasian diaspora, some oligarchs and even corrupt politicians and security officials -- enabling militants in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia. Of course, it is possible that these pro-militant sources are boasting, but Stratfor has heard similar reports from contacts in the Russian security services. It is noteworthy that there have been no arrests of collaborators working with Chechen militants in Moscow for years, even though some collaboration long has been suspected. For instance, aviation authority sources now believe that someone associated with the Domodedovo airport -- possibly someone in airport security and a member of the ground crew preparing the planes for flight, according to security sources -- helped militants place bombs aboard the two planes that crashed Aug. 24. Local security sources also believe that the hostage taking in Beslan was helped by collaborators in the North Ossetian and Ingush state structures, including traffic police.

We see no evidence that Putin will attempt to cripple this fifth column anytime soon, nor of a military uprising involving soldiers who are dissatisfied with Putin's policy. To the contrary, sources in the Russian national security establishment say top commanders are willing to tolerate Putin's moderate stance on terrorism because they reportedly enjoy such things as state-financed luxury homes, high salaries, power over state purse strings, access to business deals using state resources, use of airplanes to ship goods and other perks.

But if attacks against the Russian public increase, a moment of truth eventually will arrive. In the face of high casualty counts over a short period of time, Putin would have no choice but to respond -- and in a major way. For this pro-Western leader, the biggest dilemma is how to launch an effective crackdown against Chechen militants without exciting concerns about human rights violations or alienating the United States. It is not clear whether, or how, he might respond. But at some point, mounting attacks and casualties could force a qualitative change: Despite the reputed fatalism of Russians, we find it hard to believe that the public and military would stomach frequent, deadly attacks without calls for a response. Putin's choice ultimately would be to declare his own version of a pre-emptive "Bush doctrine," or consider the possibility of one of two outcomes: Either that Russia would be defeated in this war, or that Russian voters would elect a more decisive president.

Why Moscow cannot seriously consider withdrawing from Chechnya is clear from a glance at recent history. The first Chechen war was from 1994 to 1996. During the interwar period -- 1996 to 1999 -- Chechen and foreign Islamist militants used Chechnya in much the same way al Qaeda used Afghanistan. It was a secure location with no central authority from which militants could recruit, train and launch operations. This culminated in the 1999 Chechen/Islamist attack against neighboring Dagestan that ignited the current Chechen war.

First, he could step up Russian military operations in Chechnya and deploy security forces to locate and destroy those who plan attacks within Chechen territory. In fact, these steps likely will be ordered, but there is no guarantee that top militant leaders would be killed or apprehended. The United States, despite massive efforts, has not yet found Osama bin Laden; nor has Russia managed to capture or destroy Basayev -- believed to be responsible for overall supervision of terror attacks against Russia -- for a decade.

A more effective strategy would likely be dismantling the fifth column in Russian urban centers -- first of all in Moscow -- and government institutions. There are two ways of doing this, both of them far-reaching and harsh -- and with the potential to spark international criticism.

First, Putin could order a thorough and swift crackdown against all Chechen and other Caucasian ethnic crime syndicates in Russia, beginning in Moscow, and prosecute suspected collaborators among other segments of the Caucasian diaspora. However, given the presence of these ethnic groups within Russian political, economic -- even national security -- circles and the government, this would be a difficult maneuver.

That is not to say it is beyond the capabilities of Russia's security services, however; sources say that the names of all top and many mid-level leaders of the Caucasian criminal groups, as well as their whereabouts and associations, are known to the Federal Security Service. But pursuing them is a politically tricky matter, as law enforcement sources say many businessmen and crime figures supporting the Chechen cause are believed to be closely tied to highly positioned officials within the Putin administration and Moscow city government. These alleged ties -- some to officials serving in law enforcement and security agencies -- serve as protective shields for Islamist collaborators within the diaspora.

For this type of crackdown to succeed, it would have to be both thorough and swift: Not only would it have to target enablers among the organized crime and business communities, but also simultaneously target their protectors in official circles as well. This would obviously stir up a political hornet's nest, and charges against many would be difficult to prove in court.

However, numerous sources within Russian law enforcement and security agencies say the main reason Putin has been reluctant to make this move is that many of those who tacitly collaborate with Chechen militants also have provided financial and political support for his administration. For example, some oligarchs who have made financial contributions to Putin's government also have business deals involving Chechen crime figures linked to Islamists, numerous Russian political and law enforcement sources say. From Putin's perspective, allowing the status quo might be less harmful to his own support base than launching a massive crackdown.

In the near term, there will be an uptick in Russian intelligence agencies' efforts to locate and destroy militant cells, and security measures will be tightened throughout the country. However, that likely will not be enough to stem the ongoing militant offensive.

In the longer term, if attacks continue and intensify -- as we believe likely -- Putin's hand could be forced toward more decisive or even pre-emptive measures. However, so far the Russian public has applied no pressure on the president, even after news about hundreds of children dying and the Russian government and security forces' mistakes in handling the Beslan incident. There have been no public rallies or protests demanding that the Kremlin take the counterterrorism fight more seriously. The only demonstrations reportedly have been organized by the government to allow people to let off steam over the incident.

If the years of Putin's rule teach anything, it is this: As long as the Russian public remains silent, Putin is unlikely to go ahead with serious measures against militants. But if Moscow is to win its battle against the militants, Russia's responses will have to grow resolute and harsh -- with Putin, or without him.

If Putin can't do it here's someone who can. Let's not forget Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

"Mad Vlad' urges West and Russia to destroy Islam," By Julius Strauss in Moscow, 13/02/2004

"The West should unite with Russia against Islamic radicals and Chinese immigrants, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the flamboyant Russian ultra-nationalist, said yesterday.

"The firebrand politician, who is making a moderate political comeback in Russia, gave warning that if the former Cold War enemies did not form an alliance they would be overrun. . .

"Washington, London, Moscow and Tel Aviv need to form a common front. If we don't, the terrorist attacks we see today will continue for another 50 years. . .

"Russians fear that the growing threat of militant Islam in the Caucasus and central Asia will strike at their soft and ill-protected underbelly. . . ." [End excerpt]

Yes I know that years ago "the former lawyer. . .called for the Russian army to invade Alaska and India, drop nuclear weapons on Japan and flood Germany with radioactive waste." But that was then this is now. Some say he "has a reputation as a political weather vane who skilfully mines a rich lode in the Russian popular psyche."

Important. I keep posting this here. Thank you.

"For this pro-Western leader, the biggest dilemma is how to launch an effective crackdown against Chechen militants without exciting concerns about human rights violations or alienating the United States."

Russia, you won't be hearing any concerns from this American. Russia needs to act aggresively and with determination. A weak response will only encourage these murderous cretins both in Russia and elsewhere. I am certain that the vast majority of Americans will stand with Russia.

In February, 1996, Vladimir Zhirinovsky hailed Pat Buchanan's victory in the New Hampshire presidential primary. He wrote a letter to Buchanan, saying: ``You say that Congress is 'Israeli-occupied territory.' We have the same situation in Russia. So, to survive, we could set aside places on U.S. and Russian territory to deport this small but troublesome tribe.''

Zhirinovsky called Buchanan a ``brother in arms'' and wished him a ``convincing victory'' in November's U.S. presidential ballot. Buchanan rejected Zhirinovsky's endorsement.

Zhirinovsky then changed tone. "I thought you were really defending the interests of your nation," said the letter, the text of which was released by Zhirinovsky's office. "And you've turned out to be just like Clinton and other corrupt politicians, moved by greed and vanity, not by love for the fatherland."

Putin may just have to declare martial law. Sounds extreme but he may soon have no choice. The Chechens will only get bolder, targeting the Russian leadership itself if their demands are unmet. Better for Putin to start early. Late may be too late.

I doubt the Russian people are going to put up with this for too much longer.

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