Archives Staff Was Suspicious of Berger

Washington Post ^ | July 22, 2004 | John F. Harris and Susan Schmidt

[wildbill]

The Dems recently charged her with being a tool of the white house smear machine.

[GeronL]

Page 6???

[GeronL]

Not page one.

That stinks. So typical.

[Howlin]

...but the DOJ (or the WH) didn't do anything (because either they've decided to wait until after the Convention, which would have been much better timing, or the investigation is not finished - take your pick depending on how devious you think GW and Cheney are).

I like it. I like it.

[MJY1288]

"What has Hillary said about all this?"

Osama bin Laden has been more available to the press these days than Hillary :-)

[ladyinred]

Berger, his attorney Lanny Breuer said, checked his office and realized for the first time that he had walked out -- unintentionally, he says -- with important papers relating to the Clinton administration's efforts to combat terrorism.

They take us for fools don't they?

The spin, including from Dan Rathernot, and Katie the Cutie that the timing of the release of this information is the crime is beyond reprehensible. There is EVIL among us.

[Howlin]

The AP.

John Solomon.

Lanny Davis' favorite leakee.

[wildbill]

How do you assassinate his character? He has none if he's filching files and breaking national security rules and laws.

[adam_az]

Things that make you go hmmm....

[Samwise]

What I don't understand is why he went back to steal the SAME documents

When a document is dispersed for comments, each and every copy with someone's individual comments on becomes a new document. Five copies of a document are given to five different people for comments. They each make individual comments. You now have five different documents, plus the original. The comments documents are edited and merged to create a new document--the report. You now have one draft, five drafts with comments, and a final report.

He was trying to get all the versions.

[tubebender]

Maybe he took all five drafts to hide the identity of the one he was ordered to procure...

[Howlin]

Great points!

[Palladin]

They need to put hidden cameras in all National Archive reading rooms, after this debacle.

[1066AD]

Berger volunteered that he had also taken 40 to 50 pages of notes during three visits to the Archives beginning in July, the lawyer said. Berger turned the notes over to the Archives. He has acknowledged through attorneys that he knowingly did not show these papers to Archives officials for review before leaving -- a violation of Archives rules, but not one that he perceived as a serious security lapse.

Aren't such notes subject to the same security classification and laws as the original material ? Think so.

[Viet-Boat-Rider]

What did Kerry know and when did he know it? Its time for a Senate Investigation.

[ScaniaBoy]

When did the 9-11 Commission start its work?

When was it consituted?

[Samwise]

It won't truly reach Watergate proportions until it becomes a conspiracy.

It won't truly reach Watergate proportions until the media goes into a blood-feeding frenzy.

[Dolphy]

He was trying to get all the versions.

And would there be copies of all of these versions as the Dem apologists are now claiming?

[Samwise]

Berger had to know he could be caught and probably would be caught.

and he did it again after he was caught.

[Howlin]

To: Owl_Eagle

I've posted this top a few other threads. Please ignore if you've seen it before ...

I called our local Clear Channel station the night after this story broke and spoke for about 10 minutes describing the procedures used to handle classified information. The following is a basic description of what I said ...

1) A person who wishes to review classified information at a given facility must have his/her clearance on file with the security office that has legal custody of the information.

2) Once they arrive to the facility, they must show their credentials to identify themselves, sign into the facility - maybe issued a badge indicating their clearance and access and escorted to the room where the material will be reviewed.

3) Once in the room, the container (probably a safe i.e. a very heavy duty file cabinet with heavy combination locks with different combinations on each drawer) is opened. This process should be logged by security personnel.

4) The documents are taken from the container. All classified documents are stamped (each page) with items such as a control number, date of creation, level of clearance (top and bottom), program name indicating what access is required and eventual dispensation (i.e. when the material is designated to destruction if applicable).

5) If the documents are classified "top secret", each document has a log on the cover sheet. EACH time a person has access to this information, they must sign and date it.

6) The material is not to be removed (ie stuffed in underwear, socks ... etc) without approval of security personnel. If this takes place, the transfer is documented on both ends of the transaction. If the material is top secret or above, it requires at least two cleared people as an escort.

7) If you travel overnight, the material is not to be kept in your hotel/motel room but instead must be taken to an approved facility. Arrangements are usually made in advance. Security people do not like suprise visits. They like to make them but not receive them.

8) No photocopies are to be made or notes copied without the proper security personnel logging this activity and making appropriate markings (mentioned above) on the documents.

9) This material is frequently audited by internal security agents and is subject to "suprise" audits conducted by military, FBI or other external security personnel.

10) People given access to this type of information are briefed and attend classes on how to handle this material - ie. no excuses for "honest mistakes".

11) As the NSA for the clinton administration, I imagine Berger was personally responsible that this protocol was designed, implemented and enforced by his staff - at least in an appropriately managed administration. This would apply to government employees, officials, military personnel and civilians under contract and extended clearances issued by the DoD, DoE or other intel operations.

12) As such, ANYBODY who has worked in this environment and heard Mr. Berger's comments yesterday about being "sloppy" and "an honest mistake" knows beyond any doubt that he was not only lying, but this was a premeditated act.

13) I left the aerospace business(as an engineer) in 1993 so these comments are based upon the security world of that time. Only Lord knows how the clinton adm changed things during his 8 years.

That summarizes what I mentioned to Steve Cannon of WTVN 610 AM (Columbus, Oh) last night.

The latest word I have heard from this morning is that this material was classified "Code Word Access". Folks, if true, this is "Above Top Secret" ie. John Pollard type material.

So the question comes to mind, why would anybody do such a thing under conditions where he knew he stood a huge chance of being caught? The mission must have been extraordinary for such a risk. The presumption is that he wanted to alter or remove and destroy material that implicated either himself, or quite possibly mr. clinton. The fact that some of the material is "lost" implies that regardless of the consequences, the mission has been accomplished with his current situation collateral damage.

Webb Hubbell's infamous quote "I guess I'll have to roll over again for Hillary" comes to mind. Another example of the clinton whirlwind leaving a trail of destruction in its wake.

15 posted on 07/21/2004 1:50:31 PM EDT by tang-soo (Prophecy of the Seventy Weeks - Read Daniel Chapter 9)

[tang-soo]

I've posted this top a few other threads. Please ignore if you've seen it before ...

I called our local Clear Channel station the night after this story broke and spoke for about 10 minutes describing the procedures used to handle classified information. The following is a basic description of what I said ...

1) A person who wishes to review classified information at a given facility must have his/her clearance on file with the security office that has legal custody of the information.

2) Once they arrive to the facility, they must show their credentials to identify themselves, sign into the facility - maybe issued a badge indicating their clearance and access and escorted to the room where the material will be reviewed.

3) Once in the room, the container (probably a safe i.e. a very heavy duty file cabinet with heavy combination locks with different combinations on each drawer) is opened. This process should be logged by security personnel.

4) The documents are taken from the container. All classified documents are stamped (each page) with items such as a control number, date of creation, level of clearance (top and bottom), program name indicating what access is required and eventual dispensation (i.e. when the material is designated to destruction if applicable).

5) If the documents are classified "top secret", each document has a log on the cover sheet. EACH time a person has access to this information, they must sign and date it.

6) The material is not to be removed (ie stuffed in underwear, socks ... etc) without approval of security personnel. If this takes place, the transfer is documented on both ends of the transaction. If the material is top secret or above, it requires at least two cleared people as an escort.

7) If you travel overnight, the material is not to be kept in your hotel/motel room but instead must be taken to an approved facility. Arrangements are usually made in advance. Security people do not like suprise visits. They like to make them but not receive them.

8) No photocopies are to be made or notes copied without the proper security personnel logging this activity and making appropriate markings (mentioned above) on the documents.

9) This material is frequently audited by internal security agents and is subject to "suprise" audits conducted by military, FBI or other external security personnel.

10) People given access to this type of information are briefed and attend classes on how to handle this material - ie. no excuses for "honest mistakes".

11) As the NSA for the clinton administration, I imagine Berger was personally responsible that this protocol was designed, implemented and enforced by his staff - at least in an appropriately managed administration. This would apply to government employees, officials, military personnel and civilians under contract and extended clearances issued by the DoD, DoE or other intel operations.

12) As such, ANYBODY who has worked in this environment and heard Mr. Berger's comments yesterday about being "sloppy" and "an honest mistake" knows beyond any doubt that he was not only lying, but this was a premeditated act.

13) I left the aerospace business(as an engineer) in 1993 so these comments are based upon the security world of that time. Only Lord knows how the clinton adm changed things during his 8 years.

That summarizes what I mentioned to Steve Cannon of WTVN 610 AM (Columbus, Oh) last night.

The latest word I have heard from this morning is that this material was classified "Code Word Access". Folks, if true, this is "Above Top Secret" ie. John Pollard type material.

So the question comes to mind, why would anybody do such a thing under conditions where he knew he stood a huge chance of being caught? The mission must have been extraordinary for such a risk. The presumption is that he wanted to alter or remove and destroy material that implicated either himself, or quite possibly mr. clinton. The fact that some of the material is "lost" implies that regardless of the consequences, the mission has been accomplished with his current situation collateral damage.

Webb Hubbell's infamous quote "I guess I'll have to roll over again for Hillary" comes to mind. Another example of the clinton whirlwind leaving a trail of destruction in its wake.