To: kattracks
I called our local Clear Channel station the night after this story broke and spoke for about 10 minutes describing the procedures used to handle classified information. The following is a basic description of what I said ...
1) A person who wishes to review classified information at a given facility must have his/her clearance on file with the security office that has legal custody of the information.
2) Once they arrive to the facility, they must show their credentials to identify themselves, sign into the facility - maybe issued a badge indicating their clearance and access and escorted to the room where the material will be reviewed.
3) Once in the room, the container (probably a safe i.e. a very heavy duty file cabinet with heavy combination locks with different combinations on each drawer) is opened. This process should be logged by security personnel.
4) The documents are taken from the container. All classified documents are stamped (each page) with items such as a control number, date of creation, level of clearance (top and bottom), program name indicating what access is required and eventual dispensation (i.e. when the material is designated to destruction if applicable).
5) If the documents are classified "top secret", each document has a log on the cover sheet. EACH time a person has access to this information, they must sign and date it.
6) The material is not to be removed (ie stuffed in underwear, socks ... etc) without approval of security personnel. If this takes place, the transfer is documented on both ends of the transaction. If the material is top secret or above, it requires at least two cleared people as an escort.
7) If you travel overnight, the material is not to be kept in your hotel/motel room but instead must be taken to an approved facility. Arrangements are usually made in advance. Security people do not like suprise visits. They like to make them but not receive them.
8) No photocopies are to be made or notes copied without the proper security personnel logging this activity and making appropriate markings (mentioned above) on the documents.
9) This material is frequently audited by internal security agents and is subject to "suprise" audits conducted by military, FBI or other external security personnel.
10) People given access to this type of information are briefed and attend classes on how to handle this material - ie. no excuses for "honest mistakes".
11) As the NSA for the clinton administration, I imagine Berger was personally responsible that this protocol was designed, implemented and enforced by his staff - at least in an appropriately managed administration. This would apply to government employees, officials, military personnel and civilians under contract and extended clearances issued by the DoD, DoE or other intel operations.
12) As such, ANYBODY who has worked in this environment and heard Mr. Berger's comments yesterday about being "sloppy" and "an honest mistake" knows beyond any doubt that he was not only lying, but this was a premeditated act.
13) I left the aerospace business(as an engineer) in 1993 so these comments are based upon the security world of that time. Only Lord knows how the clinton adm changed things during his 8 years.
That summarizes what I mentioned to Steve Cannon of WTVN 610 AM (Columbus, Oh) last night.
The latest word I have heard from this morning is that this material was classified "Code Word Access". Folks, if true, this is "Above Top Secret" ie. John Pollard type material.
So the question comes to mind, why would anybody do such a thing under conditions where he knew he stood a huge chance of being caught? The mission must have been extraordinary for such a risk. The presumption is that he wanted to alter or remove and destroy material that implicated either himself, or quite possibly mr. clinton. The fact that some of the material is "lost" implies that regardless of the consequences, the mission has been accomplished with his current situation collateral damage.
Webb Hubbell's infamous quote "I guess I'll have to roll over again for Hillary" comes to mind. Another example of the clinton whirlwind leaving a trail of destruction in its wake.
5 posted on
07/21/2004 8:37:43 AM PDT by
tang-soo
(Prophecy of the Seventy Weeks - Read Daniel Chapter 9)
To: tang-soo
I worked with an utter nitwit in 93, who got caught leaving TS docs in his desk due to his desktop being so tidy that when his manager (and mine) wanted to leave him a note, there was neither a pen nor a pad of stickies on his desk. She opened his pen drawer to get them, and ... voila!
The safe was just too damn far to walk to lock them up when it was time to go to lunch. A whole forty feet.
9 posted on
07/21/2004 8:49:24 AM PDT by
nina0113
To: tang-soo
"The latest word I have heard from this morning is that this material was classified "Code Word Access". Folks, if true, this is "Above Top Secret" ie. John Pollard type material."
If the Bergular stole this material, he should be in very serious trouble.
17 posted on
07/21/2004 10:06:46 AM PDT by
Grampa Dave
(Berger was an attorney w/o his secretary, and he just re-filed in the wrong drawers! Move On!)
To: tang-soo
FWIW, Back in the late 70's I had relatives working in the Pentagon, specfically weapons development. I won't say which branch.
I came to visit when I was 17 and they took me to work with them everyday for a week. A simple, "he's with me" got me through checkpoints and security and I'd send a couple of hours hanging around the offices then I'd head into DC for the day.
I remember there were counless open file drawers with combo locks and files marked "TOP SECRET", many of them were left open with files hanging out like it was an accountants office on April 14th. I know times have changed but I got a big laugh out of seeing all the TOP SECRET files labeled "Project XYZ" and such just laying around the office.
20 posted on
07/21/2004 10:24:34 AM PDT by
Rebelbase
( A majority of Europeans have lost the courage of their fathers and grandfathers.)
FreeRepublic.com is powered by software copyright 2000-2008 John Robinson