Missile kills Pakistan tribal head

CNN ^ | Friday, June 18 | Syed Mohsin Naqvi

[AdmSmith]

ISLAMABAD (CNN) -- A tribal leader accused of harboring Al Qaeda militants in Pakistan's western border region was killed Thursday night in a targeted missile strike, according to Pakistan intelligence sources. The Associated Press quoted an army spokesman Friday as identifying the tribal leader as Nek Mohammed, a former Taliban fighter.

He was killed late Thursday at the home of another tribal chief, the spokesman said.

"We were tracking him down and he was killed last night by our hand," Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan told The Associated Press.

[POA2]

Read early today that 2 Al Qeade associates were captured over this past weekend - Arms smugglers - Both have been wanted by the U.S. for some time - Very good news.

[Boot Hill]

“A clash between Levies and terrorists in Kohlu left three terrorist dead while two levies personnel were also killed in the fighting.”

Kohlu:   Kohlu is a district, an area and also a city. The city is located 219 km (136 mi.) East (099º) from the Quetta, the capital of the Province of Balochistan.

On the map below, Quetta is in the left-center of the map. Kohlu is located due East of there, near the far right side of the map. All the action quoted in this story is occurring in Balochistan, which is the first province South of the FATA, South Waziristan and the city of Wana. The "levies" spoken of in the article appear to local tribal conscripts.

Quetta can be located in the overview map below near the center of the map and near Pakistan's border with Afghanistan.

--Boot Hill

[Dog]

Hey Boot!

Look what I just found over on the Daily Times..

2 foreigners jailed for fake documents in Gilgit

It is in the same area as the two AQ arrests..

[Dog]

Forgot to ping you see 183...2 caught trying to sneak out of Pakistan.

[jeffers]

Thanks for the ping. Hard to tell what or who this is, or what their objectives are.

Though I refuse to name names, I know of several world class climbers who prefer not to pay permit fees on the order of $65,000 to climb mountains such as Everest.

Some of them are pretty inventive. One makes a regular practice of dressing as a Sherpa. Another, when asked about his gearlist for 8000m climbs, replied "toothbrush and a credit card".

Still, suggesting alternatives should in no way lessen the chance that these are bad guys. You don't have to be a climber to go native and melt into a crowd.

[Boot Hill]

Very good find, Dog.

A couple of things caught my eye in that story. First, they were caught on the Pakistani side, before entry into China. It looks like Mushi must have finally lowered the boom on the border guard patrol. Second, they were attempting their entry via the Khunjerab Pass (see map #2 here), a mere 16,200 feet high and previously identified as the most likely crossing point in post #156.

However, it might have been more interesting to have let them go through and observe the kind of reception they got on the Chinese side. Or maybe we already know.

Whether Gilgit is in the same area as Chitral (where the two AQ arrests occurred last week) is a matter of whether you're walking or riding from one city to the other. See map #1 from the link above. That's some mean country there (but I'd give my eye teeth for a chance to explore it).

--Boot Hill

[AdmSmith]

An interesting article describing the tactics used to get hold of the remaining aQ targets: http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0625/p07s02-wosc.htm

Pakistani Army must go through the Pashtuns
By Owais Tohid and Scott Baldauf

PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN - This spring, the dry mountains of Shikai were showered with rose petals to celebrate a truce between the Pakistani military and local pro-Al Qaeda militants. Together, they pledged to cleanse the tribal area of South Waziristan of all foreign militants.

Two months later, the floral confetti has turned to bullets and bombs. Jets and helicopter gunships circle in the sky, and militants on the ground vow to fight a jihad against the "traitorous" Pakistani Army.

Once a fight between Western democratic values and militant Islam, the war on terror along the Afghan-Pakistani border has become something murkier, complex, and ancient. Now, it's tribal.

The rules of this war are a far cry from the easy slogans of "you're either with us or against us." Indeed, Pashtun history is filled with heroes who played both sides for the benefit of tribe, family, and honor.

The latest such figure is tribal leader Naik Mohammad. Before being killed this month, Mr. Mohammad had cut deals with both his Al Qaeda guests and the Pakistani military trying to evict them. That it was the military who ultimately got double-crossed displays how much the antiterror coalition still must learn about how to influence the tribes who shelter top Al Qaeda leaders.

"The Army thinks they can give an order and people will just obey it," says a former Pakistani intelligence officer. "They should have paid more attention to history. The Pashtuns don't take orders from anybody."

Following a bruising fight with tribesmen in March, Pakistan opted to negotiate. Through the mediation of local mullahs and legislators, military officials and five local militant leaders struck a truce. The five chiefs, including Mr. Mohammad, pledged to stop using Pakistani territory for terrorist activity.

But the settlement quickly soured when Mohammad refused to help register foreigners with the authorities, disputing with officials who said that had been agreed. What Pakistan was asking was the impossible: handing over guests in a culture that demands protection of those who seek refuge. Amid the recriminations, Mohammad announced he would continue jihad and fighting erupted again (see timeline).

Tribal insiders say it was easy for the militants to break their deal with the Pakistani government, because the deal was perceived to be conducted through local mullahs - not through an assembly of tribal elders, called a jirga. In Pashtun society, form is everything.

"Nobody was sincere," says Mohammad Noor, an educated tribal member. "It was a deal with knives hidden under sleeves. Both sides are here to fight, not negotiate."

Tribal elders, however, dispute that. Even now, they say, there's room to negotiate. "The military demonstrated impatience in launching their operation," says Maulvi Mairajuddin, a cleric who helped mediate the deal. "The cannons and bombings cannot go side by side with negotiations in a tribal system. We still believe that talks can work better than guns."

Tribal elder Malik Behram Khan agrees: "The more you bomb, the stronger will become the sentiments against the Army. It is difficult for tribesmen to throw their guests out of their homes.... Our culture does not allow us, and we are taunted for generations if we violate our customs."

But if Pashtun tradition forbids a host from handing over his own guest, history is full of instances where rivals managed to do it for him, often to dishonor enemies. Where honor is all, dishonor is the ultimate weapon.

"For arresting a major Taliban commander, or even Osama or [his No. 2, Ayman] al-Zawahiri, the intelligence officer should find out who he has a relationship with," says a senior Afghan intelligence officer in Kabul. "These are people who are trusted. They can tell you what the plans are, where these people are located."

Every major figure in tribal politics has enemies, this intelligence officer adds, even within his own family. And to bring down a rival, all methods are fair game.

"If you give money to somebody from a tribe, you can get information about a Taliban commander from that tribe," says this intelligence officer. "For an outsider, you can't get that information, because there is no trust. But from inside the tribe, we can get information, no problem."

Setting off intertribal rivalries is a risky game - part of the reason why Pashtuns themselves are reluctant to do it. In a culture where every violent act is followed by an equal and opposite attack, most Pashtuns adopt a surprisingly nonviolent ethos.

"Tribal lashkars [militias] cannot be effective, because tribals are threatened with dire consequences if they take any action," says a tribal elder and former legislator, Malik Waris Khan Afridi. Pakistan encouraged tribesmen to form posses to round up the foreigners and their supporters, but the lashkars caught no one.

Yet US pressure is clearly mounting on Pakistan to quash the militants. In April, US ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, stated in a speech that if Pakistan didn't remove the foreign fighters, US troops would cross over from Afghanistan and do it themselves.

Pakistan's recent offensive and killing of Naik Mohammad should buy Islamabad some time, but the fight is far from over. Al Qaeda maintains support in the tribal belt through a mixture of ideology, shared history fighting the Soviets, and money.

Following the deal with the military, Al Qaeda issued an ultimatum, described by one aide to Naik Mohammad this way: "We are born to sacrifice our lives in the name of Allah, not to indulge in tricks and deals to save our lives. Either be a mujahid [holy warrior] or join the Americans and their supporters."

However, Al Qaeda threats are accompanied with gifts. Al Qaeda purchased local property for training camps at handsome prices.

"It is the economics of jihad playing its role in Waziristan," says Dilawar Khan, an educated tribesman. "Some sold the foreigners tomatoes for 500 rupees, some sold their houses for 500,000 rupees, charging 10 times the price. Why would they kill the hen when they get golden eggs from it?"

Such a deal becomes even more attractive to those who consider supporting Al Qaeda's to be a service to Islam.

Islamabad, for its part, has also dangled monetary carrots, including million-dollar development projects to construct roads and schools. But development is a longer term pay off than cash handouts from Al Qaeda. And Pakistani incentives may not involve a wide enough group.

"Prior to this, development projects were just to bribe pro-government tribal elders or influential chieftains," says analyst Behroz Khan in Peshawar. "The effective way of governance in the tribal areas is jirga [and] development projects should rout through it to give the locals a sense of participation."

The government since British times has largely left the Pashtun tribes to rule themselves.Military operations were left for extraordinary circumstances. Today, the Pakistan is using many of the same British tactics of old. In Wana, the market has been closed down as collective punishment.

Apparently feeling the heat, tribesmen Wednesday insisted that authorities lift the economic sanctions and release detainees. The government countered by reiterating its demand for the handover of the remaining four pro-Al Qaeda leaders.

Opinions are divided on whether Naik Mohammad's demise will ultimately advance Islamabad's agenda.

"Killing Naik Mohammad is not going to stop anything," says Milt Beardon, a former CIA station chief in Islamabad. "Ultimately, [Al Qaeda] will find a new guy to take his place."

But his death has temporarily stunned the tribes, and deprived the foreign fighters of a key backer and main liaison with the local population. "He was the strongest link between Al Qaeda and local militants and cannot be replaced easily," says Mr. Noor, the educated tribesman.

An interim successor has been chosen named Haji Mohammad Umer, who is believed to be more flexible than Naik Mohammad. The timing may be right for another round of negotiations.

"The militants will want to buy time and the authorities will not want to lose this opportunity to further weaken the nexus [between foreigners and locals] by using a carrot and stick policy against the tribesmen," says Mr. Noor.

[AdmSmith]

Click here to get an interactive map of the Taliban Tribes and their leaders http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0625/p07s02-wosc.html#tableTop (It is from the article above)

[jeffers]

"That's
some mean country there (but I'd give my eye teeth for a chance to explore it)."


I uploaded two panoramas, one looking east and one looking west from Khunjerab Pass, and an animated west to east flyby through the same pass. They all use a 30 meter per pixel SRTM dataset and can be downloaded at:


http://host1.in-motion.net/~jefft/tech/Mapping/afghanistan/index.html

[AdmSmith]

One can not be right all the time:
http://www.hipakistan.com/en/detail.php?newsId=en68937&F_catID=&f_type=source

Embarrassment for US military as captured men aren?t Taliban commanders

PESHAWAR: The US military in Afghanistan is confronted with an embarrassing situation following the realisation that the two men in its custody were Afghan government officials from Helmand province rather than top Taliban commanders as claimed by it earlier.

On Monday, the US military spokeswoman Master Sergeant Cindy Beam said American special forces captured top enemy commanders Hafiz Abdul Majeed and Mohammad Daud in southern Afghanistan in raids on their compounds pre-dawn Saturday. "We have evidence indicating that they were supplying arms to insurgents, conducting rocket attacks on the military, attacking non-governmental aid organisations helping Afghanistan build a national infrastructure, funding ambushes and trafficking opium," she said in a statement.

"During the mission, the enemy regional leaders surrendered as coalition SOF (Special Operations Forces) surprised the insurgents," she added. However, the US military claim is turning out to be untrue. Officials in Afghanistan?s interior ministry in Kabul were quoted as saying that the captured men weren?t the top Taliban commanders sought by the US and Afghan governments. Government officials in Helmand explained that one of the captured men, Hafiz Abdul Majeed, was the administrator for Naomesh district in the province, while the other man was his military bodyguard, Mohammad Daud. They said Majeed had been an anti-Taliban commander and three of his fighters were injured in a firefight with the Taliban fighters only 20 days ago.

The announcement of Majeed?s capture by the US military had created lot of excitement in the American intelligence and media circles. In fact, it had generated hopes that his arrest would enable the US military to track down the Taliban supreme leader Mulla Mohammad Omar. This wasn?t far-fetched because the real Hafiz Abdul Majeed was very close to Mulla Omar. He was the security chief for Kandahar when the Taliban were in power. After the Taliban?s ouster from power, he became one of the important resistance leaders in southern Afghanistan and was named by Mulla Omar as a member of the 10-member Taliban leadership council. His arrest would have been a huge setback for the Taliban.

The fact that the US military announced Hafiz Abdul Majeed?s capture without cross checking his identity isn?t the first time that the Americans have committed such blunders in Afghanistan. Certain other arrests of anti-US Afghans were also cases of mistaken identity.

Earlier, they printed wrong pictures of Mulla Omar on leaflets announcing monetary reward for his capture. Warplanes have frequently bombed the wrong targets, including wedding parties, passenger buses, graveyards, and convoys of pro-government tribal elders.

Taliban spokesman, Abdul Latif Hakimi, whose claims about battleground successes are often ridiculed by Afghan and US government officials, was vindicated on Tuesday following reports that Hafiz Abdul Majeed had not been captured by the American military. On Monday, he had denied the capture of Hafiz Abdul Majeed while talking to The News from an undisclosed location. He thought the US military could have captured someone else. As it turned it, the US military had apprehended Hafiz Abdul Majeed?s namesake.

Hakimi had said he was unable to place Mohammad Daud. The only Daud that he knew in the Taliban movement was Daud Haideri, who was deputy to Mulla Nasir, the Taliban military commander for Ghazni province. Daud Haideri, according to Hakimi, had not been captured. On both counts, Hakimi was proven right.

The US military spokeswoman had not mentioned the place where the two men were captured. She had vaguely said that they were detained in southern Afghanistan. Afghan sources later said the arrests were made in Girishk, a town sited in south-western Helmand province on the Kandahar-Herat road.

It remains to be seen how the US military is going to handle the situation now that it has emerged that the two men in its custody weren?t top Taliban commanders, Hafiz Abdul Majeed and Daud Haideri. Measures would surely be taken to do some damage control and avoid such an embarrassing situation in future. As for the men in its custody, the US military would have to release them because warlords whether small or big are needed to fight the Taliban and other anti-US forces in Afghanistan.

[AdmSmith]

Hit them where it hurts - in the wallet:
http://www.dawn.com/2004/07/01/top8.htm

Tribesmen allow army posts in Shakai

By Dilawar Khan Wazir


WANA, June 30: Four tribes have allowed the army troops to set up permanent posts in Shakai, in the South Waziristan tribal region.

The agreement was reached between the four tribes and administrator Asmatullah Khan Gandapur on Wednesday at a jirga in Wana, which the officials termed a major breakthrough since the Wana conflict started.

Shakai, which was considered one of the strongholds of the foreign and local militants in the volatile region, was targeted with precision bombs by the Pakistan Air Force's jets and gunship helicopters on June 12 to destroy hideouts of the militants.

The four sub-tribes of the Ahmadzai Wazir, who signed the agreement, are Khoniakhel, Shodyakai, Spirkai and Khojakhel. Former federal minister Faridullah Khan, who also belongs to Shakai, was present on the occasion.

According to the terms of the agreement, these tribes would pay a fine of Rs40 million to the authorities in case of any hostile act against the army in the area. Out of the Rs40 million, the tribes will deposit Rs10 million as guarantee in advance on Thursday, whereas surety bonds of the remaining amount will be given by the tribesmen.

According to the agreement, the respective tribes also permitted the security forces to establish check posts in the area, an official said. Local people said despite calm in the area the security forces continued its siege of Shakai and restricted the tribesmen's movement into or out of the area.

The continued siege is a major hurdle in determining the damages and the casualties from the last month's bombing, they said. The siege, they said, would worsen the already disturbing position of foodstuff in the area.

The NWFP governor has directed the local authorities to lift economic sanctions against the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe for 10 days in Wana. The government sealed more than 6,000 shops of the tribesmen under the collective responsibility clause of the Frontier Crimes Regulations.

[CaptSkip]

"Allahu Fubar!"

sheik...yo' f***'n funny!

[AdmSmith]

A view on Pakistan from India. Skip this article if you only are interested in war against terrorism :http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/jul/01raman.htm


The sins of Jamali

July 01, 2004



Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Pakistan's first Baloch prime minister, resigned on June 26, and designated Chaudhry Shujjat Hussain, leader of the Pervez Musharraf-controlled Pakistan Muslim League, as his interim successor.

It was indicated that Shujjat himself would ultimately hand over to Shaukat Aziz, allegedly a US citizen of Pakistani origin, who was the finance minister in Jamali's cabinet, after he got himself elected a member of the national assembly, the lower house of Pakistan's parliament. At present, Aziz is a member of the senate, the upper house. Under the Pakistan constitution, only a member of the national assembly can be prime minister.

The announcements regarding Jamali's exit and Aziz's impending elevation as prime minister came after Jamali met the military dictator. For over a month now, there has been widespread speculation in Pakistan about Jamali's likely exit because of Musharraf's alleged displeasure over his perceived lack-lustre performance as prime minister. Jamali was elevated to this office by Musharraf after the highly controversial general election of October 2002.

After the election, Shujjat Hussain was elected by the PML (the PML Qaid-e-Azam as it was known, to distinguish it from Nawaz Sharif's party by the same name) as leader of the parliamentary party. Generally, in Pakistan, as it was in India till recently, the tradition had been that the parliamentary leader of the party -- which has an absolute majority or the largest number of seats if it is part of a coalition -- became the prime minister.

To the surprise of many, Shujjat Hussain did an act of self-abnegation and designated Jamali to be the prime minister and rallied the support of other members of the coalition to his candidature. Even though Shujjat, a Punjabi, gave the impression that Jamali's nomination was his decision in order to enable a minority Baloch to hold this high office, nobody accepted his explanation. It was widely believed that it was Musharraf who ruled out Shujjat taking over as the prime minister and directed that Jamali should be chosen by the PML for this post.

Well-known Pakistani sources cited the following reasons for Musharraf's decision:
Jamali's well-known proximity to the Americans in general and to the Central Intelligence Agency in particular right from the days of the anti-Soviet Afghan war of the 1980s.
His image as a pliable leader, who would let Musharraf continue to wield the reins of power and would not try to assert himself so long as he enjoyed the perks of office.
His belonging to the Baloch community, which is again in a state of political ferment and Musharraf's expectation that he would calm down his community.
His perceived acceptability to the six-party religious coalition called the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, many of whose leaders held Jamali in some esteem despite his proximity to the Americans.
Musharraf's hopes that with his contacts in the MMA he would be able to weaken their opposition to his continuing as chief of the army staff.
Musharraf's expectations from Jamali on the question of his continuing as army chief were belied. Jamali could not succeed in making the MMA drop its opposition to his continuing as army chief. Ultimately, faced with an embarrassing constitutional deadlock which lasted several months because of the MMA's refusal to support the incorporation of the various constitutional changes introduced by Musharraf through executive orders before the elections into the constitution through an Act of Parliament, Musharraf had to give an assurance that he would resign from the office of army chief by the end of 2004. Only then, he could secure the MMA's support for the constitutional amendments which have, inter alia, restored the presidential powers of dismissal of the elected prime minister and dissolution of the national assembly, which the late Zia-ul Haq had arrogated to himself and which Nawaz Sharif had got abolished when he came to the office of prime minister for a second time in 1997.

Since the beginning of this year, there were indications that Musharraf was preparing the ground to wriggle out of his commitment to resign as army chief by the end of this year on the ground that the situation presently prevailing in the country due to its role as the frontline ally of the US in the war against terrorism demanded his continuation as the army chief. He got the idea of his continuing on the post in the 'supreme national interest' (a favourite phrase of his) floated by some ministers of Jamali's cabinet.

It was widely believed that Musharraf wanted that the suggestion for his continuance as chief of army staff should come from Jamali and his cabinet in the form of an unanimous resolution requesting him to do so and that Jamali should either persuade the MMA to support this or, failing to do so, engineer a split in the MMA in order to get the required number of votes in parliament for the constitutional amendment to enable him to continue in the post while holding office as president.

Jamali's attitude on this was non-committal. He indicated on more than one occasion that while he would not take the initiative in preparing the ground for Musharraf's continuance, he would support whatever decision Musharraf took in the matter in the national interest and work for its implementation. It was Musharraf's unhappiness over what he perceived as the ambivalent attitude of Jamali in this matter which initially caused his disenchantment with Jamali.

An aggravating factor was Jamali's failure (in Musharraf's eyes) to vigorously explain to the people and to support in public the operations launched by the army in the South Waziristan area of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas -- FATA -- in its hunt, under US pressure, for the dregs of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The operations have caused considerable resentment not only among the tribals, but also in the lower and middle ranks of the army and have been bitterly opposed by the religious parties.

Jamali, who has many friends in the tribal communities of Balochistan, the North-West Frontier Province and FATA, adopted an ambivalent attitude on this too. His stance was: Musharraf and the army know best. If they feel the operations are necessary, they must have valid grounds. The people should support them. He was avoiding making a categorical statement that he himself was convinced that the operations were necessary and hence should be supported by the people.

Since the middle of last year, Jamali showed signs of unhappiness over what he perceived as his increasing marginalisation by Musharraf and by the prominence given to Shaukat Aziz. Before Musharraf's visit to Camp David in the US in June 2003 for talks with President Bush, there were indications of growing US concerns over the rogue proliferation activities of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called father of the Pakistani atomic bomb, and his cronies in Pakistan's nuclear and missile establishment and the army.

In order to divert suspicion from himself and the army, Musharraf ordered Shaukat Aziz to inspect the security and accounting procedures at the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant and took Aziz along with him to the US to reassure the US that everything was in order in the nuclear establishment.

Before this, no civilian political leader of Pakistan had ever been allowed by the army to visit any of its nuclear and missile establishments. Jamali was put in a highly embarrassing position when questions were raised as to why this task of seeming civilian supervision over the nuclear and missile establishment was given to Aziz and not to him (Jamali) and why Aziz reported his findings directly to Musharraf and not through Jamali.

Subsequently, when the interception of a ship carrying centrifuges from Malaysia to Libya off the Italian coast by the US and UK navies in October 2003 forced Musharraf to take Qadeer Khan and other scientists into informal custody and interrogatre them, Musharraf made Shaukat Aziz in charge of the co-ordination of the investigation and the interrogation and kept Jamali totally out of the picture.

Peeved over this, Jamali again adopted an ambivalent stand when the interrogation of A Q Khan created a public furore in Pakistan. His stand once again was: Musharraf knows best. If he had taken this action there must be valid grounds for it in the national interest.

Since the middle of last month, there was speculation in Pakistan that Musharraf's disenchantment with Jamali was complete and that he would be eased out before Musharraf embarked on a foreign tour on July 3. Jamali continued denying that his exit was imminent, but ultimately succumbed to Musharraf's pressure to quit on June 26.

Shaukat Aziz, the ultimate beneficiary of the 'palace intrigues' as sections of the Pakistani media have dubbed the happenings, enjoys the trust of the USA and Saudi Arabia, where he had lived before and worked for Citibank. He is a close personal friend of a brother of Musharraf who lives in the US. It was he who had suggested his induction into the cabinet as finance minister after Musharraf seized power in October 1999. His induction was also strongly backed by the Saudi ruling family.

But he is likely to be a red rag to the fundamentalist bull in Pakistan. Many religious clerics distrust him because they look upon him as the USA's cat's paw. Moreover, since he was inducted as finance minister after the coup of October 1999, there have off and on been allegations that he comes from a family of Ahmediyas, the ultimate sin in the eyes of the fundamentalists.

Would such a man be accepted by the fundamentalists of the madrassas and the army? If they don't, what impact this would have on internal political stability?

If Musharraf had wanted, he could have got Shaukat Aziz elected overnight as a member of the national assembly and made him prime minister. He has not done so apparently because he wants the ground prepared for his continuing as army chief. This would require parliamentary endorsement. Parliamentary endorsement would be feasible only if the MMA's solidarity on this issue is broken and large-scale defections caused in its parliamentary ranks.

These are political games, which Shaukat Aziz, being essentially a technocrat with no skills of political manipulation, may not be able to perform. Hence, the importance of the role of Shujjat Hussain, who as a trusted aide of Nawaz and as a member of his cabinet, had acquired a mastery of the required skills. Would he be prepared to exercise them for the benefit of Musharraf if a collateral beneficiary would be Shaukat Aziz and not he himself?

Musharraf knows that his continued survival in power depends on the continued support of the US and senior army officers and on his continued ability to divide and dominate the religious elements. He has no reason to fear the loss of the US support. In the present army hierarchy, only Mohammad Yusuf Khan, the vice-chief of the army staff, and General Mohammad Aziz Khan, chairman, joint chiefs of the staff committee, owed their rise in their career beyond the rank of major general to the pre-1999 political dispensation and not to Musharraf. Once they retire in October next, all the other lieutenant generals would be officers who crossed the rank of major general due to Musharraf's benediction.

Hence, in his calculation, he has no reason to fear any threat to his position from them. Any threat to him, open or conspiratorial, would come from officers of the rank of brigadiers and below, amongst whom fundamentalist and anti-US feelings are strong. To keep them under effective surveillance and to nip any trouble in the bud, he needs to continue as army chief. So he feels. So, he will do unless the US exercises pressure on him to discard the army chief hat. It is unlikely to do so. The US has never shown any political wisdom in the past. It is unlikely to do so in future.

It is often said that Pakistan is ruled by a mix of Allah, the Army and the Americans. But the reality is that Allah has not always been on the side of a military dictator. One saw it in the case of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul Haq. When past military dictators thought they had secured their position, Allah had an uncomfortable way of indicating they had not.

Would history repeat itself? Would it be 'Musharraf proposes, Allah disposes'?

[AdmSmith]

Tomorrow the Ahmadzai Wazir clan has to hand over the wanted persons Maulvi Abbas and Mohammad Javedone. I guess that it was discussed at this meeting. Expect something during the weekend:

http://www.geo.tv/main_files/pakistan.aspx?id=27164
Musharraf says Wana becomes Al-Qaeda headquarters

ISLAMABAD: President Gen Pervez Musharraf while presiding over a high level meeting regarding law and order in the country, held here Awan-e-Sadr on Thursday said that Wana and Shakai were headquarters of Al-Qaeda and added that terrorists hiding there and their harbours would be dismantled.

The President identified contrasting perceptions vis-a-vis law and order the gap between policy formation and its implementation as the major impediments in the way of maintenance of peace and security in the country.

He underlined that the religio-political parties as well as Ulema and Mashaikh should also fulfill their obligation in promoting sectarian harmony and tolerance in the society.

The meeting which lasted for about five hours was attended by Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Senior Minister Shaukat Aziz, Interior Minster Faisal Saleh Hayat, Information Minster Sheikh Rashid Ahmad, Minster for religious affairs Ijazul Haq, governors and chief ministers of all the four provinces, Vice Chief of Army Staff General Yousaf Khan and chiefs of law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Interior Minister Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat told Geo TV that the meeting identified internal security threats and discussed ways and means to curb them.
"We focused on the possible solutions of law and order problems and decided that the Government would concentrate on addressing the problems at flashpoint places."

With close coordination between the provinces and the federal government, we will be able to root out the menace of extremism, terrorism and lawlessness", he said.

The President warned that elements, which are bent upon impairing law and order situation and are conspiring to stop fruits of economic progress reach masses would not succeed in their vicious designs.

Given the present circumstances the President said that rooting of terrorism and extremism were in the large interest of the country.
"Pakistan would achieve its objectives without comprising its national interest", he said.

The meeting also reviewed reports regarding imparting of training of terrorism in some seminaries of the country.

[POA2]

Bump (for myself)

[mhking]

Just damn.

If you want on the list, FReepmail me. This IS a high-volume PING list...

[Grampa Dave]

Another one bites the dust.

I wish that I had the music link to that great song!

[Dog]

Damn that one is funny..

[sheik yerbouty]

There is nothing better than smiting jihadists with humor. It has the effect that garlic is said to have on vampires. Consider what is best in life. To destroy the jihadists, to drive their enablers before you, and to hear the lamentations of their media!

[Peach]

Sounds like very good news.

I do not know how you all keep up with these unpronouncable names...