Missile kills Pakistan tribal head

ISLAMABAD (CNN) -- A tribal leader accused of harboring Al Qaeda militants in Pakistan's western border region was killed Thursday night in a targeted missile strike, according to Pakistan intelligence sources. The Associated Press quoted an army spokesman Friday as identifying the tribal leader as Nek Mohammed, a former Taliban fighter.

He was killed late Thursday at the home of another tribal chief, the spokesman said.

"We were tracking him down and he was killed last night by our hand," Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan told The Associated Press.

Thought I'd post this here.....

Musharraf's double game unravels

By Ahmed Rashid International Herald Tribune

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 10, 2005

LAHORE, Pakistan Since the July 7 bombings in London, Pakistan's military ruler, President Pervez Musharraf, has again come under severe international pressure to clamp down on local extremist groups linked to Al Qaeda, bring extremist religious schools under control and stop the Taliban from using Pakistan as a base for attacks in Afghanistan. As a result, serious cracks are developing in the 35-year alliance between Pakistan's army, its intelligence services and Islamic fundamentalist parties.

Musharraf has parried international criticism of Pakistan by accusing Prime Minister Tony Blair of allowing Islamic extremism to flourish in Britain, but since July 7 he has arrested 800 militants and is expelling 1,400 foreign students studying in the religious schools, or madrasas.

For decades, Islamic fundamentalist parties in Pakistan have provided manpower and ideological support for the military intelligence services' forays in Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir. Under outside pressure, however, the inherent contradictions in this relationship are coming to the fore.

In an unprecedented broadside on Sunday, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the head of an alliance of six Islamic fundamentalist parties and leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, accused the army of helping militants to attack Afghanistan, supporting "jihadi" training camps in Pakistan and deceiving the West in its commitment to combat terrorism. ''We will have to openly tell the world whether we want to support jihadis or crack down on them - we cannot afford to be hypocritical any more," he said.

For nearly two decades, Maulana Rehman has been one of the strongest Islamic leaders in the country. He heads Jamiat-e-Ullema Islam, or JUI, the most powerful fundamentalist party in the Pashtun tribal belt bordering Afghanistan. Since the 2002 elections, the JUI has dominated the provincial governments of North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

Working closely with the intelligence services the JUI has spawned numerous virulently anti-Western, violence-prone extremist groups who now work for Al Qaeda. In the 1990s, the JUI helped the army provide arms and manpower to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, JUI mullahs have allowed Taliban leaders to recruit Afghan and Pakistani students from JUI-run madrasas.

Now there are severe tensions between the army and the JUI. Under considerable American pressure to explain the Taliban resurgence, Lieutenant General Safdar Hussain, the Corps Commander in Peshawar, said on July 25 that the Taliban "are getting public support in Pakistan, especially from some Pakistani religious parties." He was clearly pointing the finger at the JUI and Maulana Rehman was furious.

On Aug. 1, Maulana was detained in Dubai International Airport while on his way home from Libya and promptly deported, with officials in the United Arab Emirates hinting that he was on a terrorist list. Maulana Rehman accused the Pakistan government of not doing enough to save him from humiliation.

Musharraf's declaration that he would send home foreign students was seen as another attack on the JUI, who control the largest number of madrasas. Rehman and other leaders from his six-party alliance mounted a tirade against Musharraf and have threatened to start a campaign to unseat the government.

The fundamentalist leaders don't like Musharraf's liberal stance and are determined to protect their parties and institutions. But they are also furious with the army for trying to make them a scapegoat for all of Pakistan's ills, when they have only been a junior partner to the army's own past policies that have encouraged Islamic extremism to flourish.

Rehman is now defying the army by declaring that it bears responsibility for the fruits of its past policies, and that it should not seek to parry American pressure by blaming Pakistan's Islamic parties.

At one level, such statements are part of the kind of political wheeling and dealing that can be expected before local council elections later this month and general elections scheduled for 2007, when Musharraf wants to get himself elected as president. The fundamentalist parties feel threatened because they know that Musharraf may be trying to reduce their influence. But the danger is that Rehman and others could divulge more details of the intelligence services' links, which might diminish the military's credibility at home and abroad.

Musharraf is in a difficult position. Since Sept. 11 he has successfully ridden two horses, placating the West with promises of reform and crackdowns on extremists while pandering to the Islamic parties in order to retain their support. But now that Pakistan's political system is in danger of slowly unraveling as he loses support across the political spectrum, Musharraf could fall off altogether.

(Ahmed Rashid is the author of ''Taliban'' and, most recently, ''Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia.'')
LAHORE, Pakistan Since the July 7 bombings in London, Pakistan's military ruler, President Pervez Musharraf, has again come under severe international pressure to clamp down on local extremist groups linked to Al Qaeda, bring extremist religious schools under control and stop the Taliban from using Pakistan as a base for attacks in Afghanistan. As a result, serious cracks are developing in the 35-year alliance between Pakistan's army, its intelligence services and Islamic fundamentalist parties.

Musharraf has parried international criticism of Pakistan by accusing Prime Minister Tony Blair of allowing Islamic extremism to flourish in Britain, but since July 7 he has arrested 800 militants and is expelling 1,400 foreign students studying in the religious schools, or madrasas.

For decades, Islamic fundamentalist parties in Pakistan have provided manpower and ideological support for the military intelligence services' forays in Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir. Under outside pressure, however, the inherent contradictions in this relationship are coming to the fore.

In an unprecedented broadside on Sunday, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the head of an alliance of six Islamic fundamentalist parties and leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, accused the army of helping militants to attack Afghanistan, supporting "jihadi" training camps in Pakistan and deceiving the West in its commitment to combat terrorism. ''We will have to openly tell the world whether we want to support jihadis or crack down on them - we cannot afford to be hypocritical any more," he said.

For nearly two decades, Maulana Rehman has been one of the strongest Islamic leaders in the country. He heads Jamiat-e-Ullema Islam, or JUI, the most powerful fundamentalist party in the Pashtun tribal belt bordering Afghanistan. Since the 2002 elections, the JUI has dominated the provincial governments of North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

Working closely with the intelligence services the JUI has spawned numerous virulently anti-Western, violence-prone extremist groups who now work for Al Qaeda. In the 1990s, the JUI helped the army provide arms and manpower to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, JUI mullahs have allowed Taliban leaders to recruit Afghan and Pakistani students from JUI-run madrasas.

Now there are severe tensions between the army and the JUI. Under considerable American pressure to explain the Taliban resurgence, Lieutenant General Safdar Hussain, the Corps Commander in Peshawar, said on July 25 that the Taliban "are getting public support in Pakistan, especially from some Pakistani religious parties." He was clearly pointing the finger at the JUI and Maulana Rehman was furious.

On Aug. 1, Maulana was detained in Dubai International Airport while on his way home from Libya and promptly deported, with officials in the United Arab Emirates hinting that he was on a terrorist list. Maulana Rehman accused the Pakistan government of not doing enough to save him from humiliation.

Musharraf's declaration that he would send home foreign students was seen as another attack on the JUI, who control the largest number of madrasas. Rehman and other leaders from his six-party alliance mounted a tirade against Musharraf and have threatened to start a campaign to unseat the government.

The fundamentalist leaders don't like Musharraf's liberal stance and are determined to protect their parties and institutions. But they are also furious with the army for trying to make them a scapegoat for all of Pakistan's ills, when they have only been a junior partner to the army's own past policies that have encouraged Islamic extremism to flourish.

Rehman is now defying the army by declaring that it bears responsibility for the fruits of its past policies, and that it should not seek to parry American pressure by blaming Pakistan's Islamic parties.

At one level, such statements are part of the kind of political wheeling and dealing that can be expected before local council elections later this month and general elections scheduled for 2007, when Musharraf wants to get himself elected as president. The fundamentalist parties feel threatened because they know that Musharraf may be trying to reduce their influence. But the danger is that Rehman and others could divulge more details of the intelligence services' links, which might diminish the military's credibility at home and abroad.

Musharraf is in a difficult position. Since Sept. 11 he has successfully ridden two horses, placating the West with promises of reform and crackdowns on extremists while pandering to the Islamic parties in order to retain their support. But now that Pakistan's political system is in danger of slowly unraveling as he loses support across the political spectrum, Musharraf could fall off altogether.

(Ahmed Rashid is the author of ''Taliban'' and, most recently, ''Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia.'')

http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/09/news/edrashid.php

more info:
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_9-8-2005_pg3_1

EDITORIAL: Fazlur Rehman's shocking allegations

Maulana Fazlur Rehman, chief of his own faction of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, has lashed out at the government. He has tried to achieve multiple objectives through his Sunday press conference in Lahore. Despite a late and indirect denial of the central element of his statement against the government, most papers covered his views, albeit with different headlines.

Mr Rehman has alleged that the Pakistani government is deceiving the US and the West by helping militants enter Afghanistan from Waziristan. He said that the government should reveal the identity of the infiltrators and explain its reasons for launching these people into Afghanistan. Mr Rehman says these men are being moved from Waziristan to military training camps in Mansehra before being sent into Afghanistan.

This is explosive stuff. Why would Mr Rehman choose to make such sweeping allegations? The answer to this can perhaps be found in his statement at the same press conference that "if pressured, I will reveal facts that will open a Pandora's box" (emphasis added). This means that Mr Rehman is feeling the heat of some government measures and is signalling to the government to lay off.

Still, the question is: Why would Mr Rehman - a religio-political leader whose party is the biggest vote-getter in the MMA (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal) alliance - make such an allegation? Mr Rehman was at one time identified with the Taliban and even gave anti-US and pro-Taliban statements. Why should he oppose an alleged official policy that presumably seeks to undermine the Pakistan and Karzai government? For an answer, let's hark back to the time Pakistan got involved in Afghanistan.

The thin end of the jihad wedge at the time was the Jama'at-e Islami. It was the JI-ISI combine that ran the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami was the leading group that Pakistan was supporting. The Deobandi JUI, Mr Rehman's faction as well as Maulana Samiul Haq's faction, were mostly out of the loop. By the early 1990s, however, with Afghanistan having plunged into a fratricidal civil war since the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1987, the JUI got the opportunity to play a role in Afghanistan when Islamabad conjured up the policy of using the Taliban. Mr Rehman was then an important ally of Benazir Bhutto's government. However, on the ground, it was Mr Haq's JUI faction that appropriated the Taliban, most of whom, followers of Maulvi Nabi Mohammadi, were educated in JUI-S seminaries.

This period saw the decline of Mr Rehman, both as a political and a religious leader. It was during this period that he employed the device of making anti-American statements to capture his religious vote-bank and cosy up to Mullah Umar. At the same time he got down to the task of reorganising his political party. By the time of the US attack on Afghanistan, Mr Rehman had pulled himself up. A combination of factors - government rigging in support of the MMA but primarily in support of the JUI, mobilisation of seminary students, the Pashtun factor, pro-Taliban sentiments and anti-American feelings - helped the JUIF to emerge as the largest vote-getter within the MMA. Mr Rehman has since played his cards well, securing for himself the position of leader of the opposition and keeping his governments in the NWFP and his coalition partnership in Balochistan safe. Indeed, he would have been even more successful but for the hard line taken by Qazi Hussain Ahmed, amir of the JI, who is looking for a direct confrontation with the government.

Mr Rehman's objectives are now clear. He wants to retain his two provincial governments because that allows him to retain and work on expanding his political base; he also wants to safeguard his religious interests because those interests translate into political power for him; so he will criticise the government but not do anything that could radically upset the current power balance; he wants to distance himself from extremist elements and the jihad underground because that does not fit into his scheme of things and so on. However, pressure from outside has forced the government to go for a broad sweep against all religious hard liners. Islamabad also seems to be in the process of reviewing its policy of subterranean alliance with the MMA. Mr Rehman feels that measures against the seminaries and getting the courts to disqualify MMA candidates from contesting municipal polls suggest that Islamabad is changing the rules of the game. This has forced him to lash out at Islamabad.

Mr Rehman employs religion to appeal to his constituency for political purposes. He feels that the heat is wrongly on moderate religious elements like the JUI. This is why he was quite specific in making his allegations when he said: "We ask the rulers to reveal the identity of the people being transported to Afghanistan from Waziristan via Kaali Sarak in private vehicles." It is instructive that he said the government was accusing clerics of promoting religious extremism and militancy although they (JUI clerics) were playing an active role in restoring peace in the tribal areas.

Mr Rehman is really cut up with the government for not having done anything in the wake of his humiliation at the Dubai airport. He feels that the UAE government treated him shabbily because Islamabad is signalling to the world that the extremist trouble can be directly traced to religious parties including the JUI.

Mr Rehman's allegations are serious. He should have thought twice before making them. He may now be keen to deny them. But the damage has been done.

More info about the Sudairi clan:
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/08/10/stories/2005081000931000.htm

Global terrorism - The Pakistan-Saudi Arabia nexus

G. Parthasarathy

There is no dearth of evidence that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are partners in global terrorism. Mosques and jehadi-oriented madrassas in both countries spout anti-Western venom. Terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba have links in Saudi Arabia. There are reports of extensive nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia since 1994. Hopefully, says G. Parthasarathy, the new Saudi monarch, King Abdullah, will avoid the path of sponsoring terror abroad.

WHEN SAUDI ARABIA'S ailing ruler King Fahd died after a prolonged illness on August 1, his last rites were performed according to strict Wahhabi traditions, with people going about their normal lives. But the one person who reacted as though his beloved uncle had died and proceeded to mourn publicly, was Pakistan's President, Gen Pervez Musharraf, who promptly declared a week-long state mourning and became the first non-Arab ruler of a Muslim country to announce that he would be present in Saudi Arabia at the last rites of the Saudi monarch.

What is it that prompted this show of grief and solidarity by Gen Musharraf? He had, after all, paid an official visit to the Wahhabi Kingdom barely six weeks ago? Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are now finding themselves in the same boat on issues of global terrorism. Pakistan's ISI continues to provide support to the Taliban and such Jehadi groups as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed, whose cadres are being arrested worldwide for inciting and promoting terrorism. There are strong suspicions that government-backed Saudi charities such as the Al Harmain Islamic Foundation, the International Institute for Islamic Thought, and the International Islamic Relief Organisation continue to fund extremist and terrorist activities worldwide and disturb peace and harmony in pluralistic societies.

King Abdullah, who has just ascended the throne in Riyadh, is respected as a moderate who realises the dangers of funding and supporting terrorism abroad.

The same, however, cannot be said of others in the Royal Family, including members of the powerful Sudairi clan, who have controlled the levers of power and defied Abdullah even when he was the kingdom's de facto ruler, after King Fahd became incapacitated. It is no secret the influential Royals of the Sudairi clan such as the Governor of Riyadh Prince Salman have funded extremist Islamist causes worldwide.

Prince Salman, for example, channelled huge funds to Islamic extremist groups in Bosnia, He is also known to have assisted in the provision of arms and training to Chechen rebels. King Fahd's "favourite" son Prince Abdul Aziz (popularly known as Azouzi) is reported to have sent millions of dollars through a known associate of Osama bin Laden to "slaughter Russian soldiers and civilians alike" in Chechnya.

Azouzi is also known to have transferred huge sums of money to countries Germany, Spain and the US to fund Wahhabi Islamic causes that preach hatred of the west.

His love for opulence is such that he was permitted by an indulgent father to spend $4.6 billion for constructing a palace outside Riyadh. Not surprisingly, one of America's leading experts Robert Baer, who was formerly in the CIA, says that Saudi Arabia is ruled by "an increasingly bankrupt, criminal, dysfunctional royal family that is hated by the people it rules'.

One would have expected that after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the Americans would come down heavily on Saudi Arabia's rulers. Washington has instead chosen to tread cautiously.

It is well-known that humanitarian causes dear to influential people such as Mrs Barbara Bush and Mrs Nancy Reagan have been funded by the Saudi Royals. Influential Americans including the Vice-President, Mr Dick Cheney, and Messrs George Schultz, James Baker, Colin Powell and Henry Kissinger have all been associated with companies such as the Carlyle Group, Haliburton and Chevron-Texaco that deal extensively with Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis are estimated to have invested over $500 billion in the US. They remain a major buyer of American arms and are the largest supplier of oil to the US. They have also played ball with the Americans in keeping global oil prices at levels that the Americans find acceptable. But while the Bush Administration has avoided public criticism of the links of Saudi Royals with international terrorism, American writers such as Robert Baer, Gerald Posner and Craig Unger have been given access to information about their terrorist links.

Gerald Posner recently revealed that when the FBI captured a top Al Qaeda man Abu Zubaydah in Faisalabad, the terrorist revealed that his main contacts in Saudi Arabia were Prince Ahmed bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz, a wealthy royal with a passion for racehorses, Prince Sultan bin Turki al Saud, a nephew of King Fahd, and Prince Fahd bin Turki, another relative of the monarch.

Zubaydah told his American interrogators that the Royal Family struck a deal with the Al Qaeda for the latter not to target it. He also revealed that Prince Ahmed was informed beforehand that the Al Qaeda was planning to strike American targets on September 11, 2001.

Zubaydah further revealed that the Al Qaeda had also struck a deal with the Pakistani military and informed Pakistan's Air Chief Marshal Mushaf Ali Mir of the impending 9/11 attacks.

Not surprisingly, the Bush Administration has remained silent on these allegations. More ominously, the 43-year-old Prince Ahmed died mysteriously in his sleep a few weeks after Zubyadah's revelations. His cousin Prince Sultan bin Turki died the next day in a "car accident" while proceeding to attend Prince Ahmed's funeral. Prince Fahd bin Turki died mysteriously a week later of "thirst" while he was said to be driving in the desert. Finally, the last person whose identity was revealed by Abu Zubaydah as having known of the impending terrorist attacks of 9/11, Air Chief Marshal Mir, died in a mysterious air crash in Pakistan.

According to Posner, the air crash in which Air Chief Marshal Mir died is widely believed to have been an act of sabotage. There is no dearth of evidence now that if Pakistan and China are partners in nuclear and missile proliferation, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are similarly partners in global terrorism. Mosques and jehadi-oriented madrassas in both countries spout anti-Western venom. Terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba have links in Saudi Arabia.

This is evident from the phone calls made by Lashkar militants operating in India to contacts in Saudi Arabia. But the Pakistani-Saudi Arabian nexus goes beyond terrorism. In July 2000, the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly reported that Saudi Arabia was sending 150,000 barrels of oil per day virtually free of cost to Pakistan. These supplies, currently valued at $ 3.2 billion annually, still continue.

Robert Baer has reported that the US has known of extensive nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia since 1994. The Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, was given unprecedented access to Pakistan's nuclear facilities in Kahuta in May 1999.

Dr A. Q. Khan visited Saudi Arabia shortly thereafter. According the Pakistani writer Amir Mir, Gen Musharraf's visit to Saudi Arabia on June 25-26 was primarily to discuss how to deny the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to information about the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia nuclear nexus. Saudi Arabia is said to be resisting pressures to adhere to the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which Iran has been compelled to accept.

Saudi Arabia has been a consistent supporter in the Organisation of Islamic Conference of Pakistan's protégés in the Hurriyat Conference in Jammu and Kashmir. It is going to take a long time for members of the Saudi Royal Family to stop funding extremist Islamic causes that destabilise pluralistic societies across the world. One sincerely hopes King Abdullah will avoid going down the path chosen by Gen Musharraf. No country can insulate itself from the inevitable consequences of sponsoring jehad and extremism abroad, while piously proclaiming its abhorrence of such causes. Words necessarily have to be matched by deeds.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

The Crisis in U.S.-Pakistani Relations

GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT08.24.2005

By George Friedman and Kamran Bokhari

Though the governments of the United States and Pakistan appear to be in sync with one another on the hunt for Osama bin Laden and militant Islamists, a crisis of relations is brewing just beneath the surface. Despite expressions of unity in the war against al Qaeda, cooperation at the operational and tactical levels is nearly nonexistent -and calculated interference by Pakistani intelligence and security elements is hindering U.S. operations in the country.

This situation is further complicated by ongoing rivalries between government agencies, poor communications and general lack of cooperation by U.S. intelligence and security agencies. All of which leaves counterterrorism operations in Pakistan -- or, more precisely, U.S. efforts to capture or kill bin Laden and other top al Qaeda leaders -- stagnant.

At the broad political level, Washington and Islamabad are presenting a relatively unified front in the battle. Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who must balance his domestic political concerns against U.S. pressure, continues to walk a fine line -- between cooperation with Washington (or with opposition forces within Pakistan), and capitulation.

On the surface, Musharraf and U.S. President George W. Bush are in a state of cautious compromise -- with Washington continuing to express confidence in Musharraf's government and offering increased military assistance to Pakistan. For its part, Islamabad has been paying lip service to counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, while still professing its ability to carry out sweeps and all other anti-jihadist operations on its own. The Musharraf government's attitude has been that it is doing all it can to get rid of terrorist sanctuaries, but it will not allow foreign forces to conduct operations on Pakistani soil. As Musharraf told U.S. media earlier this year, "We are capable of" capturing bin Laden, and "if we get intelligence, we will do it ourselves."

Islamabad recognizes that U.S. forces will operate in Pakistani territory -- with or without government permission -- and thus has struck a compromise so that U.S. operations will be kept as low-key as possible by both sides. The Pakistanis have acknowledged the involvement of foreign forces in the counterterrorism offensive but claim joint efforts are limited to intelligence-sharing and logistics cooperation. In this way, Islamabad seeks to defuse both U.S. pressure to act -- and domestic pressure to avoid acting.

But despite the political niceties, two key issues continue to impede efforts to dismantle al Qaeda's structure in Pakistan. The first is the professional rivalry between the CIA, Department of Defense and FBI, as well as other security and intelligence agencies, which continues to dog the post-Sept. 11 efforts to streamline intelligence-sharing. The second is the dismal performance by the Pakistani security and intelligence organizations.

It is true that a number of key al Qaeda operatives and leaders have been arrested by Pakistani authorities since their exodus from Afghanistan in late 2001. In March 2002, Abu Zubaydah, a senior al Qaeda member, was captured in Faisalabad. Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a deputy leader of the task force that coordinated the Sept. 11 attacks, was captured in Karachi in September 2002. And in March 2003, another task force leader, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, was picked up in Rawalpindi. Other prominent captures include those of communications expert Naeem Noor Khan, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (linked to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa), and Abu Farj al-Libi, believed to be the head of al Qaeda operations in Pakistan.

Nevertheless, the progress made against the core leadership of al Qaeda remains an open question. First, how is it that al Qaeda's mostly Arab leadership is able to evade detection in a country with very few Arabs? More important, how can a foreign non-state actor evade detection -- when he is known to be in a certain region, with massive global search-and-destroy operations hunting him -- unless he is granted succor or protection from some members of the local security and intelligence organizations closest to the front?

While those at the topmost levels of U.S. authority have been praising the Musharraf government as a crucial ally in the war against al Qaeda, certain U.S. officials lately have been making a public issue of Islamabad's non-cooperation. Among these is CIA Director Porter Goss, who insinuated a few months ago that bin Laden is known to be in Pakistan and said outright that in order for him to be captured, certain "weak links" -- i.e., Pakistan -- must be strengthened.

Goss's comments are clearly echoed by U.S. intelligence and defense officials now active in Pakistan and working with Islamabad. There is an ingrained distrust of U.S. and other foreign services within Pakistan's intelligence community -- stemming from nationalistic instincts, a desire to hide links between intelligence services and jihadists and their supporters, and sympathies on multiple levels with the jihadists.

One very senior Pakistani intelligence source engaged in a frank discussion about this atmosphere of distrust -- which is pervasive throughout the country's security organizations, even though most of Pakistan's law enforcement personnel are not personally Islamists. Some simply don't like the idea of U.S. pressure against their government, while others dislike being told how to do their jobs. Still others see the United States as arrogantly pursuing its own interests at Pakistan's expense. We are told there is a great deal of resentment -- from the highest echelons down through the rank-and-file -- over what the Pakistanis perceive as Washington's failure to recognize the efforts, sacrifices, and cooperation they are providing.

And, not insignificantly, there are some who perceive that the jihadists Washington is now pursuing were created by the United States' proxy war in 1980s Afghanistan -- and who believe that the U.S. government, having abandoned Afghanistan after meeting its objectives there, will abandon Pakistan in similar fashion.

Resistance to U.S. influence, therefore, has been both passive and active, with intelligence operatives telling local police and village chiefs directly not to cooperate with U.S. operations on the ground. Sources in Pakistan tell us that the Inter-Services Intelligence and Military Intelligence agencies debrief all private Pakistani citizens who come into contact with U.S. government, media and think tanks -- both before and after the interface -- in attempts to restrict contact between the two countries to official channels. Additionally, certain high-level leaders of Pakistani militant Islamist movements have been declared off-limits as targets for security forces, thus leaving key segments of the international militant network unmolested. The United States is providing large amounts of supplies, money and training for Pakistani forces, but with few results.

Clearly, cooperation from the country's intelligence and security apparatus -- a major cog in the machine built to hunt down al Qaeda in Pakistan -- is not happening. There are four reasons for this:

1. The insistence by top leadership that U.S. forces cannot operate any more prominently on Pakistani soil than they already are. Though there are many reasons behind this, as mentioned earlier, they boil down for some key government officials to mere survival: Islamist militants have made several attempts on Musharraf's life and others within the regime, at al Qaeda's behest. Nationalist sentiments and political opposition to Musharraf's government are considerations as well.

2. Calculated moves by influential figures at the middle and lower levels of Pakistan's intelligence and security apparatus to thwart offensives against the militants. Some of this reflects countermoves by Islamabad against American attempts to push the limits of tacit security agreements with the Pakistanis. However, it is also a sign that the Musharraf regime does not have tight control over its own intelligence and security services -- and of this, Islamabad is keenly and nervously aware.

3. The Pakistani military's desire to hide its past links with the militants and its current ties to certain Islamist groups -- which it views as assets of the state to be used in pursuit of Islamabad's geopolitical goals. For Islamabad, the jihadists have long been both an internal threat to military/civilian rule and a useful form of leverage in its geopolitical maneuvers -- for example, gaining strategic depth with regard to Afghanistan and waging its proxy war against India in Kashmir. Pakistan is not willing to surrender this leverage lightly -- and, because the lines between those "useful" militant groups and al Qaeda members can be blurry, many on Islamabad's preservation list fall into both categories.

4. Recognition within Islamabad that Pakistan's importance as a U.S. ally likely will dissolve if bin Laden is captured or killed. Washington has been attempting to strengthen its ties with India and is even attempting tentative negotiations with Iran, with the eventual goal of warmer relations. Should these efforts bear fruit, the Musharraf regime's geopolitical importance to the United States will diminish -- leaving Islamabad as a potential member of the "outposts of tyranny" rather than a close anti-terrorism ally.

Given these factors -- coupled with the potential for ineptitude and rivalries among the Pakistani and U.S. security and intelligence agencies -- there is a crisis that has brought the search for al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan to a virtual halt. This situation cannot last indefinitely -- the breaking point will come either with a misstep by Musharraf that destroys the political balance he has tried to maintain within Pakistan, or a decision by Washington that delay, obfuscation and overt obstructionism will no longer be tolerated. If Islamabad doesn't act -- and it is questionable whether another pre-packaged capture of a mid-level al Qaeda operative by Pakistani forces will satisfy the Bush administration -- Washington will be left with little choice but to move on its own.

Islamabad's response to the pressure is predicated on one unanswered question: Is Musharraf lying to the United States, or is he being lied to by his own people? In other words, is he in control of the obstructionism, or is he a victim of it? We believe the reality is somewhere in the middle. Nevertheless, the outlook is troubling.

Thought I'd move this article over here..............

11 soldiers, 30 militants killed in North Waziristan-(results of Paki offensive)
jang ^ | October 01, 2005 | Rahimullah Yusufzai

http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2005-daily/01-10-2005/main/main1.htm

PESHAWAR: Federal Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao on Friday conceded the loss of 11 soldiers in two days of fighting in North Waziristan as helicopter gunships again bombed villages to flush out militants who have been offering stiff resistance to Pakistan Army troops.

The intense fighting has caused casualties on both sides and forced hundreds of villagers to evacuate to safer places. The village of Khattay Killay, scene of most of the fighting, has reportedly been emptied of the population due to the intense exchange of fire in the area and the constant threat to life and property.

Precise casualty figures were not available, primarily due to the fact that fighting was still going on in the area. In an interview to BBC Urdu service, Interior Minister Sherpao said six troops were killed on Thursday while another five, including an Army Major, died on Friday.

He said nine of the dead were Pakistan Army soldiers while the remaining two were militiamen from the paramilitary Frontier Corps. The minister estimated that 25 to 30 militants were also killed in the fighting.

However, Sherpao did not say anything about reports that 20 soldiers had gone missing after being deployed in the Khattay Killay area. Tribal elders and Ulema who met Major-General Muhammad Akram Sahi, General Officer Commanding (GOC), Peshawar and commander of the troops battling the militants in North Waziristan, in Miranshah town on Friday afternoon quoted him as saying that 19 Pakistan Army soldiers and one Frontier Corps militiaman were missing.

Requesting anonymity, they said the general wanted recovery of his men and delivery of militants to the military before any agreement on ceasefire. More than 200 tribal Maliks and Ulema waited the whole day on Friday for fighting to subside before travelling to Khattay Killay in the Hamzoni tribal territory near Miranshah, headquarters of North Waziristan, in a bid to effect ceasefire.

They had come from all over North Waziristan to the Miranshah Fort to meet political agent Syed Zaheerul Islam and seek his instructions regarding terms of the ceasefire. They were made to wait for Maj-Gen Sahi, who was directing military operations in the battle zone. The general later met the Jirga members and discussed the situation in North Waziristan.

If the Jirga is able to undertake the journey to Khattay Killay today, its major task would be to prevail upon the village elders to allow troops to search the suspected homes. However, the Jirga members said they want the military to stop the bombing of the village by helicopter gunships to enable them to mediate between the two sides.

Maulana Nek Zaman, the pro-MMA MNA from North Waziristan, his colleague Senator Mateen Shah, JUI-F leader Maulana Abdul Rahman, and leading tribal elder Malik Qadir Khan are some of the prominent members of the Jirga.

A 180-member Jirga had gone to Khattay Killay on Thursday but the fighting and bombing prevented them from pursuing their task. Official sources said the troops were keen to lay hands on Maulana Sadiq Noor, who belongs to Khattay Killay where he runs a Madrassa and is accused of harbouring militants. He and other important figures among the tribal militants had reportedly escaped from Khattay Killay.

Earlier, tribal militants from all over North Waziristan were reported to have rushed to Khattay Killay to join the fighting and resist the military. Meanwhile, the bodies of Major Muhammad Khan, who belonged to Swat, and two soldiers who were killed in the fighting on Thursday were recovered from the hills near Khazoyo village and flown away in a helicopter.

Tribal elders too had been sent early on Friday to retrieve the bodies of the fallen soldiers. Tribal sources said at least six tribesmen were among the dead in the affected villages. The militants too suffered casualties but they would have taken away bodies of their slain colleagues.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1494727/posts

OK,

PAKISTAN: AT LEAST 18 KILLED BY MISSILE ATTACK

Islamabad, 13 Jan. (AKI) - Unknown aircraft fired some three missiles into a village in the pro-Taliban tribal area of Bajaur on Friday, killing at least 18 people, according to residents and security officials quoted in news reports. The area borders Afghanistan's insurgent-troubled Kunar province, and several "huge" explosions rocked the village of Damadola at about 3 am local time, said a military spokesman, Major-General Shaukat Sultan.

Sultan said he did know the cause of the blasts, but said an investigation of the incident was underway. Eywitness told the Pakistan's Geo-TV that aircraft had been flying over the area for the last four days, and they heard the sound of planes' engines when Friday's blasts occurred. The house of local tribesman Gul Zaman was completely destroyed in the attacks, eyewitnesses said.

A Pakistani intelligence official quoted by Reuters said two aircraft had come in from Afghanistan and fired two or three missiles. "The casualties may be much higher. People are very angry. They are not allowing access, so exact figures of deaths and wounded people are not available," he said.

A U.S. military spokesman in Afghanistan was quoted as saying there were no reports of US forces operating in that area. There have been no previous reports of fighting in Bajaur.

The incident comes just days after Pakistan launched a vehement protest with the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. Cross-border firing in the nearby Waziristan tribal area last weekend killed eight people, including a women and wounded nine, Pakistan alleges.

Damadola village, the scene of Friday's attack, has been a stronghold of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law), a pro-Taliban group banned by Pakistan in January, 2002.

Pakistani intelligence officials suspect Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi may be involved in attacks on Coalition forces in Afghanistan, and the missile strikes may have been launched in retaliation.

US forces have been in Afghanistan since 2001, pursuing the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies. US officials have long said they believed Osama bin Laden has been hiding out on the remote Afghan-Pakistan border

http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level.php?cat=Security&loid=8.0.248941634&par=0

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