Posted on 01/13/2004 9:01:35 AM PST by Aurelius
Dust jackets for most books about the American Civil War depict generals, politicians, battle scenes, cavalry charges, cannons[sic] firing, photographs or fields of dead soldiers, or perhaps a battle between ironclads. In contrast our book {[url=http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?userid=2XGHOEK4JT&isbn=0842029613&itm=7]Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War Mark Thornton, Steven E. Woodworth (Editor), Robert B. Ekelund[/url]features a painting by Edgar Degas entitled the "Cotton Exchange" which depicts several calm businessmen and clerks, some of them Degas’s relatives, going about the business of buying and selling cotton at the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. The focus of this book is thus on the economic rationality of seemingly senseless events of the Civil War – a critical period in American history.
What caused the war? Why did the Union defeat the Confederacy? What were the consequences of the War? The premise of the book is that historians have a comparative advantage in describing such events, but economists have the tools to help explain these events.
We use traditional economic analysis, some of it of the Austrian and Public Choice variety, to address these principal questions and our conclusions generally run counter to the interpretations of historians. In contrast to historians who emphasize the land war and military strategy, we show that the most important battle took place at sea. One side, the blockade runners, did not wear uniforms or fire weapons at their opponents. The other side, the blockading fleet, was composed of sailors who had weapons and guns but they rarely fired their cannons in hopes of damaging their opponents. Their pay was based on the valued of captured ships. Historians often have argued that the Confederacy lost because it was overly reluctant to use government power and economic controls, but we show the exact opposite. Big Confederate government brought the Confederacy to its knees.
Some now teach that slavery was the sole cause of the Civil War – an explanation that historians have developed in the twentieth century. However, this analysis does not explain why the war started in 1861 (rather than 1851 or 1841) and it fails to explain why slavery was abolished elsewhere without such horrendous carnage.
We emphasize economics and politics as major factors leading to war. The Republicans who came to power in 1860 supported a mercantilist economic agenda of protectionism, inflation, public works, and big government. High tariffs would have been a boon to manufacturing and mining in the north, but would have been paid largely by those in the export-oriented agriculture economy.
Southern economic interests understood the effects of these policies and decided to leave the union. The war was clearly related to slavery, but mainly in the sense that Republican tariffs would have squeezed the profitability out of the slave-based cotton plantation economy to the benefit of Northern industry (especially Yankee textiles and iron manufacturing). Southerners would also have lost out in terms of public works projects, government land giveaways, and inflation.
The real truth about wars is that they are not started over principle, but over power. Wars however, are not won by power on the battlefield, but by the workings and incentives of men who go to work in fields and factories, to those who transport, store and sell consumer goods, and most especially to the entrepreneurs and middlemen who make markets work and adapt to change. This emphasis and this economic account of tariffs, blockade and inflation, like the focus of Degas’s "Cotton Exchange" reveals the most important and least understood aspect of war.
We know he wouldn't do that </sarcasm>
That is absolutely ridiculous. After getting Lincoln to agree that they were, in fact, independent you expect the rebels to agree to reunification? Why would they do that? They launched their rebellion because they saw Lincoln as a threat to slavery. Lincoln wasn't going away. Slavery wasn't going to become any less important in the weeks or months to come. But you believe that there was a chance that the confederate congress would change their mind, the Davis regime would fold it's tent, and everyone would reunite under Lincoln's leadership. All while holding hands and singing 'Kumbaya' no doubt.
No discussions with the so-called peace commissioners was possible because nothing was open for discussion until recognition was bestowed. Peaceful settlement was possible only if everything was open for discussion and that was not the case. Davis didn't want it that way.
Why would we admit something as completely asinine as that? Lincoln didn't invade a foreign country and he didn't exceed his constitutional authority.
free dixie,sw
Your assertion is that the President - by meeting with anyone - establishes diplomatic relations? Congress by law establishes such relations. Anything else is simply a meeting.
Lincoln didn't invade a foreign country and he didn't exceed his constitutional authority.
The blockade extended - by international law - official recognition of a foreign government.
Yes, the laws had "failed of execution" in the south, is the way I believe the president put it.
That triggers section 2, and as the Court said, the president is authorized to act under the act of 2/28/1795 -- the Militia Act.
All your verbose excuses fail besides the clear words of the Prize Cases ruling.
Walt
When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory, have declared their independence, have cast off their allegiance, have organized armies, have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a war.Were they considered belligerents and was it a war?
Foreign nations acknowledge it as war by a declaration of neutrality. The condition of neutrality cannot exist unless there be two belligerent parties.The world considers the contest a war and the parties belligerents. Next, what rights are accorded to the parties as belligerents, and what type of war is this?[O]n the 13th of May, 1861, the Queen of England issued her proclamation of neutrality ... This was immediately followed by similar declarations or silent acquiescence by other nations.
Hence the parties to a civil war usually concede to each other belligerent rights. They exchange prisoners, and adopt the other courtesies and rules common to public or national wars.No problem so far, the world, and the governments all recognize the parties as belligerents, and the war as a public war. So what does Grier have to say about belligerent parties in a public war?
'The parties belligerent in a public war are independent nations.
It's no opinion, non-seq. It is a simple matter of fact about the document as written by the people who were there and as understood by any and all but the most tortured, willfully obtuse, and intentionally deceptive readings of that document's explicit text. If your argument were valid - which it is not - you would have to not only accepted an extremely tortured reading of the constitution but also explicitly deny the recorded understanding of that clause by the people who were physically there at the constitutional convention. In any case, such an argument is unsustainable, indefensible, and for all practical purposes junk.
Case in point: Robert Yates, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, explicitly wrote of that clause that "In the same section it is provided, that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion and invasion, the public safety may require it." This clause limits the power of the legislature to deprive a citizen of the right of habeas corpus, to particular cases viz. those of rebellion and invasion; the reason is plain, because in no other cases can this power be exercised for the general good."
Robert Yates was there at the convention, non-seq. Had the authors of the constitution considered even the remote possibility that the clause pertained to anybody other than Congress do you think that Yates would have said what he did? Do you honestly believe that Robert Yates or any of the other delegates to that convention - any single one of them - ever believed that the clause they wrote and they inserted into Article I under the explicit provisions of Article I applied to somebody other than Congress? If you do then not only do you possess great ignorance of your country's history - you are also willfully dishonest about it.
but not one shared by Abraham Lincoln.
The assertion that black people are equal to white people was not shared by Abraham Lincoln. Does that make it less true?
Since the Constitution does not explicitly state who may suspend habeas corpus then it would be for the Supreme Court to determine who is right.
Your premise is faulty. The Constitution DOES explicitly state who can suspend it and that body is Congress. Once again, exactly what about the phrase "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States" is so confusing? Exactly what about that phrase do you not understand?
That phrase doesn't state that the suspension of habeus corpus is a legislative power, only that legislative powers are vested with congress, and your interpretation doesn't account for the extended periods when Congress is not in session.
Lincoln did pretty well given the secessionist cards he was dealt. For example in 1861 he could have leveled Charleston without suspending habeus corpus, and he didn't.
legislative = that which is of or pertaining to a legislature. By stating "legislative powers" - the object of the article itself - and noting them to be "herein granted" - as in within Article I - the Constitution indicates that the powers found in Article I are legislative (that is they are of or pertaining to a legislature). Those powers, notes the constitution, are vested in a Congress. Since the habeas corpus clause is in Article I it must by necessity belong to Congress. Doubt me? Then provide the statement of a founding father or other authority present at the adoption of the Constitution who ever said so much as a single word otherwise.
and your interpretation doesn't account for the extended periods when Congress is not in session.
Sure it does. That's why there is this clause from Article II pertaining to a president's powers:
"[H]e may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper"
Surely something like a war or other emergency would constitute an "extraordinary occasion," thus the Constitution is clear on its intent for the president to convene congress in times such as those you mentioned.
"§ 1556. The power to convene congress on extraordinary occasions is indispensable to the proper operations, and even safety of the government. Occasions may occur in the recess of congress, requiring the government to take vigorous measures to repel foreign aggressions, depredations, and direct hostilities; to provide adequate means to mitigate, or overcome unexpected calamities; to suppress insurrections; and to provide for innumerable other important exigencies, arising out of the intercourse and revolutions among nations."
Per page 350 of the 2004 World Almanac, Montana became the 41st state on November 8, 1889, 24 years after Appomattox.
foreverfree
In the realm of constitutional law, the means used to arrest him was indeed a cardinal sin. Habeas Corpus is known as "The Great Writ" for a reason: it is the primary basis of all other rights within the judicial system.
I would have shot him.
And, excepting the event that you fired in order to protect your own person or property, you would have been rightly prosecuted for murder upon doing so.
Be it enacted, &c., That whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth such number of the militia of the State or States most convenient to the place of danger or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to issue his orders for that purpose to such officer or officers of the militia as he shall think proper. And, in case of an insurrection in any State against the Government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the Legislature of such State, or of the Executive, (when the Legislature cannot be convened,) to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or States as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such insurrection.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed in any State, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the Marshals by this act, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia of such State, or of any other State or States, as may be necessary to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed; and the use of militia so to be called forth, may be continued, if necessary, until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of the then next session of Congress.
[Walt]
Yes, the laws had "failed of execution" in the south, is the way I believe the president put it.That triggers section 2, and as the Court said, the president is authorized to act under the act of 2/28/1795 -- the Militia Act.
All your verbose excuses fail besides the clear words of the Prize Cases ruling.
[T]he laws had "failed of execution" in the south, is the way I [Walt] believe the president put it. The way Section 2 of the Militia Act puts it is, That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed in any State, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the Marshals by this act....
Lincoln did not call up the Militia to assist the Marshals of the courts. This assinine excuse for a legal argument is so irrelevant that the court did not even see fit to make the slightest reference to Section 2 of the Militia Act of 1795.
Daniel Farber wrote an entire book, Lincoln's Constitution, in which he tried to defend most of Lincoln's acts (although even he conceded that some of the acts could not be defended). He also did not make any reference to Section 2 of the Militia Act of 1795.
You never provide any citation to anything when making this assinine assertion because no legal authority would even consider making this goofy argument.
[Walt] That triggers section 2, and as the Court said, the president is authorized to act under the act of 2/28/1795 -- the Militia Act.
Again, you must pervert what was said and supply your words in preference to what was actually said.
The court said absolutely nothing about Section 2 of the Militia Act of 1795. The court did not even refer to Section 2 of the Militia Act. The court referred to Section 1 of the Militia Act and only to recite what he is authorized to do pursuant to the Act. The Court simply restated that the President may call out the militia "in case of invasion by foreign nations, and to suppress insurrection." The Act itself spells out the differing requirements to calling out the Militia in response to invasion or insurrection.
REALITY CHECK: "But by the Acts of Congress of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is authorized to call out the militia and use the military and naval forces of the United States in case of invasion by foreign nations, and to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of the United States." ~The Prize Cases~
I prefer to discuss what SCOTUS actually said, rather than to discuss your inaccurate paraphrase. The President may act alone in case of invasion, whether by a foreign nation or by states in rebellion. However, in case of insurrection, action pursuant to the Militia Act requires a state request. What are you going for, Walt? Invasion that did not require a state request, or insurrection that did require such request?
Specifically, SCOTUS partially restated the clause that says: "And, in case of an insurrection in any State against the Government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the Legislature of such State, or of the Executive, (when the Legislature cannot be convened,) to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or States as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such insurrection."
The Militia Act is not involved with the holding in the decision. SCOTUS was extracting Lincoln's chestnuts from the fire. SCOTUS was addressing the question of a blockade which led to the seizure of foreign ships and their cargo. One does not blockade in an insurrection, one closes the ports. A blockade is an act of war. SCOTUS found a war to exist. The ruling explicitly states that the authority to institute the blockade and make it lawful was jus belli or the laws of war.
SCOTUS did --NOT-- apply the Militia Act to the facts of the instant case and find it to have any relevance
Lincoln had cited the Militia Act. SCOTUS incompletely stated the content of the Act, not wanting publicly to make Lincoln look like a fool. That does not change the content of the Act.
[Walt] All your verbose excuses fail besides the clear words of the Prize Cases ruling.
No. All -your- lame excuses and misstatements of the case fail when confronted by the clear words of the Prize Cases ruling. Read it again. Keep reading it until it penetrates. The Court ruled "the President had a right Jure Belli. Jure Belli = The Law of War, not the Militia Act of 1795.
The Militia Act of 1795 was irrelevant to the Prize Cases. Lincoln proclaimed and instituted a BLOCKADE. The Prize Cases concerned the legality of a BLOCKADE.
AGAIN, HERE IS HOW THE COURT ACTUALLY RULED:
THE QUESTION:Mr. Justice GRIER.
There are certain propositions of law which must necessarily affect the ultimate decision of these cases, and many others, which it will be proper to discuss and decide before we notice the special facts peculiar to each.
They are, 1st. Had the President a right to institute a blockade of ports in possession of persons in armed rebellion against the Government, on the principles of international law, as known and acknowledged among civilized States?
THE SUPREME COURT RULING ON THAT QUESTION:
On this first question therefore we are of the opinion that the President had a right, jure belli, to institute a blockade of ports in possession of the States in rebellion, which neutrals are bound to regard.
"The president had a right, jure belli...."
The president had a right pursuant to the laws of war....
HAD THE PRESIDENT A RIGHT TO INSTITUTE A BLOCKADE?
YES, PURSUANT TO THE L-A-W-S O-F W-A-R.
That's what he did.
Walt
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