Posted on 03/07/2002 11:06:46 PM PST by JohnHuang2
Former U.S. diplomats say the Saudi Arabia government helped "sustain" the al-Qaida network inside the kingdom as well as in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Somalia, and that the U.S. Mission there "failed" to provide information to Washington about the Saudi role.
"The level of involvement of the Saudi government was wholehearted and enthusiastic. It was Saudi government policy to keep the Americans at bay and deceived with one arm while aiding and encouraging the international groups involved in conquest and terror with the other arm," Tim Hunter, a former military intelligence officer and diplomat in Saudi Arabia, told WorldNetDaily.
"All U.S. intelligence gathered in the U.S. Mission was turned over to the CIA station, which generally did not send the information on to Washington," he said. The mission "consequently failed to provide information about the widespread role of Saudi Arabia – actually elements in certain ministries – in sustaining al-Qaida," the terrorist group founded by Osama bin Laden and blamed for the Sept. 11 attacks, inside the kingdom and elsewhere.
Hunter also says that "a number of U.S. officials" received funds for "special projects" from Saudi sources, including sources "in the palace." The diplomat described corruption between U.S. and Saudi officials as "massive," adding the dishonesty is likely what permitted al-Qaida to thrive.
The corruption, as well as "loss of independence and [a] general lethargy of activity on behalf of the American cause, is the major reason that al-Qaida was able to exist, operate on a broad scale and carry out a series of highly successful terrorist acts in which the Saudi government flatly refused to assist U.S. officials in Washington," he said.
Worse, he asserted, "U.S. officials in Saudi Arabia generally undermined U.S. efforts to track down al-Qaida killers and effectively acted as advocates for a range of Saudi interests and personalities."
Recent reports have detailed rifts between Washington and Riyadh, as the Saudi government balked at demands made by the U.S. last year following the attacks that it help identify, track down and destroy suspected al-Qaida cells and operatives inside the kingdom.
A former Air Force officer and civilian contractor who served from 1983-91 in Saudi Arabia agreed that anti-U.S. sentiment grew steadily over the years.
"Back then we didn't know them as 'al-Qaida,' but you'd hear stories about some of the preaching in the mosques and so forth that was very anti-American," said the officer, who requested anonymity.
"There was little overt hostility then," he said, but it became clear that Americans were not welcome in the kingdom.
"I told one of my students one day it was unfortunate that I didn't know more Arabic, as we taught [civilian air adviser courses] in English and there was no need for it," the officer said. "My student replied, 'It's probably better you don't understand Arabic, because you'd hear things you wouldn't like.'"
Other foreign-service officers recall "special" circumstances where U.S. officials were likely aiding bin Laden's growing al-Qaida network.
Michael Springmann, a former State Department official stationed in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, from 1987-89, told WorldNetDaily that he believes the CIA was running a liquor-for-profit scam in the kingdom more than a decade ago to help finance an effort to train bin Laden operatives fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.
In Jeddah – the historic Saudi capital – on his first assignment abroad for the State Department, Springmann said that, as consular officer in charge of approving visas, "I repeatedly objected to being told by high-ranking [State Department] officials to issue visas for unqualified applicants."
Essentially, he said, "these were people who … had no ties either to their own country or to Saudi Arabia, where they were applying for the visa."
Upon leaving the State Department a few years later, Springmann said he discovered "that I wasn't objecting to visa fraud – I was objecting to a CIA program to recruit people for the Afghan war, using [CIA] asset Osama bin Laden, and get them visas to come to the [United States] for terrorist training."
Springmann said such stories were confirmed by program participants – a journalist, a Palestinian and an Afghan – who "were tied to the U.S. government. …"
The State Department vet said part of the "screaming" he was doing at the time was related to the sale of "fantastic amounts" of bootleg liquor at the U.S. Consulate. "Nobody would come clean where the money was going," he said.
Springmann said U.S. officials told him the money raised went to charities and "family support funds." But he believes the profits "fueled 'off-the-books' operations, including shipping these guys to the States for training, then getting them back to Afghanistan."
The liquor – illegal in the kingdom – came from U.S. military warehouses in Germany, Insight Magazine reported Feb. 11, brought into the country in 40-foot maritime containers.
Springmann estimated he was forced to approve "about 100" illicit visas while at his post. He told WND he kept a file on each one he was ordered to issue by senior consulate officials.
"I made a photocopy of their visa application with a notation that it was rejected but the consulate general had ordered it to be issued," he said. "I learned after I departed Jeddah that these files had been destroyed."
"Several U.S. foreign-service officers repeatedly called attention to these and other problems," Hunter says. But "by not correcting these problems, by squashing dissent, the U.S. became a sort of accomplice in its own injuries," a reference to 9-11 and other attacks against U.S. interests.
He added that it's "difficult to document" how senior U.S. officials "failed to curb the activities of al-Qaida." But, he observed, "one notices that events and sequences that took place over many years … occurred because of decisions which can only be made at a high level," adding that some "5,000 Saudi nationals were trained by al-Qaida."
The former diplomat said funds for the terrorist group were openly collected in the streets and shops of the kingdom around 1992, intended for "international fraternal Islamic fighters," a phrase he says refers to al-Qaida.
"Solicitors went to workplaces and mosques and sought contributions, and these funds flowed to the Balkans – where al-Qaida operated," he told WND.
The State Department was contacted but did not immediately return phone calls seeking comment.
Other critics say it may be time for Washington to end its "special relationship" with Riyadh.
"The common wisdom is that we must turn the other cheek and stay on friendly terms with the Saudi autocrats because we need their oil. Nonsense," writes Jerry Taylor and Ted Galen Carpenter, analysts for the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank in Washington, D.C.
"They need our money more than we need their oil," Taylor and Carpenter wrote in a Nov. 16 commentary. "Repeat after us: 'There is no "oil weapon."'"
But, "all that could change if bin Laden's political agents seize control of the [OPEC] oil kingdoms," the Cato analysts said – a point of view shared by Ivan Eland, director of defense policy studies at Cato.
"The worst possible case is Saudi fundamentalist radicals torching the oil wells to undermine the Saudi government – a scenario made more likely by public resentment of the U.S. military presence," Eland wrote in a recent study. "After all, that is Osama bin Laden's chief reason for waging a worldwide jihad against U.S. targets."
"If there's a case for turning the other cheek when it comes to the Saudis, it's that any regime replacing the House of Saud would probably be worse than the one we're dealing with now," Taylor and Carpenter said.
"Saudi Arabia is an oppressive regime that mocks everything this nation stands for. They helped to create and sustain the terror network that now threatens our existence. Saudi Arabia is not a reliable member of the international coalition against terrorism," the pair wrote. "In fact, when it comes to terrorism, the Saudi regime is part of the problem, not part of the solution. American foreign policy should react accordingly."
I'll believe that. And if they DON'T ........ well, they get to spend more time with their family.
Now, where people get that Glaze over their eyes is when you start compiling the logic and the "Famous Quotes" from public figures who stated that.
I agree with Lion's Cub in his reply #19-someone in Washington really had to know and nothing was done just as ratcat confirmed in reply #24.
Bush family deals with the Saudis and Saudi royal family backing of AlQaeda in Saudi Arbia, Somalia,Afghanistan and the Balkans (WND articel that came out yesterday) are other reasons why Washington looked the other way.
See Plummz reply #22 about Atta and Saudi Royal family. THe FBI was tracking Atta for years in the US but kept hands off. Was it because Atta really was protected by the Saudi influence on US decison makers in FBI, DOJ,CIA? The FBI told the Norman Oklahoman flight school VP in 1999 that the FBI knew then that Atta was preparing for a terror missing using airliners in the US!
"The FBI told the Norman Oklahoman flight school VP in 1999 that the FBI knew then that Atta was preparing for a terror MISSION using airliners in the US!"
Absolutely correct. Far too many people still think we must stay friends with the House of Saud because of oil.
"If there's a case for turning the other cheek when it comes to the Saudis, it's that any regime replacing the House of Saud would probably be worse than the one we're dealing with now," Taylor and Carpenter said.
Maybe. It is up to the House of Saud to show that their value to us is enough to justify our continued support. Based on what has made it into the public domain, their time has passed. Perhaps the behind the scenes help has been better, but there is little visible evidence that this is so.
If a formal break comes, I do not expect any problem from the break itself. We have now had enough time to mitigate the loss of a formerly critical airbase in Saudi Arabia. Ending the chimera of friendship may make it much easier to do what needs to be done.
We might have a problem if open hostilities erupted between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. We could swat them like a fly militarily, but the presence of Mecca and Medina on Saudi soil would make things complicated. Any perceived threat to these locations could easily unify all of Islam against the U.S. We do not want a war against all of Islam, but it could certainly happen.
Balkans and the State Department, eh? BIN LADEN GATE
"I made a photocopy of their visa application with a notation that it was rejected but the consulate general had ordered it to be issued," he said. "I learned after I departed Jeddah that these files had been destroyed."
"Several U.S. foreign-service officers repeatedly called attention to these and other problems," Hunter says. But "by not correcting these problems, by squashing dissent, the U.S. became a sort of accomplice in its own injuries," a reference to 9-11 and other attacks against U.S. interests.
I wonder how many "suitcase handshakes" (arabic slang for a very large cash bribe) have passed between Suadi princes and high US officials?
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.