North Korea and their NUCLEAR Weapons Program

VARIOUS ^ | FR Post 02-22-02 | Compiled by VANNROX

[vannrox]

North Korea
And their NUCLEAR Weapon Program

Compiled by VANNROX.

The Forthcoming Perry Report

On 12 November 1998, US President Bill Clinton appointed former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry as the US North Korean Policy Coordinator. Perry was tasked with (a) consulting and coordinating US North Korean policy with South Korea, Japan, and China, (b) undertaking a comprehensive review of current US foreign policy toward North Korea, and (c) making a detailed report to the Clinton administration including policy recommendations on modifying US policy toward North Korea.

Perry’s appointment was an attempt to give high-level attention and direction to the US’ North Korea policy at a time when the administration’s policy of cautious engagement with North Korea was under attack from conservatives in Congress and the media, as well as conflicting bureaucratic agencies in Washington.[1] The 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework under which North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in return for the delivery of heavy-fuel oil and two 1,000MW light-water nuclear reactors was in trouble. Funding problems, a consequence of the East Asian financial crisis, and political pressure from conservatives within the United States, were compounded by intelligence leaks that North Korea had breached the 1994 accord by pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program at an alleged secret underground nuclear site at Kumchang-ri.[2]

It also became evident that the totalitarian regime of Kim Jong-il was unlikely to collapse soon. Pyongyang came to regard its nuclear ambiguity and ballistic missile programs as bargaining chips in its negotiations with the United States and viewed them as essential tools to guarantee regime survival in the face of economic collapse and diplomatic isolation. In Seoul, the Kim Dae-jung administration recognized this reality and from early 1998 embarked on a bold "Sunshine" or engagement policy with North Korea. Thus, pressure increased on Washington to explore the prospects of normalizing economic and political relations with Pyongyang in order to achieve the twin US foreign policy goals of regional stability and nonproliferation in Northeast Asia.[3]

As part of the process of consulting with regional actors, Perry traveled to South Korea, Japan, and China in December 1998.[4] He also undertook a diplomatic mission to North Korea in late May 1999, the highest-ranking US representative to visit the country since former US president Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang in June 1994. During his visit, Perry met with senior North Korean leaders including the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong-nam, Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan, and General Ri Yong-chol, director of the North Korean National Defense Commission, and held discussions on both missile and nuclear proliferation as well as the future direction of US-North Korean relations.

Although Perry was unable to meet with supreme North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, he characterized the talks as "intensive, extremely substantive, and quite valuable".[5] South Korean government sources later disclosed that during his visit to North Korea, Perry proposed a comprehensive plan for engaging North Korea including a package of economic and political incentives if North Korea abandoned its nuclear and missile programs.[6]

The contents of the forthcoming Perry report and the attendant policy recommendations are a closely guarded secret. However, the report’s salient features have been leaked by various sources ranging from the South Korean government to Perry himself.[7]

On 25 February 1999, the Wall Street Journal reported that Perry will propose that the current US policy of cautiously engaging North Korea be abandoned in favor of a bold approach. The United States should engage North Korea vigorously for a short-period of time during which it should offer the possibility of normalizing political-economic relations with North Korea in order to achieve US foreign policy objectives, including the curtailing of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.

However, if engagement fails, the United States should adopt a stringent containment policy toward North Korea. It should decrease diplomatic contact to the point where North Korea becomes isolated from the rest of the world until the Kim Jong-il regime collapses under the weight of its own economic and political contradictions.[8]

Perry has hinted that his report will include policy incentives should North Korea cooperate with the United States, as well as disincentives if North Korea remains intransigent and unwilling to cooperate. On 11 March 1999, Perry said that if North Korea refused to be reasonable, "We would expect to have the United States, Japan, and South Korea united in both the need for sterner measures and the way in which we carry them out." Perry said these measures could include military strikes and "across the board" economic blockades of North Korea.[9]

On 26 March 1999, Perry explained that his report to the Clinton administration would not include "time limits" for US engagement of North Korea and that he "believes military confrontation is so serious, we should exhaust every diplomatic measure."[10] South Korean President Kim Dae-jung has suggested that Perry's report will include recommendations to lift the economic embargo against North Korea and normalize US-North Korean diplomatic relations.[11] The US state department has refused to comment on the veracity of these rumors and has called Perry's report "a work in progress."[12]

There is some feeling within the Clinton administration that Perry's policy recommendations assume that the Korean peninsula is inevitably heading towards a crisis and that North Korea must be dealt with now. Observers doubt that all of Perry's policy recommendations will be adopted by the Clinton administration.[13] In fact, Perry has contradicted the Clinton administration on several occasions, raising the ire of some officials. Perry has asserted that there is evidence that North Korea is continuing to develop nuclear weapons, despite Clinton's certification to Congress that there is "no basis to conclude that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has violated" the 1994 Agreed Framework.[14]

A significant part of Perry's assignment has been to coordinate policies of the United States with those of Japan, South Korea, and China. Perry had some difficulty in coordinating US policy with South Korea, because Seoul envisioned much more aggressive engagement with North Korea than US policy. In fact, South Korea has been critical of US policies that punished North Korea and there have been regular calls from Seoul for the United States to extend diplomatic recognition to North Korea. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung has emphasized that he agrees with the US policy of engaging North Korea vigorously, but is wary of the US taking any military action against North Korea.[15] However, Perry has made it clear to Seoul that although US policy toward North Korea will be congruent with South Korea’s engagement policy, military actions will remain an option for the United States.[16]

Perry also held talks with the Japanese and Chinese governments in December 1998. Japan, which is concerned about North Korea's ballistic missile capability, has been supportive of a tougher US approach toward North Korea and has resisted several pleas from South Korea to improve relations with Pyongyang. On the other hand, China has warned the United States not to push North Korea too hard on the nuclear issue. China has said that it is opposed to North Korea possessing long-range ballistic missiles.[17]

The Perry report was initially expected in spring 1999. However, its publication has been delayed to include the results of the May 1999 Kumchang-ri inspection and North Korea’s official response to the US offer of normalization of economic and political relations.[18]

Acknowledgements:
Michael Dutra and Gaurav Kampani,
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Notes

[1] "State Dept. 11/12 on New North Korea Policy Coordinator," Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily Report, 12 November 1998, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>.

[2] Becker, Elizabeth, "Clinton Advisor Says North Korea is Advancing Its Nuclear Program," 12 March 1999, New York Times, p.8.

[3] Jun Kwan-woo, "Perry's N.Korea Report Just Beginning of South Korea-US Policy Coordination," 11 March 1999, Korea Herald (Seoul), <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.

[4] "Perry Says US to Base DPRK Policy on Engagement Policy," Yonhap (Seoul), 3 March 1999; in FBIS document FTS19990311001983, 12 March 1999.

[5] "Remarks Made to the Press by Dr. William J. Perry, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State and US North Korea Policy Coordinator," Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report, 2 June 1999, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>.

[6] Son Key-young, "Perry's 4-Day NK Visit Focuses on Peace Initiatives," Korea Times (Seoul), 21 May 1999, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>.

[7] Ricks, Thomas E. and Michael Schuman, "US Review of North Korea Policy Sets the Stage for Harsher Stance," 25 February 1999, Wall Street Journal, p.2.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Becker, Elizabeth, "Clinton Advisor Says North Korea is Advancing Its Nuclear Program," 12 March 1999, New York Times, p.8.

[10] Son Key-young, "No 'Limits' for Engagement Policy: Perry," 26 March 1999, Korea Times (Seoul), <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>.

[11] Lee Chang-sup, "Perry Report to Change S-N Korean Relations," 24 March 1999, Korea Times (Seoul), <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>.

[12] Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily Report, 23 April 1999, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>.

[13] Ricks, Thomas E. and Michael Schuman, "US Review of North Korea Policy Sets the Stage for Harsher Stance," 25 February 1999, Wall Street Journal, p.2.

[14] Becker, Elizabeth, "Clinton Advisor Says North Korea is Advancing Its Nuclear Program," 12 March 1999, New York Times, p.8.

[15] "Perry Says US to Base DPRK Policy on Engagement Policy," Yonhap (Seoul), 3 March 1999; in FBIS document FTS19990311001983, 12 March 1999.

[16] Tarrant, Bill, "S.Korea, U.S. Keep Engagement Policy Toward North," 7 December 1998, Reuters; in Yahoo News, <http://dailynews.yahoo.com>.

[17] "Perry Says US to Base DPRK Policy on Engagement Policy," Yonhap (Seoul), 3 March 1999; in FBIS document FTS19990311001983, 12 March 1999.

[18] Don Kirk, "Perry Delays Policy Review on Pyongyang," International Herald Tribune (Paris), 27-28 March 1999.

Return to the North Korea Nuclear Program.

 

2 January 1998

US intelligence agencies suspect that North Korea may be building an underground nuclear weapons-related facility at Kumchang-ri.

Reuters, 2 January 1998.

7 March 1998

South Korea says that it will meet its commitment of playing a “central role” in the North Korean light-water reactor project by supplying Korean-manufactured construction materials. Seoul also proposes to meet the labor cost of the project.

Yonhap (Seoul), 7 March 1998; in FBIS-EAS-98-066, 7 March 1998.

9 March 1998

After three years of operation, KEDO’s debts total $47 million. The debts stem primarily from loans contracted to supply heavy-fuel oil to North Korea. The United States initially estimated the cost of supplying oil to North Korea at about $45 million annually. However, the average annual cost has exceeded $60 million.

FBIS-EAS-98-068, 9 March 1998.

10 March 1998

North Korea expresses unhappiness over continued US economic sanctions and the slow pace of the light-water reactor project. North Korea’s foreign ministry issues a statement saying, “nobody can predict what will happen unless the United States seeks new practical measures and takes decisive action to implement its obligations.”

AP, 10 March 1998.

17 March 1998

North Korea refuses to cooperate with IAEA inspectors, citing delays in the implementation of the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework. IAEA inspectors are prevented from taking samples of nuclear waste. Inspectors are also barred from taking samples from the high-temperature water plant of the 5MW gas-graphite reactor.

Korean Overseas Information Services, 17 March 1998.

2 April 1998

During four-party talks between North and South Korea, the United States and China, North Korea announces that it will only continue the freeze on its nuclear program if the United States ends its economic embargo.

Nucleonics Week, 2 April 1998, p.17.

19 April 1998

North Korea unseals its 5MW gas-graphite reactor for maintenance purposes.

South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 14 May 1998, <http://www.scmp.com>.

2 May 1998

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warns South Korea and Japan that there is a great risk that North Korea will continue its nuclear weapons program if a lack of funds slows down the construction of the light-water reactors.

Barry Schweid, Washington Times, 2 May 1998, p.7.

7 May 1998

North Korea’s foreign ministry says that while North Korea has followed the 1994 Agreed Framework in good faith, the United States has yet to ease sanctions in accordance with the Agreed Framework. It accuses the United States of using the agreement “as a means for gaining concessions from the [North Koreans].”

Disarmament Diplomacy, May 1998, p.54.

11 May 1998

US state department spokesman James Rubin admits that the United States and its allies have not resolved all problems relating to financing for the light-water reactor project and heavy-fuel oil shipments to North Korea. Rubin says that the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright is working to ensure that the EU, Japan, and South Korea fulfil their portion of the agreement.

NAPSNet Daily Report, 12 May 1998, <http:www.nautilus.org>.

The traditional Korean Taeguk flag (still used by South Korea) was official in North Korea until July 10, 1948, when the current flag was introduced. Its red stripe and star are for the country's commitment to communism, while blue is said to stand for a commitment to peace. The white stripes stand for purity, strength, and dignity.

Korea, North Official name: Choson Minjujuui In'min Konghwaguk (Democratic People's Republic of Korea). Form of government: unitary single-party republic with one legislative house (Supreme People's Assembly [687]). Chief of state: Head of State. Head of state and government: Premier. Population (1998): 21,234,000. Population projection: (2000) 21,688,000; (2010) 23,505,000. Natural increase rate per 1,000 population (1996): 17.2 (world avg. 15.7). Gross national product (1996): U.S.$20,867,000,000 (U.S.$970 per capita). Land use (1994): forested 61.2%; meadows and pastures 0.4%; agricultural and under permanent cultivation 16.6%; other 21.8%.

12 May 1998

US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Stanley Roth says that the United States hopes that China will “rethink its stance and participate in KEDO.”

Yonhap (Seoul), 13 May 1998; in FBIS-EAS-98-132, 12 May 1998.

14 May 1998

North Korea’s ambassador to China, Chu Chang-jun, says that pressure is growing in North Korea to reopen the sealed 5MW gas-graphite reactor. Ambassador Chu also indicates that North Korea is angry with the United States for the delays in heavy-fuel oil shipments.

Kevin Sullivan, Washington Post, 15 May 1998, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.

14 May 1998

US state department spokesman James Rubin denies reports that the United States and KEDO are not meeting their obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework. The US state department and South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs announce that the IAEA has confirmed that the seals on the 5MW gas-graphite reactor remain in place.

NAPSNet Daily Report, 14 May 1998, <http//www.nautilus.org>.

4 June 1998

According to a report published in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo), a confidential study conducted by Japan’s Defense Agency concludes that North Korea may have assembled a nuclear bomb.

Sunday Times (London), 4 June 1998, <http://www.Sunday-times.co.uk>

9 June 1998

According to the head of South Korea’s Agency for National Security, contrary to media reports, North Korea is not trying to resume its nuclear weapons program. Further, the IAEA is being allowed to supervise North Korea’s adherence to the 1994 Agreed Framework.

F.J. Kergamvala, The Hindu (Chennai), 9 June 1998, <http://www.hinduonline.com>.

19 June 1998

Russian nuclear energy minister Yevgeny Adamov proposes constructing nuclear reactors in the Russian Maritime Territory in order to transfer energy to North Korea as a means of replacing the light-water reactor project through KEDO.

Newsedge, 19 June 1998, <http://www.newspage.com>.

22 June 1998

North Korea announces that the United States is “obliged to lift economic sanctions against it under the 1994 Agreed Framework.” The United States has continued to raise “one precondition after another for lifting sanctions,” because it wants to change North Korea’s “system and to disarm [it].”

Reuters, 22 June 1998; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 22 June 1998.

24 June 1998

IAEA inspectors arrive in North Korea to negotiate the implementation of the inspection regime agreed under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Inquisit, 24 June 1998, <http://www.inquisit.com>.

28 June 1998

KEDO opens a four-day meeting to discuss cost-sharing arrangements for the two light-water reactors being built at Sinpo. KEDO’s Executive Council reports that there is likely to be a “funding shortfall of around $400-500 million” over the life of the project.

NAPSNet Daily Report, 29 June 1998, <http://www.nautilus.org>.

15 July 1998

The Clinton administration says that it will ask Congress to increase funding to $50 million annually to pay for heavy-fuel oil shipments to North Korea. The US Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia Rust Deming says that heavy-fuel oil shipments to North Korea are running behind schedule. To date, only 216,000 tons of the 500,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil have been shipped to North Korea. The annual cost of the program is $65 million; the United States has contributed $80 million.

Boston Globe, 15 July 1998, p.2.

15 July 1998

A US General Accounting Office (GAO) report says that there are many monitoring problems that affect the IAEA’s “ability to ensure that North Korea is complying fully with certain aspects of the nuclear freeze.” North Korea has not allowed the IAEA to install monitoring devices in the nuclear waste tanks. The tanks are connected to a “complex and inaccessible piping system that, if operating, would permit the waste to be removed and/or altered.” The GAO report warns that North Korea may have “secretly removed some of the nuclear waste in order to hide evidence of earlier diversions of plutonium.”

Philip Shenon, New York Times, 15 July 1998, <http/www.nytimes.com>.

16 July 1998

US state department spokesman James Rubin clarifies that North Korea will not get key components for the light-water reactors until it clarifies the discrepancy regarding the quantity of weapons-grade plutonium it possesses.

George Gedda, Washington Times, 16 July 1998, p.17.

10 August 1998

US officials say that North Korea is building a new nuclear reactor; the reactor is being built underground to avoid detection by US spy satellites.

J.F.O. McAllister, Time, 10 August 1998.

17 August 1998

US intelligence agencies say they have evidence that 15,000 North Korean workers are building an underground nuclear facility in a mountainside 25km from its nuclear center at Yongbyon. Although the exact nature of the facility is unclear, US intelligence sources have concluded that the facility is intended to be either a nuclear reactor or a nuclear reprocessing plant. US officials estimate that it will take between two to six years to complete the construction. However, there is no evidence yet that North Korea has violated the 1994 Agreed Framework; pouring cement for the plant would constitute a violation.

South Korean officials downplay US intelligence reports.

David E. Sanger, New York Times, 17 August 1998, p.1.

18 August 1998

South Korea’s foreign ministry says that it has seen US spy satellite photographs of the alleged underground nuclear complex under construction at Kumchang-ri in North Korea.

Inside China Today (Beijing), 18 August 1998, <http://www.insidechina.com>.

21, 24-25 August 1998

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan and US envoy for Korean nuclear affairs Charles Kartman meet to discuss the suspected nuclear-related site at Kumchang-ri and the 1994 Agreed Framework. During the talks, Kartman says that the United States opposes construction at Kumchang-ri and requests access to inspect the site. Kim refuses to grant the United States access and insists that the site is intended for civilian use. Kartman informs Kim that the United States will continue to implement the Agreed Framework and is reconsidering sanctions against North Korea and heavy-fuel oil shipments.

Dana Priest, Washington Post, 26 August 1998, p.A16; Philip Shenon, New York Times International, 15 December 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

27 August 1998

South Korea’s National Security Council meets to determine whether a “possible underground nuclear plant” is being constructed at Kumchang-ri in North Korea. The South Korean government says that it is closely observing to see if the facility is nuclear weapons-related. However, “it cannot confirm that the construction is for nuclear weapons at this time.”

NAPSNet Daily Report, 28 August 1998, <http://www.nautilus.org>.

27 August 1998

The US state department requests that the EU provide further funding to help pay for the construction of the two light-water reactors at Sinpo. It is expected that the EU will want assurances that European companies will receive contracts to build the reactors.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 27 August 1998, pp.8-9.

31 August 1998

KEDO announces that South Korea has agreed to pay 70 percent of the cost of the light-water reactor project in North Korea. Japan will contribute $1 billion for the project.

Reuters, 31 August 1998; in Inquisit, 31 August 1998, <http://www.inquisit.com>.

31 August 1998

North Korea conducts the first flight test of its three-stage Taep’o-dong-1 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The missile is fired from the Hwadaegun Missile Test Facility on the east coast and flies for a distance of 1,380km over Japanese territory before landing in the Pacific Ocean.

Joseph Bermudez, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 September 1998.

2 September 1998

Responding to North Korea’s 31 August 1998 rocket test and allegations of construction of an underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ri, the US Senate cuts funding for heavy-fuel oil shipments to North Korea.

Sean Scully, Washington Times, 3 September 1998, p.A10.

4 September 1998

Japan suspends food aid and political normalization talks with North Korea in response to the latter’s 31 August 1998 missile test. Japan also suspends $1 billion in financial assistance to KEDO for the construction of the two light-water reactors at Sinpo.

Michiyo Nakamoto, Financial Times (London), 4 September 1998, p.7.

6 September 1998

The CIA suspects that North Korea has dumped liquid plutonium waste on the grounds of its Yongbyon nuclear facility. The liquid plutonium waste is believed to have been stored underground in unsuitable storage tanks which could leak. The CIA believes that North Korea used these containers in an effort to hide the plutonium waste from IAEA inspectors.

Newsweek, 6 September 1998.

10 September 1998

The US House Appropriations Committee votes to eliminate all funding for North Korean heavy-fuel oil shipments. This follows a US Senate vote stipulating that funding for heavy-fuel oil shipments will be contingent upon presidential assurances that North Korea is not developing nuclear weapons or exporting ballistic missile technology to nations on the US state department’s terrorist list.

San Diego Union and Tribune, 11 September 1998; in Inquisit, 11 September 1998, <http:www.inquisit.com>.

10 September 1998

The Clinton administration puts forth a package of agreements for North Korea “aimed at defusing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and restarting the stalled diplomatic initiatives.” US state department officials say that the United States will demand that the suspected underground nuclear-related site at Kumchang-ri be opened up to international inspections. It states that this is a “non-negotiable condition for further US compliance” with the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post, 11 September 1998, p.25.

10 September 1998

Diplomatic talks between North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan and US envoy for Korean nuclear affairs Charles Kartman conclude with a six-point agreement. North Korea pledges to resume packing its nuclear spent fuel rods, and the United States reaffirms its commitment to heavy-fuel oil shipments and additional stipulations of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Both countries agree to further negotiations.

US-Korea Review, September/October 1998, p.12.

19 September 1998

North Korea denies US allegations that it is building a secret underground nuclear facility. The North Korean paper Rodong Sinmum reports that the facility is a “civilian structure.”

Inquisit, 19 September 1998, <http://www.inquisit.com>.

28 September 1998

US government sources confirm that North Korea has resumed packing its nuclear spent fuel rods in containers. The process had been suspended since April 1998.

Inquisit, 29 September 1998, <http://www.inquisit.com>

29 September 1998

KEDO Executive Director Desaix Anderson says that the Organization is planning to begin construction of the two light-water reactors at Sinpo in 1999. Preliminary work at the reactor site has been completed and KEDO is ready to begin full-scale construction.

Inquisit, 29 September 1998, <http://www.inquisit.com>.

4 October 1998

US President Bill Clinton diverts $15 million in foreign aid money to fund heavy-fuel oil shipments to North Korea. KEDO will use the money for approximately 150,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil. However, it will still be short of funds for the remaining 134,000 tons.

Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post, 4 October 1998, p.27.

14 October 1998

The Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang) announces that North Korea will not try to stop the United States from breaking the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Inside China Today (Beijing), 14 October 1998, <http://www.insidechina.com>

15 October 1998

According to a KEDO report, basic reclamation work on the light-water reactor project will be delayed for “three months until January 1999.” The delay is due to financial difficulties.

NAPSNet Daily Report, 15 October 1998, <http://www.nautilus.org>.

15 October 1998

North Korea alleges that the United States has not completely fulfilled its portion of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Heavy-fuel oil shipments have not been delivered on schedule and only a few sanctions against North Korea have been lifted. A North Korean foreign ministry spokesman says that North Korea will resume its nuclear program if the United States cuts heavy-fuel oil shipments and food assistance.

South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 15 October 1998, <http://www.scmp.com>.

17 October 1998

Japan decides to lift the freeze on its funding for the two light-water reactors at Sinpo.

Washington Post, 17 October 1998, p.22.

19 October 1998

The US special envoy for Korean nuclear affairs, Charles Kartman informs the US Congress that the United States will discuss the possibility of Taiwanese contributions to KEDO. The United States will have to consider China’s reaction before inviting Taiwan to participate.

Taiwan Central News Agency (Taipei), 19 October 1998; in FBIS-CHI-98-292, 19 October 1998.

21 October 1998

Japan is reluctant to accept Taiwan’s offer to contribute funds for the construction of the light-water reactors at Sinpo. Taiwan’s offer raises complications as the two countries do not have formal diplomatic relations.

Financial Times, 21 October 1998, p.6.

9 November 1998

KEDO’s Executive Council meets in New York to formally adopt the new cost-sharing agreement. KEDO’s revised budget estimate for the light-water reactor project is reduced from the original estimate of $5.17 billion to $4.6 billion. Resolution of the agreement will allow KEDO to finalize its contract with KEPCO, the primary contractor in the light-water reactor project.

NAPSNet Daily Report, 10 November 1998, <http://www.nautilus.org>.

9 November 1998

North Korea says that an inspection of the suspected underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ri will only occur on North Korea’s terms.

South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 10 November 1998, <http:www.scmp.com>.

10 November 1998

A US state department official says that North Korea must fulfil its portion of the 1994 Agreed Framework and prove that it has not restarted its nuclear program. He adds that in the event that the United States is not allowed to inspect the underground facility at Kumchang-ri, it will be unable to “sustain [its] obligations under the Agreed Framework.

Jane A. Morse, NAPSNet Daily Report, 10 November 1998, <http://www.nautilus.org>; South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 12 November 1998, <http://www.scmp.com>.

12 November 1998

US President Bill Clinton appoints US former defense secretary William Perry as US North Korean Policy Coordinator. Clinton tasks Perry with reviewing, advising, and coordinating the United States' foreign policy toward North Korea.

NAPSNet Daily Report, 12 November 1998, <http://www.napsnet.org>.

16-18 November 1998

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan and US envoy for Korean nuclear affairs Charles Kartman meet in Pyongyang to discuss the suspected nuclear-related site at Kumchang-ri. Kim requests that the United States not link Kumchang-ri and continued implementation of the Agreed Framework. Kartman insists that US-North Korean diplomatic ties will improve only if access to the site is granted. He demands that the IAEA be given access to the site; if access is denied, North Korea will be breaking the Agreed Framework. Kim insists that the site is intended for civilian use. He agrees to grant access to the site in return for $300 million in monetary compensation. Kartman refuses to pay a compensatory fee for access. The talks end in a stalemate. North Korea threatens to abandon the Agreed Framework if the United States does.

Choson Ilbo (Seoul), 11 November 1998; Korea Times (Seoul), 5 November 1998; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 24 November 1998, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Kyodo (Tokyo), 4 December 1998; Jane A. Morse, United States Information Agency, 10 November 1998; Yonhap (Seoul), 20 November 1998.

17 November 1998

According to US intelligence sources, North Korea is building "a Chernobyl-style graphite-uranium reactor" to produce weapons-grade plutonium at the suspected underground nuclear site at Kumchang-ri.

Richard Parker and Michael Zielenziger, San Jose Mercury News, 17 November 1998.

19 November 1998

US defense secretary William Cohen warns North Korea that if it does not remove suspicions regarding the site at Kumchang-ri, the 1994 Agreed Framework will be serious jeopardy.

Joongang Ilbo (Seoul), 21 November 1998, <http://english.joongang.co.kr>.

20 November 1998

A South Korean government official alleges that South Korea and the United States have material evidence that the two underground facilities in North Korea at Kumchang-ri and Taean-ri are nuclear-related. Fallen leaves, bark, and topsoil one centimeter deep, and wastewater were secretly collected from the site, and tested positive for traces of radioactive plutonium.

Yonhap (Seoul), 20 November 1998; Reuters, 19 November 1998, <http://www.dailynews.yahoo.com>.

21 November 1998

The US envoy for Korean nuclear affairs, Charles Kartman says that “there is strong evidence to [make the United States] suspicious but [the United States lacks] conclusive evidence that the intended purpose of the underground site is nuclear related.”

CNN World News, 21 November 1998, <http://www.cnn.com>.

24 November 1998

South Korean intelligence sources allege that North Korea has tested nuclear weapon detonators. Satellite photographs indicate that high-explosive tests have been conducted in Kusong, 30km northwest of Yongbyon.

Korea Herald (Seoul), 24 November 1998, <http://www.koreherald.co.kr>.

24 November 1998

North Korea says that South Korea and the United States have escalated regional tensions by making slanderous and “non-existent charges that [North Korea’s] suspected underground site is a nuclear site.”

Korea Herald (Seoul), 24 November 1998, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.

29 November 1998

After meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei calls on North Korea to open suspected nuclear sites for IAEA inspection and to rejoin the IAEA.

NAPSNet Daily Report, 30 November 1998, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>; Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 30 November 1998.

December 1998

US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry embarks on a three-nation tour of South Korea, China, and Japan to conduct a review of US policy towards North Korea.

Bill Tarant, Yahoo News, 7 December 1998, <http://www.dailynews.yahoo.com>.

3 December 1998

North Korea announces that the underground facility at Kumchang-ri is for civilian use.

Joong-Ang Ilbo (Seoul), 5 December 1998, <http://english.joongang.co.kr>.

4-5, 7-8, 10-11 December 1998

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan and US envoy for Korean nuclear affairs Charles Kartman meet in New York and Washington to discuss the suspected nuclear-related site at Kumchang-ri. Kim insists that North Korea will grant the United States access to the site in return for $300 million. Kartman refuses to pay a compensatory fee for access. He then threatens to halt the light-water reactor project if access to the site is not granted. The talks end in a stalemate. However, both sides are reportedly beginning to understand one another’s position and agree to reach a common understanding to find a solution to their differences.

Moscow Voice of Russia World Service, 15 December 1998; Yonhap (Seoul), 12 December 1998.

8 December 1998

US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry meets with Chinese officials to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue. China states that it supports the 1994 Agreed Framework and that it hopes for an eventual denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

NAPSNet Daily Report, 8 December 1998, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>.

10 December 1998

US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry informs the Japanese government that the Agreed Framework "could be scrapped due to [North Korea’s] refusal to allow inspections" of the suspected nuclear facility at Kumchang-ri.

CNN, 10 December 1998, <http://www.cnn.com>.

24 December 1998

North Korea's ambassador to the United Nations says that North Korea will restart its nuclear program if the United States breaks the 1994 Agreed Framework. Additionally, he says that prospects for successful negotiations between North Korea and the United States are not good.

South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 24 December 1998, <http://www.scmp.com>.

5 January 1999

North Korea announces that the United States has postponed construction of the light-water reactor project from January 1999 to mid-1999.

Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 5 January 1999; in FBIS Document 01051999000317, 5 January 1999

10 January 1999

The North Korean Anti-Nuclear Peace Committee demands that the United States pay "tens of billions of dollars" for economic losses North Korea has incurred due to delays in construction of the light-water reactor project. The Committee calls the United States’ demands to inspect the suspected nuclear site at Kumchang-ri "a declaration of war and a provocation."

NAPSNet Daily Report, 12 January 1999, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>; Jim Lea, Pacific Stars and Stripes, 13 January 1999.

12 January 1999

According to Rodong Sinmun (Pyongyang), since the United States has not "faithfully implemented" its commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea has "no intention of observing the Geneva agreement because the United States refuses to abandon its attempts to use it as a lever to stifle [North Korea]." South Korea dismisses the article as "routine rhetoric."

Reuters, 12 January 1999; South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 12 January 1999, <http://www.scmp.com>.

12 January 1999

As part of the "sunshine policy" of engagement with North Korea, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung calls on members of the US Congress to be patient with regard to North Korea's nuclear program.

Korea Herald (Seoul), 12 January 1999, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.

15 January 1999

US defense secretary William Cohen announces that the United States will provide South Korea with a "nuclear umbrella" if it is attacked by North Korea. Cohen and South Korean Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek warn North Korea against testing another Taep'o-dong ballistic missile and say that if there is a rocket launch, there will be "military-diplomatic countermeasures."

AFP (Paris), 16 January 1999; in South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 16 January 1999, <http://www.scmp.com>.

16-17, 23-24 January 1999

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan and US envoy for Korean nuclear affairs Charles Kartman meet in Geneva to discuss the suspected nuclear-related site at Kumchang-ri. Kim continues to demand $300 million in return for granting the United States access to the site. Kartman refuses to pay compensatory access and demands that the United States be granted multiple on-site inspections at Kumchang-ri; he suggests offering food and economic assistance in return for access. Kim accepts the offer and agrees to grant the United States one “visit” to the site in return for one million tons of grain. Kartman later threatens to halt the light-water reactor project if access is not granted. He also threatens heavy-fuel oil shipments if access is not granted by 1 June 1999. Some progress is made at the talks; both parties agree to consider the option of food assistance through the UN World Food Programme in return for US access to the site.

AP, 11 January 1999; CNN, 16 January 1999, <http://www.cnn.com>; CNN, 25 January 1999, <http://www.cnn.com>; Disarmament Diplomacy, December 1998/January 1999, pp.56-57; KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 24 January 1999; NAPSNet Daily Report, 25 January 1999, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>; Reuters, 25 January 1999; South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 15 January 1999, <http://www.scmp.com>.

19 January 1999

North Korea and KEDO begin talks in Hyangsan (North Korea) to develop a plan to train North Korean technicians to operate and maintain the light-water reactors provided under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Korea Herald (Seoul), 20 January 1999, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.

28 January 1999

South Korean officials say that the United States endorsed South Korea's "sunshine policy" of engaging North Korea during South Korean National Security Advisor Lim Dong-won's recent trip to Washington. Lim met with US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, US Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering, and US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry and encouraged the United States to engage North Korea by establishing diplomatic relations and easing economic sanctions.

Korea Times (Seoul) 29 January 1999, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>.

5 February 1999

North Korea proposes converting the facility at Kumchang-ri into a joint US-North Korean plant or offices.

Maeil Kyongje (Seoul), 6 February 1999

22 February 1999

South Korean Ambassador to the United States Lee Hong-koo announces that the United States and South Korea disagree on the type of diplomatic package deal to be offered to North Korea. South Korea seeks a long-term improvement of relations through engaging North Korea, whereas the United States wants a quick solution to the nuclear and missile issues. South Korea is not optimistic about the next round of US-North Korean negotiations.

Jun Kwan-woo, Korea Herald (Seoul), 23 February 1999, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>

25 February 1999

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright calls the Korean Peninsula the greatest threat to peace in Northeast Asia. She says that before the United States improves relations with North Korea, it must open its suspected underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ri. Albright urges the US Congress to release funds earmarked for KEDO.

Korea Times (Seoul), 25 February 1999, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>.

27 February-15 March 1999

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan and US envoy for Korean nuclear affairs Charles Kartman meet in New York to discuss the suspected nuclear-related site at Kumchang-ri. Kim demands one million tons of grain in return for access to the site. Kartman offers to donate 500,000 tons of food assistance through the UN World Food Programme in return for multiple access to Kumchang-ri. Kim refuses to grant the United States regular access. Kartman requests that the parties announce the amount of food assistance following the first inspection and relaxing sanctions after the second. He then suggests regular access to the site if it proves necessary or if suspicions of other uses or developments at the site arise. Kartman then offers to donate 700,000 tons of food assistance and support a series of bilateral food programs with North Korea in return for access to the entire site and follow-up visits. Kim agrees to his offer.

Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 5 March 1999; Dow Jones Newswires, 3 March 1999; Korea Times (Seoul), 2 March 1999; Edith M. Lederer, AP, 16 March 1999; Nezavisimaia gazeta (Moscow), 13 March 1999.

11 March 1999

According to a US Department of Energy intelligence report, North Korea is working on uranium enrichment techniques in cooperation with Pakistan. The report estimates that North Korea will be capable of producing nuclear weapons within six years or less.

Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 11 March 1999, p.A1.

11 March 1999

US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry reaffirms the US commitment to a policy of engagement with North Korea during a visit to Seoul.

Jun Kwan-woo, Korea Herald (Seoul), 11 March 1999, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.

12 March 1999

US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry announces that North Korea is still pursuing its nuclear weapons program. He suggests that the United States may undertake an "across the board" economic blockade or military action if North Korea continues to reject inspections of the suspected nuclear site at Kumchang-ri.

Elizabeth Becker, New York Times, 12 March 1999, p.8.

12 March 1999

South Korean National Security Advisor Lim Dong-won says that US foreign policy toward North Korea is incompatible with South Korea's. Lim calls on the United States to extend diplomatic recognition to North Korea.

Korea Herald (Seoul), 12 March 1999; in FBIS document FRS1990311000883, 12 March 1999.

13 March 1999

A South Korean official in the Planning Office for the North Korean light-water reactor project says that the sealing of the nuclear spent fuel rods from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon will be complete sometime in May or June 1999.

Chungang Ilbo (Seoul), 13 March 1999, <http:www.joonggang.co.kr>; in FBIS Document FTS19990314000166, 14 March 1999.

16 March 1999

The US-North Korean agreement regarding the site at Kumchang-ri is announced. According to the agreement, the United States will: (1) donate food through the UN World Food Programme, (2) institute bilateral food programs with North Korea, and (3) take steps to improve political and economic relations with North Korea. In return, North Korea will permit multiple site visits by a US team to the entire site. It is at this time that both parties reaffirm their commitments to the 1994 Agreed Framework and principles of US-North Korean bilateral relations as expressed in the 11 June 1993 US-North Korean Joint Statement. Both parties also agree to meet on 29 March 1999 to discuss North Korea’s missile export and development programs.

Nezavisimaia gazeta (Moscow), 13 March 1999; Statement By Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, US Department of State, 16 March 1999; US-DPRK Joint Press Statement, US Department of State, 16 March 1999.

16 March 1999

A US official states that the agreement reached between the United States and North Korea for inspections at the site at Kumchang-ri meets US requirements for the number of visits, durations of visits, and restrictions placed on the visits.

United States Information Agency, 17 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 19 March 1999, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>.

17 March 1999

The Unites States and North Korea agree that the United States will provide North Korea with 400,000 tons of food assistance through the UN World Food Programme, and bilateral food programs in return for US access to the site at Kumchang-ri. US food assistance to North Korea is estimated to cost $177 million.

AP, 25 June 1999.

18 March 1999

US intelligence reports that North Korea is building four large underground facilities. The facilities are located at: (1) Chagando, (2) Hagap, (3) Pyonganbukto (between Taechon and Kusong), and (4) Chagando, 10km from the first. It is suspected that the first site at Chagando is used for nuclear testing.

Chiharu Mori, Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 18 March 1999, p.2; in FBIS document FTS19990318000499, 18 March 1999.

18 March 1999

South Korean Foreign Minister Hong Soon-young calls on Japan and the United States to extend diplomatic recognition to North Korea. Hong says that the agreement is "just the beginning of the process of confirming whether or not North Korea has a nuclear program."

International Herald Tribune (Paris), 18 March 1999; in NAPSNet Daily Report, 19 March 1999, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>.

21 March 1999

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung state that they intend to fully cooperate with the United States in their future dealings with North Korea.

Yoshihisa Watanabe, Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 21 March 1999

24 March 1999

IAEA officials report that critical parts of the North Korean 50MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon have been missing since 1994 when IAEA inspectors first arrived at the site. The parts are vital for controlling nuclear reactions in the reactor's graphite core. The equipment could be used to construct another nuclear reactor.

Stewart Stogel and Ben Barber, Washington Times, 24 March 1999, p.3.

25 March 1999

US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry confirms that his upcoming report to the Clinton administration will not include "time limits" for the US policy of engagement with North Korea. He says, "I believe military confrontation is so serious, we should exhaust every diplomatic measure."

Son Key-young, Korea Times (Seoul), 26 March 1999, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>.

16 April 1999

Kim Tok-yong, a member of the South Korean parliament, accuses North Korea of having an underground nuclear complex between Tongsan-ri and Huiyon-ri in Kusong City. He alleges that plutonium is being produced at the complex.

Shukan Post (Tokyo), 16 April 1999; in FBIS document FTS19990410000079, 16 April 1999.

7 May 1999

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright meets with South Korean foreign minister Hong Soon-young and applauds South Korea's "sunshine policy" of engaging North Korea. She pledges that the United States will integrate the "sunshine policy" into its North Korea policies.

NAPSNet Special Report, 18 May 1999, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>.

13 May 1999

Following a visit by US envoy on Korean nuclear affairs Charles Kartman, North Korea confirms that the suspected nuclear site at Kumchang-ri will be open for examination to fifteen US arms inspectors beginning 18 May 1999.

Jun Kwan-woo, Korea Herald (Seoul), 13 May 1999, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.

18-24 May 1999

A fifteen-member US team, consisting of nuclear scientists and members of the US state and defense departments inspect Kumchang-ri. North Korea cooperates fully with the US inspection team. The team is allowed to measure the dimensions of all underground areas at the main complex, and videotape and photograph agreed above-ground facilities. They are also allowed to take soil and water samples to be analyzed for radioactive substances.

BBC, 28 May 1999, <http://www.bbc.co.uk>; United States Information Agency, 25 June 1999.

25 May 1999

US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry travels to North Korea for negotiations at the invitation of the North Korean government.

NAPSNet Special Report, 2 June 1999, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>.

29 May 1999

US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry returns from North Korea to discuss nuclear and missile issues with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan. Perry remarks that the exchange of views was "intensive, extremely substantive, and quite valuable."

NAPSNet Special Report, 2 June 1999, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet>.

2 June 1999

South Korean foreign minister Hong Soon-young reaffirms South Korea's "sunshine policy" and reveals that US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry's visit to North Korea involved making a proposal that the United States, Japan, and South Korea normalize political relations with North Korea in exchange for North Korea relinquishing its missile and nuclear programs.

Hong Soon-young, Korea Times (Seoul), 3 June 1999, <http://www.koreatimes.com>.

25 June 1999

According to US state department spokesman James Rubin, the US inspection team witnessed no effort by North Korea to conceal the facility at Kumchang-ri during the May 1999 visit. He says that the site was incomplete and that there was no equipment present during the inspectors’ visit. Furthermore, additional work remained to be completed, as almost all of the tunnels were still bare rock. Rubin dismisses allegations that nuclear equipment could have been removed prior to the inspectors’ arrival. Rather, he says that Kumchang-ri was at a stage of construction at which no other equipment other than construction equipment would be expected to be present.

Rubin concludes that the site at Kumchang-ri does not contain a plutonium-production reactor or reprocessing plant, either completed or under construction. Given the size and configuration of Kumchang-ri and the type of graphite-moderated reactor North Korea previously built at Yongbyon, the site is not suitable for a reprocessing plant.

Despite the inspection team’s findings, the United States continues to remain suspicious that Kumchang-ri may be intended for other nuclear-related uses. Rubin says that the site is a large underground area, which could support such a facility in the future given substantial modifications. At present, however, Kumchang-ri does not violate the Agreed Framework (new construction of graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities would constitute a violation).

The next US inspection team is scheduled to visit the site at Kumchang-ri in May 2000. The purpose of the second visit will be to examine the feasibility of Kumchang-ri being utilized for commercial purposes.

United States Information Agency, 25 June 1999.

Acknowledgements:
Brooke Milton and Gaurav Kampani
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies

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Garnered from various sources. Interesting.

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