Five weapons that bilk the taxpayers

By claiming that the Joint Strike Fighter and the F-22 can accomplish the same mission, this author makes it clear that he does not know what he is talking about. In fact, while some of these programs have problems, they are all necessary to replace existing, aging systems.

Most of the delays are caused by Congress, which fiddles endlessly with the funding schedule. This leads to development slowdowns, and ultimately cost overruns.

Scrapping these programs now would cost more than it would save, both on the battlefield and in the Pentagon. Don't forget, any canceled program has to be replaced, and I notice that this author has no suggestions for this, beyond forcing the military to make do with the aging gear.

Written by Clintonites attempting to gut the military again.

Personally, I'd rather have a lot of guns, bombs, planes, and bullets than ANY government "social(ist) program". At least the weapons DO something, they're cool to look at, and people WORK making them.

With the social programs, the money is usually thrown down a rathole.

Liberals have never met a weapons system that they thought the nation needed. Ever. We have to fight, tooth and nail, for every one. It's quite similar, really, to their views on firearms. Both should be treated with scorn, as they are usually based in emotional foolishness.

This is who they are (from their website):

"We've got all the right enemies."

CounterPunch is the bi-weekly muckraking newsletter edited by Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair. Twice a month we bring our readers the stories that the corporate press never prints. We aren't side-line journalists here at CounterPunch. Ours is muckraking with a radical attitude and nothing makes us happier than when CounterPunch readers write in to say how useful they've found our newsletter in their battles against the war machine, big business and the rapers of nature.

Nuff said.

How about eliminating the billions of dollars spent on the folks breeding their illegitimate children on our bases and labeling welfare as defense. I don’t need ten or fifteen unmarried pregnant females in my unit degrading readiness.

Likewise, let’s start requiring job specific physical standards for soldiers. The New York Fire Department has a fairly rigorous fitness test for every “basic trainee”: in a force of 11,000+, only 36 women have made the grade. Surely a battlefield is tougher than any fire fighting scenario…why the discrepancy in requirements.

The real waste of dollars is on the personnel side, not in procuring weapons?

In fact, while some of these programs have problems, they are all necessary to replace existing, aging systems.

I would be interested in finding out more about this, because we seem to be going in the direction of fewer and fewer aircraft with a higher unit cost.

There are what, 40 or 50 B-2s in the fleet, when we used to have whole bomb groups of hundreds of B-52's. Someday maybe we'll have only one single bomber aircraft in the whole USAF, it'll be a GREAT plane, but if it goes down we're toast.

Why wouldn't it make more sense to re-open the assembly line for F-18's, F-15's etc and keep building them with improved engines, armaments as appropriate? What enemy are we going to fight which can overpower that level of technology? (I am not an aviation expert by any means, but I think China's air force is pretty much in the '80s still).

A lot of defense procurement seems to me to be heavily larded with good old congressional pork.

Why wouldn't it make more sense to re-open the assembly line for F-18's, F-15's etc and keep building them with improved engines, armaments as appropriate? What enemy are we going to fight which can overpower that level of technology? (I am not an aviation expert by any means, but I think China's air force is pretty much in the '80s still).

I believe we are doing that where appropriate. The latest version of the F-15 is the f-15E the last letter denoting the latest,greatest version. latest F-14 is the F-14D which is an awesome machine. The "super hornet" is a redo of the F-18. I think the main problem is that in the case of the 14 and 15, the chassis was designed in the late 60's, early 70's and theres only so much you can do with it before it becomes more expensive.

Make an analogy with your PC, sure you can buy a new motherboard, cpu, ram and Hard drive, but by that time you might as well go out and buy a brand new one.

One upgrade that I think we can and should do is replace the 8 jet engines on our 100 B-52's with four modern turbofan engines. longer range, more fuel efficiency, more power = more payload.

Fair questions. Having been involved with aviation for nearly 20 years, I'll try to answer.

The F-15,-16,and -18 were actually designed in the 60s(15) and 70s(16,18). This was before such technology as supercruise engines, vectored thrust, stealth, and other advanced technologies were perfected. Their airframes were not designed with those things in mind, and re-engineering them would cost more than a new plane. It's not just the engines, either. It's fuel systems, electrical/avionics systems, and sensor systems, all of which have to fit the airframe.

The reason we get less total aircraft than in past decades is twofold: Capability and cost. Each aircraft costs more to manufacture, as you want the best technology available incorporated. This also has the effect of making the aircraft much more capable than its predecessors. For example, a B-2 can put a bomb in someone's window, while a B-52 must unload mass tonnage to destroy the entire area. Obviously, the one-bomb approach is preferred. Moreover, the B-2 will be MUCH more difficult to shoot down with SAMs, due to its stealthy nature.

Hope this helps!

BTW, you're right about the pork. It adds a great deal to the final cost, and its elimination would be a boon to the DOD. That'll never happen, though, so it's something we just have to deal with.(Or vote the money-grubbing whores out)

Actually, I'd rather know if the allegations made in the posted article are correct or not (howitzer too heavy for an aircraft to lift etc), and a "Nuff said" doesn't quite cover that requirement.

Personally, I follow the advice of the late Frank Herbert: "I can think of nothing more poisonous than to rot in the stink of your own reflections." and take truth where I find it, even in the hard core left wing press. At least they wear their ideology in the open so I can allow for it, unlike our "objective" mass media.

Oh, and as a comparison, our top fighter of WWII, the P-51 Mustang, was designed, built, and accepted into service in nine months, with a unit cost of $50,000 a pop. No pork was evident in its production.

For example, a B-2 can put a bomb in someone's window, while a B-52 must unload mass tonnage to destroy the entire area. Obviously, the one-bomb approach is preferred. Moreover, the B-2 will be MUCH more difficult to shoot down with SAMs, due to its stealthy nature

Actually isn't the B-52 considered more of a stand off/cruise missile platform know? Certainly it still has (as shown when it gets the chance) the ability to carpet bomb, but doesn't it also have the ability to drop guided munitions? Either way it's pretty obvious the B-52 will be around awhile, and should be. IMHO

Oh, yes, it will be. In fact it was recently extended to 2030 or so. This will make the design 80 years old at phase-out.

The BUFF is a grand airplane, no doubt. It is not my intent to disparage it, but one wonders, what could a replacement bomb truck/missile platform have done? It just seems wrong to me, as an Aircrewman myself, to crew planes older than me, flown by pilots younger.

I believe we deserve better.

I also disagree with the author's lefty pedigree, but they make some valid points. The computer comparison made by someone above is a doozy... by the same analogy, it would take 10 years to make my cool new computer, one that would have marginal improvements over my old one, and the cost would be several times greater. We are moving toward the point of being able to afford just one new bomber, and then being afraid to deploy it, for fear someone with an old Stinger missle might shoot it down. Hey, has anyone looked into modifying Boeing 777's into a cheap, dumb, iron bomb dump truck to replace those ancient b-52s?

Actually, I'd rather know if the allegations made in the posted article are correct or not (howitzer too heavy for an aircraft to lift etc), and a "Nuff said" doesn't quite cover that requirement.

You are absolutely correct. I was being a bit flip. I just wanted everyone to know the source while considering the information. For instance, if the statement, "The new senatorial library in South Dakota is vital to the interests of this country" were made by Phil Gramm instead of Tom Daschle, it would carry more weight for me. Of course, if either of them made an objective, factual statement (hey, this is hypothetical) such as 2+2=4, it would be true irrespective of the source. I have found that cases of objective reasoning are rare among the left, which accounts for my prematurely snippy remark. Mea culpa.

==============================
Date:    Mon, 06 Mar 2000 16:00:09 -0800
Subject: HMM-264 Will Be First Squadron To Deploy With Osprey 

HMM-264 Will Be First Squadron To Deploy With Osprey 

By Cpl. Derek A. Shoemake

MCAS NEW RIVER, N.C. (March 2) -- When Marine Medium
Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 264 deploys with the 26th Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in July, it will mark the beginning of the end
of the CH-46E Sea Knight and the CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter.

Only months after returning from the Mediterranean Sea, the Black
Knights will begin steps to become the first non-training squadron in
the world to employ the use of the Marine Corps' new MV-22 Osprey,
which will replace the Corps' fleet of '46Es and '53Ds.

Major Jeffrey Mosher, who is responsible for overseeing his
squadron's transition to the Osprey, said if everything runs on
schedule, it will be just over three years until the squadron deploys
with the new aircraft. Though that time line may sound expanded,
Mosher points out it is actually quite compressed, and in fact the
most compressed timeline for an Osprey transition.

The process will begin in January 2001, with the enlisted transition
plan. According to Mosher, during this evolution, enlisted personnel,
such as crew chiefs and mechanics, will take classes at New River's
Marine Medium Tilt Rotor Training Squadron (VMMT) 204, while
getting hands-on experience with the Osprey.

Marine Medium Tilt Rotor Training Squadron 204 will also host the
pilot transition process, which is scheduled to begin in March 2001.
Like the enlisted transition plan, classes will be staggered to keep a
certain number of people working in the squadron while others train.

Mosher said if the transition begins as scheduled, all VMMT-204
training will wrap up January 2002. However, the overall transition will
not be over.

"Take a guy like me," said Mosher. "I have 3,400 flight hours, but
when I get through with '204, I'll only be a co-pilot."

When the aircrew return from VMMT-204, the squadron will be joined
by the Advanced Tilt Rotor Training Unit. This is a cadre of pilots and
crewmen with extensive Osprey experience. The training unit will
work with the Marines of HMM-264, who will be renamed Marine
Medium Tilt Rotor Squadron (VMM) 264, until the pilots and
crewmen are combat qualified.

"Look at it as a step approach," said Mosher. "When we get back
from '204 we'll be only 100-level complete, which means we'll be only
combat capable. With (the Advanced Tilt Rotor Training Unit) we'll
get to the 200 or 300 level, which means we will become combat
qualified."

This, according to Mosher, is where the real time crunch comes into
play. Only nine months after returning from VMMT-204, VMM-264
pilots and crewmen will join a Marine Expeditionary Unit. Only six
months after that, they are scheduled to depart with that MEU. This
will be the first Osprey squadron deployment in history.

Though the time line may be tight, Marines who now work with the
CH-46E and CH-53D said they are ready for the challenge.

"I think Marines understand that we have to keep moving forward,
however much we love (the CH-46E)," said SSgt. James
MacFarlane, CH-46 flight line chief and Baldwin, Wis. native. "In the
world we live in, we all have to be adaptable to change. If there's one
constant in the Marine Corps, it's change."

That change has some major advantages.

According to Bell Helicopter Textron and the Boeing Company, who
jointly produced the MV-22 Osprey, with its tilt rotor mechanics, the
twin-turbine aircraft can take off and land like a helicopter, and fly as
fast as a turboprop plane. Within 20 seconds of take-off, the 38-foot
rotor systems can rotate 90 degrees forward, putting the aircraft into
a fixed-wing mode capable of a cruising speed in excess of 240
knots.

"When I talk to guys who fly the aircraft, they say it's almost
indescribable," said Mosher, who has flown the Osprey in flight
simulators.

According to Bell and Boeing, speed is not the only advantage of the
Osprey. The aircraft has a payload capable of transporting 24
combat-loaded troops or carrying more than 10,000 pounds
externally. The Osprey can also travel 2,100 nautical miles with only
one aerial refuel. Mosher said this makes the aircraft better in a
combat situation.

"When we plan a combat mission with a '46E, we're inside of 60 to
75 nautical mile radius," he said. "But with the V-22, we can operate
inside of an approximate 250 nautical mile radius with twice the
payload. This extends what we can do from sea.

"Just look at (deploying to the Combined Arms Exercise at Marine
Corps Base Twentynine Palms, Calif.) If you want to take the '46Es,
you need C-130s for equipment transport and a few days to get
there. The V-22s, which are self deployable, are there in nine hours."

Mosher said the greatest advantages may not even be known yet.

"I don't think we have begun to realize the possibilities," he said.

"This is going to change doctrines. This is going to lead the way."

The Marine Corps plans to have all 22 active duty CH-46E and
CH-53D helicopter squadrons using the Osprey by 2015.

U.S. Marine Corps
Position Paper
Feb. 14, 2001

V-22 Autorotation

It has been asked whether the V-22 can autorotate. Because the answer is yes and no, a detailed discussion is necessary for fully understanding the issue.

Autorotation is the manner in which a helicopter is expected to land if its engines are not providing power to the rotor system. In the autorotative state, the rotors are kept turning by the force of the air as the aircraft descends. Near the ground the pilot will command a flare by pulling the control stick back, thus reducing the forward speed and rate of descent at touchdown to permit a survivable landing.

Helicopter autorotations are in most cases directly caused by engine failure or indirectly caused by a drive train failure that results in removal of power to the rotor. In twin-engine helicopters, loss of a single engine does not result in a need to autorotate, and historically, very few twin-engine helicopters have had both engines fail at the same time. Even cases of fuel contamination have seldom led to simultaneous dual engine failure. Aside from engine failure, the other major reason for autorotation is the failure of the anti-torque system. In a conventional helicopter that has one main rotor, the spinning of the rotor wants to spin the fuselage in the opposite direction. Because of this, single main rotor helicopters are equipped with a dedicated anti-torque device whose only purpose is to counter the spinning tendency of the fuselage (most commonly implemented as a tail rotor driven by shafts and gearboxes). If the anti-torque system should fail, the fuselage will begin to spin, potentially leading to loss of control. To handle this emergency, the pilot should enter an autorotation since reducing power to the rotor will remove the fuselage-spinning tendency. While there are helicopter configurations (tandem, coaxial, intermeshing) that do not depend on dedicated anti-torque devices because their counter-rotating rotors eliminate the need for the devices, most helicopters do require anti-torque devices and are susceptible to autorotations induced by their failures.

The twin-engine V-22, however, is not a helicopter but rather a member of the wholly unique tiltrotor class, more representative of an airplane than a helicopter. It was designed to hover like a helicopter but also to achieve the speeds of a turboprop airplane. This top end speed of about 260 knots in level flight (280 knots maximum allowed in a descent) is not achievable by conventional helicopters, meaning helicopters with rotor systems only. The Marine Corps employment concept for the V-22 is to have it quickly transport Marines and material large distances with speed and range being of the essence. The only other rotorcraft to approach these top-end V-22 speeds have been experimental hybrid aircraft with combinations of wing and jet thrusters, a technique that would be prohibitively inefficient for expanding to the scale of a transport aircraft that would fill the USMC's modern medium lift requirement as does the V-22.

The tiltrotor achieves its remarkable capability because of its revolutionary design. On each wingtip is an engine pod (nacelle), which has a rotor system attached to the engine within its nacelle through a gearbox arrangement. There is also a cross shaft that runs from one nacelle to the opposite that allows a single engine to drive both rotors should one engine fail. By rotating both nacelles together (tilting the rotors) from the vertical helicopter position to the horizontal airplane position, the tiltrotor essentially converts from a helicopter to an airplane. The pilots can also set the nacelles at any position between helicopter and airplane modes, these intermediate positions being known as conversion mode. With respect to V-22 power-off situations, it has been determined that airplane mode glides to a landing can be successfully accomplished in the V-22. Airplane mode developmental testing included glide descents in the test aircraft and glides to a landing in simulator evaluations. While unpowered glides to touchdown were not tested in the aircraft, the testing and simulation together were adequate to conclude that an airplane mode glide to a landing can be achieved with repeated success to a hard surface runway as performed in other heavy fixed wing aircraft. V-22 pilots receive simulator training in the proper techniques for performing unpowered airplane mode landings.

The V-22 has also been examined during its developmental phase for the ability to perform autorotations. V-22 developmental testing included autorotative descents in the aircraft and autorotations to landing in the simulator. Factors that define the V-22 autorotative capability are its relatively small rotor disk area in comparison to the weight of the aircraft (this being a result of needing to operate on the confined deck areas of ships) and the unique design of the proprotor blades (a result of needing to perform well for both helicopter and airplane mode). These factors require a forward airspeed of 110 knots to ensure the rotor system contains a high level of energy for later use in the landing phase and result in a descent rate of about 4000 - 4500 feet per minute, compared to a heavy lift helicopter pilot looking for a high level of rotor energy during autorotation (about 100 - 110 knots at about 3000 - 4000 feet per minute). The V-22 has demonstrated stable autorotative descents as described above in flight test and offers enough control to the pilot to touchdown at a survivable rate of descent, but evaluations in the simulator have shown limited repeatability of making a safe landing at the touchdown phase. This is largely due to the comparatively small amount of energy in the rotor system available to the pilot for managing descent rate and speed at touchdown.

While it is commonly expected that all rotorcraft should be capable of safe autorotative landings, this is not necessarily an assured outcome. Many light helicopters, usually of the single engine variety, do in fact routinely practice safe autorotative landings. The XV-15, a light tiltrotor built as a demonstrator only and not for production, also successfully demonstrated a number of tiltrotor autorotative landings. However, heavier rotorcraft are more challenged in their ability to provide for safe autorotations. For example, pilots of medium and heavy lift helicopters execute practice autorotations to a hover or low groundspeed. Practice autorotations to the ground are generally not permitted because of the high risk of damage to the aircraft. As an example, even though the probability of the three-engine CH-53E needing to autorotate is small, the heavy lift helicopter is expected to sustain (and is designed for) significant damage should an autorotative landing be conducted. This potential for damage is partially a reflection of the difficulty of piloting a helicopter to a successful autorotative landing and partially a reflection of the ability of the helicopter to offer a consistently manageable autorotation for reasons such as descent airspeed, descent rate and energy stored in the rotor system. Because significant damage can occur in autorotative landings, it is not always assured that life threatening injuries will be avoided. As a result, helicopters such as the CH-53E use many redundancies to avoid a need to autorotate but employ crashworthiness features to maximize survivability should one actually occur.

Having reviewed the V-22 power-off flight capability, it must be considered that the probability of needing to autorotate a V-22 is extremely low as discussed below.

In concert with the USMC employment concept, the V-22 was designed to spend 70% of its airborne life in airplane mode, a mode of flight wherein a survivable engine-out glide to a landing can be conducted. The exposure of the V-22 to the potential for an autorotation therefore lies in the remaining 30% of the mission spectrum that will be conducted in conversion mode or helicopter mode. Within this window, the probability of needing to autorotate is very small. The likelihood of a V-22 autorotation due to both engines failing is extremely low for the same reasons as discussed for twin-engine helicopters. Nevertheless, to reduce the potential need to autorotate because of engine failure, V-22 pilots are trained that the proper reaction to a single engine failure is to minimize the time in helicopter and conversion mode by conducting the remainder of the flight in airplane mode to the maximum extent possible. Helicopter and conversion modes are allowed to accommodate landing, but this proactive strategy places the aircraft into the safest possible posture (airplane mode) should the first engine fail. A helicopter pilot with a single engine failure has no option but to be ready to autorotate should the remaining engine(s) fail.

Additionally, the V-22 altogether eliminates the other most prominent reason for autorotation in that its counter-rotating proprotors obviate the need for a tailrotor (anti-torque) device. The V-22 is somewhat similar in this respect to the H-46 tandem helicopter that it is replacing. However, because the H-46 relies on a synchronization shaft to transmit power from the aft mounted engines to the forward rotor, a failure of the shaft will result in loss of the aircraft. The V-22 design is more robust by virtue of having an engine in each nacelle; it does not rely on its cross shaft for turning the rotors except to permit an engine to drive the opposite rotor if the engine in that nacelle fails. A failure of the cross shaft in itself does not result in loss of the aircraft.

A final factor to discuss concerning autorotation is its utility in relationship to how the aircraft is intended to be used. Any rotorcraft requires that altitude above the ground, or airspeed, be available to convert from powered flight to an autorotative condition. For example, at about 70 knots, the altitude needed for establishing a V-22 autorotation is about 1500 feet while for a heavy helicopter it is about 650 feet. These altitude and airspeed criteria may be compared against how the rotorcraft are to be used. For instance, a prime tactic for increasing combat survivability is to fly as low as possible to minimize exposure to enemy fire. For the V-22 and for medium or heavy helicopters, the altitude required to establish an autorotation when at low airspeeds is typically greater than that at which a combat flight would be flying, meaning a successful autorotation is unlikely if attempted. A higher airspeed, if adequate, can be used to establish a successful autorotation when sufficient altitude is lacking, but at the low altitudes used in combat the aircraft may settle into the ground before the pilot can recognize the situation and take the steps to establish the autorotation. For a V-22 in airplane mode at higher airspeed, the issue of engine-off landing becomes the reaction time involved in recognizing the problem and preparing for an airplane mode landing before settling. For the helicopter at higher speed, the issue also becomes one of recognition and preparation for autorotative landing prior to settling. In this comparison of utility of autorotative capabilities, the V-22 and the conventional helicopter are similar.

While there is a low likelihood that the V-22 will need to autorotate, pilot procedures are provided for how to perform an engine-off autorotation to a landing. As discussed, autorotations to the ground were not conducted in developmental test, but the procedures generated by the engineering and developmental flight test communities working together are felt to be accurate. Discussion occurred within the wider V-22 pilot community over whether to provide autorotation procedures that have not been verified by autorotative landings in flight test. The decision was that the procedures should be provided. The basis of this decision being that in the remote situation that a pilot may be faced with an unavoidable autorotation, he will benefit from the best set of procedures available rather than making hit or miss attempts to create a set of procedures during an actual emergency. Autorotations will be re-evaluated in the recently updated fleet simulator to determine if the procedures can be refined for better repeatability.

As mentioned earlier, the V-22 pilot is trained to set up for airplane mode flight and possible airplane mode glide rather than accept a potential for autorotation. But, should a V-22 ever need to autorotate, procedures are provided and the aircraft's many crashworthiness features will come into play to maximize potential for occupant survivability at landing. These features include crash load attenuation in the stroking pilot, crew and passenger seats; self-sealing fuel cells and fuel lines with self-sealing breakaway valves; crash energy absorbing landing gear; and wing structure that is to break away from the fuselage upon impact to reduce potential to collapse or otherwise threaten the cabin.

In summary, discussions of rotorcraft autorotative capability should be viewed in a fashion that accounts for all of the many factors that are wrapped into the subject for the particular aircraft. In the case of the V-22, the design and operating procedures have addressed the issue of power-off flight in an aggressive fashion to minimize the potential for such a condition and to maximize a favorable outcome should it occur. When viewed in a comprehensive fashion, the V-22 is safer in this respect than the aircraft it replaces.

14 February 2001

MV-22 Osprey Lies

Of all the U.S. military programs facing elimination, the V-22 Osprey program is most deserving. The MV-22 is far too expensive and too unstable to conduct combat assaults. The February issue of G2mil contains an article "The V-22 Fiasco" which should convince any sane person that this program is deeply flawed. An April 20, 2001 report by POGO summarizes other MV-22 problems. Early this year, a "blue-ribbon" panel consisting of a retired Marine General and two defense industry insiders was convened to ensure continuation of this program. This bogus review panel traveled the nation to visit manufacturing plants where the flawed MV-22s were built, but didn't find time to drive one hour outside Washington DC to talk with the MV-22 test pilots based in Maryland.

The panel recommended that obvious technical problems should be fixed, and an expensive redesign is now underway. The lightweight titanium hydraulic lines are too thin, so they will be replaced. Proper testing should eliminate the software problems. The Bell-Boeing team became aware of these problems during testing, but never fixed them, and 20 Marines died as a result. In private business, Bell-Boeing would have paid millions of dollars to the families of the dead Marines. They would also be expected to fix flaws in a product they produced, but in the corrupt world of U.S. military contracting, they will be paid even more money. The Marines also want a .50 caliber gatling gun mounted, so this will further complicate matters.

Meanwhile, the production line will stay open to produce incomplete MV-22s, which will be parked until the redesign work is finished. Then another billion dollars will be wasted to modify these 40 or more pre-production lemons. This redesigned MV-22C should be ready to fly within a year, but will it be thoroughly tested as promised? This would cost another billion dollars, take another two years, and may identify more problems. As a result, Marine Generals may claim that the redesigned Osprey was already tested. The MV-22s will be delivered to operational squadrons where pilots will face ridiculously stringent flight limitations to prevent another accident. This is of little concern to the racketeers at Bell-Boeing and in the U.S. Congress. Their goal is to produced as many MV-22s as possible, and then collect billions more dollars to continually "fix" problems. They will never admit that the MV-22's design is fundamentally flawed, and will continue to look reporters and Congressmen in the eye and repeat these lies.

#1 The MV-22 has twice the range of helicopters.

The MV-22 has about the same range as modern helicopters, like the new Navy MH-60S. The Marine Corps' old CH-53E has twice the range of the MV-22, which can be verified at the Marine Corps' own website. In those rare cases when the Marines need to fly long distances for a raid, the MH-60S can be equipped with external fuel tanks and far outrange the MV-22. The Special Operations command already operates the MH-60G "Pavehawk" (right) with a range of 445 nautical miles, almost twice the range of the MV-22. The MV-22 has "indefinite" range if refueled in the air, but helicopters can be fitted with booms to refuel in the air too.

#2 The MV-22 has twice the speed of helicopters.

The MV-22 can reach 240 knots, while helicopters are limited to around 148 knots, so its about 62% faster, not 100%. Even the 40-year old CH-46 can fly 145 knots. If the MV-22 carries cargo on an external hook, it must keep its rotors upright and cannot fly any faster than helicopters.

#3 The MV-22's higher speed makes it safer from ground fire.

Obviously, a faster flying aircraft is harder to hit. However, helicopter transports flying over enemy territory are normally escorted by Cobra attack helicopters. The armored Cobras scout ahead and engage threats, and guide the transports away from dangers. The Cobras also stand guard over the landing zone to immediately engage threats. Many Marines have questioned if Ospreys will operate without escorts, or fly at helicopter speeds so the Cobras can keep up. (see the April issue of the Marine Corps Gazette) This important issue has been ignored by Marine Generals.

The biggest danger assault transports face is in the landing zone. To avoid a deadly loss of lift called "vortex ring state" MV-22s must descend at half the rate of helicopters. In addition, the MV-22s generate three times more "downwash" as they land, so the danger of damage from flying debris among a group of MV-22 is higher. The 90knt downwash is so strong (see photo) that sea rescues are dangerous and landing in the desert causes a "brown out" where visibility is zero. The wind is so strong and the flying debris so dangerous that landed troops must lie down in exposed fields until the MV-22s fly away.

Survivability is an even bigger issue. Helicopters can land after a loss of engine power, by using "autorotation", the MV-22s rotors are too small, which is why unusual "test waivers" were allowed. Minor damage to the MV-22 rotors or complex drive system can cause catastrophic results, as the first two MV-22 crashes demonstrated. The two rotors must work perfectly in tandem, otherwise the imbalance causes the MV-22 to roll over, as the third and fourth crashes demonstrated. Finally, if the rotors become stuck forward, the MV-22 cannot land anywhere because its rotor blades extend well below the fuselage. During the Vietnam War, damaged helicopters landed safely thousands of times; damaged MV-22s just fall out of the sky.

#4 The MV-22 can carry 24 combat equipped Marines.

The MV-22 is supposed to carry as many Marines as the CH-46E, but its cargo compartment is almost four feet shorter, and slightly narrower. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps insists the MV-22B can carry 24 combat-equipped Marines, even after the GAO determined that only 15-18 Marines will fit. Remember that 19 Marines died when the MV-22 flipped over during the April 11, 2000 full operational evaluation (e.g. 4 crewmen and 15 troops).

The "requirement" that a new Marine helicopter must carry 24 Marines was invented in someone's head, it is not based on a real need. A requirement to lift a certain artillery gun or vehicle is valid, but the exact number of troops is an elastic standard. If moving the maximum number of bodies is the goal, the Marine CH-53E (right) can carry 55 Marines, or an armored vehicle. Articles have appeared in professional journals which argue that the Corps should forward-deploy composite squadrons consisting of 10 powerful CH-53Es and 4 CH-46Es, rather than 12 CH-46Es and 4 CH-53Es. This mix could double the squadron's helicopter lift, but this idea was ignored because it would threaten justification for the MV-22 program.

#5 The MV-22 costs only $41 million each.

During this year (FY2001), Bell-Boeing was to receive $1208.5 million to produce 16 V-22 aircraft for the Marines, for an average cost of $76 million each. Some of this money was recently cut and reprogrammed for the redesign. The Marine Corps spent an average $90 million for each "pre-production" MV-22. The Department of Navy (which funds Marine Corps aviation) had budgeted around $66 million for each full-production copy, which is traditionally optimistic. Last year, the Navy determined the MV-22s costs had risen and cut the overall buy from 360 to 348. A GAO study last year estimated $83 million a copy, and that was before the Marines decided to add a gun and make other enhancements.

#6 It would take years to modify and test a modern helicopter like the Army's Blackhawk to operate from ships.

The new Navy MH-60S "Knighthawk" has already been fully tested and approved for full production. It can carry a crew of four and 13 passengers or 10,000lbs of cargo. The Marine Corps can simply sign a production contract to join in the Navy buy. Navy H-60 spare parts and training programs have been functioning for years, the Corps already operates eight VH-60s as part of the Presidential helicopter squadron. If the Corps joined the Army, Navy, and Air Force by adopting the Sikorsky H-60 series for basic transport, all services would save money and improve interoperability. This year, the Navy bought 17 MH-60S for $17 million each, they would cost even less if purchased at a higher rate with a joint Marine Corps buy. The MH-60S can carry almost as much as the MV-22, at one-sixth the price. The Navy is impressed with the MH-60S and plans to use them to replace their CH-46D helicopters, rather than buying 48 HV-22s.

Adopting the H-60 design would allow the Marine Corps to add a new capability by modifying some MH-60S as EH-60E electronic warfare aircraft, using components already in service with the Army. Another advantage is that the MH-60S is equipped to carry 16 Hellfire anti-tank missiles. This would quadruple the airborne anti-tank firepower of the Marine Corps. For example, composite squadrons which the Corps maintains forward-deployed include four Cobra attack helicopters which could be supported by 12 MH-60S carrying Hellfires and machine guns.

Another option is for the Corps to add the 43 MH-53E heavy lift helicopters which the Navy plans to retire. The Marines plan to upgrade and overhaul 101 of its fleet of 165 nearly identical CH-53Es to a CH-53F configuration, at a cost of $20 million each. Apparently, the funding drain of the MV-22 program will not allow all 165 CH-53Es to remain in service, even though they carry three times the cargo as the MV-22, and four CH-53Fs will cost less than one MV-22. Canceling the MV-22 would free ample funds to rebuild all Marine CH-53Es and Navy MH-53Es to provide 208 powerful CH-53Fs for the Marines.

#7 The MV-22 mishap rate is no worse than other new aircraft.

In a commentary in the February 12, 2001 issue of the Marine Corps Times, Steven Danyluk, a former Marine pilot now flying for American Airlines, wrote: "These accidents give the Osprey, which has barely 4,000 total flying hours, a mishap rate of nearly 100 per 100,000 flight hours, the statistical standard for measuring an airframe's safety record. The Marine Corps' overall safety record in 2000, excluding the MV-22, was 2.65 "Class A" mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. With MV-22 flights averaging two hours per mission, those riding aboard an Osprey have had, to date, a 1-in-500 chance of meeting a disastrous fate. If American Airlines operated with a similar mishap rate, it would suffer five crashes per day. Osprey advocates say high mishap rates are not uncommon with new designs. But the new designs that experienced such mishap rates primarily came at the dawn of the jet age, in aircraft that were mostly single-pilot configurations equipped with ejection seats. In contrast, the Osprey is designed to carry 24 combat-loaded Marines with no such escape mechanism."

FY96-00 Marine Class A Flight Mishap Rates

Data from the Navy Safety Center

			Class A
		Class A	Flight Mishap
	Flight Hours	Flight Mishaps	Rate
FY96	409,338	15	3.66
FY97	360,586	12	3.33
FY98	356,804	9	2.52
FY99	358,334	13	3.63
FY00	340,095	9	2.65
FY96-00	1,825,157	58	3.18
MV22	4,000	4	100.00

The MV-22s mishap rate is actually worse because a "Class A" mishap is one where a death occurs or over one million dollars in damage is suffered, which is not difficult for aircraft which cost around $50 million dollars. For example, when a MV-22 flipped over and killed 19 Marines in April 2000, the other MV-22 in the flight also lost some control and suffered damage when it hit the runway hard. It may have suffered enough damage to qualify as "Class A". The four MV-22 crashes were total losses where everyone on board died, while most of the "Class A" mishaps in the chart were repairable damage.

Keep in mind that Marine aircraft average over 20 years of age, fly dangerous training missions in difficult weather, and are maintained by young Marines, often based overseas on ships. The new MV-22s have been flown only carefully scripted test missions, by the best pilots in the Corps, only in ideal weather, and under care of the Corps best mechanics. In contrast, none of the new C-17 aircraft have crashed, nor have any of the new F/A-18E. The F-22 had one mishap where the pilot ejected safely. The two other new military aircraft under development have suffered no mishaps; the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter and the Joint Strike Fighter.

#8 The MV-22 is essential for future Marine amphibious operations.

Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has conducted successful amphibious operations without the MV-22. Since the Navy is concerned about shore-based missile threats, the Marine Corps has embraced a concept of offloading ships from "over the horizon", which is about 25 miles offshore. Several studies has proven this impractical, including one from the Naval War College: Logistical Implications of Operational Maneuver From the Sea, which concluded "the Navy and the Marine Corps need to keep the laws of logistics in mind if they are to distinguish campaign plans from fanciful wishes." Even if major "over the horizon" landings becomes possible, the round-trip required for offload is less than 50 miles. The time needed to load and offload cargo, and refuel are the same for MV-22s as helicopters, which lessens the MV-22s advantage of greater speed, which applies only to internal loads. In any case, a CH-53E can shuttle far more cargo and troops 50 miles ashore each day than a MV-22.

The MV-22 program has gutted the Marine Corps

Historically, the Marine Corps has taken pride in a lean, mean, and economical Fleet Marine Force. During the 1980s, the Corps entered the world of developing expensive, complex weaponry, like the MV-22. The Corps has spent $12 billion "developing" the MV-22, which is more than it has spent on all other programs combined during its entire history. This money could have bought 1000 new helicopters, but has yet to produce a safe aircraft. The MV-22 was supposed to enter the fleet several years ago, but has been delayed as engineers struggle to "fix" problems.

If the MV-22 was safe and cost $30 million each, it would be a great contribution. Unfortunately, when fatal design flaws emerged several years ago, Marine Generals refused to admit to a mistake, and committed the Corps reputation to an impossible goal of fixing a fundamentally flawed aircraft. The problems were hidden by applying heavy pressure on Marines involved in testing and evaluating the MV-22 to lie. Even the editors of the "Marine Corps Gazette" and Naval Institute "Proceedings" were intimidated to censor negative comments about the MV-22 program or suggestions about alternatives. Mildly negative comments about the MV-22 in a formal JAG Manual investigation report about the April 2000 crash were deleted by senior Marine officers. Very few Marine Generals had any direct responsibly for the MV-22 fiasco, but LtGen Fred McCorkle (left) deserves much blame. As a Marine MV-22 pilot told the Washington Post, "people who were my heroes all of my life are no longer my heroes."

Marine Generals refuse to accept that hard work, billions of dollars, political clout, and lying cannot overcome the laws of aerodynamics. Billions of dollars in funding for Marine Aviation continue to flow down the Bell-Boeing rat hole as Marine Corps helicopter lift rapidly deteriorates. If the MV-22 program were cancelled today, the Marine Corps could immediately buy dozens of MH-60S helicopters each year "off-the-shelf" at a far lower cost and free funds for a fleet of 208 powerful CH-53Fs. The MV-22 program has failed, not because of critics, not because of bad press, and not because of a lack of funding. The MV-22's design is fundamentally flawed. Bell-Boeing has built enough MV-22s for every aviation museum in the nation, its time to donate them.

Carlton Meyer editor@G2mil.com

Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer and a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School.

Letters

MV-22 would not be certified by the FAA

Many years ago, new military aircraft had to be certified by the FAA before delivery. If this were still required, the V-22 program would have died long ago. I have a PhD in Aeronautics and spent most of my life in helicopter development. I used the V-22 specs and did calculations to determine the safety margin for the aircraft needed to prevent dangerous stalls. The V-22 design provides only one-third the safety margin which the FAA requires. This is even more dangerous since the V-22 is unable to auto-rotate in the hover mode. I've shared this information with several people involved in the program, it only made them angry.

Name Withheld

Ed. The July 9, 2001 issue of "Aviation Week" states that the Bell Agusta BA609 tiltrotor is similar in design to that of the larger Bell Boeing MV-22, but will be certified to commercial, not military, standards. This is admission that the V-22 would not be certified as safe by the FAA.

V-22 lands naked Marines

Thanks for the well researched article! One important item missing in the down wash section: in early testing, exiting Marines literally had their clothing ripped off their bodies when making a combat entry approach. So the "exiting" procedure had to be redesigned. Marines must follow a certain path in order to avoid fighting naked---this of course doesn't deal with the critical problem of the direction of hostile enemy fire!

David Rucker themark@airmail.net

V-22 software problems cannot be fixed

In your article you state that proper testing can eliminate the V-22s software problems. I disagree; the V-22 is "fly-by-wire", meaning that a computer controls the aircraft, based on input from the pilot. Even with the best computers available today, the calculations which the computer must crunch are just too numerous in the hover mode. The V-22 computer controls two engines/rotors and must deal with changing winds, air temperature, speed, direction, weight, humidity, and air density whenever the pilot moves the stick. As a result, control is often sluggish, sometimes taking several seconds to respond. Sometimes the computer is overwhelmed and crashes, so be it must be reset (e.g. rebooted). If you add the complexities of external loads or turbulence from nearby V-22s or minor pilot errors common at night or in combat zones, the V-22 will often crash from "software anomalies", which is what caused the last crash.

Name Withheld

The Pentagon announced its FY2002 budget plan for the V-22. The planned buy was cut from 16 MV-22 (Marines) and 2 CV-22s (Air Force) to 12 unflyable MV-22s. Since the Air Force resisted pressure to order any flawed CV-22s, it signals they have accepted reality and will drop plans for 50 MV-22s. However, the Bell-Boeing team will get an extra $410 million for R&D to try to "fix" the fundamentally flawed V-22 design, again. Since the procurement cuts total only $231 million, the Bell-Boeing team will make even more profits during FY2002 than if the flawed V-22 had been approved for full production.

Only two V-22s will fit in an LHA Hanger

I'm in the Navy and was on the USS Saipan where the V-22 was certified as shipboard compatible. It was designed to fit in the hanger deck of an LHA or LHD, it does, by inches, which doesn't leave room to move them around. I estimated that we could only fit two in the hanger deck at a time. This probably doesn't sound like a big deal, but it is.

Name Withheld

JSF Assault Version

This may be an impossibly naive question, but would the JSF, with it's internal bomb bay and vertical lift capability, be, with appropriate modifications, a possible substitute for for the failed V-22? Barring that, is it possible to meet the Marine's needs with an aircraft with a frame, etc, built around the JSF's engine and flight controls?

Taylor Norwitt

Ed. Great idea, I've been thinking about that for years. It couldn't replace a helicopters cargo lift ability, but a few long-range rapid assault jet squadrons would prove valuable. The problem is how to disembark as the downwash from a VTOL jet is too heavy. Perhaps the Marines could be in a cargo pod which slides out the back, or they could exit the top and slide down a long extendable metal slide.

Hey, has anyone looked into modifying Boeing 777's into a cheap, dumb, iron bomb dump truck to replace those ancient b-52s?

check out the B-52's graveyard - couldn't they be used in some way? New engines, electronics, etc?

http://terraserver.homeadvisor.msn.com/image.asp?T=1&S=10&X=2581&Y=17786&Z=12&W=2