Posted on 12/02/2001 9:26:18 AM PST by Hopalong
From Parameters, Autumn 2001, pp. 76-91.
"The Lacedaemonians gave sentence that the peace was broken and that war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates as for fear the Athenian greatness should still increase. For they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into their hands."
-- Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War
"Attack when they are unprepared, make your move when they do not expect it."
"So a military force is established by deception, mobilized by gain, and adapted by division and combination."
-- Sun Tzu, The Art of War
In surveying the landscape of international politics, the Taiwan Strait stands out as an area with grave potential for seismic instability. Beijing argues that Taiwan remains a province of China, while Taiwan steadily establishes de facto independence and contemplates the formal announcement of national autonomy. Such a declaration would cross China's political "red line" and push Beijing to the use of force. The United States, meanwhile, clings to a policy of "strategic ambiguity," recognizing only one China, with diplomatic ties to Beijing and withholding diplomatic recognition from Taiwan. The United States argues that any Chinese military aggression against Taiwan would be a serious threat to American interests, but so far has stopped short of extending formal security guarantees to Taiwan, fearing that such agreements would embolden Taiwan to formally declare independence and trigger a conflict with China. The Bush Administration does appear to be edging toward a more assertive position in support of Taiwan than was the case during the Clinton era, however. President Bush in April 2001 publicly stated that the United States would do "whatever it took" to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.[1]
Despite the intractable political dilemma, many commentators and observers dismiss the potential for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. They argue that China's public comments on reserving the right to use force to cut the Gordian knot amounts to little more than bluff and bluster because China will lack the military means to attack and occupy Taiwan for at least ten years. This confident assessment lends itself to the United States resting comfortably on its current policy position of strategic ambiguity and dismissing the potential for a military conflagration in the Taiwan Strait that could bring American and Chinese forces into direct combat.
What if the prescience of these analysts is less than perfect? This article constructs a devil's advocate analysis to weigh against the analyses that see little prospect for major Chinese military action against Taiwan. It suggests that the Chinese could use strategic surprise to compensate for shortcomings in military capabilities and orchestrate a successful military campaign to take control of Taiwan. The Chinese could do so by readily deceiving outside observers about the scope of their sealift and airlift capabilities, which would fundamentally undermine the linchpin assumptions of sanguine analyses about Chinese force projection capabilities. The Chinese also could use massive barrages of surface-to-surface missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction to profoundly disrupt Taiwan's air force, air defenses, and other measures to counter Chinese amphibious and airborne assaults in a coordinated campaign to occupy Taiwan. What the Chinese military lacks in technological sophistication could be compensated for in military mass, contrary to the assertions of the optimists.
This sort of devil's advocate analysis has significant implications for US policy. American policymakers can better protect national interests if policy and military options are thought through long before the outbreak of a cross-Strait conflict than if they wait and are caught off-guard by a Chinese surprise attack.
Surprise Attack and Deception
Surprise attack is the use of military force against an unsuspecting and ill-prepared adversary. The aim of surprise attack is to strike before an adversary is able to bring his defenses to full strength and to deny him the ability to marshal the resources needed for counterattack.
Surprise attack is a particularly attractive strategy for a nation-state that needs to compensate for military inadequacies or shortcomings. Clausewitz said of surprise that "whenever it is achieved on a grand scale, it confuses the enemy and lowers his morale; many examples, great and small, show how this in turn multiplies the results."[2] Surprise acts as a force multiplier that enhances the military effectiveness of a potentially handicapped aggressor. As Michael Handel explained of the value of strategic surprise, "In compensating for the weaker position of the attacker, it will act as a force multiplier that may drastically reverse the ratio of forces in the attacker's favor."[3] Although Handel used force ratios as a measure of capabilities, another measure is the technological sophistication of weapon systems. A nation-state might turn to surprise attack to multiply the combat effectiveness of its arms that are technologically inferior to those of its adversary.
Deception operations go hand-in-hand with surprise attack. In many instances, surprise attack is facilitated by deception operations designed to mislead an adversary's intelligence collection and analysis. Handel defined deception as "the deliberate and subtle dissemination of misleading information to an intelligence service by its adversaries."[4] In his book Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Michael Herman elaborates:
Deception works by making false evidence--false reports through agents, false documents, bogus radio traffic, deceptive displays--available for foreign intelligence collection. Successful deception is usually designed to fit in with and magnify its target's own preconceptions. Its ideal is to make the victim deceive himself, while minimizing the amount of genuine information that has to be given to build up source credibility.[5]
Deception operations will deny an adversary an unambiguous warning or indication of impending war. Without unambiguous warning, nation-states may be reluctant to shift to a wartime footing, thereby presenting an aggressor with a window of opportunity to levy the first blow in combat and exploit momentum in the conflict's initial stages.
Nation-states have repeatedly defeated the best efforts by modern intelligence organizations to clearly perceive the political-military intentions and capabilities of adversaries before the onset of combat. The history of warfare, littered as it is with examples of surprise attack and their enabling deception operations, attests to this stubborn reality. Cases of surprise attack by an adversary--and of intelligence failure on the part of the victim--include the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the North Korean attack on South Korea and the subsequent intervention of China, and the 1973 Middle East war.
The reasons for one's vulnerability to surprise attack and intelligence failure are many. As Ernest May concluded from an exhaustive study of intelligence assessment before the world wars, intelligence agencies are
. . . vulnerable to willful deception and perhaps even more to self-deception. They are vulnerable in the first place because they follow an almost unavoidable rule of trying to fit the evidence they have into some coherent, rational whole. . . . They are vulnerable in the second place because, partly perhaps from awareness of the power of prejudice and preconception, they have a preference for data which are quantifiable and therefore appear comparatively objective. . . . And thirdly they are vulnerable to deception because, after having to judge hard issues, they are prone to look for confirming rather than disconfirming evidence.[6]
Abraham Ben-Zvi similarly concluded from a review of surprise attacks that states fall victim to their own preconceived notions of their adversaries: "Oblivious to the asymmetry of motivation that existed between the parties to the conflict, they remained aloof to the possibility that their opponent, while militarily weaker, might be willing to accept greater costs and risks than expected."[7] Richard Betts observes that in many cases "hesitancy in communication and disbelief on the part of leaders were reinforced by deceptive enemy maneuvers that cast doubt on the data."[8]
With such a long historical record of surprise attack and enabling deception operations in warfare, one wonders how potential victims can avoid these calamities. One way is to apply a devil's advocate analysis to a conflict-prone situation. The goal of a devil's advocate analysis, as Robert Jervis observes, is to increase the chances that policymakers "will consider alternative explanations of specific bits of data and think more carefully about the beliefs and images that underlie their policies."[9] Jervis wisely adds that "those who listen to the arguments are in a good position to learn what perspectives they are rejecting, what evidence they should examine more closely, and what assumptions need further thought. As a result, fewer important questions will be overlooked because everyone agrees on the answer."[10]
Conventional Wisdom: China Lacks the Military Means
As perceived by the West, the Chinese military is impressive in size, but underwhelming in technological sophistication. The Chinese have an active force military of about 2,470,000 personnel, with some 7,060 main battle tanks, 4,800 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 65 submarines, 20 destroyers, and 3,520 combat aircraft. The Chinese military dwarfs the size of Taiwan's armed forces with its 370,000 active-duty troops, about 750 main battle tanks, 1,175 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 4 submarines, 12 destroyers, and 668 combat aircraft.[11] The bulk of China's order-of-battle, however, consists of obsolescent Soviet-styled and Soviet-built equipment. Even the most modern Chinese weapons are inferior one-for-one with the Western-built equipment supplied to Taiwan. China's 50 Su-27 aircraft, for example, could be countered by Taiwan's F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Taiwanese pilots are also better trained than their Chinese counterparts; they receive double the flight hours per year for training.[12]
Outside observers also assume that they have a good handle on the size and scope of the Chinese ballistic missile program. Respected estimates of Chinese tactical ballistic missile inventories are at about 240 ballistic missiles, including 200 CSS-6/M-9 missiles with a range of 600km and 40 CSS-7/M-11 with a range of 120-300km,[13] both of which are capable of hitting Taiwan from the mainland. Many observers envision the use of Chinese ballistic missile strikes as a means to harass Taiwan and scare off foreign vessels from visiting Taiwan's ports or to raise havoc with the Taiwanese stock market, but they neglect the notion of integrating ballistic missile capabilities into a major Chinese military campaign to overrun Taiwanese defenses and occupy the island. In this vein, for example, Denny Roy argues that "although presently incapable of capturing Taiwan by invading it, China could seriously harass and undermine its economic well-being through operations short of invasion."[14]
Most significantly, many observers judge that Chinese military lift capabilities are too limited to project the forces needed for a successful invasion of the island. Michael O'Hanlon, for example, assesses that China's 70 or so amphibious ships could move no more than 10,000 to 15,000 troops with their equipment, including some 400 armored vehicles, while another 6,000 troops could be moved by airlift.[15] The well-respected International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that "it would take approximately 800-1,000 large landing craft nearly two weeks to transport the required 30 infantry divisions to Taiwan. At present the Chinese Navy could move one, or perhaps two divisions."[16]
Outside observers judge that Chinese sealift and airlift are so limited that there is no near-term threat to Taiwan of Chinese invasion. O'Hanlon, for example, confidently assesses that China will pose no substantial threat to Taiwan for at least ten years.[17] Roy asserts that for at least ten to 15 years, "The physical conquest of Taiwan will remain a daunting prospect."[18] David Shambaugh argues that China "remains at least five to seven years away from having the necessary capability to mount a full blockade and amphibious attack against the island (both of which would necessitate air dominance and sea-denial capability)."[19]
Thinking and Fighting Unconventionally
Conventional wisdom also assumes that any near-term Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan would be an irrational act because China needs much more time to procure and deploy more technologically sophisticated weapon systems. This assumption overlooks the political and historical wisdom revealed by Richard Betts in observing, "The probability of armed conflict depends not only on the actual dangers of war to the attacker, but also on the perceived dangers of peace."[20] Beijing does not have the combat power needed to replicate a US Marine Corps-style amphibious assault on Taiwan, but Chinese leaders may fear that they will never have sufficient time to develop such capabilities. Time is eroding Chinese interests by allowing Taipei the luxury of strengthening its economic and political linkages to the world while improving its military qualitatively with modern and technologically sophisticated weapon systems from the West, particularly from the United States.[21]
Counter-intuitively, the bolstering of Taiwanese military capabilities may be decreasing Taiwanese security. As Betts explains, "Defenders may assume erroneously that their military strength inhibits the enemy, not recognizing that consciousness of weakness may impel him to compensate with audacity in order to redress the balance."[22] Beijing may be feeling pressure to move militarily sooner rather than later, worrying that the gap between Taiwanese and Chinese military capabilities and Taiwan's integration into the world at large will only grow with time, particularly if Taiwan receives protection under a US theater ballistic missile defense system.[23]
A devil's advocate analysis assumes that under these conditions, Chinese civilian authorities have tasked or will soon task military planners to be prepared to execute a military campaign to conquer Taiwan. In anticipation of the order, the Chinese military may have had in place a prolonged, sustained, and clandestine effort to bolster those military assets needed to project power across the Strait. The Chinese--particularly with the recent publication of the Chinese military White Paper--have encouraged the West to believe that Beijing is increasing its military transparency to the outside world.[24] What the outside world knows of Chinese military assets, however, may be just the tip of the iceberg.
The Chinese undoubtedly are aware that outside observers look to Chinese inventories of sealift and airlift assets to gauge China's ability to launch an invasion across the Strait. With this in mind, the Chinese could conceive of and execute a deception campaign to reassure outside observers that their estimates of China's sealift and airlift assets are on the mark, while the Chinese military clandestinely acquires and exercises the lift assets needed to increase their capabilities to send sizable forces across the Strait.
There is evidence that the Chinese place a high priority on surprise and the enabling features of denial and deception in their military planning. Mark Burles and Abram Shulsky judge from reviewing the history of the Chinese use of force that "a key characteristic of Chinese use of force in actual conflict has been the importance of the element of surprise."[25] According to the US Department of Defense, a 1993 Chinese National Defense University treatise also suggests that the Chinese military recognizes the value of conducting deception operations, especially in a crisis involving Taiwan, to create ambiguity about Chinese intentions and to force Taiwan's political and military leadership to misallocate resources. The Chinese report argues that deception is intended to induce the enemy to reach erroneous conclusions about the activities and objectives and adds that camouflage and deception can disperse the enemy's troops, waste their firepower, and disrupt high-technology weapons.[26]
Additionally, the Chinese see surprise as a way to overcome more technologically sophisticated adversaries. As Michael Pillsbury's impressive research reveals, a theme that exists in Chinese strategic writings is "the requirement for 'the inferior' to preemptively strike the 'superior' in order to paralyze his nerve centers and block his logistics. Chinese military books and articles on US weaknesses date back at least to the Gulf War in 1991 and continue to appear, drawing on analysis of that conflict."[27]
The manufacture of air- and sealift assets presents no formidable technological obstacle to the Chinese, a fact that eludes the conventional wisdom. The Chinese have the indigenous capability to manufacture both aircraft and ships capable of ferrying troops across the Strait.[28] The Chinese are also fully able to take active measures to ensure that clandestinely procured air- and sealift assets go undetected by the West. A US Department of Defense report observes that "the Chinese are proficient at using camouflage, terrain masking, underground facilities, decoys, and other forms of denial and deception to conceal military activity and inhibit timely warning."[29] The Chinese political objective of reunifying Taiwan to the mainland should be more than sufficient incentive to devote the economic resources needed to support such a clandestine effort to build and hide substantial military lift assets.
With little difficulty, China could increase the production lines of their transport aircraft and keep the additional aircraft in warehouses and underground shelters to hide them from overhead satellite detection. Chinese conscripts could receive jump training over a sustained period without detection by the outside world. Such efforts could substantially increase the number of troops that China could send over the Strait for airdrops on Taiwan.
Likewise, the Chinese could undertake clandestine efforts to build up their sealift capacities. The manufacture of sea-going barges is hardly a technological achievement beyond their grasp. They could undertake efforts to substantially augment their sealift assets while taking care to keep the naval assets under massive nettings in isolated harbors away from main naval bases that attract the most attention from prying Western eyes.
The Chinese could also be increasing their production of ballistic missiles well beyond the scope assumed by the West. The importance that the Chinese attach to ballistic missiles in compensating for the inadequacies of their air force was evident in the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. Ballistic missile batteries--which were nearly impossible for the United States to detect in the open desert during the 1991 Gulf War--could easily be concealed in the rugged terrain along the extensive Chinese coastline.
China's Campaign
What might a campaign against Taiwan that uses these clandestinely developed military capabilities look like? The Chinese could seek to lull the Taiwanese and the Americans into a sense of political security to lessen the military preparations to defend the island. The Chinese might engage in a steady stream of diplomatic activity to portray an image of satisfaction with the status quo and a heavy political commitment to nurturing the political dialogue with Taiwan. As Handel observed from his study of strategic surprise, "The attacker takes care to maintain a facade of routine diplomacy, lulling diplomats of the intended victim into suppressing the military warning signals through optimistic political interpretations."[30] Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, for example, undertook such activities to lull the Israelis into a sense of security prior to the outset of the 1973 Middle East war. Similarly, the Chinese could surround cross-Strait visits and talks with great fanfare and publicly claim that these endeavors herald a new foundation for cross-Strait relations. In such an environment, few statesmen on Taiwan or in the United States would be calling for increased military vigilance.
In such a political atmosphere, the "routine" exercising of Chinese naval assets and increased air, air defense, and ground force activity might attract no exceptional attention. The Chinese have made Taiwan and the United States accustomed to seeing large-scale annual exercises over a period of several years. Increased Chinese military activity could be perceived by the outside world as normal. Politicians, moreover, could caution against any increased alert posture of Taiwanese and US forces, worrying that such measures would undermine the warming political and diplomatic activity the Chinese had demonstrated. In this hypothetical scenario, however, these military exercises would represent the movement of the Chinese military to a wartime footing and the foundation for a massive military assault on Taiwan.
The Chinese might judge that the initial stages of their military campaign should concentrate on Taiwan's center of gravity in its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence system. The operational concept would be to destroy the Taiwanese military's central nervous system and cause the air, naval, and ground force limbs to go limp. The Chinese could fire massive "bolt out of the blue" surface-to-surface missile barrages to saturate areas in which critical Taiwanese civilian and military infrastructure is located. Barrages of hundreds of missiles would be required to compensate for missile inaccuracies. Targeted facilities could include service and command headquarters, civilian and military residences and offices, and government facilities. The Chinese might aim at toppling buildings to trap and kill as many civilian and military leaders as possible in one fell swoop.[31] Such missile barrages would represent a military effort to "decapitate" Taiwan's leadership and significantly erode Taiwan's ability to orchestrate defenses against the unfolding Chinese campaign.
The Chinese might be more willing than their Western counterparts to integrate the use of weapons of mass destruction into their surprise attack to magnify the psychological blow against their victim. China's leaders might reason that an ambitious military campaign against Taiwan in and of itself would make Beijing an international outcast, and therefore the use of weapons of mass destruction would only marginally contribute to its ouster from the international community. The Chinese might argue that the use of weapons of mass destruction in combat would set no international precedent because they were used against a renegade province in an "internal affair," not in an international conflict. In addition, the Chinese are less adverse than many in the West to using brutal violence against their own citizens for political objectives--particularly if they challenge the authority of the state--as evident in the 1989 Chinese crackdown on student protesters in Tiananmen Square.
China could fire a handful of ballistic missiles armed with tactical nuclear warheads to increase the odds of killing Taiwanese civilian and military leaders. Some research suggests that the Chinese see military utility in the battlefield use of nuclear weapons. For example, Alastair Johnston observes that "in contrast to US proponents of the assured-destruction concept of deterrence, most of the Chinese strategists who write on nuclear questions explicitly reject the notion that nuclear weapons have overturned Clausewitz's axiom that warfare is the continuation of politics."[32] Johnston suggests that "the predominant view appears to be that the nuclear revolution does not by itself eliminate the possibility that states (including China) can use nuclear weapons in wartime for achievable political ends."[33] One can speculate that the Chinese might integrate the use of tactical nuclear weapons delivered by ballistic missiles into the battle plan for taking Taiwan rather than adopt the Western conception of nuclear weapons as weapons of deterrence and last resort.
Ballistic missile warheads also might be loaded with a variety of persistent and non-persistent chemical agents to incapacitate Taiwan's air and air defense forces on the ground in order to gain air superiority. The Chinese could lob persistent chemical warheads on Taiwan's surface-to-air missile sites to impede Taiwanese air defense crews from operating their systems. Less-persistent agents could be fired on Taiwan's main air bases to impede Taiwan's efforts to get pilots and their aircraft airborne. These efforts would give the technologically inferior Chinese air force a window of opportunity to make sorties with conventional munitions against air and air defense force installations as well as against naval and ground forces.
The Chinese fighter aircraft could also exploit this opportunity to escort Chinese transport aircraft ferrying airborne troops across the Taiwan Strait. Chinese airborne drops could concentrate on Taiwan's main and secondary air force operating bases. Airborne drops could be timed to coincide with the evaporation of the non-persistent chemical agents targeted against the airbases. These troops would secure the perimeters around the intact runways to enable larger, troop-carrying aircraft--perhaps even Chinese commercial aircraft seconded to the military--to land and rapidly reinforce the lightly armed airborne soldiers.[34]
China possesses airborne forces that could serve as the seedbed for nurturing more substantial airborne and airmobile forces than currently suspected by the outside world. According to the US Department of Defense, China's 15th Airborne Army consists of three airborne divisions, each with about 10,000 troops.[35] And since the 1991 Gulf War, China has been devoting considerably more resources to the development of special operations forces.[36] As China downsizes its huge conscript military, it is focusing greater attention on more readily dispatched combat troops. China has about 14 divisions designated as "rapid reaction" units. These are combined-arms units capable of deploying without significant train-up or reserve augmentation.[37] Chinese airborne troops dispatched in an initial wave could secure Taiwanese airbases for the ferrying--in both Chinese military transport and commercial aircraft--of such "rapid reaction" airmobile troops.
While Taiwan's military would be struggling to recover from ballistic missile strikes, tactical nuclear weapon detonations, chemical strikes, and airborne assaults, the Chinese would be mounting amphibious assaults against Taiwan's beaches....
For the rest of the article, with notes, click here
It's my understanding, for what it's worth, that some in the KMT and a few others are aiming at exactly such a "solution" on the mainland, though theoretically with any number of "parties."
On the other hand, the ChiComs argue, that by maintaining a few inconsequential dummy "parties", they are obviously already a multi-party state, hehe.
At any rate, the ChiComs don't seem to grasp easily that the ROC on Taiwan is not the British in Hongkong or the Portuguese in Macau.
Best regards. S&W R.I.P.
*Thunk*
Maybe it is because I don't like 'simple' solutions or explanations, but I think that the Chinese government strategy is 'bloody devious' (to use a British phrase). When you hold up a mirror to yourself, you see what you want to see, but you cannot see underneath, and that is without even going into the machivellian motives of the various parties. I would really like to hear from some former Sinologists, but they seem to be rather thin on the ground these days.
Regs,
VRN
Best regards. S&W R.I.P.
The element of surprise as outlined, if all the precursor assumptions of sea/air-lift inadequacy are invalidated (and quite likely too if you look at the scale of the PRC purchase of Boeing's 757s) are sufficient for them to make a 'go' decision. Harry Wu has also said they will invade, AND they will use nuclear weapons. And not just against Taiwan and its defenses, but against the U.S. mainland. They are crazy enough to do it, and play a game of 'nuclear-chicken.'
There are more than 1 million people from Taiwan work in China and China really needs Taiwan's business and factory managemnent skill badly. Here is a real example: A sr. executive who works in a large US company had a business trip to Taiwan. He was originally from Taiwan. Once he arrived in Taiwan he wanted to see his old college friends and could not find them because all of them work in China. So he flew to GuangZho, China and had the reunion there.
Today's KMT is splitted into 3 parties and it is not a major party anymore. Most of those KMT members do not maintain the old slogan "Take back China and Save the Chinese culture and people". Now DPP is the leading party in Taiwan, China can control DPP easily. Look at those members established DPP who are no longer DPP member now, they all are doing big businesses in China.
Military action against Taiwan is not an option because it does not worth the benefit. Open up China for Taiwanese is the best and easiest way to take Taiwan back and US's intervention will never happen.
US has to create a fake tension atmosphere between Taiwan and China so we can sell more out-dated weapons to Taiwan.
The crux, as usual. Some are bluffing, but doubtless some are sufficiently disconnected from reality to contemplate it.
Which is why it is not a question of whether they would "win" or not.
As I said in #3, such moves, if contemplated by the marginally rational among them, would be in my opinion strictly ancillary to painstaking political manipulation.
Which, of course, is exactly how they came to power on the mainland in the first place. And, merely by the way, how the Taleban took over most of Afghanistan.
The assassination of Massoud, in my opinion, was supposed to be the penultimate step.
Best regards. S&W R.I.P.
Another crux, which some of the more naive enemies of the KMT are constitutionally incapable of putting into their equations.
Cf. #3.
"Sleepers," until the decsive awakening, usually maintain an outward appearance of great militancy for whatever "cause" they are subverting in their dreams.
Ah Hui (for whom, admittedly from great remove, I have considerable respect) is, at least as far as I can see, playing his own usual, brilliant, and decisive game, don't you think?
Best regards. S&W R.I.P.
Best regards. S&W R.I.P.
It won't be a huge invasion at first with bombs and planes and ground troops, but rather a series of small actions that will grow in scale and scope. We of course will rattle our saber and warn China against any further action, but it will be too late.
Remember China's goal is to expand their territory. They can smile at us and even pretend to be open to some western influence (like maybe they'll let their citizans view the internet for a brief period of time, like with 9/11). But the reality is that this government is a cold, blood-thirsty communist regime bent on destroying the west. Sorry to be so upbeat, but it IMHO it is going to happen.
Ah Hui is the Godfather of Chen. He brilliantly single-handed divided KMT into 3 parties, now for this election KMT becomes 4 parties. And that was how he made Chen the president of ROC.
A lot of people in Taiwan still believe Ah Hui is a communist, not necessary the CCP. His sole job was to destroy KMT and he did it beautifully. By traditional Chinese moral value, Ah Hui should be ashamed and hide because he betrayed his party.
CCP can achieve their goal by commerce then why force? Besides, there will be a big price to pay by CCP if they want to take Taiwan by force. They already got more than half of Taiwan's money anyway.
Taiwan's businessmen's mentality: "Borrow money from Taiwan's Banks, Invest and Make money in China, Deposite money in HongKong's banks."
I understand the attitude to some large degree. By the same values, the ChiComs should collectively commit suicide. And those who oppose them should act the role of the old "Censors."
To what extent did some of the Nationalist factions betray Ah Hui, do you think?
Rather than dealing with new and promising realities, including the apparent attachment of a growing number of ROC citizens to a vibrant, almost no-holds-barred Republic where many of the traditional values—such as the quietism of "Disaster from the mouth"—no longer hold?
I defer to you on present theories about his "ideological" underpinnings, if any.
As far as I can see, he is playing a middle game. That he was responsible for Chen's initial election, and his Party's present success seems inarguable.
But was that not partly because so many in his own party did not wish to acknowledge his own auctoritas? On the other hand, had he wished simply to anoint Chen as his successor, why form a new party?
I have heard some describe Lien as incompetent. What is your view?
Best regards. S&W R.I.P.
And even without us, if it came to that, as it almost did under our last administration, the ROC is perfectly capable of fighting off the CCP, militarily or otherwise.
With us on their side, it's not much of a contest.
One thing is certain, the CCP would not survive such an attack.
Best regards. S&W R.I.P.
Best regards. S&W R.I.P.
Why?
>>By traditional Chinese moral value, Ah Hui should be ashamed and hide because he betrayed his party.
Lee betrayed the CCP in the first place. Why did the KMT trust a traitor?
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