Posted on 10/12/2003 12:00:35 AM PDT by SAMWolf
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are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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For The USS Cole Bombing An Editorial The real tragedy of the attack on the USS Cole will inevitably lead to a rash of speculation, criticism, sound bites, second-guessing and general Monday morning quarter backing. How could the Navy allow this to happen? Why didnt the captain of the USS Cole take better security precautions? These will be the questions stated in various forms by a number of people from the media to Congress. I will not join the game of piling on the commander in the field. I have not second-guessed the commander at the front and I never willespecially since I served in the Army not the Navy and particularly when I sit here safe at home in Florida. I will however contribute a few general thoughts and observations based on my time in uniform; thoughts that may help those who have never been there to better understand what it may be like at the tip of the spear. Those thoughts and comments, I believe, will describe some general conditions/circumstances that can lead or contribute to such unfortunate incidents like the Cole disaster. USS COLE (DDG 67) Our military forces are given numerous missions as an extension of Americas political policies throughout the world--regardless of the genesis of that policy--whether to defend Americas vital interests or divert attention from a scandal-ridden administration. I cant say what the Coles mission was but I can tell you from my chair here in Florida, they conducted that mission to the utmost of their ability. How do I know that? I know soldiersand I include members of all services in the term "soldier". When our forces are in any area of the world, the level of security is based on the potential threat. Some areas and times are far more threatening than others so you cannot logically treat all areas and times the same and you cant remain on high alert 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We have a system in place to alert those around the world of the level of threat at that particular time in their area. We call it Threat Condition or THREATCON for short and the level is ultimately determined by the chain of commandstarting at the Pentagon. The levels are: THREATCON NORMAL- No threat of terrorist activity is present. THREATCON ALPHA - There is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations, building locations, and/or personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable. THREATCON BRAVO - There is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified. THREATCON CHARLIE - An incident has occurred or intelligence has been received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent. THREATCON DELTA - A terrorist attack has occurred or intelligence has been received that action against a specific location is likely. Our troops respond and set their security levels based on messages from their chain of command with regard to the potential threat and the THREATCON level in place at that time based on the intelligence we have or the specific situation. Now obviously any commander can, and should if necessary, increase his security levels to meet his own situation, but he should never reduce his level below that ordered by his chain of command. At the time of the attack, the USS Cole was at THREATCON BRAVO per this Pentagon Briefing: DoD News Briefing Thursday, October 12, 2000 - 3 p.m. EDT Presenter: Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen (Special briefing on the incident involving USS Cole. Also participating in this briefing was Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark) Q: What kind of security procedures were followed? Were there armed security personnel on the deck? And did they have any of the fleet anti-terrorism support teams that normally go with ships? Clark: I described earlier the requirement to have an approved force protection plan. Then there are a series of threat conditions in every theater in the world. Their threat condition posture was threat condition Bravo. I have talked to the commander a number of times today and reviewed the bidding on this, and they were in the posture that they were required to be in for this threat condition and entering this port, which would include armed personnel topside. Seventeen Sailors aboard USS Cole (DDG 67) were killed as a result of an explosion Oct. 12 which left a 40 foot by 40 foot hole in the port side of the Norfolk, Va.,-based destroyer. U.S. Navy photo. What is not mentioned, at least that I could find, is the ROE for the ColeRules of Engagement. Not only must commanders respond to the THREATCON level, they have ROE that dictate the conditions under which they can engage and place fire on anyone. I have seen ROE that are at times so complex and detailed as to be utterly useless to the man on the ground with the rifle. These ROE are often times politically driven and, in an attempt to cover every conceivable situation, become so bogged down in double talk and detail, the poor soldier is reluctant to use his weapon at all for fear of violating some rule or shooting some innocent bystander. He must make the decision whether the man in front of him is a real threat or an innocent civilian in a split second. If he guesses wrong- he and America pay a very heavy price. In reality, he is working under conditions of threat from both sides. He could be damned either way he goes. This causes real internal turmoil for the man with the rifle. Do I know that this was the case on the Cole? No and again, I will not second-guess the captain of the Cole. I just present this as a factor in any situation of this nature. The successful application of practical damage control is evident in the wrapping and plugging of a propeller shaft hull penetration on the damaged destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) following the Oct. 12, 2000 terrorist bombing attack on the ship in the port of Aden, Yemen. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Jim Watson Compounding the problem for the man at the tip of that spear besides THREATCON Levels and sometimes confusing ROE is the support arrangements our government makes with host governments around the world. Most times, those that are providing some of our maintenance support, like refueling services, are indigenous personnel, not Americans. In Korea for example, we have Koreans doing any number of maintenance functions and they are all over the post at any given time. If pressed, could I have told you who was friendly and who might be a North Korean terrorist? The answer is plainly No. The situation was apparently similar at the refueling point for the USS Cole. Again per Admiral Clark in that same briefing: Q: Admiral, you talk about the force protection plan, and you said that force protection plans are in place. But wouldn't it make sense to send Navy personnel out to make sure that these boats coming toward you are actually part of the tender operations and not some sort of a threat? Is that a lapse, that you let these people come up so close to the boat without knowing, really, exactly who they are? Clark: Well, in my view -- and you can accuse me of 31 years of experience in this and being involved in this activity and then just sort of taking it for granted. But the reality is, is that when you enter a port like this, you make contact with the port officials, you always do before you enter; you wouldn't think of going in without having them verbally clear you in. They tell you who -- that the individuals are there to support you. You make assumptions about the credibility of that support. And I think that's appropriate, and that's the way we deal with people all around the world. We don't automatically suspect people that are sent forward to help us in an official way. This kind of support takes the tone of -- the arrangements made -- we send our request to the embassy and they deal with the local people there. And I will tell you that the first report I had from this via Admiral Moore was from an embassy support person. Q: If you really don't know who's coming towards you, wouldn't it be wise to send some Navy personnel out before it gets close to the ship to make sure that these are in fact -- Clark: Well, I think that's the same question, and the answer I just gave you would be the same. A Navy diver, assigned to Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit Two (MDSU 2), prepares to work below decks aboard USS Cole (DDG 67) during repair and recovery efforts following the Oct. 12 terrorist bombing attack on the destroyer in the port of Aden, Yemen. U.S. Navy photo by Senior Chief Engineman Lyle G. Becker The question then becomes, did the guards on the Cole know who was coming at them? They were at THREATCON BRAVO so I will assume they had guards. What were the ROE imposed by our government? That I dont know at this point. How could they distinguish between those terrorists and the indigenous support personnel our government arranged to do the refueling? You tell me. I could never be sure when I was in Korea or Germany. Another question. What responsibility should the Clinton administration assume because the cut backs that reduced the number of oil tankers in our Navy may have forced the Cole to refuel in port rather than at sea? How much responsibility should they accept because of the lack of personnel that may have prevented the ships captain from having sufficient resources necessary to accomplish all the tasks he had to accomplish during this operation? All this is related and dont think it isnt. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps security personnel patrol past the damaged USS Cole (DDG 67) following the Oct. 12, 2000 terrorist bombing attack on the ship in Aden, Yemen. Security personnel established checkpoints and searched incoming vehicles for contraband and explosives while the ship prepares for its journey back to the United States. U.S. Navy photo by Senior Chief Engineman Lyle G. Becker. As for the WABC report where we were shown two men in a rented little boat getting right up to some of our ships, keep in mind that this piece of investigative reporting began before the events with the Cole. Our ships were at home and although I dont know for certain, probably under THREATCON NORMAL or THREATCON ALPHA. Also keep in mind that if you have ever been to Norfolk and watched the number of ships and civilian boats running all around there, such a little boat in the harbor is not out of the ordinary. Should we be on high alert at home port? Are you on high alert against burglars in your own living room all the time? Should we permit civilians to approach our ships the way those WABC reporters did? I personally would say no and I would be willing to take the criticism when WABC starts protesting like they always do about being held away and prevented from reporting to the American peopleand you know that would be their reaction. Ive seen that response from the media too many times. In fact, it was one of my daily chores during the Gulf War to avoid as many reporters as possible. According to some very good Navy friends of mine, time in port is not "kick back" time. There is a tremendous amount of work to be done and it takes a full crew to do it. Do we have the personnel necessary to do all the tasks under current manning levels? My guess is no given all the cut backs weve had to endure these past 8 years. Do all these maintenance jobs have to get done anyway? Most definitely, the answer is yes. Can we get them all accomplished and remain on high alert while in homeport? The answer I would give is no. USS Cole (DDG 67), showing the results of an attack that killed 17 of her crew and injured 39 others, is towed away from the port city of Aden, Yemen, into open sea by the Military Sealift Command fleet ocean tug USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168) today. Cole will be lifted aboard the Norwegian heavy transport ship M/V Blue Marlin, and transported back to the United States, a trip expected to last approximately five weeks. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Don L. Maes Humans can only do so much with what they have. When resources are continually cut and expectations and missions continually expanded, nobody can do it allsomething has to give. The role of a leader is to recognize when that starts to occur and make adjustments to prevent it. He must make sure his troops are well equipped, his units well manned, well trained, well motivated and ready for the task ahead. The buck stops in the Oval Office and with the Commander in Chief for this preparedness. During the last 8 years, that buck has lost virtually all its value. What will be the result of all this national publicity on our men and women in the Navy because of this WABC report on top of the Cole incident? They will once again be asked to do even more with the less handed them by an uncaring, incompetent administration that has never and will never take any of the responsibility for tragedy but is always there to take the lions share of the glory for our militarys sacrifices and victories. My take on this: Military service is a very risky business. We all knew that going in and we all accept that while were there. Does our government compound that risk when it cuts resources to include equipment, personnel, training time and funding while at the same time expanding the number of deployments and missions, at times providing confusing ROE and making support arrangements with host countries to service our equipment? The answer is obviously and most definitely yes. Can the troops sense when their commander in chief doesnt care about their plight? Yes. Does it adversely impact their morale when our troops know we are at a reduced state of readiness because of the administrations policies and priorities? Yes. Does morale have an impact on the job we all do? Yes. Will things like this happen as a result of a reduced state of readiness? Absolutely, and weve been witness to it. What then is the cure? A new Commander in Chief is the most important answer in my view. An administration that puts America first, brings our troops home, only deploying them in defense of our vital national interests and adequately resources the force to do the job they are called upon to do in defense of that vital interest. One last word--In the job of defending America, there is no room whatsoever for a Commander in Chief like Bill Clinton or his echo, Al Gore. Just the view from my saddle The Colonel
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Additionally USNS Catawba (T-AFT 168), USS Camden (AOE 2), USS Anchorage (LSD 36), USS Duluth (LPD 6), and USS Tarawa (LHA 1) arrived in Aden some days later, providing watch relief crews, harbor security, damage control equipment, billeting, and food service for the crew of Cole.
Seventeen sailors were killed and 39 others were injured in the blast which blew a hole in the port side of the destroyer. The injured sailors were brought to the US Army's Landstuhl Regional Medical Center near Ramstein, Germany, and were later flown to the US.
Cole was transported from Aden by the Norwegian heavy transport ship M/V Blue Marlin. She arrived in Pascagoula December 24, 2000.
On January 19, 2001, The Navy completed and released its Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation of the incident, concluding that Cole's commanding officer "acted reasonably in adjusting his force protection posture based on his assessment of the situation that presented itself" when Cole arrived in Aden to refuel. The JAGMAN also concluded that "the commanding officer of Cole did not have the specific intelligence, focused training, appropriate equipment or on-scene security support to effectively prevent or deter such a determined, preplanned assault on his ship" and recommended significant changes in Navy procedures.
www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia
www.openbibleministries.com
www.al-bab.com
www.chinfo.navy.mil
www.cole.navy.mil
www.uss-rangerguy.com
www.norfolk.navy.mil
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IT'S IN THE BREAKING NEWS SIDEBAR Thanks |
I offer up this prayer, which we pray at the start and end of every meeting of the VetsCoR Board of Directors meetings:
Dear Lord, watch over our Brothers and Sisters who remain in harms way, where ever they are around the globe. Grant them Thy blessing, that they be protected from harm, and may they be safely, and swiftly, returned to their loved ones. AMEN
"The Era of Osama lasted about an hour, from the time the first plane hit the tower to the moment the General Militia of Flight 93 reported for duty."
Toward FREEDOM
Sailors guarding the USS Cole when terrorists bombed it last month in Yemen did not have ammunition in their weapons and were instructed not to shoot unless fired upon, The Washington Post reported Tuesday.Crew members told the newspaper that their ''rules of engagement'' prevent them from firing without obtaining permission from the ship's captain or another officer.
Russia [and Iraq] involved in attack on USS Cole, Arab report says
The sophisticated explosives used in attacking the U.S. destroyer Cole in Aden last month came from Russia via Iraq, an authoritative Arab news magazine said Thursday. The Paris-based Al-Watan Al-Arabi quoted reports filtering from Western intelligence agencies as saying that the explosives, ``which were of a type available only to Russia and the former East Germany'', had been smuggled to Iraq on one of the early Russian flights that broke the U.N. air embargo on Baghdad.
The enormity of the damage clinton caused to our country may never be realized by the masses but thank God there are plenty of us who do know and his legacy will be forever as a POS.
Thank you SAM for remembering the USS COLE on the anniversary of her attack.
I'm hopeful a lot has changed with our military since we got rid of clinton.
Thanks for stopping in to the FReeper Foxhole today.
Today's classic warship, USS Illinois (BB-7)
Illinois class battleship
displacement. 11,565 t.
length. 368'
beam. 72'3"
draft. 23'6"
complement. 660
speed. 17 k.
armament. 4 13", 14 6", 16 6-pdr., 6 1-pdr., 4 tt.
USS Illinois (BB-7) was laid down 10 February 1897. by the Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., Newport News, Va., launched 4 October 1898; sponsored by Miss Nancy Leiter; and commissioned 16 September 1901, Captain G. A. Converse in command.
After shakedown and training in Chesapeake Bay, the new battleship sailed 20 November 1901 for Algiers, La., where she was used to test a new floating dry dock. She returned to Newport News in January 1902 and from 15 to 28 February Illinois served as flagship for Rear Admiral R. D. (Fighting Bob) Evans during the reception for Prince Henry of Prussia. Bearing the flag of Rear Admiral A. S. Crowninshield, the battleship departed New York 30 April 1902 and arrived Naples 18 May, where the Admiral took command of the European Squadron. Illinois carried out training and ceremonial duties until 14 July 1902, when she grounded in the harbor of Christiana, Norway, and had to return to England for repairs. She remained at Chatham until 1 September 1902, then proceeded to the Mediterranean and South Atlantic for fleet maneuvers.
Illinois was detached from the European Squadron 10 January 1903 and assigned to the North Atlantic. She engaged in fleet maneuvers, gunnery and seamanship training, and ceremonial operations until December 1907, when she joined the Great White Fleet for the cruise around the world. Following a Presidential review, the mighty battleships sailed from Hampton Roads on their important voyage. The Atlantic Fleet joined the Pacific Fleet 8 May 1908 in San Francisco Bay and after a review by the Secretary of the Navy the combined fleets continued their cruise. The ships visited Australia, Japan, Ceylon and other countries, arriving Suez 3 January 1909. At Suez word of the Sicilian earthquake sent Illinois, Connecticut, and Culoga to Messina. After rendering valuable aid to victims of the disaster, the ships rejoined the fleet, returning to Hampton Roads 22 February 1909. President Roosevelt reviewed the fleet as it arrived, having given the world a graphic demonst ration of America's naval might. Illinois decommissioned at Boston 4 August 1909.
The battleship was placed in reserve commission 15 April 1912 and recommissioned 2 November 1912, in time to take part in winter fleet exercises and battle maneuvers with the Atlantic Fleet. During the summers of 1913 and 1914 Illinois made training cruises to Europe with Midshipmen. In 1919 the ship was again laid up at Philadelphia Navy Yard and was later loaned to the State of New York 23 October 1921 for use by the Naval Militia.
Excluded from further use as a warship by the terms of the Washington treaty, Illinois was fitted out as a floating armory at New York Navy Yard in 1924 and was assigned to the New York Naval Reserve. She remained there for more than 30 years, though reclassified IX-15 8 January 1941 and renamed Prairie State to allow her name to be assigned to a projected new battleship. During World War II she served as a U. S. Naval Reserve Midshipmen Training School at New York. Following the war, she was retained on loan to the State as quarters for a Naval Reserve unit until 31 December 1956.
Prairie State, after over 50 years of useful service to the Navy and the Nation, was towed to Baltimore and sold for scrap to Bethlehem Steel Co., 18 May 1956.
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