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The FReeper Foxhole Remembers The Battle of Santa Cruz(10/25-27/1942) - Sep. 25th, 2003
http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/santa_cruz.htm ^

Posted on 09/25/2003 12:00:07 AM PDT by SAMWolf



Lord,

Keep our Troops forever in Your care

Give them victory over the enemy...

Grant them a safe and swift return...

Bless those who mourn the lost.
.

FReepers from the Foxhole join in prayer
for all those serving their country at this time.


...................................................................................... ...........................................

U.S. Military History, Current Events and Veterans Issues

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The Battle of Santa Cruz

Prelude
The Battle for Henderson Field


With Imperial Japanese Army troops still vainly struggling to subdue the beleaguered U.S. Marines who stubbornly clung to the Henderson Field perimeter like a drowning sailor to a preserver, Imperial General Headquarters was loath to leave the situation alone. Strict measures and decisive action would have to be taken to achieve the sort of overwhelming victory at Guadalcanal that morale and strategy required to keep the possibility of final victory open. It was not surprising what the collective minds of the Imperial General Headquarters at Tokyo, still the top authority on the conduct of the war, and Combined Fleet with its seagoing headquarters on the "Hotel Yamato” in beautiful and peaceful Truk lagoon, churned out for execution in the three final weeks of October, 1942.



Similar in appearance to the operations that had led to the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, but more extensive and carefully planned, their scheme offered a foolproof method of eliminating any American opposition to Japanese reinforcement runs to Guadalcanal – either by mere threat of force imposed on a weak opponent, or by attacking and destroying him if he dared oppose the Imperial Navy.

All operations would be tied to the progress of the 17th Army on Guadalcanal. General Kawaguchi, Commander-In-Chief, would set a time by which his forces would be placed in such fashion as to overwhelm the Americans (who were still considered rather weak in number and by comparison) and bring Henderson Field into Japanese possession. The IJN, with a powerful five-carrier force, would move forward to fall upon the U.S. Navy's flanks if it attempted its own reinforcement runs, evacuation maneuvers, or even tried to employ its carriers in a fleet battle.


Admiral Kinkaid
Led the USN task force of the USS Enterprise and the South Dakota at the Battle of the Santa Cruz


The naval operations that would provide Kawaguchi with the necessary additional ground support – artillery pieces, supplies, and most importantly, more men -- would be conducted as two major reinforcement runs and repeated but regular runs of the Tokyo Express.

When Admiral Kondo, in charge of Combined Fleet operations, put to sea at 1330 on 11 October 1942, with two battleships and carriers Hiyo and Junyo, trailing Nagumo's three-carrier 3rd Fleet by three and a half hours, the first of these reinforcement runs was already being executed. It would be an awkward opening for the IJN's most carefully planned campaign. This first reinforcement run, a "singularly important” run by a reinforced Tokyo Express, containing seaplane carriers Nisshin and Chitose, would lift heavy artillery, ammunition and men to Guadalcanal, necessary ingredients to General Kawaguchi's recipe for winning on the ground. Accompanying them would be 8th Fleet's CruDiv 6, or better, its three remnants, under Rear-Admiral Goto Aritomo. Their laborious task would be to shell and disable the feared Cactus Air Force and thus open a route for easier reinforcement both day and night. Alas, it did not turn out the way it was intended.


Admiral Kondo
Led the Japanese naval forces during the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in October 1942.


The Tokyo Express, preceding Goto, arrived at Guadalcanal and successfully disembarked its load. Goto, however, stumbled unprepared into Rear-Admiral Norman Scott and was soundly defeated in the ensuing battle of Cape Esperance.

It was a heavy blow to Japanese morale, and yet it happened to be only a partial defeat within the global scope of the campaign; the most important part, the safe delivery of Kawaguchi's highly needed reinforcements, was accomplished.

While the Japanese reinforced, a small U.S. convoy under Rear-Admiral Richmond Turner also approached Lunga Roads, carrying the National Guardsmen of the 164th Regiment of the Americal Division to their first combat duty. Crowded aboard two freighters were the 2,900 men of the regiment, plus Marine replacements.


Vice-Admiral F. "Bull" Halsey
replaced Ghormley as Commander of the South Pacific area


Turner arrived off Lunga on 13 October and stumbled into the major air offensive preparing for the IJN's second important convoy, this one not a Tokyo Express but a genuine convoy. It was fortunate for Turner that the 11th Air Fleet had not considered a strike at naval forces and chose to hit the runways of Henderson Field instead.

This convoy, called the "High Speed Convoy” by virtue of its comparatively fast movement, consisted of six fast transports and an escort of eight destroyers, and carried 4,500 men and many rounds of ammunition, again vital to the 17th Army on Guadalcanal.

To box this unit through, Combined Fleet had assigned it powerful support in the form of two battleships, Kongo and Haruna, under the command of Rear-Admiral Kurita Takeo, to bombard Henderson Field in the night before the convoy's arrival. It was obvious that such a heavy shelling would incapacitate U.S. air power on the island, and together with the carriers now within supporting distance to the north, any threat to the convoy would be fought off.


Admiral Nagumo
Led the IJN 3rd Fleet at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and Carrier Division 1 at the Battle of Santa Cruz.


Kurita's arrival at Lunga Roads in the first hours of 14 October was the first and last time that Henderson Field would be subjected to a battleship bombardment; alas, that took nothing away from the savageness of the action.

Kurita's sixteen 14” guns loaded with Type 3 bombardment shells took to hitting Henderson Field for an hour and a half, and when Kurita departed, most of the Cactus Air Force had been obliterated, along with the greater part of its fuel reserves.


A Kate heading over South Dakota after having released her torpedo.


There had been light casualties overall, but the command staff of VMSB-141 and most of its planes had been destroyed, severely limiting Henderson Field's striking power on the last day it could possibly intervene with the High Speed Convoy's approach. Yamamoto hurried his forces south to engage a now-coverless U.S. fleet and win the campaign. However, Yamamoto was a bit over-ecstatic: Henderson, while severely hit, was in fighting spirits. The Americans scraped together every flyable plane to hit back at the convoy, which they did throughout the afternoon of 14 October. Their tireless efforts did little to decelerate the convoy's advance, but it was a vital feeling of doing something that would help efforts on the 15th. Imperial command units were in high spirits. Their important convoy anchored off Tassafaronga at midnight on the 14th, and commenced unloading immediately. A Tokyo Express added another 1,100 men to the landed troops, and Admiral Mikawa dropped another 700 8” shells within the Henderson Field perimeter, an effort which meant little to the Marines after Kurita's shelling the previous night.


Shokaku under attack during the Battle of Santa Cruz


2nd Fleet's carriers provided cover for the still-unloading convoy on the next morning, but several relays of attackers, first piecemeal, then coordinated, hit at the transports and forced three to beach themselves. One more transport was completely unloaded and retired, but Admiral Takama, in charge of the operation, abandoned the disembarkation and headed north of Savo, to maneuver his ships more effectively -- and never returned when the night, under a full moon, brought no relief from Henderson's constant attacks.

That night, yet another 8” bombardment, this one by cruisers Myoko and Maya, hit Henderson, but it neither turned the tide of operations. Henderson remained more or less operable, although the amount of planes it housed had considerably decreased.


A Japanese Val dive bomber plummets toward the U.S. carrier Hornet on October 26, 1942, during the Battle of Santa Cruz off Guadalcanal. A Japanese Kate torpedo bomber that has recently released its torpedo can also be seen flying past. The Hornet was sunk in this battle.


On 16 October, the renewed aerial offensive cost the U.S. a destroyer, but finally, the Americans were reasonably close to offering the Japanese resistance at sea. Carrier Enterprise left the homely waters of the Hawaiian Islands, where she had been receiving extensive if rushed repairs for the past month, and headed south to reinforce the only carrier then available, Hornet. With her Air Group 10, the U.S. might actually be in a position to move against any further operations of the IJN. But while Enterprise proceeded on her seven-day journey from Pearl Harbor to the Solomons, the Japanese experienced further trouble. Though the reinforcements had been landed largely as scheduled, an early-morning bombardment by destroyers Aaron Ward and Lardner had laced the freshly stocked ammunition dump near the debarkation area of the previous convoy; 2,000 5” shells burst into the area and ignited the greater part of the vital stocks.


26 October 1942: Three near misses straddle Enterprise, as she and her escorts turn in wild evasive maneuvers.


Accordingly, General Kawaguchi was unable to conduct his attack as planned (difficulties in moving his large forces also played into this decision), and he decided to postpone his move from the 20th to the 22nd – a move which the Navy only barely found out about.

The Imperial Navy had problems of its own. With all its major forces deployed at sea, fuel was getting critically low – so low that one of the supporting tankers had to return to Truk and take aboard fuel from battleships Yamato and Mutsu, for no other reserves were left at this advance base.



It was on 18 October 1942 that the campaign took its most sharp turn for the Allies when Admiral Nimitz, tired of Vice-Admiral Ghormley's (COMSOPAC) cautiousness (some said, timidity) and obvious disorganisation, with the approval of Admiral King relieved Ghormley and replaced him with Vice-Admiral William F. "Bull” Halsey. It was Halsey's finest hour. A stocky, tough-looking individual with a gritty face and personal manner that fit his nickname, this former Naval Academy boxer and football player was preceded by his reputation as a fiercely attack-minded fighter who cared little for formula but much for performance. His mere presence lifted American spirits and his first acts in office did likewise – he ordered neckties removed from Navy uniforms and moved the headquarters from pleasant but remote Auckland to the closer Nouméa.


The anti-aircraft battery pumping out shells at the Battle of Santa Cruz, 26 October 1942.


The IJN, meanwhile, paid another price for the continuous delays in the opening of the ground campaign -- which had been postponed to the 24th -- when Hiyo, one of 2nd Fleet's carriers, suffered an engine breakdown on the 21st that could not be fixed at sea, forcing her to retire to Truk, leaving behind several of her planes that were transferred to Junyo.



TOPICS: VetsCoR
KEYWORDS: carriers; freeperfoxhole; guadalcanal; japan; michaeldobbs; pacific; santacruz; usnavy; ussenterprise; usshornet; veterans; wwii
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To: snippy_about_it
Thanks Snippy!
61 posted on 09/25/2003 6:56:57 PM PDT by Victoria Delsoul (Arnold has the conviction and the fighting spirit to lead California into a new age of recovery)
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To: SAMWolf
At least there's no In-Laws visiting.

LOL! Lucky you.

62 posted on 09/25/2003 6:57:50 PM PDT by Victoria Delsoul (Arnold has the conviction and the fighting spirit to lead California into a new age of recovery)
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To: GATOR NAVY; SAMWolf
Came across this article while researching todays thread.

IJN Destroyers Long Lance Torpedo launcher


Long Lance Torpedo

Historians mark how leathal the Long Lance Torpedo versions were...that Japan had put the platform into most of their surface fleet ..including Heavy Cruisers.

American gunfire crippled many Japanese surface combatants ..adrift with failing powerplants..they were able to get a final volley of torpedos off.
A burning Japanese warship on the horizon was not neccessarily out of action just yet.

Historians note the failure of the Japanese to use their submarine force more offensively...at Santa Cruz..the Japanese had 11 Submarines..with more involved in later weeks.

Failures in Command decision making figures prominently in the long Guadalcanal campaign.
At Santa Cruz..the Japanese had the numerics..they should have prevailed.
Yet their command was tenative....memories of Midway still plagued certain commanders.

Guadalcanal was a journey in Chaos....the U.S. regrouped better than the Japanese..who seemd vexed by their mental demons and fears..which lead to tenative projection in battle.

63 posted on 09/25/2003 7:34:23 PM PDT by Light Speed
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To: Light Speed
Evening Light Speed.

The Japanese Long Lance was deadly. They were the only major combatant in WWII that didn't have troubles with their torpedoes.

Both the Germans and United States were plagued with faulty exploders, running too deep and premature detonations. The Japanese seem to have worked out all the bugs in their torpeodes .
64 posted on 09/25/2003 7:38:40 PM PDT by SAMWolf (A fine is a tax for doing wrong. A tax is a fine for doing well.)
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To: Light Speed
Actually, that picture is of a TAKAO class heavy cruiser. And that bad boy had 4 of those quad mounts, plus reloads for every tube.
65 posted on 09/25/2003 7:41:38 PM PDT by GATOR NAVY (20 years in the Navy; never drunk on duty - never sober on liberty)
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To: Light Speed; snippy_about_it


Here's an interesting (if a little bit beaten up) picture of the 'Kate' which finished off the already damaged USS Hornet on October 24, 1942. The splash of the torpedo (which most likely would have been a Type 91 Mod 2 or 3) can be seen at the lower right. This weapon struck Hornet at 1523 hours, and ended any hopes of saving her.

66 posted on 09/25/2003 7:44:00 PM PDT by SAMWolf (A fine is a tax for doing wrong. A tax is a fine for doing well.)
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To: GATOR NAVY
I had heard there were mud slides and it sounded pretty bad. I know you get a lot of quakes and it's usually nothing. Good to hear this wasn't near you and yours.

Any stories from your trip to Hawaii to tell? Did you at least get away for some fun?
67 posted on 09/25/2003 7:44:32 PM PDT by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)
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To: GATOR NAVY
I want to know what it's like to see the USS ARIZONA and USS MISSOURI together.
68 posted on 09/25/2003 7:51:23 PM PDT by SAMWolf (A fine is a tax for doing wrong. A tax is a fine for doing well.)
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To: SAMWolf; snippy_about_it
My meetings were at Hickam AFB and I didn't make it to Pearl so I only saw pictures of the ARIZONA and MISSOURI. I've been to the ARIZONA before so I wasn't worried about seeing it this time.

I did get a nice tour of the island on Saturday from my cousin, who I hadn't seen in almost 10 years. We had a good time.
69 posted on 09/25/2003 7:57:13 PM PDT by GATOR NAVY (20 years in the Navy; never drunk on duty - never sober on liberty)
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To: GATOR NAVY
I've been on the Missouri, she stopped in Astoria, and they allowed visitors, on her way to Pearl. Only been to Hawaii once and that was a plane refueling stop in 1969. Didn't get to see the Arizona. :-(
70 posted on 09/25/2003 8:01:46 PM PDT by SAMWolf (A fine is a tax for doing wrong. A tax is a fine for doing well.)
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To: SAMWolf; Light Speed
The Japanese torpedoes worked during the war because they took the trouble to test, retest and test again actual warshot torpedoes before the war. We were idiots and so positive our torpedoes worked we tested them without warheads and so never knew our exploders were faulty. And without warheads we didn't also know about the depth problems either.
71 posted on 09/25/2003 8:05:41 PM PDT by GATOR NAVY (20 years in the Navy; never drunk on duty - never sober on liberty)
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To: SAMWolf
Good picture, thanks.
72 posted on 09/25/2003 8:07:00 PM PDT by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)
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To: SAMWolf
I've been on MISSOURI when I was a kid and she was mothballed in Bremerton and again in the 80's when she was active in Long Beach. They're charging $16 to see her now, I thought that was a little steep.
73 posted on 09/25/2003 8:09:28 PM PDT by GATOR NAVY (20 years in the Navy; never drunk on duty - never sober on liberty)
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To: GATOR NAVY
They're charging $16 to see her now, I thought that was a little steep.

That is a little steep especially if you have a family along. I guess if the money is used for upkeep and repairs I can understand it though I don't really like it.

74 posted on 09/25/2003 8:23:08 PM PDT by SAMWolf (A fine is a tax for doing wrong. A tax is a fine for doing well.)
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To: GATOR NAVY
Technological Problems

Both Germany and America experienced technological problems with their torpedoes. In 1939 Lt Gunther Prien fired seven torpedoes at HMS Royal Oak which subsequently sank but only two torpedoes detonated. Only two weeks later Lt Wilhelm Zahn skipper of U-56, was presented with one of Britain's most powerful warships HMS Nelson, at that time hosting not only important officers but also Sir Winston Churchill himself. Unknown to these dignitaries U-56 launched three torpedoes at the battleship. Inside U-56 Zahn and his crew waited impatiently for the tell tale explosions. Instead the crew heard two clanging noises as metal merely hit metal. The torpedoes had merely struck the side of the battleship and sunk to the bottom of the North Sea. Deep dejection overwhelmed Zahn and his crew to the extent that on return to Germany Admiral Donitz was forced to take them off U-boat duties. After all it was an extremely dangerous task for a submarine to get through British defences and return home safely. Further, surprise would no longer be an element possible against anchored British warships in their home ports.

Similarly, during 1943 Lt Cdr John Scott of the USS Tunny fired ten Mk 14 torpedoes at a range of 800 yards at two very large Japanese aircraft carriers. Most of the torpedoes detonated prematurely and the carriers escaped with some damage. Due to these faulty torpedoes many good commanders were accused of failure and incompetence. However when aces such as Richard O'Kane and Dudley Morton started complaining action had to be taken.

The main problem with the Mk 14 was with the magnetically operated detonating device. Torpedo experts overlooked the fact that a vessel's magnetic earth-field varies according to its position on the globe. It was nearly two years before the USN established the cause of all the defects. The depth mechanism and contact exploders were also found to be faulty. This was undetected in the prewar navy because it was considered a serious offence to lose a torpedo in a training run. Therefore, many submariners had never heard the sound of a live torpedo detonating. The Mk 14 cost $10,000 each, a substantial sum. The Bureau of Ordnance was to blame for being overly niggardly. Even when Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, C-in-C Submarine Fleet South West Pacific, tested the torpedoes, found fault and then complained, the Bureau of Ordnance was slow to react.
75 posted on 09/25/2003 8:25:13 PM PDT by SAMWolf (A fine is a tax for doing wrong. A tax is a fine for doing well.)
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To: SAMWolf
One last point on Santa Cruz-it was the last battle of the Japanese carrier avation "A" team. The attack on HORNET was almost flawless and they came real close to getting ENTERPRISE too. The next time the carriers came out it was at the Philippine Sea battle and by then their naval aviation had been decimated flying from land bases during the Solomons campaign.
76 posted on 09/25/2003 8:27:47 PM PDT by GATOR NAVY (20 years in the Navy; never drunk on duty - never sober on liberty)
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To: GATOR NAVY
Ya duh!!..I copied the wrong text from the web page.

Have collected the magazine "Sea Classics" over the years..really enjoy their writers.


Had dinner with an officer from USS Benham in Frisco at a naval reunion.

He commented that the battles at night were almost mesmerizing visually..yet terrifying.
A Long Lance blew away USS Benhams bow on Nov14/15 1942, just north of Guadalcanal....Pete was blown from the bridge..drifted about for some time amongst many U.S. and Japanese survivors.

Pete served on USS Isherwood for a year+..after Leyte Gulf he was trans to another can...where he survived a kamikaze which penetrated into the ships CIC .

He was at sea with a carrier group..delayed due to DD'S needing refueling..they were late..arriving Pearl later on Dec 7th.
Pete saw alot of the war...I count it a gift to have met him and listened to his stories.
Poor Pete..he was not a "Plank owner" on USS Isherwood..the guys loved to tease him about this at reunions.

77 posted on 09/25/2003 8:27:58 PM PDT by Light Speed
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To: GATOR NAVY
Good catch Gator Navy.
78 posted on 09/25/2003 8:30:02 PM PDT by SAMWolf (A fine is a tax for doing wrong. A tax is a fine for doing well.)
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To: Light Speed
Thanks for sharing Pete's story with us Light Speed.
79 posted on 09/25/2003 8:30:37 PM PDT by SAMWolf (A fine is a tax for doing wrong. A tax is a fine for doing well.)
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To: GATOR NAVY; SAMWolf
I came accross some info on a search on SC and SG radars U.S.
One article mentioned the probability that the Japanese were using signal capture via several aircraft..which detected the U.S. SC radars energy beam print.

The writer commented that they probably flew in a weaving pattern using a few aircraft in a line...as the signal weakened,,they corrected flight path to obtain a stronger signature..and rode the beam right up to the U.S. Warships.

80 posted on 09/25/2003 8:43:25 PM PDT by Light Speed
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