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Posted on 07/31/2003 3:32:27 AM PDT by snippy_about_it
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade The city soon fell and Sosabowski was taken prisoner, though he quickly escaped and spent some time working with the Polish underground. However shortly after, he made his way to France while it was still defended by British and French troops. He was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Infantry Division, and later the 4th Rifle Division. After Dunkirk he was evacuated to Britain and in September 1941, at his own request, was allocated the task of raising the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade in Scotland.  Sosabowski was promoted to Major-General in June 1944, equal to that of Roy Urquhart, and was therefore qualified to be a commander of an entire division rather than just a brigade. However the Polish system of promotion was based upon ability and length of service, regardless of the post one occupied; unlike the British system where rank was directly related to the position held. Sosabowski was regarded as a hero by the Polish soldiers under his command, and he was greatly liked and respected by a number of British subordinates. However it has been well documented that he could be very stubborn and argumentative towards his superiors if they held differing views to his, and it was chiefly this that led to his eventual downfall.  During the early stages of the war, his Brigade was responsible only to Polish command and the government-in-exile, based in London, and their sole purpose was to ready themselves for the time when they would be parachuted into Poland to assist in the liberation of their homeland. However, as the war developed it became increasingly clear that this plan was unrealistic, and with the Allied invasion of Europe looming, there was a lot of pressure for the Brigade to come under British rule. In 1942, Lt-General Browning offered Sosabowski command of a new airborne division if he would surrender control of the Brigade, but he refused as he wished to stay loyal to the original purpose of his unit. Naturally, he viewed the liberation of his homeland as his priority, though he was not adverse to helping elsewhere so long as the end goal remained.  Sosabowski, walking with Lt-General "Boy" Browning. Further pressure followed until a settlement was at last reached in June 1944. It was agreed that the Brigade would carry out one Allied operation following the Normandy Invasion, after which they would be free to return to Poland at an appropriate juncture. The Brigade was incorporated into the 1st Allied Airborne Army, and placed under the command of Major-General Urquhart. This dispute led to a deterioration in relations between Sosabowski and Browning, who had originally been on good terms with each other. Sosabowski did not welcome constant interference from Browning, who in turn did not take kindly to the Pole's aggressive resistance. As the time of Market Garden approached, Sosabowski did very little to endear himself to fellow commanders with his undiplomatic views on suggested operations. He was justifiably appalled by the plan for Operation Comet, but certainly gained no friends when he requested that Urquhart put his orders in writing so that he would not be held responsible for the disaster that would surely follow. He told Browning that "This mission cannot possibly succeed", and felt it would be suicide to attempt it using only the 1st Airborne and the Poles.  His objections to the plan were supported by other officers, notably Brigadier Hackett. He and Sosabowski knew that the Germans could react very violently if you threatened a delicate area, and they were convinced that Comet was too tall a task for a single airborne division and that it would result in a complete disaster. Both men also observed the naivety of the air planners, who were not overly insightful when it came to landing airborne troops in the best position to achieve their objectives. During the briefing for Comet, Hackett remembered a typically fanciful plan being presented, and Sosabowski saying in his 'lovely deep voice', "But the Germans, General, the Germans!". Such protests played a part in the operation being cancelled in favour of Market Garden. Everyone was much happier with the proposal for Market Garden, even Sosabowski, though he still had grave reservations. He believed that Arnhem was the clear gateway into Germany, and would therefore contain a far higher enemy presence than British intelligence believed.  Though his prediction proved to be true, it is not entirely accurate because the SS Panzer Divisions were only moved into the region by chance, and the German commanders did not realise the significance of Arnhem. Sosobowski was aghast when he discovered that the drop zones were 7 miles from the Bridge, and that the landings would take place over a period of three days. He was adamant that "an airborne operation is not a purchase by instalments". Furthermore, he was not pleased that his paratroopers would drop south of the river, while the gliders carrying his vehicles and heavy equipment would land north of it. Particularly because he was told that if the Bridge had not been captured when he arrived, then he would be expected to take it. The prospect of doing so without the element of surprise, three days into a battle, and from only one side of the river with no vehicles or anti-tank guns, was quite horrifying to him.  Sosobowski wished to register his opposition to the plan more strongly than he did, but felt unable to do so as his position was becoming increasingly isolated. At the conclusion of the briefing for Market Garden on the 12th September, Urquhart asked if there were any questions. Sosabowski wanted to say something about this "impossible" plan, but felt he couldn't. He later remarked "I was unpopular as it was, and anyway who would have listened?" By Tuesday morning, Sosabowski was growing increasingly concerned over the fate of the 1st Airborne. With radio communications sporadic and vague at best, all he knew was that British troops held the north end of Arnhem Bridge, however this information was out of date and he did not know whether this was still the case. News of this was quite important to him because the Brigade was to drop a mile south of the Bridge and it would be their objective.  From his own deduction, he knew that if the troops only held one side of the Bridge, then it stood to reason that the other side was heavily defended by the Germans. If this proved to be true then he would have to capture the southern end and move men over the Bridge to reinforce John Frost's men. His grim view that this might result in the Poles having the fight of their lives was perhaps a little melodramatic, but what was of genuine concern was the possibility that the British no longer held the Bridge. If this was so then his Brigade would drop in extremely hostile territory and be completely cut off from the 1st Airborne. However it all proved to be immaterial because fog descended over the airfields and the Polish paratroopers were unable to take off. Nevertheless their gliders were and they flew to out Arnhem. In one of the gliders was Sosabowski's personal jeep, which ran into a German patrol after landing. The driver was wounded and captured, and inside the Germans found a suitcase bearing the name of Sosabowski. Propaganda broadcasts boasted that the Polish General had been killed, though he was still in England at the time.  Unable to take off, likely on Tuesday 19th, Polish paratroopers wait beside their C-47. On Wednesday morning, the plan changed. Urquhart had managed to arrange for the Polish drop zone to be moved to Driel, south of the Rhine and the Oosterbeek Perimeter, and he left orders for Sosabowski to use the Driel-Heveadorp ferry to bring his Brigade over the river. As this was a completely different area to the one that Sosabowski had prepared himself for, he needed time to make a fresh plan and ordered that the lift be postponed for 3 hours. Eventually satisfied, he and his men were in their planes and taxiing down the runway when a halt was called. Much to Sosabowski's annoyance, other airfields were engulfed in fog and their planes were unable to take off. The lift was postponed once more for 24 hours.  These cancellations made Sosabowski very anxious. Not wishing to blindly drop his Brigade into a slaughter, he prepared notes of protest to Lt-Generals Brereton and Browning, Commander and Deputy Commander of the 1st Allied Airborne Army. He even issued an ultimatum to Brereton, threatening that unless accurate information was provided on the status of the 1st Airborne, then the Brigade would refuse to take off. A reply was soon received to the effect that Sosabowski knew more about the situation than Brereton. But at 04:30 on Thursday, Urquhart managed to confirm that the Driel-Heveadorp ferry was in British hands, and this was of some comfort to Sosabowski. Just after 5pm on Thursday, the Poles jumped over Driel. Sosabowski was full of praise for the pilots who delivered his Brigade, who in spite of poor weather conditions and heavy anti-aircraft fire had managed to drop them as well as they had ever achieved during training. Slowly descending to the ground, Sosabowski saw a Dakota crashing after being hit by anti-aircraft fire, both of its engines on fire. When he had landed, he ran for cover and saw the body of one of his men with the top of his head neatly sliced off by shrapnel.  Shortly after he met a Dutch girl, Cora Baltussen, and proceeded to interview her whilst calmly eating an apple. He asked for various details, namely the positions of the Germans and the location of the ferry. He was quite furious when she informed him that the ferry was no longer in operation. "How can it have gone in just a few hours?" he said. After the Poles had dropped, Major-General Urquhart's Polish liaison officer, Captain Ludwik Zwolanski, volunteered to swim the Rhine and inform Sosabowski of the 1st Airborne's plan to retake Westerbouwing, where the ferry crossing was located, to enable the Poles to safely cross the river in improvised boats (wheel-less Jeep trailers) that the Royal Engineers were preparing.  A Horsa, containing Polish soldiers, comes in to land on LZ-L. Copyright: Jasper Booty. Zwolanski crossed successfully and gave his report, but unfortunately the attempt to capture Westerbouwing failed and due to difficulties in the conversion only one raft was ready at the specified time. News of this reached the Polish Brigade from Lieutenant David Storrs of HQ Royal Engineers, who had crossed the Rhine in a dinghy. The efforts of the Poles to affect a crossing had resulted in two American dinghies being produced and a search for the rubber boats that were amongst their equipment, which were unfortunately still on the drop zone. Sosabowski waited several hours for the boats to be produced, but when they did not come and dawn approached he had little choice but to withdraw his force on the riverbank back to Driel. The Poles took no chances, and having experienced retreats in both their homeland and France, they took care to make holes in hedges and cut away any barbed wire that could hinder them should they have to fight.  On the following morning Sosabowski sent a four-man patrol in the direction of Nijmegen, riding on airborne folding bicycles. Meanwhile he had acquired a ladies bicycle and used it to carry out an inspection of his Brigade, which prompted men of the 8th Company, in the process of digging foxholes and dugouts, to ask if he had a permit for such a manner of travel. Whilst he was in the western sector of Driel he heard the sound of armoured cars approaching and naturally assumed them to be German. However using his binoculars he soon identified them as being British, and so immediately ordered that the anti-tank mines be removed from the road. The four scout vehicles, commanded by Captain Wrottesley of No.5 Troop, C Squadron, the 2nd Household Cavalry, had been able to break through the German defences north of Nijmegen under the cover of fog, and they encountered the Polish bicycle patrol soon a few hours before arriving at Driel. Not long after they were joined by Lieutenant Arthur Young's No.2 Troop. A short time later Driel was attacked from several directions by German armoured cars, forcing several positions to be abandoned while others were overrun. The attack was halted, but the Poles were low on ammunition and German numbers were increasing. Sosabowski asked the British cavalrymen to intervene on their behalf, but they refused as their vehicles were too lightly armoured to be used in such a way and they also pointed out that their radios could contact both the 1st Airborne Division and Nijmegen, and so were too valuable to risk. Sosabowski persisted and said that the Polish Brigade was in danger of being overrun and that if this was the case then the inaction of the armoured cars would certainly be questioned. Persuaded by this argument Lieutenant Young went forward, led by Sosabowski on his bicycle, and the presence of this vehicle and the fire from its 2-pounder and Bresa machine-gun forced the Germans to pull back, although a part of Driel was still held by the Germans.  Tank captured by Americans in Operation Market Garden On Friday morning, Urquhart sent Lieutenant-Colonels Charles Mackenzie and Eddie Myers across the river to contact Sosabowski and inform him that rubber boats were being prepared by the 1st Airborne to bring approximately 200 Polish soldiers over the river that night. Mackenzie impressed upon him the desperate need for reinforcements of any number, but Sosabowski shook his head as there were no proper means of getting his men across. Myers, the commander of the 1st Airborne's engineers, suggested a cable be laid across the river so that the dinghies could be ferried back and forth, and he left to discuss this with the Polish engineers. Unfortunately due to various problems only 50 men were ferried to the other side that night. The current was too strong for the cable to be held, and the improvised raft that the Polish engineers had laboured upon sank as soon as it was placed in the water because two heavy oak doors had been incorporated into the design. Another attempt was made by the Poles on the following night, using proper assault craft that Sosabowski had pleaded with XXX Corps to send forward, but the crossing was similarly ineffective.  On Sunday morning, Lt-General Horrocks, the commander of XXX Corps, met Sosabowski and they discussed what should be done. Both were in favour of trying to reinforce the 1st Airborne rather than withdrawing them, and Horrocks declared that he wanted to put a battalion over close to the 1st Airborne that night, carrying supplies, and then shortly after put a whole Brigade across the river, several miles downstream for what would have likely been an unopposed landing. Later that morning, the two men met again at the Valburg Conference, where the principal commanders on the spot met to work out a plan. The atmosphere didn't so much take on the appearance of a conference, but more that of a court-martial. Sosabowski sat on a chair opposite Browning, Horrocks, and Major-General Thomas of the 43rd Wessex Division, all seated behind a desk. The British commanders were clearly dissatisfied with Sosabowski's seemingly troublesome conduct throughout the operation, and didn't so much ask for his thoughts on what should be done, but told him what would happen and what he would do. Horrocks said that a battalion of the Dorsets, followed by the Polish 1st Battalion, would be put across the river, near to the 1st Airborne's positions at Westerbouwing. Sosabowski was understandably dismayed that a battalion had been removed from his command without his consent, or indeed his selection. He could sense from the atmosphere what was happening, but stood up and spoke through an interpreter to try and clearly impress upon the British officers that he had examined the German defences himself and believed that a crossing where they suggested would result in the troops landing amongst the German positions, in the strongest part of their defence.  He said that he could see that German strength was only in the area of the fighting, and suggested that a crossing of the entire 43rd Division and his own Brigade, several miles downstream, would yield far superior results. However the British commanders were not interested in anything he had to say and Thomas merely restated his orders. This made Sosabowski angry and he rose to his feet once more, now speaking English by himself and becoming more fluent as his anger rose, insisting that the crossing they proposed would lead to the destruction of both the Dorsets and his 1st Battalion. He declared "I am General Sosabowski. I command the Polish Parachute Brigade. I do as I like". Horrocks abruptly ended the conference by telling him that "You are under my command. You will do as I bloody well tell you", and added that if Sosabowski did not like his orders then he would find another commander who did. The operation went ahead that night, and though the Poles were not sent across, Sosabowski's fears over the fate of the Dorsets proved to be entirely accurate.  Browning, who had not said a word in Sosabowski's defence, drove him back to Nijmegen for lunch on Sunday. On the way, Sosabowski noticed that there didn't seem to be any boats in evidence, north or around Nijmegen. Browning told him that there were almost no boats this far forward along the column. Sosabowski snapped and demanded to know what kind of army conducts a major operation over large rivers without a forward supply of boats. Captain Jan Lorys, one of Sosabowski's staff officers, said that daring to criticise the British generals in this way was probably the final nail in his coffin. Lt-General Horrocks was quite keen to try another assault, as was Sosabowski, but the XXX Corps commander was dissuaded in doing so by both Browning and Major-General Thomas. Sosabowski later wrote that he blamed Browning for being the chief pessimist in the final stages of the battle. He felt that since British armour and other heavy equipment had finally arrived in strength in Driel, a final assault from the southern bank to relieve the 1st Airborne could have worked and should have been attempted. He believed that the battle was not lost at this point and victory could have been snatched from defeat. Sosabowski was quite astonished that Browning did not use his influence to urge the XXX Corps commanders towards this, and wondered how different the situation might have been if Montgomery had been present on that last day.  Sosabowski with Major-General Thomas of the 43rd Wessex Division, at the Polish Brigade's HQ in Driel on Saturday 23rd. Sosabowski's dissent cost him greatly after the battle. To try and deflect blame away from their own failings, British commanders ensured that the Polish Brigade became a convenient scapegoat. Montgomery wrote to CIGS and reported that the Poles "fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight", and he declared that he did not want them under his command and suggested they be sent to join other Poles in Italy. Lt-General Browning submitted a long report to CIGS on Sosabowski's performance, before and during the battle. He charged him with being "difficult to work with", "unable to adapt himself to the level of a parachute brigade commander", and "quite incapable of appreciating the urgent nature of the operation and continually showing himself to be both argumentative and loath to play his full part in the operation unless everything was done for him and his brigade." Though the last of those statements is complete nonsense, there is certainly some merit in that accusation he was difficult to work with. While undoubtedly possessing a highly developed military mind, Sosabowski was quite temperamental and scarcely made any effort to win the favour of the British commanders, though when all said and done, such pleasantries are completely besides the point. It is also possible that he was unsuitable to be a parachute commander. Such operations always involve a high element of risk, and it could be argued, due to his violent opposition to proposed airborne drops, that he was not prepared to run this gauntlet as other equally capable airborne officers were, and therefore could have been too cautious a man for parachute operations. Browning requested that Sosabowski be removed from his command and that a younger, more cooperative man replace him. On the 9th December 1944, the Polish President-in-exile, Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz, wrote to Sosabowski and informed him that he was relieved of his post. The letter gave no reasons for his dismissal, and it was clearly wrote under British pressure as the President was seemingly apologetic for the necessity of his action on account of Sosabowski's meritorious past with both the Parachute Brigade and the Polish army. Sosabowski remained in England after the war and pursued a number of occupations; once as an ordinary labourer in an electronics factory. In 1960, he published his memoirs, Freely I Served. After experiencing heart trouble, Stanislaw Sosabowski died in September 1967. He was laid to rest in Warsaw. Educational resources; www.warlinks.com www.rememberseptember44.com www.extraplan.demon.co.uk      |
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Air Power |
'The Wooden Wonder', as the Mosquito is affectionately known, almost never came to be. Air Ministry opposition to de Havilland's original proposal for an unarmed, all-wooden bomber almost forced de Havilland to abandon the design, but thanks to some behind-the-scenes lobbying, the Air Ministry reluctantly agreed to progress with the design.
The Mosquito was almost too radical a concept for the Air Ministry. Bomber designs were, by design, slow, cumbersome beasts, heavily-armed and metal in construction. Despite a specification being issued by the ministry for a bomber with some wooden construction in the airframe (B17/38), the idea of leaving the aircraft with no means of self-defence was too much of a risk to take. But some gentle persuasion of the ministry by Air Marshal Sir Wilfred Freeman, who sat on the Air Council as Member for Research and Development, resulted in a new Specification, B1/40, detailing a light bomber capable of carrying a 1,000lb load over a distance of 1,500 miles which could, presumably if it failed in this respect, be quickly modified as a fighter or photo-reconnaissance aircraft. An initial order for 50 aircraft was placed in March 1940.
In November 1940, Geoffrey de Havilland took the prototype Mosquito into the air for the first time. The performance of the aircraft was something of a revelation, the two Merlin engines giving fighter-like handling and a top speed which would allow the aircraft to outpace enemy fighters. The first bomber version, the B.IV first flew in the following September and the first deliveries to No 105 Squadron at Swanton Morley followed in November 1941.
Following its operational debut in a raid by four aircraft on Cologne on 31 May 1942, the Mosquito joined the Main Force but became famous for a number of set-piece attacks, and the first of these was a low-level attack on the Gestapo Headquarters in Oslo on 25 September 1942.
By this time, No 109 Squadron, based at Marham, had formed on Mosquitos, but was unusual in that the squadron was tasked with the development of various bombing aids then in the pipeline. The first of these aids was a blind-bombing device known as 'Oboe' and this was tried for the first time during an attack on a power station in Holland during the night of 20th/21st December 1942. Trials with 'Oboe' continued and gradually introduced across the remainder of Bomber Command during 1943.
No 105 Squadron was not idle, and along with the third Mosquito bomber squadron, No 139 at Marham, set about carrying out a series of highly-publicised precision attacks on enemy targets during the early months of 1943. Indeed, over 100 such attacks took place in the first half of 1943, notably raids on Copenhagen (27 January), Berlin (30 January) and Jena (27 May). The Jena raid, on the Zeiss optical factory and Schott glassworks was the final such attack to be carried out in daylight.
Shortly after the raid at Jena, Nos 105 and 139 Squadrons were transferred from No 2 Group, which had left Bomber Command for the newly-formed Second tactical Air Force, to the Pathfinder Force (No 8 Group) and began to re-equip with an improved bomber Mosquito, the B.IX. With these aircraft, the Mosquito squadrons flew ahead of the Main Force, marking out waypoints for the bombers to guide them onto their intended target and used 'Oboe' increasingly to mark as accurately as possible.
The next bomber variant was the B.XVI, and this became the standard version of the aircraft in Bomber Command, eventually equipping 16 squadrons. This version could fly at altitudes up to 40,000ft thanks to a pressurised cockpit, and could also carry a 4,000lb bomb in an enlarged bomb-bay. With additional wing fuel tanks, the Mosquito could take one of these mighty bombs to Berlin and still evade much of the defending night fighter force.
In 1944, with the tide turned against the Germans, the Mosquitos were transferred to the new Light Night Striking Force (LNSF), part of No 100 (Bomber Support) Group. Here, the Mosquitos were tasked with carrying out diversionary raids to attract the defending fighters away from the main bomber stream. These 'spoof' attacks, many of which were against Berlin, were aided by electronic aids to deceive the German radar network into believing that the much smaller Mosquito force was the main attack.
Some Mosquitos which served with the LNSF and Pathfinders were Canadian-built Mark 25s. After the War, a number of B35s were produced and entered service from late 1947 onwards, many with squadrons on the Continent. The final home-based bomber Mosquitos, some 1,690 of which had been built (from a total of 7,781 of all versions), serving with No 139 Squadron, were eventually replaced by Canberras in November 1953.
An example of the tremendous accuracy achieved by Mosquitos can be shown by comparing figures for the attacks on the V-weapons sites. The average tonnage of bombs required to destroy one of these sites by B-17 Flying Fortresses was 165; for B26 Marauders it was 182 tons and for B25 Mitchells 219 tons. The average for the Mosquito was just under 40 tons!
Specifications:
Manufacturer: de Havilland
Primary function: Fighter-bomber
Power plant: Two Rolls-Royce Merlin XXI engines with Thrust 1,635 HP 1,220 kW each
Crew: Two
Date deployed: 1943
Dimensions:
Wingspan: 54.2 ft
Length: 40.9 ft
Height: 15.25 ft
Wingarea: 454 sq ft
Weights: empty 14,300 lb / Max. 22,300 lb
Performance :
Speed: 380 mph
Ceiling: 36,090 ft
Range: 1,205 mi
Armaments:
4x 20mm cannon,
4x 7.7mm machine gun;
2 x 227 kg bomb or
2x 227 lt (or 2x 454 lt) ext. tanks or
8x 27 kg rockets
All photos Copyright of RAF Mod.UK and Military.Cz websites.
Hey, can you keep the noise down, some folks aren't quite awake yet.
Coffee! I need coffee! ('fraid I haven't tried your brew. Missed the recipe. Wanna repeat it?)
Interesting topic today. And, with Valin's 'history' column, I'm remembering so much of his stuff first-hand, I must be getting old.
So that's what it was!!!!!!!
Great plane! I have a chance to get "633 Squadron" on DVD. Good movie featuring the Mosquito.
Oh no, not you too! LOL. First SAM and now you.
So true Darksheare, I think at least my stomach wouldn't have felt as bad had I used real milk or cream. However, I'm not willing to try it again to find out!! LOL.
Oh, I was plenty awake.
I'd have to go back to the thread that day to see for sure but as I recall we stayed up extra late that night, went to a restaurant on the way home just so I could keep talking. And believe me, that's not like me, lol.
I bet SAM thanks you for that, *chuckle*.
I found some more information regarding this. Quite interesting:
Oboe
A blind-bombing device installed into an aircraft but controlled from ground stations in England. Two stations transmitted pulses which were picked up by aircraft and then retransmitted to the ground stations.
The aircraft receiving the Oboe signals used the pulses to keep itself on the correct path in order to pass over the target; the stations in England, by measuring the time taken to receive the pulses back again, calculated the aircraft's exact position and sent a short signal at the moment when the bombs should be released.
Oboe had several limitations; it was - like Gee - a 'line-of-sight' device and thus limited by the curvature of the earth. Also each of the three base stations in England could only control six aircraft each per hour, and those aircraft had the highly dangerous task of flying straight and level for several minutes.
The best tactic employed was for a small force of Oboe-equipped Pathfinder Mosquitoes (with an operational ceiling of 30,000 ft - thus extending the range of Oboe) to be the first to mark the target. This would then be backed up by non Oboe Pathfinder aircraft to further mark the target.
Oboe was one of the most accurate of blind bombing devices.
First trialed in December 1942, it was used operationally from January 1943 onwards.
In the beautiful village of Driel you can find this monument for the Polish troops who fought here. The Polish troops had to land with the third lift on tuesday 19 September. Because of bad weather conditions the flight was postponed till thursday. On thursday there were also bad weather conditions, but the Airborne troops at Oosterbeek needed them. They landed but the Germans expected them. Many Polish troops were killed during their landing with parachutes. At night the Polish General Sosabowski, the leading commander of the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade Group, commanded his troops to cross the river to help the Airborne troops at Arnhem. Unfortunately the Germans noticed that the Polish were crossing the river and launched some fireworks. The Polish then were an easy target. Many Polish Airborne Soldiers died during this action. Only 200 reached the other side. On the monument you can read:
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