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Posted on 07/29/2003 12:00:09 AM PDT by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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The Battle for Saipan Plans to launch an offensive against the Japanese in the islands of the Pacific were initiated in 1943 at the Quadrant Conference held in Quebec. President Franklin Roosevelt received the proposal that the Allied effort in the Pacific should be directed first toward the Gilbert Islands, then the Marshalls, followed by Wake, the Eastern Carolines, and finally the Marianas. It was at Saipan that American military planners were presented with the problem of how to cope with a dense civilian population, the first to be encountered in the Pacific war. American forces were to be under the overall command of Admiral Chester Nimitz.  Aerial view of Saipan, July 1944. (National Archives) The American drive across the Pacific would be two-pronged. While Nimitz fought his way across the central Pacific, General MacArthur would advance across the southwest Pacific to the Philippines. The islands of the central Pacific either succumbed one by one under the sheer weight of American forces or were bombed, neutralized and bypassed. With their supply lines cut, the defenders of by-passed islands were left to starve. After the fall of the Marshall islands, no other island in the central Pacific would be invaded by American ground forces until the American armada reached the waters off the Marianas and the island of Saipan.  American war strategy in the western Pacific was developed around the premise that Japan would never surrender and that the nation would fight to the last man, woman, and child, particularly if the home islands were invaded. It was anticipated that such an invasion, if it were to occur, would result in the loss of one million American lives. In planning for this eventuality, air bases in the Marianas were essential in order to accommodate the new B-29 Superfortress, a U.S. bomber that was just beginning to be mass-produced in early 1944 and which had a flying range equal to the distance from Saipan, Tinian and Guam to Japan and back. The B-29's normal range was 2,850 miles at 358 m.p.h. with a 20,000 ton carrying capacity at 32,000 feet. The capture of the island of Saipan thus became crucial in the preparations for this massive invasion. The assault on Saipan began on June 15,1944, almost a week after the invasion of Europe. An armada of 535 ships carrying 127,570 U. S. military personnel (two-thirds of whom were Marines of the 2nd and 4th Divisions) converged on the island. The ships of the invasion force carried 40,000 different items to support the assault - everything from toilet paper to government-issue coffins. A single supply ship carried enough food to feed 90,000 troops for one month. Navy tankers transported the gigantic quantity of petroleum products required to support the invasion. Aircraft alone consumed over 8 million gallons of aviation fuel during the battle, while the aircraft carriers burned more than 4 million barrels of fuel.  Seven American battleships and 11 destroyers shelled Saipan and Tinian for 2 days before the landings, firing 15,000 16-inch and 5-inch shells at the islands along with 165,000 other shells of other caliber. To even begin to comprehend the magnitude of this onslaught, one needs to realize that a single 16-inch round weighs slightly more than a Volkswagen Beetle, besides being packed with high explosives. On the second day of the bombardment, this force was joined by 8 more battleships, 6 heavy cruisers and 5 light cruisers. The islands were ringed by American warships with their guns blazing. Shells rained down on the island, its villages, inhabitants, and defenders, gouging huge craters in the sand and coral. The earth trembled under the tremendous explosions of naval bombardment and simultaneous air attacks. The main attack of the Marine Divisions was centered near Chalan Kanoa, just as planned. The 2nd Marine Division was to land at Red and Green Beaches north of the town while the 4th marine Division would land on Blue (opposite the town) and Yellow Beaches. As with most amphibious operations, not everything went as planned. The tractors moved faster than the tanks and in several cases blocked the ability of tank to fire. 2nd Marine Division's landings in the south were made slightly to the north of their planned objectives, this caused a gap to occur between the flanks of the two divisions. Although the original plan had allowed for a small gap between the two divisions, the northward landing of the 2nd Battatlion, 8th Marines more than doubled the size of this gap. By 0907, the first wave had reached the beach with only minimal losses and 8,000 marines were ashore.  Besides the large gap between the two divisions, another problem that occurred during the landing was in the use of the amphibious tanks and tractors. In the 2nd Marine Division's area, the tanks were to move ahead of the tractors and advance inland about 1,500 yards and then set up defensive positions and lay down defensive fire while the initial wave of tractors moved up to this defensive line and the troops off loaded. The second - fourth waves were to unload their troops on the beach. In the 4th Marine Division area, the tanks were to lead the first two waves of tractors all the way to the objective, about a mile inland on some high ground. These tanks would then support the troops as they moved inland. The follow-on would be unloaded at the beaches. In general, although most of the tanks and tractors made it to the beaches unharmed, the combination of their thin armor and slow movement made them easy targets for the Japanese artillery once ashore. The amphibious vehicles were under-powered and were easily stopped by obstacles (loose sand, trenches, holes, and trees) that normal tanks would not have had a problem with. This significantly slowed the movement of the amphibious vehicles. The lack of suitable paths inland from the beaches also inhibited the inward movement of the marines. By nightfall, despite the various delays, both divisions were fully ashore and had established a defensive belt over 1,000 yards deep and over 10,000 yards long. Seven battalions of artillery had also landed and so had two heavy tank battalions. Division command posts were also established ashore. One of the benefits of using the troop carrying amphibious tractors was that it allowed the men to be carried ashore in armored vehicles, rather than having to wade ashore as at Tarawa.  The Japanese had killed or wounded many Americans during the invasion, but the exact numbers for D-Day are unknown. The Marines had landed against the strength of the Japanese defensive area and at a time when four battalions of men who had not had time to move to their assigned positions elsewhere on the islands were located in vicinity of the beaches! The landing area was well registered for artillery and the Japanese had sixteen 105-mm, thirty 75-mm, and eight 150-mm guns on the high ground overlooking the beaches and were extremely accurate due to the pre-registration of the guns and the use of the bamboo sticks to help in adjusting fire. Yet, the Japanese artillery could have been more effective if they would have practiced concentrating their fire and not simply firing each weapon individually wherever the commander of the gun wanted to fire. On the first day, the Japanese relied almost solely on artillery, heavy weapons, and a few tanks to defeat the marines on the beaches. The infantryman rarely saw battle on D-Day. To H. Smith's G-3, the most critical phase of the Battle for Saipan was the fight on the beaches. To succeed the marines had to establish a beachhead into which sufficient troops, heavy equipment, and supplies could be brought ashore. On the first day, the marines gained control of the beaches, but they were not secure since artillery and heavy weapons were still able to attack men and equipment on the beach. It would take six days before the beachhead was actually secure. One of the major problems was the gap between the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions at Afetua Point and on the outward flanks of each division. This gap, which should have been closed the first day, took three days to close due to it being larger that originally planned thereby allowing the Japanese to defend this area in greater strength than expected.  By the night of the 15th, the Japanese knew that they had to drive the Marines back to the sea. Yet, Saito believed that the landings might be a feint and only ordered minor counterattacks against the marines. He wanted to save his major forces in case the Americans did launch an invasion near Magicienne Bay. At 2000, a large force of Japanese infantry, supported by tanks, attacked the left flank of the 6th Marines of the 2nd Marine Division. Fortunately for the marines, naval gunfire firing illumination rounds were able to light up the sky enough to allow the defending marines to see the outlines of the Japanese soldiers as they attacked. The marine's machineguns and heavy rifle fire, along with the assistance of a battalion of 75-mm howitzers, were able to stop the Japanese counterattack. At 0300, another attack was launched against the same area, but it also failed. Before daylight, tanks and infantry again attacked the defending marines. By this time, a few of the medium tanks were ashore and able to help the marines stop the Japanese third counterattack against the 2nd Marine Division. The attack on Saipan, originally designed to overwhelm the Japanese with naval gunfire and rapid landings, failed on the first day. On this one day, the Marines failed to advance inland to their initial objective and were generally only 2/3 of the way to their objectives. An estimated 2,000 men were either killed or wounded and over 25% of the tractors and tanks were damaged or destroyed.  H. Smith, knew that a naval battle between the Japanese Mobile Fleet and the American 5th Fleet was most likely going to occur in the near future. Realizing this, he was determined to get as many supplies and men ashore as possible before the protective battleships, cruisers, and destroyers departed with the carriers to met the Japanese fleet. On the evening of the 16th, the 27th Infantry Division landed on Saipan. Their mission was to capture Aslito airfield and to cut off the Japanese in the southeast corner of the island. Meanwhile, the 2nd and 4th marine Divisions would continue their attack inland. By the fourth day the Japanese had given up on trying to defend the beaches and had moved inland to set up defenses in the hilly and mountainous terrain. In the meantime, after the landing of the 27th Infantry Division, the majority of the 5th Fleet departed the Saipan area as H. Smith had figured they would. On 19 June to 21 June the 5th Fleet met the Japanese Mobile Fleet and defeated the Japanese fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Because of this naval battle, the Japanese on Saipan could expect to receive no further assistance. They were cut off from Japan and would have to fight out the battle for Saipan on their own. From this point onwards, it was believed by both sides that the American forces would defeat the Japanese on Saipan, the only question was how long would it take and how many men would die.
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Here's one we both know.
As many war documentaries and combat footage as I've seen, I don't ever recall seeing a Banzai Charge on film.
Amtracks heading for the beach.
Landing craft headed for the beach.
LST unloading trucks at the temporary pier created at the beachhead from pontoon barges.
Twenty four Marines head ashore in an amphtrac
Marines in LCVP
The Story of Armored Amphibians
The First Armored Amphibian Battalion was built around an extraordinary, now almost forgotten, vehicle, the amphibious tank. This vehicle and weapon came into being in World War II, played a very special role in combat, and then faded into history. It was called variously, an armored amphibian, amphibious tank, or amtank. And in the Equipment Tables it was designated the LVTA, for Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored). It is not entirely accurate to call our strange vehicle a seagoing tank, but we regularly went ashore from over two miles out to sea, and could also maneuver on land. That made us amphibious.
LVTA-4, armored amphibian with 75mm howitzer
Both the Marine Corps and the Army operated two types of amphibious tracked vehicles. One was the amphibious tractor, also called an amtrac or LVT. The other was our amtank, the LVTA. Though tracked amphibs were no doubt important in the European Theater, there was a special need for them in the Pacific. Most Pacific islands were ringed by coral reefs, often more than a half mile across. If those islands had had sandy beaches, then the Navy could have continued its usual practice—bring troops in close to shore by boat and let them wade in a few yards to the beach. But for a hostile beach with a wide coral shelf in front of it, the boats could not move in all the way to the shore, only to the edge of the coral reef. In such a situation, a Marine wading ashore on a rough coral reef, from a thousand yards out, was an easy target for enemy fire, assuming he didn't fall into one of the many potholes common to coral reefs.
Amphibious tracked vehicles were the only solution found for that problem. Both the amtrac and the amtank could climb onto the reef from the sea and advance across the rough coral to the beach. The amtracs transported troops ashore where they could continue the assault. Our amtanks led the way, firing at the beaches from the time that Naval gunfire and air strikes lifted till the troops were ashore to continue the assault.
Tracked landing vehicles evolved from a most unlikely prototype. In the 1930s, Donald Roebling developed a tracked vehicle called a swamp buggy or alligator for rescuing people stranded in the Florida Everglades. Some Marine Corps planners saw possibilities in Roebling's alligator for amphibious military operations. After long negotiations, the Navy issued a contract with Roebling in 1940 to design a military vehicle, and another contract to the Food Machinery Corporation to build 100 of them.
LVTA-1, armored amphibian with 37mm cannon
Those first models were amtracs—not amtanks— and were delivered in 1941. Later they mounted a turret on the amtrac and gave it more fire power and light armor. That was the amtank, first delivered in 1943. In the First Armored we had two models of LVTAs. For our first two invasions, Kwajalein and Guam, we operated the LVTA-1, with an M-3 light tank turret mounting a 37mm gun. Then, for Okinawa, we had the upgraded LVTA-4, which mounted a 75mm howitzer in an uncovered mount.
In early campaigns, in the Solomons, amtracs had only logistical assignments, as amphibious transport for men and matériel. At Tarawa, however, they demonstrated their value in assault. Unfortunately, there were only half enough amtracs at Tarawa, and no amtanks at all, and the consequences were bloody. From Kwajalein on, both vehicles were permanent players in all invasions from the sea.
Though we had other assignments, beach assault was always the primary mission of our armored amphibians. At sea we were usually transported on LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank), but once we traveled on LSDs (Landing Ship, Dock), and once on LSMs (Landing Ship, Medium). In a landing our tanks would debark before dawn through the bow doors of the LSTs, two miles or more at sea. While we were forming up at a Line of Departure, the Navy would be bombarding shore targets, and planes would be bombing and strafing the beaches. The last naval vessels to fire on the beaches were little LCIs near the edge of the reef, armed with cannons and rockets. As the LCIs turned away, the armored amphibians would climb onto the reef, continue the assault by fire, and lead the first waves of amtrac-borne Marine infantry onto the beach. We would then act as land tanks until the heavier conventional armor was ashore.
Amtanks were awkward, ungainly beasts. The designers kept working to improve them. Our second model, the LVTA-4, was certainly better than the earlier LVTA-1. Basically amphibious tractors (LVTs) with a turret superimposed on the hull, amtanks were powered by a Continental aircraft engine. They floated because the sides were empty, compartmented pontoons. Their top speed may have been as high as 20 to 25 miles per hour on land, 5 to 7.5 mph in the water, but actual speed was much affected by terrain or surf. They depended on their cleat-equipped tracks for traction on land and propulsion at sea. Steering was accomplished by the difference in speed between the left and right tracks. To put on brakes, you reversed the track. Though we were sometimes given assignments on land, LVTAs made poor land tanks, mainly because they had so little heavy armor.
They tended to take on a lot of water, especially in rough seas. Seawater entering around the hatches could disable the auxiliary generator. Dripping onto the hot transmission, the water produced a steambath atmosphere, fogging up the periscope. Our radio operators improvised with ponchos to protect radio equipment from seawater, and with condoms to keep their microphones dry and working. Amtanks had a bilge pump to pump out water, but if a tank ran out of gas, the engine would stop, and so would the bilge pump. If the pump stopped and the waves were high, the tank could take on water and likely sink. We lost a few tanks that way.
Our first amtank model, the LVTA-1, weighed 16 tons, and was 16 ft., 1 in. long, 10 ft. 8 in. wide and, at the turret, 10 ft. 1 in. high. It carried a 37mm cannon and four .30-caliber machine guns—the scarf-mounted gun in the turret, one machine gun in the radio operator's position in the cab, and two on scarf mounts in cockpits behind the turret. The LVTA-1 carried a crew of seven: the 37mm gunner in the port side of the turret, the tank commander beside him, the driver seated forward in the port side of the cab, the radio operator (also machine gunner) to starboard in the cab, two machine gunners firing from waist mounts—one to port, one to starboard—aft of the turret, and the ammunition passer working down in the hull.
In late 1944 our LVTA-1 tanks, with their 37mm cannon, were replaced by new LVTA-4s, with a turret which carried a 75mm howitzers in an uncovered mount. That not only gave us more fire power, but made possible a new mission. Although beach assault remained our primary mission, we were also able to operate as artillery. Our battalion commander, Major Louis Metzger, had artillery experience in his background, and we began to learn how we might function as artillery. We organized our platoons into artillery batteries and were trained by artillerymen of the newly formed Sixth Marine Division. Part of our value as artillery was that we were the first troops ashore, and, depending on conditions, could, in minutes, be in position, register, and be able to provide supporting fire for the attacking Marines. It would take several hours to bring conventional artillery ashore. In the Okinawa campaign, especially in the south, we became an integral part of the of the massed artillery bombardment of entrenched Japanese defenses.
Because of our amphibious character, we had a maneuvering flexibility lacking in conventional artillery. An action in northern Okinawa demonstrates this special capability. On Motobu Peninsula, Japanese resistance centered around a mountain called Yae Take There, 1500 to 2000 well-armed troops in rugged terrain and caves, were holding off the 29th Marines and causing heavy damage with artillery fire. Neither naval shelling from the sea nor aerial bombing had proved effective against them. Regular artillery could not reach the area because all bridges had been destroyed. On orders from the 6th Division, two platoons of D Company amtanks went to the area by sea. We put in to shore at a site where we could most effectively bring our 75mm howitzers to bear on the enemy in ravines and caves. We were credited with silencing enemy field pieces, covering advances of the 29th Marines, and making possible the evacuation of wounded.
LVTA-4s made only one appearance after World War II. They were used in the Korean War, but as artillery, not for amphibious assault. But amtanks, as we knew them, did become forerunners of more powerful amphibious assault vehicles. They were the Model-Ts of amphibious assault. For a while, in the ‘50s and ‘60s, with helicopter gunships that could fly right over coral reefs, it looked as though amphibious vehicles would become obsolete.. But that has not happened. In the Persian Gulf War and other recent actions, modern amphibious vehicles have shown there are modern uses for them. A direct descendent of the old amtracs, the AAV-7A1, and also an air-cushioned vehicle (the LCAC) are faster and more maneuverable both at sea and on land, have heavier armor than our old clunkers, and have a lot of fire power.
The amtracs and amtanks we knew may have passed into history. But they did a job in their day, and it is fitting that their story can now be told in this new electronic medium, the Internet.
-- Dale Barker
LVT-1
LVT-4
My father served in the Rocky Mount which was scheduled to participate in Operation OLYMPIC, the invasion of Kyushu, Japan. My father-in-law was in the Army that was being prepared to take part in that invasion as well.
If these men had perished (like these Americans on Saipan) in the fierce fighting that was expected, none of the people in this picture [family photo at link below] would be alive today.
I wish to thank the veterans who preserved my freedom. I also wish to thank Harry Truman who preserved the lives of so many servicemen by ending the war before the invasion.
The amtracs and amtanks we knew may have passed into history. But they did a job in their day, and it is fitting that their story can now be told in this new electronic medium, the Internet.
Thanks for the background on the LVT. They provided a great service to the Marines in the Pacific.
Deployment pics always bring tears to my eyes. It's so hard on everyone concerened....the soldiers and their families. This young man with the tear dangling from his eye really got me.
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