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Posted on 06/30/2003 11:59:39 PM PDT by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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Overview If the Allies had not won the Battle of the Atlantic, they would not have won the Second World War. Success ensured Britain's survival and the ultimate victory of the Allies over Nazi Germany. Half Britain's food and two-thirds of its raw materials came from overseas. Before America's entry into the war, the campaign in the Atlantic was purely defensive, fought to maintain Britain's lifeline. After it, the need to transport American land and air forces to Britain to prepare for the invasion of Europe transformed it into the most important of the war. Both of these operations depended utterly on the safe and timely arrival of Allied merchant ships. Although problems posed by German surface raiders and aircraft were not insignificant, the security of the sea lanes could be assured only by the defeat of the U-boat.  The three ways of achieving this goal were, in order of importance, establishing convoys, avoiding U-boats or sinking them. Ships sailing in convoy were less vulnerable to U-boats than those sailing independently, although the system always depended on the number of escort vessels available and in the early years of the war there were simply not enough. The spectacular intelligence breakthroughs which the Allies achieved allowed them to route convoys away from U-boats, though they were helped by equally important German failures. U-boat Command could never bring itself to believe that the Enigma code had been penetrated and never understood that the Allies' exploitation of the huge volume of radio communications generated by its centralised command system was the basis of their success. When German codebreaking put the U-boats back in the path of Allied convoys, the belated deployment and combination of trained and co-ordinated escort groups, technological superiority and air power began to sink U-boats rapidly and in increasing numbers and eventually won a hard-fought and timely victory. The U-boat war began in earnest with the acquisition by the German Navy of bases on the French Atlantic coast in mid-1940. However, within a year the Germans had lost the Battle of the Atlantic. The Allies' success with Ultra from mid-1941 onwards defeated the first wolf pack offensive. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June began a campaign which always took resources away from Dönitz's submarines. Within seven months of America's entry into the war, US shipyards were building merchant ships faster than U-boats could sink them.  Royal Canadian Navy Flower-Class Corvette escorts a convoy early in the war. Ultimately, the Battle of the Atlantic was a triumph of the co-operation and integration of the armed forces and the mobilisation of resources of three formidable maritime powers, Britain, Canada and America. The foundation upon which all Allied naval success was built was the contribution of the thousands of sailors, civilians and servicemen, who constantly carried out the many tasks, usually monotonous and uncomfortable, often dangerous, which characterised life in the Atlantic. But the Battle was won as much by men (and women) on dry land in London, Liverpool, Washington, Ottawa and the Bethlehem-Fairfield shipyard, Baltimore as men, braced against the wind and the rain searching for the next U-boat, at sea. Four days after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Germany declared war on the United States of America. Long before its actual entry into the war, the USA had been participating in the Atlantic campaign on an increasing scale. From 1940 onwards, US naval observers had been attached to the Royal Navy. In mid-September 1941, US ships began to escort convoys between Newfoundland and Iceland. The German Navy had long since identified the western Atlantic as the most vulnerable area for Allied shipping and anticipated rich pickings along the American eastern seaboard.  U-boats were in place to start operations by mid-January 1942. The abundance of targets, including a preponderance of valuable oil tankers sailing between the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico and east coast US ports, and the American reluctance to adopt the convoy system created a second "Happy Time" for the U-boat commanders. Between January and June in the North Atlantic, Allied losses reached an average of nearly 88 ships ( 471,948 tons) per month. In May and June alone, U-boats sank over one million tons in US waters. This massive German success was achieved with a relatively small number of boats. However, from mid-March, their operational endurance was boosted by the deployment of submarine tankers (or "milch cows" as the Germans called them) which resulted in strength peaking at 16-18, operating between Nova Scotia and the tip of Florida. Initially, the Americans preferred to route coastal traffic independently and hunt U-boats by offensive patrols. They had seen the lack of success achieved by the Canadians when escorting slow convoys in autumn 1941. Many US escorts were deployed in the Pacific until the Battle of Midway in early June greatly reduced Japanese naval power. Unfortunately, westbound ships which had been safely convoyed across the Atlantic and eastbound ships loaded with essential supplies in American ports were lost in waters where the existing Allied convoy system could not protect them. Despite pressure from the British, the Americans were slow in adopting suitable defensive measures and did not introduce even a partial convoy system until 1 April.  Depth charge exploding Gradually, however, an improvement was made in US tactics and began to take effect. Firstly, U-boats were denied their profitable hunting grounds in shallow coastal waters. Then, by the middle of 1942, both north and south bound convoys along the US eastern seaboard were instituted, forcing the U-boats to move from this area to the Caribbean. By September, the US Navy had established a complete interlocking convoy system between Canada and Brazil. Convoys across the Atlantic now took a more direct, southerly route than before to avoid the worst of the northern weather (albeit rendering air cover based on Iceland less effective). Crucially, this was made possible by the introduction to the convoys of tankers, which could refuel escort vessels en route. Other tactical and technical advances were also made. A change in patrol techniques gave convoys better air support. Coastal Command aircraft now had radar and searchlights (known as Leigh lights), which gave them the advantage of surprise over the U-boat, exploited by new, more powerful, depth charges. By August, the arrival of a few Very Long Range Liberators meant that aircraft were beginning to operate in the crucial mid-Atlantic air gap. Shipborne radar and, from July onwards, High Frequency Direction Finding (or "Huff-Duff") equipment, which pinpointed U-boats making radio transmissions on the surface, gave escort vessels a better chance of finding their adversary. Improved training for their commanders and the introduction of standard attack response procedures contributed towards the improved efficiency of convoy escort groups. Throughout 1942, the numbers of operational U-boats increased rapidly, at a rate significantly faster than the Allies could sink them. In January there were 91, twelve months later the strength had risen to 212; 87 U-boats were lost during the year. Planned wolf pack attacks in the North Atlantic had temporarily ceased in November 1941, though a few isolated assaults were still attempted over the first half of the year. Then, from August, with Western Atlantic and Caribbean waters becoming unprofitable, Admiral Dönitz, the U-boat commander, unleashed his wolf packs in a renewed campaign of increasing intensity against the North Atlantic convoys. He concentrated his forces in the central Atlantic air gap, which all but a few of the covering Allied aircraft could still not yet reach. Dönitz had several advantages. The support of a number of "milch cows" gave the U-boats extended endurance. The Allies were still short of escort vessels. They had also, for most of 1942, lost the ability to read U-boat high-level coded radio signals, whereas German wireless intelligence of Allied convoy movements was still highly successful.  The battle raged for the rest of the year. Between July and December, 480 Allied ships with a tonnage of 2,639,533 tons were sunk in the North Atlantic. The overall, worldwide total for 1942 of nearly 7.8 million tons gave a monthly average not far short of the 700,000 tons Dönitz had identified at the start of the year as that which would soon bring Britain to defeat. His U-boats had accounted for approximately 80% of the sinkings. By the end of 1942, the Admiralty reported that the shipping situation had never been tighter. There were still not enough naval and air escorts and fuel stocks were getting very low. Most of the new merchant shipping being built was American, most of the losses were British. Imports were down one-third on the 1939 total. Paradoxically, the great success of transporting the massive numbers of troops and their supplies needed for the North African landings in November from Britain and the USA had been at the expense of taking the necessary escort ships away from the North Atlantic convoys. For the Allies, the Atlantic battle, on which so much rested, was reaching crisis point. The Battle of the Atlantic came to a climax between March and May 1943. In the three winter months from December 1942 to February 1943, bad weather and evasive routeing of convoys ensured that losses were comparatively fewer than in the previous autumn, though sinkings in the North Atlantic still reached 119 ships (723,451 tons). However, from the end of February onwards, fortified by a U-boat operational strength nearing its zenith and a break down in Allied Ultra intelligence during the first three weeks of March, German submarines again began to enjoy great success in the mid-Atlantic gap where Allied air cover still did not reach.  Hedgehog pattern. The hedgehog was the DE’s other antisubmarine weapon, in addition to depth charges. You can see the splashes from several of these small charges, plus two in flight and others just about to hit the water. The haze under the upper 3” is smoke from the hedgehogs being launched. Each of these projectiles carries a small explosive charge that detonates upon contact with a submarine. If one or more of these hit a sub, it would hopefully damage it enough to force it to the surface or sink it outright. Over the next twenty days, the wolf packs, which now had a strength of one hundred in the North and Central Atlantic, wrought such havoc that Allied losses again began to reach the devastating levels of 1942. One of the biggest engagements of the war took place between 16-20 March when twenty U-boats attacked two eastbound convoys totalling 100 ships. At the cost of only one U- boat, the Germans sank 21 ships, with a combined 141,000 tonnage. The overall figure for March in the North Atlantic was 476,349 tons, about 75% of the world total, with 82 of the 108 ships lost in this theatre. Most serious of all was that nearly two-thirds of these losses had been sunk while sailing in convoy. The Admiralty considered that this was the closest the Germans ever came to breaking the transatlantic lifeline between Britain and America. However, this possibility was only a fleeting one as, over the next two months, the German offensive faltered rapidly. The foundation of the change in fortunes had been laid in January when the British and US leaders conferred at the Casablanca Conference. Churchill and Roosevelt decided that the defeat of the U-boat must become the Allies' top priority. The liberation of Europe would never be able to go ahead until the Battle of the Atlantic had been won. From 1st-12th March, British, American and Canadian naval and air force representatives at the Atlantic Convoy Conference in Washington decided upon several initiatives. Twenty Very Long Range (VLR) Liberator aircraft were to be supplied to the Royal Canadian Air Force in Newfoundland to begin the closing of the mid-Atlantic air gap. Escort carrier groups were to be introduced to provide further protection for convoys. New convoy cycles were to be created and the High Frequency Direction Finding ('Huff-Duff') network was to be increased. Only 20 VLR Liberators were operational by the end of March but by the middle of April the number had doubled to 41. By the same time, RAF Coastal Command had 28 anti-submarine squadrons, with aircraft types including Leigh Light Wellingtons and ordinary Liberators. The number of escort vessels was increasing sharply, which often allowed convoys to be given an outer as well as an inner protective cordon. At the end of March, five support groups were established to reinforce escorts of threatened convoys and hunt for U-boats. Some had escort carriers which were able to provide convoys with their own covering airpower. Centrimetric radar, with its effective 360 degree surveillance, became operational in February. Improving weather in April made radar and 'Huff Duff 'more effective. The availability again of Ultra intelligence from the third week of March enabled these new weapons to be deployed to their maximum effect.  Losses in April were significantly lower than those of the previous month. North Atlantic sinkings fell by over 50% to 235,478 tons (39 ships). At the beginning of May, Dönitz still had approximately sixty U-boats preying on the (narrowing) mid-Atlantic air gap. Half of these were concentrated across the path of a slow eastward convoy, with another eleven waiting further ahead. For a week from 29 April during very stormy weather the U-boats engaged in a fierce running battle with the convoy and its escorts. They succeeded in sinking twelve merchantmen, but at the cost of seven of their own. During the rest of May, the wolf packs made a series of repeated, but ultimately failed, attacks. The number of sinkings was greatly reduced and some convoys crossed the Atlantic without any losses at all. Conversely, U-boat casualties were heavy. Between mid-April and the end of May, 27 were lost in the North Atlantic and nearly 100 had been sunk in the Atlantic since the start of the year. VLR Liberators had finally closed the air gap. Sea and air escorts with the convoys were now present in sufficient numbers to thwart the U-boat. At the end of May, Dönitz withdrew his battered force from the Atlantic, a clear signal that the Allies had won a decisive victory. The Allied victory over the German U-boats in May 1943 was not the end of the Battle of the Atlantic, but it was the decisive moment. Dönitz fulfilled his promise for his submarines to return to the fray, but never again did they pose as grave a threat. The sea and air escorts and support groups sent out with the convoys and the Very Long Range aircraft patrolling in mid-Atlantic were the keystones of the Allied success and they maintained their predominance until the end of the war. Also, in July 1943, the rate of production at which new merchant shipping was coming out of British and American yards overtook the rate at which U-boats were sinking Allied ships at sea and never afterwards fell below it.  During July and August, further defeats were inflicted on Dönitz's forces along U-boat transit routes in the Shetlands-Faroe Islands gap and across the Bay of Biscay. The offensive in the latter area proved by far the most successful of the two, where twenty boats were sunk between 1 July and 2 August. Many were surprised on the surface at night by aircraft now equipped with both Leigh Lights and centrimetric radar. Also, American escort carriers destroyed the "milch cows" refuelling U-boats off the Azores. The wolf packs returned to the North Atlantic in September 1943 armed with new acoustic homing torpedoes and improved anti-aircraft radar and weapons. However, attacks on convoys over the autumn achieved only limited success at the cost of a severe mauling by Allied sea and air escorts. Forty U-boats were sunk in the North Atlantic in the last four months of 1943 to add to the twelve lost between June and August. Wolf pack tactics had finally failed. In early 1944, Dönitz concentrated on British coastal waters in the north-western approaches in an attempt to repeat the first "happy time". Unfortunately for the German Navy, three and a half years on, Allied anti-submarine firepower was vastly stronger than it had been in 1940. Coastal Command squadrons from western Scotland and Northern Ireland provided continuous air cover, while at sea several escort and support groups, some with escort carriers, were concentrated against the U-boats which suffered another severe defeat.  For the rest of the war, Dönitz's force was reduced to a harassing role to try and tie down as many Allied naval forces as possible. A prime opportunity for such action came against the ships and landing craft massing in the waters of the English Channel and adjacent coastal areas for the invasion of Europe in June 1944. Most U-boats had by this time been fitted with the Schnorkel breathing device, allowing them to stay underwater for much longer periods than hitherto and making them much harder to detect. However, so numerous were the escorts and so intensive the air and sea patrolling accompanying the invasion convoys that few U-boats reached the fleet. In the remaining months of the war, increasingly successful Allied bombing of factories and assembly ports, which delayed the completion of advanced new types, put the seal on the final and utter defeat of the U-boat.
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From September 1939 onwards, US Navy (USN) ships patrolled larger and larger sections of the ocean and, when America took over the defence of Iceland in July 1941, USN ships escorted vessels of any nationality to and from it. From August, the USN escorted convoys between Newfoundland and Iceland alongside Royal Canadian Navy ships. Confrontations with U-boats started immediately.
During the first half of 1942, U-boats inflicted massive losses on shipping along the American eastern seaboard as the USN did not establish a full convoy system until mid-summer. However, its responsibilities for transatlantic escorts were reduced when those escort vessels it did have were deployed in support of the growing number of troop convoys sailing to Britain and North Africa.
For the first half of 1942, the Royal Navy enjoyed a respite as U-boats concentrated in American waters. It was still short of escort vessels, but those which were available began to benefit from technological advances in radar, direction finding equipment and weaponry. However, when U-boat wolf packs returned to mid-Atlantic in the second half of the year, intelligence failures and the commitment of escort vessels to the North African landings contributed to a massive rise in shipping losses.
The RCN undertook convoy duties and control of merchant shipping movements in the western Atlantic and Naval Headquarters in Ottawa co-operated successfully in the intelligence war against the U-boat. The assumption of responsibility for the escort of slow convoys towards the end of 1941 did not help the struggling RCN as these ships were the most vulnerable and suffered the heaviest losses. Further pressure came when the USA entered the war as RCN ships had to cover for those US Navy vessels which were rapidly transferred to the Pacific.
www.thehistorychannel.co.uk
www.navy.go.kr
members.kingston.net
www.navylib.com
www.uboatarchive.net
www.1freespace.com
home.nycap.rr.com
www.archives.gov
www.mikecampbell.net
www.hmsfiredrake.co.uk
www.canonesa.care4free.net
www.history.navy.mil
history.acusd.edu
www.stenbergaa.com
www.electricedge.com
www.british-merchant-navy.co.uk
home.nycap.rr.com uboat.net
24.154.92.207:20080
www.thyssen-nordseewerke.de
| 'The only thing that ever frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril.' -- Winston Churchill 'Enemy submarines are to be called "U-boats." The term "submarine" is to be reserved for Allied underwater vessels. U-boats are those dastardly villains who sink our ships, while submarines are those gallant and noble craft which sink theirs.' -- Winston Churchill 'The reason that the American Navy does so well in wartime is that war is chaos, and the American Navy practices chaos on a daily basis.' -- Attributed to Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, |
.......FALL IN to the FReeper Foxhole! I love hear about your puppies' progress. That line just brought a big smile to my face and lots of good memories.
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