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Posted on 05/27/2003 5:33:55 AM PDT by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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an overview The Battle for Crete in May 1941 is the most dramatic battle in which New Zealand forces have participated. For twelve days, with British, Australian and Greek troops, assisted by Cretan civilians, they battled to repel airborne assault on a scale never before attempted. They almost succeeded. There was a very narrow margin between success and failure for both sides, especially in the first two days. Ultimately the battle ended in defeat for the Allies, but its impact was lessened by the successful evacuation of many of the non-Greek defenders.  New Zealand troops were present in Crete because of their involvement in the preceding campaign on the Greek mainland, to which the Second New Zealand Division had been committed along with an Australian division and British units. When the Germans attacked on 6 April, they had quickly outflanked the Commonwealth defences. The Allies conducted a skilful withdrawal down the peninsula and most were taken off by the Royal Navy in the last week in April. Two brigades of the New Zealand division were among the evacuated troops who were landed in Crete. It was expected initially that this would be merely a temporary sojourn, and that they would very shortly follow the other New Zealand brigade to Egypt. But this not to be.  There were two main reasons. First, the German intention to invade the island quickly became apparent, and it was feared that the assault would come before the troops could be taken off. The sensible course appeared to be to use the troops already on the island to defend it. Second, the authorities in London at least were tempted by the possibility of inflicting a humiliating defeat on the invaders, who were known to be planning an airborne assault on the island. Their confidence rested on the very full information about German intentions they were obtaining from deciphered German signals — the so-called Ultra intelligence. Perhaps in no other battle have the defenders been so well informed about their adversary's intentions. Because paratroopers would be vulnerable in the early stages of an attack, the removal of the element of surprise made a crucial difference. On 30 April 1941 Major-General Bernard Freyberg, the commander of the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force and a legendary hero of the Great War (he had won a VC on the Somme in 1916), was given command of the British forces on Crete (Creforce, as it was styled). He was given a monumental task, for little had been done previously to put the island in a state of defence, largely because of the demands on scarce British resources elsewhere in the Mediterranean theatre. Freyberg set about trying to overcome some of the many deficiencies. Although there were substantial numbers of troops on the island — far more than the Germans anticipated — most of the evacuated units had reached Crete with little more than their personal weapons. Some tanks and guns arrived, but the garrison lacked adequate air support.  Major-General Bernard Freyberg, Commander of CREFORCE Airfields had been constructed at Maleme and Retimo to support the aerodrome at Heraklion, but only limited forces were available to operate from them, and they were soon fighting heroically against overwhelming odds when the Luftwaffe began to operate in strength over the island. The remnants of the airborne forces would be withdrawn just before the invasion but, because of hopes in Cairo that air forces would be available later, Freyberg was forbidden to render the airfields inoperable — a crucially important omission. For the Germans, the capture of Crete would complete the Greek campaign. Its seizure might have opened the way for German assaults on other key British possessions in the Middle East (though the conquest of Malta would have been more important in this regard). But in fact German intentions were essentially defensive rather than offensive. Crete was to be secured in order to buttress the flank of the massive offensive Germany was preparing to launch against Russia in June 1941. In particular, German possession of Crete would prevent the British using it to mount long-range bombing raids on the Romanian oilfields, so vital to the German war effort. It would also make it more difficult for the British to penetrate the Balkans.  When the assault began on 20 May, the initial German focus was on the airfield at Maleme and the Canea area. The glider-borne troops and paratroopers were badly mauled where they landed in or near the defenders, and were rapidly eliminated. But in two areas the Germans got a foothold — west of the airfield at Maleme, where substantial forces had come down in undefended territory west of the Tavronitis river, and in what became known as Prison Valley in the Canea sector. The concentration of Germans in the latter presented a latent threat from the outset, but it was the Maleme area that would prove the key point in the battle, though the invaders were at first prevented from seizing the airfield. On the afternoon of the first day the second wave of the German assault went in with landings at Retimo and Heraklion. The aggressive reaction of the defenders ensured that the Germans could make no progress towards seizing the airfields. By nightfall, therefore, none of the German objectives had been secured. The risky plan — attacking at four separate points rather than concentrating on one — seemed to have failed and there was despondency at the German headquarters in Athens. In a mood of mounting desperation, it was decided to throw everything into the Maleme sector the next day. Without the airfield reinforcement would be impossible, unless a seaborne operation also being mounted succeeded.  This decision was vindicated when, next morning, it was found that the New Zealand infantry battalion defending the airfield, and the key high ground overlooking it (Point 107), had withdrawn. Effectively the airfield was in German hands, even if it was still under artillery fire. In the evening transport planes began trundling in, bringing elements of a mountain division. The airfield was soon littered with wrecked aircraft, but the mountain troops, who went straight into battle after landing, soon began to tip the balance the German way. German dominance in the air left the defenders struggling against impossible odds. On the night of 21-22 May Creforce, aware that failure to regain the airfield would probably spell defeat, mounted a counter-attack by two battalions. Because of continuing concern about the possibility of a seaborne landing — removed, ironically, by the Royal Navy that night as the troops waited to go forward — this attack was mounted in insufficient strength and too late to have any real chance of success. Its failure effectively dispelled any hopes the Allies might have had of defending the island. In the next few days the defenders pulled back to the east to avoid being outflanked, and the weight of German attacks steadily increased.  Reluctantly the authorities in London agreed to evacuate, and the western elements of Creforce pulled back to Sfakia, from where about 16,000 troops were taken off over four nights. A separate evacuation took off the non-Greek defenders from Heraklion (though many were killed in bombing attacks en route to Egypt). About 5000 men capitulated to the Germans at Sfakia on 1 June — joining another 10,000 taken elsewhere. Of the 7700 New Zealanders among the island's defenders, 671 were killed, 967 wounded, and 2180 captured in the brief campaign. The Royal Navy suffered even higher casualties than the troops on land — more than 2000 men were lost during the operations to supply the defenders, to prevent the seaborne reinforcement and to effect the evacuation. But so heavy were the casualties inflicted on the German paratroopers that they were never again used in an airborne assault on the same scale. Many of the Allied prisoners left behind on the island when the evacuation ended took to the hills or later escaped from captivity. They roamed the island, sometimes for years, seeking a way off. Many escaped to Egypt on small boats or were picked up by submarines. Some were later sent back to Crete to foster resistance among the Cretans, who took great risks to succour and hide Allied personnel throughout the occupation. Many paid with their lives for such actions.  With the benefit of hindsight, the loss of Crete can be seen as a blessing in disguise for the Allies. The German attack on Russia soon afterwards dispelled fears that the Germans would use the island as a staging point to attack other Allied possessions in the eastern Mediterranean. Even so, the German-Italian forces in North Africa came close to success in 1942. Had the Allies had the distraction of supplying and defending Crete the balance might well have tipped the other way. When the German offensive was halted before Moscow in late 1941 there was some exaggeration of the importance of the delay on the German timetable caused by the Balkan campaign. To be sure the date of Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia, had been put back following the coup d'état in Belgrade which precipitated the German onslaught in the Balkans, but a late thaw in eastern Europe would have delayed the Russian invasion in any case. Moreover, the German preparations for the invasion were not seriously hindered by the operations in Greece and Crete. The Battle for Crete is to the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force what Gallipoli was to its Great War predecessor. In both campaigns New Zealand troops faced their first major test of battle, and came through with flying colours. In both, defeat and evacuation was the ultimate outcome. The much shorter battle in Crete remains of enduring significance in New Zealand because of the key role of New Zealand troops in the island's defence scheme, and because it was such a narrow defeat. Click the link The Battle for Crete Today's thread is dedicated to Freeper U S Army EOD's relatives who served with the New Zealanders in this battle
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LOL! All that 'tank' time! You should!
Right Snippy?
I'm not tellin'.
He's in the dark, let's keep him there.
Heydrich was a very effective administrator, certainly totally willing to break eggs, but more so, efficient in bringing the conquered territories into willing discipline. Interesting guy. The Brits figured him to be very extraordinarily dangerous (Czech industrial capacity very important in those days). My opinion is not fully formed, but this could be. Maybe Lidice was worth it.
Good work on this one, your point of view on the Crete affair interesting and useful, clear and to the point.
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