|
Posted on 03/26/2003 5:35:35 AM PST by SAMWolf
|
|
 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
|
| Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans.
Where the Freeper Foxhole introduces a different veteran each Wednesday. The "ordinary" Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine who participated in the events in our Country's history. We hope to present events as seen through their eyes. To give you a glimpse into the life of those who sacrificed for all of us - Our Veterans.
|
|
|
|
of the Marine Corps' Amphibious Warfare School Quantico, Virginia 15 March 1985 Thirty-five years ago, I was sitting where you are sitting today. I was a member of what was then called the "Amphibious Warfare School, Junior Course." The student body was made up of first lieutenants, captains, and majors. The Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course, corresponds to today's Command and Staff College and had lieutentant colonels as students.  Brig. Gen. Edwin A. Simmons On graduation I was ordered to the 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune. So were a good number of my classmates. I was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines; and as a major, was given command of Weapons Company. The battalion had just come back from the Mediterranean and we were still unpacking expeditionary boxes when, on 25 June, the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel. In short order we moved west on a troop train to Camp Pendleton where we became the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, with about ten days to build from our half-strength peacetime tables of organization to war-time strength, before sailing from San Diego. Our regimental commander was Colonel "Chesty" Puller. We landed at Inchon on 15 September and that was the first we saw of the 5th Marines which had come up from the Pusan Perimeter. We did not see the 7th Marines until we reached Seoul. We were successful at Inchon and Seoul - and that success I think can be attributed to the quality of leadership at all levels. From the division commander, Major General Oliver P. Smith, on down, virtually every officer and non-commissioned officer was a World War II veteran. In my company I had corporals who could do a platoon sergeant's job and do it well, and in fact were so soon doing. The Reserves that filled up our ranks at Camp Pendleton were outstanding - indistinguishable from the Regulars. Also, a great advantage we had was that a remarkable number of the officer's knew each other well even though the Division had come together on the battlefield. A large proportion of the captains and majors had just graduated, as I, from the Junior Course.  I don't know what you have in your syllabus now, but in those days we spent a good deal of time with the fundamentals of tactics and techniques, with many, many map exercises, command post exercises, and field exercises. We knew the school solution and we were ready to apply it. In an infantry battalion of that time there were three rifle companies - we would soon learn that we needed four rifle companies - a weapons company, and a headquarters and service company. In my weapons company I had a heavy machine gun platoon - the heavy machine gun of the day was the water-cooled .30 caliber Browning, a superb weapon - an 81mm mortar platoon, and an anti-tank-assault platoon. The anti-tank platoon had 3.5-inch rocket launchers - which we just gotten to replace our 2.36-inch launchers - flame throwers, and demolitions. As Weapons Company commander I was also the battalion's Supporting Arms Coordinator. I am a believer in weapons companies and I am a believer in organic supporting arms coordinators. You have heard the broad outlines of the battle. Now I will tell you how it was at the company and battalion level, at least how it was at my company, and my battalion level. Here I want to say, and those of you who have been in combat already know this, that every man has his own war, his own battle. I am speaking today not as a historian but as a participant. A historian can be objective. A participant cannot; he can only be subjective. I will tell you of the battle from my own narrow perspective.  We had landed, as I have said, at Inchon on 15 September. In the advance on Seoul, the 5th Marines were on the left and the 1st Marines on the right. The 5th Marines took Kimpo Airfield on the 17th and crossed the Han River northwest of Seoul on the 20th. They would have three days of hard fighting taking the high ground immediately northwest of Seoul. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines had unloaded at Inchon the afternoon of the 21st and reached Kimpo that evening. The 1st Marines crossed the river on the 24th and the next day, 25 September, both the 1st and 5th regiments went into the city itself. The 7th Marines, in reserve, crossed the river and took up a position behind the 5th Marines. General Almond, the X Corps commander, who on 21 September took personal command of the operations ashore, ordered the U.S. Army's 32d Infantry Regiment, followed by the 17th ROK Regiment, also to cross the Han on 25 September and occupy "South Mountain" to the east of Seoul. The North Korean commander, Major General Wol Ki Chan, had chosen to ignore the occupation of South Mountain and concentrated his forces first on the high ground northwest of Seoul and then on the defense of the city itself. For this he had about 10,000 troops. At the battalion and company level we were only dimly aware of these developments. Our attack began at 0700 on the 25th. RCT-1, with the 2d KMC Battalion attached, was given a zone of action about a mile wide going right through the center of the city to the high ground to the northeast. The 2d KMC Battalion was to mop up behind us and then revert to its own regimental control. The 5th Marines were to come into the city on our left from the northwest and the 7th Marines, committed to combat for the first time, were to the north and left of the 5th Marines.  The mission assigned the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, was to advance along the axis of Ma Po Boulevard to seize Duksoo Palace, taking the railroad station en route. To give you an analogy: this was rather like crossing the Anacostia River and moving up Pennsylvania Avenue to capture the Captitol, taking Union Station along the way. And we had to do this in one day. General Almond wanted the city secured by 26 September. We had heavy going all day. George and How Companies were in the assault, with George on the left and on Ma Po Boulevard itself. Item Company was in reserve. As Weapons Company Commander and Supporting Arms Coordinator I had a most frustrating day as we were operating under a very restrictive fire plan. Damage to the city and civilian casualties were to be held to a minimum; hence, we could not get artillery support, except for directly observed targets and we could not get close air support at all. Our Corsairs had done a superb job from Inchon to Seoul, but air was ruled out of the picture once we got into the city itself.  I want you to visualize Ma Po Boulevard. It was a wide avenue. Seoul, of course, was a much less modern city than it is now. Ma Po Boulevard was a solidly built up street, mostly two and three story structures of stucco or masonry construction, and occasional more impressive buildings - churches, hospitals, and so on - often enclosed with a walled compound. The street itself was interrupted by repeated echelons of barricades. These barricades were made for the most part of large rice straw bags filled with earth. Other reports to the contrary, you didn't blow up these barricades or push them aside. They were much too heavy and inert for that. We had to contend with them in place. Not all of them were defended. Those that were defended had long-barreled Soviet-made anti-tank guns - 45mm if my memory serves me - heavy water-cooled Maxim machine guns - the equivalent of our Brownings - and rather awkward looking anti-tank rifles. There were also plenty of small arms fire and sniping from all sides. You have heard that we went through the interior walls of the buildings. Perhaps there was some of that but I saw none of it. The house-to-house fighting was chiefly a matter of grenades, M-1 rifles, and BAR automatic fire. We had the intermittent support of tanks. The battle tank was the M-26 Pershing and our tankers had received them just before the Inchon landing. The tanks were at their best when they were being used as an assault gun. They were in direct support of us rather than attached; therefore, they came and went pretty much as they pleased. Back at the Junior Course we had frequently argued the respective merits of supporting arms assigned - that is, organic - or attached. This was particularly true when our battalion was operating more-or-less independently which was a good part of the time.  By the middle of the afternoon the situation was about as follows: George Company had reached what the company commander thought was Duksoo Palace, but could not get across a small bridge to get to it. How Company had reached a railroad station but the company commander was having a hard time convincing anyone he was there because the map would indicate that the railroad station was to the right of George Company and he was insisting that he was in front of George Company and that George was calling down artillery fire on him. Our battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tom Ridge, sent me forward to see if I could straighten things out. I found the George Company commander in a highly agitated state. I also found that he was very wrong in his map reading. he was about a mile short of Duksoo Palace. What was in front of him was something else. We later found out that it was a girl's school. I said "Let's make one more try to get across the bridge." I couldn't get him an artillery preparation, but I promised to give him the best I had with my 81mm mortars which were close behind George Company. We drenched the other side of the bridge with a couple hundred 81 mortar shells, but the attack failed. George Company commander was nearly distraught. He said, "Take my bars, I've had it." All of this was reported to Colonel Ridge who ordered me to stay with George Company and to organize the defense for the night. I put a road block across the boulevard on our side of the bridge, manning it with two rifle squads, a heavy machine gun section, a rocket squad, and a 75mm recoilless rifle section from the regimental Antitank Company. Our attached engineers put in a field of anti-tank mines on the bridge itself. There was a section of tanks with us and I asked them to stay, but they said they had to go back to re-arm and re-fuel and they would see us in the morning.  There was a sizable hill to the left rear of the road block with a house on it. George Company set up its command post in the cellar of the house. I established the battalion observation post - that is to say, my radio operator, my runner, and myself immediately in front of the house. Behind me was a set of steps that led down into the cellar. Item Company was on the high ground on the right of the battalion sector and How Company, which had become disorganized during the day, was to fill in the center of our position. The battalion CP was about a half mile to the rear in a brick-walled compound. My communications consisted of the normal radio nets - we were then using the SCR-300 - and wire from the OP back to the battalion switchboard and also direct lines from the OP to the 81mm mortar battery position which was about 150 yards to the rear of the road block.
|
Thanks Jen
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.
