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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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Posted on 01/28/2003 5:18:27 AM PST by SAMWolf
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are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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On June 17, 1775 British regulars faced an assemblage of independently minded colonial militia at the Battle of Bunker Hill. By evening of that day the British held the Charlestown peninsula, and a new respect for the determination and resourcefulness of colonial forces. The colonials, if shaken from what was for many the first taste of war (and what it reveals of men's character), had proven to themselves that in direct confrontation they could thwart the British army, a force superior in training, equipment, and organization.  Following the beginning of the war at Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775 the citizens of Boston found themselves between two armies. General Artemas Ward's New England volunteers surrounded Boston and blockaded the land approaches. General Thomas Gage and 4,600 British soldiers held the city itself. One Bostonian wrote, "We are besieged this moment with 10 or 15,000 men, from Roxbury to Cambridge... We are every hour expecting an attack by land or water." Critical to the British occupation of Boston was control of the hills on the Charlestown peninsula. An army holding this position overlooked both Boston and her harbor. On June 15 the Americans learned that the British planned to occupy Charlestown. To frustrate them the Americans decided to act first. On the evening of June 16, Colonel William Prescott, leading 1,200 Massachusetts and Connecticut soldiers, left Cambridge to fortify Bunker's Hill, the dominant hill in Charlestown. Prescott, however, bypassed this position and instead dug in on a lower hill closer to Boston called Breed's Hill. The next morning, the British awoke to find Breed's Hill fortified with an earthen redoubt measuring 160 feet by 30 feet. Gage ordered the position captured.  Major General William Howe, Gage's senior officer, was given field command. A shortage of boats, poor navigational maps, and ill-timed tides affected Howe's strategy and delayed the operation. In the end, Howe decided to land his troops at Moulton's (or Charlestown) Point near the mouth of the Mystic River. From her he could press westward across the peninsula, outflank the American redoubt and seize Bunker's Hill and Charlestown neck. While the British waited for the tide to rise, the Americans used the time wisely. Prescott's men extended their fortifications to the north of the redoubt by building a breastwork. As Colonel Stark's new Hampshiremen arrived, they joined Connecticut troops fortifying a rail fence that extended down the slope of Breed's Hill toward the Mystic. Other soldiers constructed three shelters of fence rails, called fleches, in the exposed area between the breastwork and the rail fence. To cover Prescott's right flank, still other men took up snipers' positions in deserted Charlestown. In all, between 2,500 and 4,000 New Englanders manned the lines. By 3:30 p.m. transports had delivered Howe's initial force, and reinforcements were landing on the shore between Moulton's Point and Charlestown. Whenn colonial snipers began firing at the arriving Redcoats, Howe ordered immediate retribution and the town was set afire by cannon. As Charlestown burned and spectators crowded to rooftops of Boston for the best view of the spectacle, Howe launched his first assault.  Howe's primary objective was the rail fence. As a diversion, Brigadier General Robert Pigot was to lead an assault on the redoubt and adjoining breastwork, while an elite group of light infantry would proceed up the Mystic shore to outflank the colonials on their left. Simultaneously, Howe and his principal force would hit defenders of the rail fence hard. The advance of the Redcoats must have been a terrible sight to the Americans. But nervous as they were, they had to wait. It was critical that the first rounds of fire be coordinated, with men alternately firing and loading to keep up a barrage capable of breaking the enemy's charge. Whether or not they were told to hold fire until they saw the "whites of their eyes," the Colonials were told to wait for the order to fire, to aim low, and to pick off British officers.  Interrupting the advance of Howe's and Pigot's soldiers were fences and uneven terrain hidden by tall grass. Unhindered by such obstacles, the light infantry was able to move swiftly along the Mystic shore, only to be met by Colonel Stark's deadly surprise - a stone wall on the beach backed by soldiers who have no ground. On the meadow above, as Howe's men approached their enemy, they were met by premature but increasingly steady musketry. In the struggle to negotiate fences while under fire, momentum and discipline were lost. Pigot's attack on the redoubt, too, was repulsed. Prescott's men had held. No sooner was the first assault turned back than Howe regrouped and marched forward again in a hasty, uncoordinated attack all along the American front. Once again the assault was a costly failure. The colonials were jubilant, but not for long. Confusion, a lack of discipline, inter-colony rivalries, and the resulting lack of reinforcements and supplies were to take their toll. Howe had been frustrated but not defeated. It was true that British troops were no longer fresh or overconfident and had suffered devastating losses of both rank and file and officers. The officers that remained, however, roused their troops and put together for the final charge a group grimly determined.  This time the British drove against the right and center of the American line. They cut through the breastwork and overran the redoubt from three sides. Stark managed to hold on at the rail fence long enough to help cover Prescott's retreat, but the final scene inside the redoubt was carnage. The surviving colonials retreated northward toward Cambridge. The British, bloodied and exhausted, pursued only as far as Bunker Hill and there dug in. By 5:30 p.m. the fighting was over. Both armies had fought courageously and learned much. For the Redcoats, the lesson was painful. Although they had captured the hill, out of 2,200 soldiers engaged, 1,034 were casualties. The British attempted no further actions outside Boston for the next nine months. When Howe replaced Gage as military commander in America, the events of that day would continue to haunt him, and he would time and again fail to follow up a victory over the Americans. The Americans had shown they could stand up to the British in traditional open field combat. But where they had succeeded, it had been through individual gallantry rather than tactical planning or discipline. Some regiments had fought well, other not at all. Of an estimated 2,500 to 4,000 men engaged, 400 to 600 were casualties. Stronger leadership would be critical to success in further battles. This leadership was provided on July 2, 1775 when George Washington arrived in Cambridge to assume his role as Commander-in-Chief of the new Continental Army.
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Visited U.S.S. Constitution and took first post-graduate job 1970 in Roxbury at Unity Bank & Trust, sixty-two employees and I the white.
At the employees' meeting president Philip J. Sneed told us "Sneed don't take no sh!t from nobody, walkin' or ridin', slippin' or slidin'"; proving same when he put down a crazy who tried to rob his bank the following Friday.
Outside it was "watchoo doon awn mah street", while Weathermen trashed, and the women of Cambridge competed in the Ozzie Oswald lookalike contest.
There's a classic film episode of a Polish general (Koskiusko? Pulaski?) teaching our volunteers to load efficiently.
This account appears:
If pressed, the trained Continental soldier could load and fire his piece four times a minute, but the rate generally was slower. He took little care in aiming, aware of the inaccuracy of his weapon except for short ranges. He swung his cartridge pouch to the front for greater accessibility; and between loading he thrust his ramrod conveniently into the ground beside him. His flint, if of good quality and adjusted properly between a fold of lead or leather in the jaws of the hammer, could be used 50 or 60 times. His handicaps were fouling of the barrel from powder combustion, which necessitated swabbing with the ramrod; and fouling of the flashpan and frizzen with clogging of the touchhole, requiring the use of a small iron brush and slender wire pick that usually were hung from the shoulder of the cartridge pouch or powder horn.
To accomplish four times a minute the laboratories provided cartridges:
Musket cartridges, prepared by those skilled in their making, often were supplied to the troops from the ammunition laboratories. When they were not provided it was necessary for the soldier to "roll his own." He melted his lead and poured it into an iron mold, forming balls which numbered 12 or 16 to the pound depending on the caliber of the musket in which they were to be used. The handles of the mold formed a snipping device intended for use in cutting off the "neck" of the bullet after molding; but the soldier usually preferred to smooth the leaden pellet with his jackknife. Into an oblong of tough paper he placed the ball, sometimes with four or six buckshot, and four or four and one-half drams of coarse, black powder which he rolled into a cylinder, twisting or tying the ends. After receiving a coating of grease for protection from dampness, the cartridges were placed in separate borings in the wooden block forming part of the cartridge pouch and covered by its flap of leather. The pouch, suspended by a shoulder belt of webbing or leather, was worn behind the right hip and usually held 24 cartridges or "rounds of ammunition." If the pouch and its contents became thoroughly wet during a rainfall or at a river ford, the soldier, except for his reliance on the bayonet, was hors de combat until his ammunition dried or a fresh supply of powder was obtained.
In order to load his musket when ammunition in the form of cartridges was used, the soldier brought the hammer of the lock to half-cock and uncovered the pan by pressing the frizzen upward and forward. (See diagram below.) Tearing or biting through the cartridge at its powder end, he filled the pan with powder, retaining it by closing the frizzen. Placing the butt end of the piece on the ground, he poured the remaining powder, together with the ball and paper as wadding, into the muzzle of the barrel and rammed them all well down with the rammer. Lifting the piece, he slapped it upon the stock opposite the lock in order to shake a small quantity of powder from the pan into the touchhole of the barrel. The piece then was ready to fire.
To accomplish lethal efficiency in the path of advancing professional soldiers required a deeply engrained Don't Tread On Me, or "don't take no sh!t from nobody, walkin or ridin, slippin or slidin"--
To which we can only add "or Biden"--
1986 Ellison S Onizuka Hawaii, Major USAF/astronaut, dies in Challenger disaster
1986 Francis R Scobee Washington, USAF/astronaut, dies in Challenger disaster
1986 Gregory B. Jarvis Detroit Michigan, payload specialist/astronaut, dies in Challenger disaster
1986 Dr Judith Arlene Resnik Akron OH, astronaut, dies in Challenger disaster
1986 Michael J Smith Beaufort NC, Commander USN, astronaut, dies in Challenger
1986 Ronald E McNair Lake City SC, astronaut, dies in Challenger disaster
I will never forget these brave and wonderful Americans. May they rest in peace. Thanks for the history Valin.
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