The FReeper Foxhole Revisits General John Buford at Gettysburg (7/1/1863)- July 1st, 2005

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The Battle of Gettysburg has quite possibly drawn more scholarly study than any other battle in American history. It remains a hallmark of the drama surrounding the Civil War. It is for that very reason that the battle's first actions, on July 1, 1863, tend to be overshadowed. However, if it were not for the foresight and stubborn military leadership of Brigadier General John Buford, the events of July 2 and 3 might have been dramatically different. Brevet Major General Henry J. Hunt, who directed the Union artillery's rain of destruction upon Pickett's Charge two days later, wrote that Buford was so "impressed by the importance of the position" (McPherson's Ridge) on July 1 that he had his troopers dismount to hold it until reinforcements could arrive. In his three-volume study, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, Stephen Z. Starr related that it was Buford and his 1st Cavalry Division that "determined the site of the battle and prevented the Confederate takeover of the town," and if not for him, Gettysburg would not have become the decisive victory for the Union cause that it was.

At Gettysburg, on the first day of battle on July 1, 1863, Colonel Gamble's brigade did the early skirmishing with advance elements of Confederate General Heth's Division as they advanced on the Chambersburg Pike. Arriving in the town, Gamble established his headquarters on the grounds of the Lutheran Theological Seminary. Under the leadership of General Buford, Gamble's men employed a successful "defense in depth" delaying tactic until General John F. Reynolds and his I Corps could come up in support. Gamble was later made a full Brigadier.

John Buford was born in Kentucky in 1826 but was raised in Illinois. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., in 1848 -- 16th in a class of 38 cadets. Prior to the Civil War, Buford served on the frontier fighting Indians and took part in the Utah Expedition against the Mormons from 1858 to 1860.

In July 1862, he was appointed a brigadier general and given command of the Reserve Cavalry Brigade, Army of Virginia. Buford served with great distinction during the Second Bull Run campaign, gaining particular notice for the delaying action his brigade fought against Maj. Gen. James Longstreet's I Corps at Thoroughfare Gap on August 27. During the Second Battle of Bull Run, Buford was badly wounded, and at one point he was reported dead. Nevertheless, by September 17, he had recovered in time to see action at Antietam, as well as at Fredericksburg on December 13. He also served admirably in the Chancellorsville campaign in May 1863. It was Buford's cavalry division that spearheaded the attack on Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's Confederate cavaliers at Brandy Station on June 9, 1863, when his troopers swept into the camp of Brig. Gen. William E. "Grumble" Jones' brigade at Beverly Ford at dawn and took 150 prisoners. Buford then served well at the cavalry battles of Aldie, Middleburg and Upperville, but the zenith of his career was still to come.

Colonel Theodore Lyman, a volunteer aide to Maj. Gen. George G. Meade who met Buford in 1863, gave the following description of the cavalry commander in a letter to his wife: "He is one of the best officers of that arm and is a singular-looking party...a compactly built man of middle height, with a tawny moustache and a little, triangular gray eye, whose expression is determined, not to say sinister...notwithstanding...he is a very soldierly-looking man [of] good natured disposition but not to be trifled with."

After General Meade took command of the Army of the Potomac on June 28, he ordered "a general movement toward Harrisburg," Pa., and sent Buford's cavalry to intercept the enemy. In his instructions to the cavalry on June 30, 1863, Meade stressed the need for the cavalry to render him "reliable information of the presence of the enemy" and that "cavalry battles must be secondary to this reporting."

Buford traveled unchallenged from Frederick, Md., on June 29 and met other commanders at Meade's headquarters. Buford and his corps commander, Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, had discussed possible enemy contact locations and agreed that Gettysburg was a likely spot. After all, Buford had pointed out, there were "many roads, some ten or twelve at least concentrating there, so the army could easily converge to, or...diverge from this point." That gave Gettysburg, despite its size, strategic importance as a center for command and control.

The Union I Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, was assigned to the left wing of the Army of the Potomac on June 30, and Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard's XI Corps was close beside the I Corps. Buford's cavalry division was sent ahead to search for the Army of Northern Virginia. Approaching Gettysburg via the Emmitsburg-Gettysburg Road at 11 a.m., Buford found the quaint rural village very quiet and passed through to a depression immediately west of Seminary Ridge. Then, suddenly, the vanguard of his unit spied approaching Confederate infantry. Buford observed Brig. Gen. James J. Pettigrew's brigade marching down the Cashtown Pike to carry out orders from their division commander, Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, to "take his brigade to Gettysburg, search the town for supplies (shoes especially) and return the same day."

Lee's Troops march through Cashtown on their way to Gettysburg

The wording of Heth's order notwithstanding, it was Gettysburg's strategic location, not shoes, that attracted Confederate General Robert E. Lee's attention. Lee's orders to Heth, however, were to avoid a general engagement until Lee could concentrate his forces. Therefore, upon first contact with Buford, Pettigrew quickly disengaged and withdrew toward Cashtown, then set up pickets four miles west of Gettysburg. With great urgency, Buford had Colonel William Gamble's 1st Brigade and Lieutenant John F. Calef's artillery battery emplaced south of the Chambersburg Pike and the old packed roadbed, extending pickets and videttes (mounted pickets) westward. To protect his right flank to the north, Buford ordered Colonel Thomas C. Devin to deploy pickets and videttes from his 2nd Brigade on all roads leading to Gettysburg from the north.

Reynolds arrives at Gettysburg

After scribbling messages to Reynolds and Meade, Buford surveyed the surrounding terrain with an experienced eye. The ridges ran generally north and south to form a basin, in the center of which lay Gettysburg, squeezed from the east and west by a series of long, rather flat hills and ridges. Between each of those features stretched fertile fields and lush pastures. A mile and a half west of the town stood Herr Ridge; 900 yards to the east, across a swale through which meandered a sluggish little stream called Willoughby Run, was McPherson's Ridge; a few hundred yards south of the Chambersburg Pike stood the 17-acre patch of McPherson's Woods and Grove. Oddly, the usual tangle of forest growth was missing there. The grove was long and narrow, extending from the crest of the southern ridge to Willoughby's Run, whose banks offered excellent protection. That watercourse formed a natural line of defense that Buford could put to good use. Another 500 yards to the east, about three-quarters of a mile from Gettysburg, lay Seminary Ridge, where the three-story, brick Lutheran Theological Seminary stood serenely 40 feet above the surrounding meadows. A short distance north of the Chambersburg Pike, Seminary Ridge merged with McPherson's Ridge; from there a single promontory, Oak Ridge, continued northward to Oak Hill, an 80-foot-high knob that dominated the area northwest of Gettysburg. The pike traversed the ridges from the northwest, and about 200 yards to the north, a railbed ran parallel to the road. The railbed was as deep as 20 feet in places, and no track had been laid yet. Nine other roads radiated from Gettysburg to all points on the compass.

The ground formed an excellent arena for hosting a major battle. Buford immediately dismounted his troopers to hold McPherson's Ridge -- the best terrain west of the town -- until infantry could reinforce them. As his brigade commanders pushed out pickets and videttes to the west and north, Buford took an accounting of their strength. Of Buford's three brigades, only two, those of colonels Gamble and Devin, were on hand. His Reserve Brigade, en route to Emmitsburg, would be unavailable for more support, leaving him with just under 3,000 men.

The Eve of Battle,Gen. J Buford, Gettysburg, June 30, 1863

The cavalrymen's newly issued small arms were a point in their favor. The division had recently received its first allotment of Spencer rifles, augmenting the Sharps carbines already in service. The Sharps was a .52-caliber, single-shot, breech-loading weapon that could be fired at a rate of 10 rounds per minute. The Spencer repeating rifle was the first magazine-fed weapon, able to fire seven rapid-fire shots before requiring a reload.

Another factor in the Union cavalrymen's favor was their willingness to dismount and fight like infantry when the situation deemed it necessary. With the shock value of cavalry units largely rendered ineffective by the advances in firearm lethality and accuracy, new tactics were developed focusing on four main components: swift operational mobility outside enemy contact; readiness to dismount and fight on foot when the enemy was close; effective use of new small-arms advances; and posting a mounted reserve that would be ready to make a saber charge at the decisive moment. Buford had been quick to recognize the inadequacies of the old Napoleonic school of cavalry use. While the Southern cavalryman saw his horse as an extension of himself, John Buford once stated that he considered his horse "strictly transportation." He, along with contemporary cavalry professionals such as the 2nd Division commander, Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg, embraced and developed the concept of cavalry as mounted infantry. That tactic produced a mixture of firepower and maneuverability that multiplied the force of a typically understrength cavalry division.

Reynolds & Buford at Gettysburg

The night of June 30 was a busy one for the 1st Cavalry Division. Deploying scouts in all directions, Buford was able "to gain positive information of the enemy's position and movements" by dawn. Buford fanned his cavalrymen out in a 5-mile arc beginning north of Gettysburg, sweeping southwest and ending about a mile and a half from town. That formed a perilously extended defensive line for a force of only 2,748 -- a quarter of whom were detailed to hold horses for the other men. Gamble's 1st Brigade was emplaced along the east bank of Willoughby Run in a 1,000-yard-long line extending south from the railbed across the Chambersburg Pike. North of the railroad, Devin's 2nd Brigade reached to the base of Oak Hill. Moreover, with only six cannons, Buford knew that if attacked in force his division could conduct nothing more than a delaying action for Meade's advancing Union force.

Despite those odds, morale in the 1st Cavalry Division was high. Colonel Devin commented that he thought the Confederates would probably bypass them. Buford sternly responded: "You are wrong. The enemy will attack in the morning. He'll come booming three deep, and we shall have to fight like devils to maintain ourselves until the arrival of the infantry." That caution aside, Buford felt that he was ready for Heth's morning attack. He wrote later, "My arrangements were made for entertaining him."

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At 5 o'clock on the morning of July 1, 1863, Confederate Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill marched east on the Chambersburg Pike toward Gettysburg with the divisions of Heth and Maj. Gen. W. Dorsey Pender and supported by the artillery battalions of Brig. Gen. John Pegram and Colonel David G. McIntosh, with Pegram's artillery in advance. At 5:20, Buford's advance pickets caught their first glimpse of Heth's division approaching Marsh Creek through the drizzly dawn haze. The farthest Union outposts across Willoughby Run soon came under fire, and the men quickly fell back, as per orders.

Leading his men into the Herbst's woods farm woodlot, just south of the McPherson's farm, General Reynolds was shot in the saddle and died almost instantly. Shot through the neck he reeled from the saddle and was taken to the rear.

Upon reaching Herr Ridge, Heth deployed Brig. Gens. James J. Archer's and Joseph R. Davis' brigades to the right and left of the Chambersburg Pike, with Brig. Gen. James J. Pettigrew and Colonel John M. Brockenbrough in reserve. The first ranks of Confederate skirmishers went trampling down Herr Ridge through the fields of wheat and across pastures with guns at the ready. The Union troopers silently trained their seven-shot Spencers at their advancing foes. Just as the Rebels splashed through Willoughby Run, they were staggered by a terrific burst from the concealed cavalrymen. Concurrently, the six guns of Lieutenant John Calef's battery of horse artillery fired deadly salvos into Archer's men. "My troops at this place had partial shelter behind a low stone fence, and were in short carbine range," wrote General Buford in his after action report. "Their fire was perfectly terrific, causing the enemy to break." Confused by the ferocity of Buford's massed fire, the Rebels withdrew to re-form for another assault.

Statue of General John Buford depicting him looking off towards the South Mountains which Lees Army crossed on the way to Gettysburg

Buford's men continued to fire furiously, holding Heth at bay for a full hour. Buford's pickets scattered themselves at intervals of 30 feet behind post-and-rail fences and kept up a rapid fire with their Sharps and Spencers, some firing up to 21 shots per minute with the repeater -- 10 times the Rebels' rate of fire. The Confederates, however, began to sense that only a small force was opposing them. Supported by artillery, they began to intensify their fire against Buford's horse soldiers, destroying two of Calef's guns. Taking refuge behind rocks and trees, Buford's skirmishers were slowly forced back across Willoughby Run onto the crest of McPherson's Ridge. There, Buford placed his dismounted cavalry along the banks of Willoughby Run, extending his line to the left as far as the Hagerstown Road and to the right to the Harrisburg Pike. He then placed an artillery battery on the Chambersburg Pike. With Devin's brigade holding the line from the Chambersburg Pike to the right and Gamble's line holding to the left of the road, Buford maintained a firm defensive position.

Photo by Rob Nixon

Because smoke began to obscure the battlefield, Buford climbed to the cupola in the Lutheran Seminary in order to better view the field. As the commander climbed the tower stairs, he glimpsed the scene before him and was filled with foreboding. "The Rebel infantry flowed forward like a human river escaping its banks," he later wrote. "Menacing rows of cannon were limbered and swung around...pointed toward [the] men." If support did not arrive soon, his gallant cavalry could not hold. Buford sent couriers galloping off to Reynolds and Meade to request infantry support.

Using the cupola as his command post, Buford directed the action for another desperate hour, fending off Confederate probing attacks. But by 9 a.m., Buford could see that Gamble's troopers were being pushed back across Willoughby Run. To the north of the Chambersburg Pike, Davis' Mississippi brigade was advancing in spite of Archer's repulse.

Buford in the cupola of the Lutheran Seminary

Buford descended the stairs to personally inspect Gamble's condition. He stationed a signal crew in the cupola of the seminary to monitor the battle and to search southward for a sign of Reynolds' approach. Sometime before 10 o'clock, the lookouts discerned a faint dust cloud approaching from the south. Buford, summoned to the cupola to observe the welcome sight of those oncoming reinforcements, had barely finished climbing the stairs when Reynolds, who had galloped a mile in advance of his column, drew up below and called out, "What's the matter, John?" Buford responded, "The devil's to pay!" After a hurried conference, Reynolds asked if Buford could hold until the infantry began arriving, to which he replied, "I reckon I can." As Reynolds galloped south to move up his I Corps, Buford's line was hotly engaged.

Shortly after 10 o'clock, Buford's cavalry began to show signs of weakening under the mounting pressure from Heth's division. As Gamble's men methodically fell back, Confederate skirmishers began to swiftly climb the slope, gaining momentum as another brigade supported them on the left. As Archer's men reached the crest of the ridge, they were met with a thunderous volley of musketry from the crack "Iron Brigade" of Brig. Gen. James Wadsworth's division, whose troops were advancing at the double-quick to relieve the battered cavalrymen. Gamble's men, who had to be dragged from the line by the officers, shouted encouragement to the black-hatted brigade: "We have got them now! Go and give them hell!" When Reynolds, at the forefront of the counterattack, entered McPherson's Woods to direct the emplacement of the men, a Confederate sharpshooter fired a single round into the back of Reynolds' head, killing him instantly.

Buford's men were withdrawn and redeployed to the flanks and rear to provide security as Union infantry filled the line. The battle lines continued to sway and writhe as each force struggled to surmount the other. In the afternoon, Buford learned from Devin's videttes that Confederate Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's II Corps was massing in the north and quickly informed the commander of the Union XI Corps. As the forces joined at 1 p.m., the troops of Howard's XI Corps, exposed to a terrific enfilade that made their position untenable, broke and retreated east into Gettysburg, compelling the I Corps to follow suit. Once again, Buford stepped in, fighting a rear-guard action to allow the Union army to reach the safety of Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge. Gamble's and Devin's men fought bravely on Seminary Ridge and the plains north of town.

That evening, Buford assisted Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, sent to take command of the field, in the consolidation of the day's survivors and the construction of protective earthworks. Soon the fishhook-shaped defensive line was prepared for the next phase of the battle.

John Buford's gravesite at West Point Cemetery in New York. Buford was commissioned Major General on his deathbed. He died on December 16, 1863.
Photo provided by Eric J. Wittenberg

That ended the first day's battle at Gettysburg. Despite the odds they faced and the carnage of the next two days, Buford's troopers escaped with a total of 16 dead, 82 wounded, 38 missing and 13 horses killed. In the next two days, Lee's quest for a decisive victory ended in bitter failure. Had Lee been able to press through Gettysburg and take the heights of Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops, the battle, and perhaps the war, might have ended differently. Buford's recognition of the value of the terrain at Gettysburg, his willingness to dismount his troopers and make a stand and his possession of the best small-arms technology of the day were deciding factors in the battle's outcome. In the final assessment, however, the most important factors were the courageous and tenacious leadership of Brig. Gen. John Buford and the indomitable spirit of the troopers of the 1st Cavalry Division, which presented the Union with the opportunity of victory at Gettysburg. As author and historian M.F. Steele ably put it in 1921, Buford's valiant stand was "the most valuable day's work done by the cavalry in the Civil War."

Unfortunately for the Union, its greatest cavalry corps leader of 1863 was not destined to see the following year. In November 1863, Buford went on sick leave after contracting typhoid fever. He succumbed to the disease on December 16.

Michael S. Grogan

Additional Sources:

home.epix.net/~rplr
www.hammergalleries.com
www.utm.edu
www.allenscreations.com
www.pumpwarehouse.com
www.memberbbb.com
www.hrosecure.com
www.virginialighthorse.freeservers.com
www.morrisville.edu
www.mmcwrt.org
www.drumbarracks.org

'They will attack you in the morning and they will come booming - skirmishers three deep. You will have to fight like the devil until supports arrive.'

-- Brigadier General John Buford,
USA, June 30, 1863

'Meade will come in slowly, cautiously, new to command... And then, after Lee's army is entrenched behind nice fat rocks, Meade will attack finally, if he can coordinate the army. He'll attack right up that rocky slope, and up that gorgeous field of fire. And we will charge valiantly, and be butchered valiantly. And afterwards men in tall hats and gold watch fobs will thump their chest and say what a brave charge it was. Devin, I've led a soldier's life, and I've never seen anything as brutally clear as this.'

Sam Elliot as General John Buford,
Gettysburg (1993)

'That damned Yankee rifle they load up on Sunday and fire all week!'

This quote was attributable to Confederates who came up against Union outfits that used this weapon.

The most famous repeater of the war was the SPENCER. This rifle was a .56 -.56 caliber, (later .52 caliber), seven shooter of fairly short range, (around 400 yards). Approximately 106,000 saw service, of which around 12,000 were rifles and 94,000 were carbines mainly used for cavalry.

The Spencer Carbine played a pivotal role at the start of the Battle of Gettysburg. On June 30th 1863, Union Brigadier-General John Buford's 1st Division, Cavalry Corps consisting of 2,500 dismounted horse soldiers positioned along McPherson's ridge held back a much larger force of muzzle loader equipped fighting men under the command of Confederate Major-General Henry Heth. Buford's much smaller force of repeater firing cavalry held the advance long enough for the Union foot soldier infantry reinforcements from I Corps under Major-General John Reynolds to arrive and help him hold the line, and thus enjoin the three day epic engagement.

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June-July 1863
The Devil's Call

Since Chancellorsville, as much was asked of the cavalry as it could deliver. They'd done most of the fighting, lived in their saddles, and took a heavy casualty toll. Buford's men were allowed four days to rest and refit before being ordered to pursue Lee. Guarding the rear of the newly-formed "Left Wing" commanded by Major General John Fulton Reynolds, consisting of the 1st, 3rd, and 11th Infantry Corps, Buford crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry on June 27. Upon reaching Frederick MD, Buford caught and hung a spy named Will Talbot, who admitted he was a member of Confederate Elijah White's Comanches. Buford had a note pinned to the body announcing that the corpse was to hang three days and that anyone cutting him down early would hang the remainder. When the townspeople complained of the spectacle, Buford, in an obvious reference to the June 28 promotions to brigadier general of Wesley Merritt, Elon J. Farnsworth, and George A. Custer, in dry humor stated that he hung him rather than send him to Washington for fear that "they would make him a Brigadier General." Much of the Army of the Potomac, on its march northward, would pass by the hanging Talbot. Talbot was as much of a message evidencing Buford's viciousness in dealing with spies as it was a vignette of the dark reality of war to the marching blue army behind him.

On the same day that the three "boy generals" were promoted, Hooker's offer to resign was accepted and General George G. Meade placed at the helm. Hooker had just dispatched the cavalry "in the direction of Gettysburg and Emmitsburg" to ascertain the movements and position of the Rebels. Buford was ordered by Pleasonton to proceed to Gettysburg by way of Emmitsburg, with orders to cover the left flank of the army. The new commander, Meade, decided to continue the pursuit. It is unsure whether Pleasonton's claim that he ordered Buford to hold Gettysburg, an important rail and road junction, "at all costs" was a contemporary order or a post-battle embellishment, but the old Dragoon would soon recognize the importance of the area and the favorable terrain surrounding it.

On June 29, Buford sent his Reserve Brigade under Merritt to Mechanicsburg (now Thurmont), Maryland, to guard the Catoctin mountain passes and the divisional trains. To the call of "Boots and Saddles" the First and Second Brigades left at 9 am, following the base of South Mountain to Pennsylvania. Crossing the Mason-Dixon line into the Keystone State, all the troopers, especially those of Devin's 17th Pennsylvania, "raised their caps and lustily cheered, again and again" for their home soil.

Reinforced by 21 year-old 2nd Lieutenant John Calef's Battery A, 2nd US Artillery, and its 75 men, the brigades continued on dangerous winding roads and steep cliffs, finally reaching the summit of the Monterey Gap pass in the South Mountain ridge. As Buford peered through the pass in the approaching dusk, he saw Confederate campfires in the valley farm fields below. To no one in particular, Buford prophesied aloud that "Within forty eight hours the concentration of both armies will take place on a field within view and a great battle will be fought." It was almost as if, by Dragoon instinct, Buford knew somehow that Lee had just turned his army around on the information of one of Longstreet's paid spies. Buford of course didn't know, but the movement and concentration of Lee's army would underscore the importance of Buford's destination, a little crossroads town in southern Pennsylvania.

Proceeding down the mountain, the troopers went into camp near present-day Fountaindale PA for another restless respite for the exhausted men. At 2 am on June 30, the men began the march to Fairfield, through which they planned to pass on the way to Gettysburg. However, an unexpected run-in with pickets of a Mississippi and North Carolina regiment, which they hadn't seen in the dense fog that morning, reinforced his premonition. After a brief skirmish, Buford wisely broke it off and countermarched south toward Emmitsburg to march to Gettysburg via that alternate different route. Buford was intensely irritated by the lack of warning by the populace, leading to the stumble, as evidenced by his report: "The inhabitants knew of my arrival and the position of the enemy camp, yet not one of them gave me a particle of information... Had any of them given me timely information and acted as a guide that night, I could have surprised and captured this (Rebel) force." Arriving at Emmitsburg, Buford likely consulted with his wing commander Major General John F. Reynolds, after having sent early morning dispatches to both him and Pleasonton about a large Confederate force in the vicinity of Cashtown, only 8 miles from Gettysburg.

Marching along the road between Emmitsburg and Gettysburg, passing Federal infantry along the way, the worn-out troopers arrived in town about 12 noon, following advance scouts from Gamble's Brigade who arrived about an hour earlier. The scouts, pounding into town at full gallop, captured several Confederates who were straggling from Confederate General Jubal A. Early's visit to the town just four days prior. The brigade, along with Calef's artillery, received a rousing welcome from the townspeople. Buford sent a dispatch back to Pleasonton about the "terrible state of excitement in the town" and that the men and horses were at their limit. Setting up headquarters at Tate's Blue Eagle Hotel at the corner of Washington and Chambersburg Streets, Buford declared martial law, closed the saloons to his troopers, and jailed another captured spy.

By mid-afternoon, Buford and his commanders were closely inspecting the terrain around the town. His trained Dragoon eye quickly took note of the network of roads radiating through town like the spokes of a wheel, perfect for infantry to march on. Foremost were the series of hills and ridges north, west, and south of the hamlet. Knowing that a large concentration of Rebel troops was to his west and north, Reynolds and the other Federal corps commanders to his south, any confrontation would be an obvious race for the high ground. The nearly parallel ridges to the west and northwest, in the direction from which Buford suspected the Confederates would advance, seemed ideal to deploy a "defense in depth," a dismounted cavalry delaying-action and active defense designed to buy time for the infantry to arrive. He also inspected the ridges and hills east and south of town, a very defensible fall-back position for the infantry, a perfect ultimate line of passive defense. His Dragoon tactical expertise told him that a delay action in advance of the intended ultimate position for defense, holding until the infantry could arrive in force, had a chance for success. He also knew that timing, planning, and the dedication of his men would be critical. Climbing into the cupola of the Lutheran Theological Seminary west of town with Colonel Devin, Buford was able to see this lay of the land and far out the due-west Chambersburg Pike. By late afternoon, Buford sat upon Grey Eagle near the hotel, alone, in profound thought, staring to the west. The arthritis that had begun to afflict him was getting worse. But any personal matters were unimportant... he had made up his mind to stand and fight. He would commit his brigades. He had committed himself.

The day and evening were filled with preparations. Along with his brigade leaders, staff, and his signal officer Aaron B. Jerome, Buford studied the topography that would play such a crucial role in what he knew was to come. Earlier that day, his troopers had seen a Confederate element (General J. Johnston Pettigrew's) approach to within a mile of town to the west, but they had backed off at the sight of the cavalrymen. If the intelligence was correct, then he knew that the whole of the Army of Northern Virginia, some 70,000 strong, would come to this town the following day. He had to achieve the seemingly impossible, the thought of which might have crippled any other commander than Buford - to hold off an enemy force many times larger than his, perhaps for several hours. A cavalry defense-in-depth delaying action of such magnitude had never been attempted before. He had to hope that the Rebels would come at him piecemeal, a unit at a time, and he had to both deceived and confuse them for as long as could. He could last perhaps those few hours, but not much more.

Buford, though by nature extremely steady under such pressure, was understandably anxious as well. He and his men had a hard month in the saddle, and final destiny would come on the morrow. Jerome observed a meeting that night between Buford and Colonel Devin, in which the ever-anxious for a fight Devin tried to reassure his commander that the brigades could hold off anything the Confederates would throw at them. "You're unduly excited, General. I'll agree to take care of all the Rebels in my front for the next twenty-four hours," stated Devin. The pragmatic Buford looked at the exuberant Irishman and said, "No you won't... you will have to fight like the devil to hold your own until supports arrive... and if we are able to hold it we will do well." Buford's state of mind on this June 30 is evidenced by those who observed him. One of his staff recorded that they "had never seen him so apprehensive, so uneasy about a situation as he was at this time." Additionally, Jerome wrote, "He seemed anxious, even more so than I ever saw him." Buford was convinced he would be attacked in the morning.

The McPherson Farm and ridge

Buford's anxiousness worked to his and the men's advantage. Once described by a staff officer as "anxious by nature, a tremendous worker leaving nothing undone," this trait of Buford's personality perfectly fit his role, and no less conspicuously than on the coming day. Anxious people tend to deal with their anxieties in one consistent way; they must tediously prepare for every single possible contingency, in order to achieve a comfortable confidence in their situation. How well the old dragoon dealt with his anxiety this day would go a long way toward determining the level of his success on the morrow.

As the darkness fell, Buford deployed his men according to his measured tactics along a seven-mile front west and north of the town. The furthest vedettes posted themselves at intervals of thirty feet, using anything - fences, shrubs, trees, as cover. Half of all the horses were kept bridled and saddled, ready to ride, and the men grabbed anxious sleep in shifts. At 10:30 pm, Buford penned an assessment of his situation to Pleasonton: "A.P. Hill's corps... is massed back of Cashtown... rumor says Ewell is coming over the mountains from Carlisle." He also sent a detailed report to Reynolds. Meade was apprised of Lee's position and movements. In the early morning, Buford could conceivably be attacked from three directions, by a force many times larger than his own. For the old dragoon and his troopers, all of whom had been through so much together and who looked to him for reassurance, the test of their lives was coming.

The overcast, warm summer dawn arose. Buford's early warning system kicked in as one of Gamble's vedette posts on the Chambersburg Pike, about four miles from town, sent back word that an approaching Confederate column had been sighted. A shot had been fired by the post, while Devin's vedettes north of town may have exchanged shots with some pickets of Confederate General Robert Rodes' division. At 8 am, upon receiving the news, Buford hastily climbed on Grey Eagle to make the ride from headquarters to the Lutheran Seminary area. When asked by a staff officer what was "the matter," as rifle and cannon shots began booming in the distance, Buford nodded to the west and curtly snapped, "That's the matter!" The deadly business had begun, and there was no sign or word yet from Reynolds. Also, the time for anxiety had passed; now was the time to put all the preparatory deployments into motion.

Forming skirmish and battle lines, Confederate General Henry Heth's men pushed Buford's pickets in from the west. They and Devin's posts to the north were doing a meritorious job of delaying the onslaught. With every fourth trooper holding the horses behind each ridge summit, it was some time before the Confederates determined they were facing veteran Union cavalry. It would take Heth one and a half hours to advance the mile and a half from Wisler's (Knoxlyn) Ridge to McPherson's Ridge. Buford's men were executing his plan perfectly, but time was running short. Sooner or later they would break under the pressure of superior numbers. Confederate commanders felt secure in the fact that they were pushing their enemy back over the ridges toward town, taking very few casualties. But, they were missing the point of the "game" Buford was playing with them. If he could just hold them until Reynolds' infantry could arrive...

Grudgingly and stubbornly giving way, Buford's winded troopers were pushed back to the main defensive line on McPherson Ridge by 9:30 am. There, Buford's battle line was set. But the situation was now very deadly, more so than before. Subtracting the horse-holders, Buford had barely 2,000 effectives to hold off the more than 7,000 Confederates. He could only delay them, not fight them toe-to-toe. Calef's battery was working their guns so fast and furious, the barrels were red hot. Heth positioned his guns on Herr Ridge and pounded away as his brigades formed a massive front line. Buford had given Devin a free hand to the north while he stayed close to Gamble's line, moving between the ridge and the Seminary cupola, glassing for a sign of Reynolds. While riding his line, Buford sat high upon Grey Eagle, seemingly daring the Rebels to shoot at him, while he calmly puffed his pipe. He constantly yelled encouragement to his worn-out troopers, telling them they must "hold this position until Reynolds comes up or die in the attempt!"

He sent Jerome up into the cupola to watch for Reynolds' arrival. As Buford's lines were just about to break, Jerome spotted the First Corps flag of Reynolds, flapping in the humidity of the morning, along the Emmitsburg Road. Jerome yelled down to a staff officer to alert the General. At the news, Buford spurred his horse to the Seminary, ran up the steps to the observation deck, and glassed south. Spotting the advancing blue column, Buford let out the breath he had been holding. "Now we can hold the place."

Statue of civilian John Burns, a Gettysburg resident who joined the Iron Brigade for the first day's battle and was wounded three times. Burns was over 70 years of age at the time

Buford sent out two officers to ride to Reynolds and rush him to the scene. He nearly had to retreat at this point to his next fall-back position, Cemetery Hill, but decided to hold on a little longer while the First Corps moved into line. Buford anxiously stared through the glass as Reynolds spurred ahead of his column and rode to the front. Arriving on the grounds of the Seminary, Reynolds looked up to the cupola and yelled to Buford, "What's the matter, John?" Using his characteristic phrase he yelled back, "The devil's to pay!" Moving down the steps to greet his old friend, Buford was asked by Reynolds if he could hold out until the Corps could arrive in force. "I reckon I can," was the reply. "Let's ride out and see all about it," the wing commander said as he looked at the desperate fighting ahead. Riding to the front, Buford filled in Reynolds on the situation, all the while under infantry and artillery fire. Buford expressed concern over Reynolds' exposure to the missiles. Reynolds simply laughed and moved even closer to the front.

As the commander conferred, Buford turned back, pointing toward Cemetery Hill and Ridge to the east and south, emphasizing that it was the proper position for the ultimate battle line of the army. Reynolds immediately gave a verbal message to an aide to take back to Meade, stating to the army commander that "the enemy are advancing in strong force... I will fight them inch by inch... and will hold them back as long as possible." Reynolds told the aide to run his horse to death if necessary.

Meanwhile, Buford's men were being pounded, with both men and horses going down. Colonel Gamble rode up to Reynolds and cried in his thick Irish brogue, "Hurry up, General, hurry up! They are breaking our line! They are breaking our line!" Bringing his commanders up at the double-quick, the winded infantry got into line, relieving Buford's exhausted, sweaty troopers. As the cavalry fell back between the infantry's lines, some of Gamble's men exhorted the First Corps on by yelling, "Go in and give them hell!" The cavalry moved to the Corps' flank in support.

That hot and deadly morning, Buford's two small brigades had accomplished their mission. They had held off a vastly numerically superior enemy just until the infantry could take the field. His old dragoon ploy had worked, deceiving his foe about both his numbers and his nature. Heth had come to Gettysburg expecting to brush aside green, scared, local militia, but instead had run into the veteran commander and his steadfast men. The small prey had delayed the larger hunter, just barely long enough. But it was enough.

Later in the afternoon, as the Federal infantry was pushed through the town and reformed on the ridges earlier pointed out by Buford, the old Dragoon oversaw the emplacement of his troopers in support of the new line. After Reynolds had been killed around 10:35 am, command of the field fell upon Major General Abner Doubleday. In danger of being flanked by a new Confederate advance, Doubleday sent to Major General Oliver O. Howard, just arrived and now in command, for reinforcement. Unable to spare any, Howard suggested that the courier go find Buford and seek his help. The courier, Captain Eminel P. Halstead (assistant adjutant on Doubleday's staff), found Buford and his two brigades along the Emmitsburg Road. When Halstead advised Buford of Howard's order, the irate Buford set his jaw, rose up in his stirrups, pointed west and yelled, "What in hell and damnation does he think I can do against those long lines of the enemy out there?" Advised again of Howard's order, Buford said, "Very well! I will see what I can do."

It was now about 5 pm. Buford ordered his entire command to trot out into the fields fronting Cemetery Hill, in full view of the Confederates. Colonel Gamble sent out men to remove fence rails, as if to clear the way for a mounted charge. Forming a cavalry line of battle, the exhausted troopers of both brigades stood their ground and stared at the Confederates of Brigadier General James H. Lane's brigade. Union Second Corps commander Major General Winfield S. Hancock later recalled that it was "one of the most inspiring sights" of his military career and lauded the "splendid spectacle of that gallant cavalry, as it stood there unshaken and undaunted, in the face of the advancing Confederate infantry." Lane's infantrymen delivered an ineffective fire, and then began forming "square" to meet the expected mounted assault Gamble's troopers fired at the Confederates, inflicting heavy casualties, then trotted back to their places in line. The maneuver bought the additional time necessary for the Federals to rally on the heights. That night, the veteran Dragoon would assist Hancock, Howard, and Chief Engineer Gouvernor K. Warren in making dispositions for the infantry along the ridges and hills to meet what must surely come as Lee decided to continue the engagement.

Buford's Division, less than a month before, had participated in the largest cavalry battle known to man. Now he had chosen the ground for, opened, and determined the course of, the largest infantry battle of the Civil War. When he and his command was ordered south on July 2nd by Pleasonton to give his men a much-needed rest and refit, his job still would not be over. Lee, his army bloodied and repulsed at Gettysburg, would retreat to safer haven off enemy soil. And Buford, who had chased him here, would now have to chase him again.

My thanks to J. David Petruzzi of www.bufordsboys.com for graciously allowing the use of his material for this thread.

www.bufordsboys.com
This is a "Revists" Foxhole originally posted by Sam in 2003.

"FALL IN" to the FReeper Foxhole!

It's Friday. Good Morning Everyone.

If you want to be added to our ping list, let us know.

Good morning Snippy.

Good morning Aeronaut.

Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the foxhole.

Morniong Snippy.

The Spencer Carbine (top) uses the action of a lever to load and eject cartridges; its operation is seen in the cutaway drawing (left). Cartridges are stored in a tubular magazine in the butt of the gun, where they are held in place by the breech block. Depressing the lever ejects the spent cartridge and, by lowering the breech block, allows the spring to push a fresh cartridge into the breech. Raising the lever brings the breech block into contact with the fresh cartridge, pushes it into the barrel, and closes the breech. The gun is fired by cocking the hammer and then pulling the trigger. (Right) The Spencer Carbine, hammer cocked, is ready for firing.

Morning Aeronaut.

Good morning ALL.

Morning E.G.C.

Supposed to be a nice day today and so far the weekend looks like a good one.

Morning GailA. :-)

Good morning, folks.

Today is the day for my Dad's replacement. Please keep us in your thoughts and prayers.

Also, watching out for storms today and tonight.

How's it going, Snippy?

Hey Sam.

Prayers offered for a sucessful operation. Please keep us informed.

thanks all, the potrayal of Buford in "Gettysburg" is one of my favorite parts of the TV movie.

July 1, 2005

Joy—Even In Poverty

Read:
Habakkuk 3:14-19

Though the labor of the olive may fail, and the fields yield no food; . . . yet I will rejoice in the Lord. —Habakkuk 3:17-18

Bible In One Year: 2 Kings 15-17

cover In the book 450 Stories for Life, Gust Anderson tells about visiting a church in a farming community of eastern Alberta, Canada, where there had been 8 years of drought. The farmers' economic situation looked hopeless. But in spite of their poverty, many of them continued to meet together to worship and praise God.

Anderson was especially impressed by the testimony of a farmer who stood up and quoted Habakkuk 3:17-18. With deep feeling, he said, "Though the fig tree may not blossom, nor fruit be on the vines; though the labor of the olive may fail, and the fields yield no food; though the flock may be cut off from the fold, and there be no herd in the stalls—yet I will rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation." Anderson thought, That dear saint has found the secret of real joy!

It's not wrong to find pleasure in the good things money can buy, but we should never rely on them for happiness. If our fulfillment depends on material possessions, we are crushed when we lose them. But if our joy is found in the Lord, nothing can disrupt it, not even economic distress.

Yes, those who know and trust the Lord can rejoice—even in poverty! —Richard De Haan

Pleasures of earth, so seemingly sweet,
Fail at the last my longings to meet:
Only in Thee my bliss is complete;
Only, blest Lord, in Thee. —Anon.

Happiness depends on happenings; joy depends on Jesus!

FOR FURTHER STUDY
How Does God Keep His Promises?

I LOVE that speech by Sam Elliot as Buford in Gettysburg. It causes a lump in my throat every time I hear it to think how he immediately grasped the strategic situation.

By the way, Buford was one of a few career soldiers who really made a difference, and he perfectly applied the instructions in THE field manual by Denis Mahan, An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Out-post, and the Detachment Service of Troops

Buford followed Mahan's teachings to the letter. Mahan's book is on Amazon:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/B00086TO30/qid=1120221680/sr=8-2/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i2_xgl14/102-1050845-9616107?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

"thanks all, the portrayal of Buford in "Gettysburg" is one of my favorite parts in the TV movie."

I'd have to say it is one of mine too.

Joy—Even In Poverty

Read:Habakkuk 3:14-19

Though the labor of the olive may fail, and the fields yield no food; . . . yet I will rejoice in the Lord. —Habakkuk 3:17-18

Bible In One Year: 2 Kings 15-17

Read:
Habakkuk 3:14-19