Posted on 05/22/2005 10:36:38 PM PDT by SAMWolf
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are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans. In the FReeper Foxhole, Veterans or their family members should feel free to address their specific circumstances or whatever issues concern them in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, brotherhood and support. The FReeper Foxhole hopes to share with it's readers an open forum where we can learn about and discuss military history, military news and other topics of concern or interest to our readers be they Veteran's, Current Duty or anyone interested in what we have to offer. If the Foxhole makes someone appreciate, even a little, what others have sacrificed for us, then it has accomplished one of it's missions. We hope the Foxhole in some small way helps us to remember and honor those who came before us.
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Evolution of Allied Air Doctrine In October 1943, the U.S. Eighth Air Force's losses became critical, forcing a reappraisal of the American daylight bombing strategy. Boeing B-17 "Flying Fortress Sixteen bomber groups from the 1st and 3rd Air divisions would participate in the strike. In all, 291 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses took off from bases in England and headed east toward the German border. As the bombers formed up over the Channel, short-range British Supermarine Spitfire fighters climbed to escort the heavies to the Continent. There, Republic P-47 Thunderbolts took over, escorting the flying armada to the German border. But insufficient range prevented the Thunderbolts from keeping the bombers company all the way to the target. Turning back somewhere around Aachen, just inside the German border, the P-47s left the unescorted bombers to a catastrophic fate. Out of 291 bombers dispatched, 257 actually entered German airspace. Sixty were shot down, just over 20 percent of the total number. Two hundred twenty-nine B-17s reached Schweinfurt and dropped their bombs. Only 197 returned to England. Of those, five planes were abandoned or crashed on landing, while 17 others landed so damaged that they had to be written off. Altogether, 82 of the 291 original bombers that left England were lost, more than 28 percent of the entire force assigned to the raid. Moreover, the Schweinfurt raid was the climax of a week of strikes against German industrial targets. Between October 8 and 14, 1943, the Eighth Air Force flew 1,342 heavy bomber sorties, losing a total of 152 bombers (11.3 percent), with another 6 percent receiving heavy damage. During the entire month of October, the Eighth lost a total of 214 heavy bombers, almost 10 percent of the total number dispatched. Lost and damaged planes constituted more than half the sorties flown during the month. At that rate of attrition, an entirely new bomber force would be required every three months in order to maintain the Allied bomber offensive. After the prohibitive losses sustained in October 1943, the Eighth Air Force suspended deep bomber strikes into German territory. Two premises of daylight strategic bombing--that bombers would be able to get through enemy defenses and back without escorts, and that destroying the enemy's industrial base would cripple its war effort--appeared to be greatly mistaken. American air leaders, recognizing the inability of unescorted heavy bombers to get through and bomb German industry without excessive losses, questioned the very foundation of American air strategy. But why did American air leaders initially believe their heavy bombers would always get through, and what were the consequences of the American strategic doctrine when applied in the skies over the Third Reich? How has American air doctrine changed as a result? The airplane, initially used during World War I in a reconnaissance role to locate enemy troop and artillery movements and concentrations, evolved throughout the conflict to perform all of the roles identified with modern air power--including strategic bombing. Although it was an immature weapons system during the Great War, the airplane's enormous potential fueled the imaginations of interwar air theorists, foremost among them Italy's Giulio Douhet. Assuming that population and industrial centers would be vulnerable to fleets of heavy bombers, Douhet advocated attacking an enemy nation's urban areas and factories with explosives, incendiaries and poisonous gas--with no distinction being made between combatant and noncombatant. Douhet believed that the impact of strategic bombing would simultaneously demoralize an enemy's civilian population and destroy its capacity to wage war. During the 1920s, Douhet's theories and those of air power advocate Brig. Gen. William "Billy" Mitchell gained champions within the U.S. Army Air Corps, and strategic bombing doctrine began to be reflected in its field manuals. Chief among this new generation of bomber advocates in the late 1930s was the leader of the Army Air Corps, General Henry "Hap" Arnold. As the commander in chief of the American air service, General Arnold surrounded himself with "bomber men," disciples of daylight strategic precision bombing. According to Arnold and his top commanders, the primary purpose of air power in Europe during the coming conflicts would be strategic bombing. Strategic bombing was the only major contribution the airmen could make to the war effort that was largely independent of the Army and Navy. If air power was to show its capabilities as an equal partner to ground and naval forces, it would be done through the successes of strategic bombing. Because of the prohibitive cost of creating a bomber fleet on a "Douhetian" scale in the interwar fiscal environment, the U.S. Army Air Corps Tactical School advocated only the precision bombing of an enemy nation's vital centers--its factories, power sources, transportation and raw materials. Advocates believed this goal could be achieved through the use of the new, fast, long-range "precision bombers" coming into service late in the 1930s, the B-17 Flying Fortress and the Consolidated B-24 Liberator. Consoilidated B-24 "Liberator" Powered by four turbocharged engines, the B-17s and B-24s were, at the time of their test flights in the mid-1930s, faster than most of the world's operational interceptors. "If the superior speed of the bomber was such to make interception improbable, or at worst, infrequent, then no provision need be made for escort fighters to accompany the bombers on their long range missions," said one modern analyst of the 1930s air doctrine. Moreover, the new heavy bombers flew above 20,000 feet, too high to be reached by most ground-based anti-aircraft. The Air Corps bomber men believed the American heavy bombers would fly high and fast into enemy territory, eluding interceptors and anti-aircraft defenses. Once above the target area, these "self-defending" American bombers would utilize the world's most sophisticated bombsight--the Norden--which allowed for such factors as speed, course, wind direction and distance to target. Under favorable conditions, trained aircrews were able to place their payloads within a few hundred feet of their target from over 15,000 feet, prompting an Army Air Forces spokesman to boast that the aircrews could "drop a bomb into a pickle barrel at 25,000 feet." But for the Norden bombsight to work well, American pilots had to deliver their payloads during daylight hours, in good weather and in level flight.
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With fighters that could fly beyond the Rhine, protect bomber formations and sweep ahead to engage the Luftwaffe interceptors, the Eighth Air Force formations reversed the loss ratio with the German fighter force. American bomber losses fell below 10 percent of each raiding force, while German pilot losses mounted. In February 1944 alone, the Luftwaffe lost 33 percent of its single-engine fighters and 20 percent of its fighter pilots, including several fliers who were credited with more than 100 victories. In the first four months of 1944 it had lost 1,684 fighter pilots. Their replacements would be unskilled youths thrust into combat against experienced American pilots. Compounding Germany's troubles, the Americans had begun to introduce new fighters into the European theater in the fall of 1943, which continued throughout the war. They included Thunderbolts, Mustangs and Lightnings, which were joined by British Spitfires and Hawker Tempests. During the first six months of 1944, the air battle over occupied Europe continued with unabated ferocity. A primary goal of Operation Pointblank was fulfilled when, on June 6, 1944, the Luftwaffe failed to menace Operation Overlord, the Normandy invasion, and the Allies enjoyed air superiority over the battlefield for the rest of the war. The success of Operation Overlord was in no small part due to the air war waged over the Continent between January and June 1944. Meanwhile, the remnants of the Luftwaffe battled the RAF and USAAF as the round-the-clock pounding of German cities and industry continued. Allied heavy bombers over the Reich now served as both bait and hunter, compelling the Luftwaffe to climb above 20,000 feet to meet the oncoming bombers and their deadly escorts in order to defend important industrial and population centers. The German planes then became targets for the well-trained Mustang and Thunderbolt pilots. By the time Operation Pointblank ended, it had achieved its primary objective, securing air superiority over the cities, factories and battlefields of Western Europe in preparation for Overlord. Operation Pointblank had succeeded, but not in the way Allied planners had initially intended or expected. Round-the-clock bombing had not smashed the Luftwaffe into oblivion, nor had it destroyed German aircraft production. Instead, by simultaneously striking at aircraft factories and bombing industrial and military targets deep inside Germany, the combined bomber offensive forced the Luftwaffe to send its fighters to meet the ever-increasing flow of bombers over the Reich. Once in the air, they were assailed by Allied fighter escorts. In this war of attrition, the Luftwaffe lost its greatest asset--its experienced pilots. Without skilled pilots to meet the Allied threat, the rise in German aircraft production meant nothing. The American doctrine of strategic daylight precision bombing failed because it rested on three premises that would be tested in World War II. The first premise centered on a belief of Arnold and his bomber disciples that their heavy bombers would "always get through" without escort and destroy or neutralize enemy industry. The B-17s and B-24s were not able to adequately fight their way in and establish local command of the air. Instead, the Luftwaffe exploited the weaknesses of the flying armadas, inflicting heavy losses on the bombers--losses so extreme that, after Black Week, strategic bombing was suspended until the emergence of a new air strategy. Second, supporters of strategic daylight precision bombing believed erroneously that the civilian population was the weak link in a nation's defense. It was thought that bringing the horrors of war directly to the factories, power plants and railroads in the cities would cause the citizens of an enemy nation to compel their government to sue for peace. In practice, neither the morale nor the will of the bombed populations approached collapse. The third premise was the belief that strategic bombing could eliminate an enemy's ability to wage war by destroying its industrial base. German industrial output was not stopped by Allied strategic bombing. Legions of laborers ensured adequate manpower, while the largest machine-tool industry in the world compensated for the damage done to machinery. Germany had sufficient industrial capacity to absorb the first years of Allied strategic bombing. Dispersal of industry, ongoing repair and expansion compensated for additional bombing losses. In spite of the Allied strategic bombing campaign, the German economy continued to expand until late in the war. As the American strategic campaign entered its second year, it faced an experienced and determined foe in the Luftwaffe. By 1943, when American bombers began to invade the airspace of the Reich proper, the Luftwaffe fighter command began to make a major effort against them. American losses from both England and North Africa mounted inexorably from August to October, culminating in the Eighth Air Force's so-called Black Week. The week as a whole cost the Eighth Air Force a quarter of its airmen in England. After Black Week, the Americans effectively suspended daylight raids over the Reich until February 1944. With U.S. bombers experiencing greater and greater attrition rates, American air commanders desperately sought a solution to their failing strategic-bombing campaign. A solution came with a change of emphasis in air doctrine. The changes produced a revision of Operation Pointblank and a doctrine that emphasized destroying the Luftwaffe in a war of attrition in order to gain air superiority for the coming D-Day invasion in the summer of 1944. The revised Operation Pointblank gave the Allies air superiority for D-Day and virtual command of the air for the push toward Berlin. Operation Pointblank was a success. Local air superiority belonged to the Allies for the opening of the second front. The war for air superiority over Western Europe had been won, but not by "self-defending" heavy bombers. It had been won by a combination of fighters actively hunting down and killing Germany's air force and Allied bombers damaging the industrial and logistical infrastructure that supported the German military machine's ability to make war. In this two-pronged strategy, both bombers and fighters had a crucial, symbiotic role. American air commanders, like their ground counterparts before them, finally realized the truth of German strategist Carl von Clausewitz's statement--that victory in war comes, first and foremost, through the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. Operation Pointblank proved that American air power's first mission should always be the establishment of air superiority through the destruction of the enemy's air force. |
Great story
Something not so great.
Stout says no to ROTC discrimination (Wi.)
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1408497/posts
Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Freeper Foxhole.
Good morning
When Queen Victoria was a child, she didn't realize that she was in line for the throne of England. Her instructors, trying to prepare her for the future, were frustrated because they couldn't motivate her. She just didn't take her studies seriously. Finally, her teachers decided to tell her that one day she would become the queen of England. Upon hearing this, Victoria quietly said, "Then I will be good." The realization that she had inherited this high calling gave her a sense of responsibility that profoundly affected her conduct from that day forward. Our Scripture reading for today tells how Saul had been chosen from among the people of Israel as their anointed king (1 Samuel 15:17). Almighty God had honored him greatly in giving him this position as leader of His special nation. But Saul didn't think about the kind of attitude that should accompany his high calling. If he had, he would not have pounced on the loot of battle as if he were the leader of an outlaw band (v.19). As believers, we are children of God and joint-heirs with Christ (Romans 8:16-17). We have a noble calling. Let's always keep in mind who we are. This will help us to say, as young Victoria said, "I will be good." -Herb Vander Lugt
There's nothing hid from You; So help me live the kind of life That's honest, good, and true. -D. De Haan A child of the King will want to display the manners of the court.
How Do You Live The Christian Life? |
Off to Jury Duty Bump for an interesting Foxhole.
See the book "Winged Victroy' by Geoffry Pearrault(sp) for a fascinating histroy of the AAF from WW-I to WW-II
Regards
alfa6 ;>}
Would have been nasty, but nothing compared to N, the Anglo-American anthrax bombing project.
If you divide the total tonnage of Eighth Air Force bombs dropped on Germany by the number of American human casualties you will get a shocking number. Looks to me like four tons per American death. Much worse in the early days. Tons of bombs dropped per bomber lost is maybe thirty tons including milk runs. Need to find higher quality numbers. A rough game though, for sure.
On this Day In History
Birthdates which occurred on May 23:
1598 Claude Mellan French engraver/cartoonist/painter, baptized
1707 Carolus Linnæus Swedish botanist/"Father of Taxonomy"
1718 William Hunter obstetrician/medal writer
1734 Friedrich Anton Mesmer Austria, physician/hypnotist (Mesmerism)
1753 Giovanni Battista Viotti violonist/composer
1810 Margaret Fuller writer/critic 1st pro book review column (New York Tribune)
1813 Mason Brayman Brevet Major General (Union volunteers), died in 1895
1820 James Buchanan Eads US, engineer/inventor (Eads Bridge-St Louis)
1824 Ambrose Everett Burnside Major General (Union volunteers)
1828 Edward Hitchcock America's 1st professor of physical ed (Amherst College)
1837 James Sanks Brisbin Brevet Major General (Union volunteers), died in 1892
1844 'Abdu'l-Bahá early Bahá'í leader
1848 Helmuth J L von Moltke German general/chief of staff (WWI)
1848 Otto Lilienthal pioneer aviator
1849 Károly earl Khuen-Héderváry Premier of Hungary (1910-12)
1866 Gustav Aschaffenburg German psychiatrist/criminalologist
1883 Douglas Fairbanks Denver CO, actor (Zorro/3 Musketeers/Robin Hood)
1890 Herbert Marshall London, actor (Murder, Razor's Edge, Little Foxes)
1890 Virginia Eames Fort Davis TX, entertainer
1903 Walter Reisch US, screenwriter (Ninotchka, Gaslight, Titanic)
1908 Christian GK Baëta Togolese chairman (International Mission Council)
1908 John Bardeen US, physicist (transistor, Nobel 1956, 1972)
1910 Artie Shaw [Arthur Jacob Arshawsky] New York NY, bandleader (Come'on my House)
1910 Franz Jozef Kline US expressionist painter
1910 Scatman Crothers [Benjamin], Terre Haute IN, actor (Zapped, Shining)
1915 Clyde Wiegand physicist
1920 Helen O'Connell Lima OH, singer (Green Eyes, Amapola)
1921 Humphrey Lyttelton jazz musician/actor (It's Great to Be Young)
1921 James [Benjamin] Blish US/UK, sci-fi author (Hugo, Star Trek Reader)
1928 Rosemary Clooney Maysville KY, singer
1931 Barbara Barrie Chicago IL, actress (Breaking Away, Barney Miller)
1933 Bruce A Peterson US test pilot (M2, HL-10)
1934 Robert Moog inventor (the Moog Synthesizer)
1945 Lauren Chapin actress (Kathy-Father Knows Best)
1950 Linda Thompson Memphis TN, actress (Hee Haw)
1951 Anatoliy Karpov USSR, world chess champion (1975-85)
1954 "Marvelous" Marvin Hagler New Jersey, middleweight boxing champion (1982-83)
1958 Thomas Reiter Germany, cosmonaut (Soyuz TM-22)
1961 Drew Carey Cleveland OH, actor/comedian (Drew-Drew Carey Show)
1973 Verna Vasquez Miss Universe-best swimsuit (Curacao, 1997)
1974 Jewel [Kilcher] St George UT, folk/rock vocalist (Pieces of You)
For the reading list:"Clash of Wings"[A general history of the air war], by Walter J. Boyne; "To Command the Sky" [Air Ops over Germany 1942-1944], by McFarland and Newton]; "Double Strike" [Regensburg/Schweinfurt Raid] by Edward Jablonski
uh-oh, Can't see the 'gram.
ahha! there it is! Good one, reminds me of bittygirl and elfboy.. er, superboy.
Morning, PE. Swell Flag-0-gram today, love those kids.
Morning Snippy.
A week of nice weather coming :-)
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