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Posted on 07/22/2004 12:00:11 AM PDT by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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July through August 1779; Penobscot Bay, Maine In June 1779, Royal Navy transports escorted by three sloops of war landed 700-800 soldiers and marines at Majabagaduce, a peninsula near the mouth of the Penobscot River. From this location, which was then in Massachusetts territory, the British intended to protect their possessions in eastern Canada from American incursions, raid the colonists' coastal shipping, and launch forays against New England cities and towns farther south. In addition, British commanders hoped to establish a colony of American loyalists.  Map of Penobscot Bay showing location of Fort George and the initial position of three supporting Royal Navy frigates. Source: Allen, A Naval History of the American Revolution. Upon learning of the British incursion, the Massachusetts General Court, then in session in Boston, authorized an expedition to destroy the Penobscot base. The General Court also petitioned the Continental Congress for assistance from three Continental Navy warships anchored in Boston harbor. Congress agreed, and Commodore Dudley Saltonstall, commander of the squadron, was picked to lead the naval portion of the expedition. Armed vessels from the Massachusetts and New Hampshire state navies joined Saltonstall's force, as did 12 privateers cajoled into state service for the expedition. Overall, the amphibious task force boasted 19 armed ships mounting 344 guns and 24 transports. The latter vessels carried a landing force of approximately 1,200 men under Brigadier General Solomon Lovell. The bulk of these troops were Massachusetts militia, joined by 300 Continental Marines. Ultimately, the Penobscot expedition turned into the largest American naval expedition of the Revolutionary War. Saltonstall's orders directed him to completely eliminate the British presence in the Penobscot. To do so, his superiors emphasized, he would have to "preserve the greatest harmony with the commander of the land forces, that the navy and army may cooperate and assist each other." It was guidance that the commodore would discount, to the detriment of the entire mission.  After delays in loading the transports - caused in part by reluctance among the privateer captains to partake in such an unremunerative operation - the task force sailed from Boston on 19 July. It first proceeded to the area of modern Boothbay to pick up reinforcements that never materialized. Underway once again, the American warships entered Penobscot Bay on 25 July. By this time, British naval commanders had good intelligence of the American force's composition and destination, and were preparing to find and destroy it. When the Saltonstall's expedition first arrived in Penobscot Bay, British forces had only partially completed a dirt fortification, named Fort George, on the heights of the Majabagaduce peninsula. However, the three Royal Navy sloops, each mounting 18 guns, remained anchored in the bay nearby. A small party of British troops also had established a minor fortification on Nautilus Island just to the south of Majabagaduce peninsula. Hence, British gunners on land and on board the warships were able to engage in a desultory two-hour duel with the American expeditionary task force as it entered the bay, which inflicted little or no damage on either side. Initially, things went well for the revolutionary forces. On the 26th, Marines and militiamen, under covering fire from the American warships, took Nautilus Island and captured several British cannon. Two days later, a U.S. landing force stormed ashore on the southwest end of the Majabagaduce peninsula after two privateers had shelled the heavily wooded area above the landing beach. The initial echelon landed in three divisions, with approximately 200 militiamen on the left and in the center and 200 Continental Marines on the right. The Marines faced stiff resistance from several companies of British troops atop a steep bluff overlooking their landing point. Nevertheless, they cleared the bluff in less than 20 minutes, suffering 30-35 dead and wounded in the assault. Ensconced ashore, the American troops moved their artillery to a position only 600 feet from Fort George.  At this point, the American force began to move more cautiously, taking time to first build its own fortifications. Militia and marines next launched a night attack, conceived by Saltonstall, to seize a part of the British breastworks closest to the bay where the Royal Navy frigates had taken shelter. This would, the commodore believed, cut Fort George's garrison off from communication with their naval support, allowing the Americans to finish off each force individually. The assault on the breastworks succeeded initially, but the British men-of-war eventually opened fire on the position, causing the American forces to retreat to their own fortifications. The results of the night-time action reinforced Brigadier General Lovell's reluctance to commit his mostly green troops to an attack on Fort George while they remained exposed to potentially heavy land- and sea-based cannon fire. He urged Commodore Saltonstall to attack the sloops, which his fleet outgunned, and thus remove that threat. Once this had been accomplished, the fleets guns could be used to suppress artillery fire from the fort during a subsequent American ground attack. Saltonstall, however, insisted that this course of action was too risky, continuing the pattern of ultra-cautious behavior that he had exhibited since the start of the operation. In the ensuing days, Lovell and his militia commanders - and even some of Saltonstall's subordinates - pleaded with the commodore to attack the British sloops, but to no avail. Reports that a Royal Navy force had sailed from New York to relieve the Pensobscot defenders, and that Fort George was becoming stronger by the day, still could not persuade the timid commodore. The continuing impasse poisoned interservice relations between the land and sea forces, all the way down to the unit level.  Continental Marines storm the heights at Dice Head, Castine, Maine in August 1779. Courtesy US Naval Historical Museum. Meanwhile Lovell and his men had been sending messages back to Boston on board fast ships - something the Commodore Saltonstall saw no need to do. The latter's superiors on the Navy Board of the Eastern District eventually supported Lovell's position and ordered Saltonstall to attack the British sloops and complete the operation before the Royal Navy relief force could arrive in his area. Reluctantly, Saltonstall made plans to take some sort of action on 13 August. But by then it was too late. On the 13th, two American warships acting as pickets spotted a task force under the command of Sir George Collier approaching the bay. Collier's force consisted of six warships, including a 64-gun ship of the line and four frigates. Saltonstall's warships still outnumbered the British and carried more guns, but the armament on board the Royal Navy ships outranged that of the Americans and their gun crews were far superior to their American counterparts. Nevertheless, Saltonstall still had the opportunity to engage the British, damage some of their ships, and perhaps allow part of his own force to escape. At first, that appeared to be what he might try to do, as the American forces formed a defensive crescent across the bay. However, as the British moved closer, Saltonstall and his captains concluded that they could not overcome the enemy force. The entire American fleet turned tail and fled up the Penobscot River. Most crews ran their ships aground and set them afire.  One part of Tory doctor John Calef's two part map of the retreat. Castine is in the lower left hand corner and the map is oriented with north pointing to the right. The American fleet's difficulty getting up river is clearly depicted. From the Journal of Dr. John Calef, in Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution, 1779 Reprint (New York:The New York Times and Arno press, 1971). Lovell's men fared little better. At word of Collier's approach, they evacuated their positions and reembarked their transports. These vessels ultimately joined their warship counterparts on the banks of the Penobscot. What was left of the American expedition - soldiers and sailors - had to travel overland through the dense wilderness to make their way back to Boston. In all, the Americans lost 43 ships and approximately 500 men. Massachusetts, which incurred a heavy debt outfitting the expedition, also suffered a major financial blow. The committee of inquiry looking into the Penobscot fiasco placed most of the blame on the "want of proper spirit and energy on the part of the commodore," and Saltonstall was subsequently discharged from the naval service. Fundamentally, the expedition's failure highlighted problems with ambiguous command arrangements during amphibious operations. It also underscored the difficulty of mounting a large, complex expeditionary operation with a cobbled-together, untrained, and mostly nonprofessional force. In addition, the palpable mistrust and lack of communications between the naval and ground commanders - and their respective subordinates - demonstrated the importance of building a sufficient level of confidence and mutual understanding between land and sea warriors before an amphibious operation commenced.
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Howdy Snippy.
Maine: home to Olympia Snow and Susan Collins: motto: "Proud to be consistently wrong."
Dudley Saltonstall was placed in the stocks with a pair of bloomers on his head.
Subsequent winners of the Sit'n'stall Award include George McClellan.
May 10, 1779
Benedict Arnold begins his treason
Embittered because the Continental Congress was slow in recognizing his achievements between 1775-1777 and charged with abusing his authority while in command of Philadelphia, Arnold opens negotiations with Sir Henry Clinton, the British commander in New York.
May 23, 1779
Benedict Arnold provides the British with information
Arnold provides Clinton with intelligence so that he can formulate his plans against Washington’s Continental Army. This also provides Clinton with evidence of Arnold’s sincerity
Benedict Arnold spied on America for Clinton--who was Sandy Berger spying for?
Suffice it to say that on the 26th of June the Yankee marines made a successful landing, capturing some cannon and ammunition, mounted a battery, and caused a precipitate retreat of the enemy, while the naval forces under Commodore Saltonstall exhibited a remarkable indisposition to assume the offensive and supplement the work of the soldiers on land. The commodore, indeed, seemed deliberately bent on keeping the fleet as far as possible out of danger,--- a course which filled both the land forces and Saltonstall’s own men with supreme disgust.
A council of war was held on board the brig Hazard August 7, at which the question was discussed as to whether the siege should be continued. It was voted to continue, Revere being one of eight and Commodore Saltonstall another who voted in the negative. Revere decided to file a record of his reasons for this vote, and he was allowed to do so in connection with the official report made of the proceedings. He offered this defence of his course:
“1. Gen. Lovell says that he is not able to reduce the Enemy with what Troops and Stores he has got.
“2. That under present circumstances it is best to take post to the westward to hinder the Enemy going any further.
“3. That six Captains of ships give as their opinion that they cannot keep their men but a few days longer.
Four days later another council of war was held, at which, as a result of that day’s experience, it was unanimously voted that with the force then on hand it would be impossible to hold a post in the rear of the enemy’s fort, and, at the same time, the lines as then drawn up.
Three reasons were given for this decision: that “our Force is not sufficient to take Possession of the ground; our Numbers are not able to do Duty after taken for one week; the great want of Discipline, and Subordination.” “Many of the Officers,” it was said, “ being so exceedingly slack and ignorant of their Duty,--- the Soldiers averse to service --- And the wood in which we are Incamped so very thick, that on an alarm on any special occasion, nearly one-fourth part of the Army are Skulked out of the way, and concealed.: Truly a spectacle of disgraceful incompetence and temerity if not downright cowardice!
But fortunately for the reputation of Yankee valor and self-respect the dark picture has its bright spots. Not all of the subordinate officers were dead to shame; and thirty-one of Saltonstall’s staff drew up a round-robin, in which, after commenting on the importance of the expedition and their own desire to render all the service in their power, they said: “ We think Delays in the present case are extremely dangerous: as our Enemies are daily fortifying and strengthening themselves, & are stimulated so to do being in daily Expectation of a Reinforcement. We don’t mean to advise, or censure your past conduct, But intend only to express our desire of improving the present opportunity to go Immediately into the Harbour & attack the Enemy’s ships.”
But Saltonstall was not moved. He effected to concede the desirability of an immediate attack, but he found obstacles which he had not the courage to confront and overcome, and so the sea attack was never made. But it was at length decided, as the result of another council of war on board the Warren, participated in by land and naval officers, Revere being of the number, that a body of troops should be landed on the peninsula and, if possible, the heights scaled, and a permanent foothold secured upon the bluffs.
In the early morning of the 28th this was done, and the exploit was a brilliant success. No protective works had been erected at this point by the British, but some three hundred troops had been posted on the precipice and opened a sharp fire upon the Americans as soon as the latter’s boats struck the beach.
General Lovell, in his Diary, says of it: “When I returned to the Shore it struck me with admiration to see what a Precipice we had ascended, not being able to take so scrutinous a view of it in time of Battle, it is at least where we landed three hundred feet high, and almost perpendicular, & the men were obliged to pull themselves by the twigs & trees. I don’t think such a landing has been made since Wolfe.” Lovell reported the American loss at fifty killed and twenty wounded, and three wounded, besides the loss of eight prisoners.
Following this exploit there were various engagements of no consequence on the part of the military, while Commodore Saltonstall remained practically idle and deaf to repeated urgings to storm the fort and destroy the few ships of the enemy, which he might readily have done at any time. He only offered excuse after excuse for his continued delays and inactivity.
General Lovell, exasperated beyond further endurance at Saltonstall’s pusillanimous conduct, finally determined to resort to independent means of attacking the enemy’s vessels. On the 3rd day of August he sent General Wadsworth to erect a land battery opposite the British anchorage, with which, if possible, to drive away the hostile ships.
But the distance of the battery from the target was a mile and a quarter, the fire would not carry, and the attempt had to be abandoned. “It is all the army can do,” wrote General Lovell in his journal.
On the 11th he again addressed a note to the commodore, saying: “I mean not to determine on your mode of attack, but it appears to me so very impracticable, that any further delay must be infamous; and I have it this moment, by a deserter from one of their ships, that the moment you enter the harbor they will destroy them, which will effectually answer our purpose…. I feel for the horror of America, in an expedition which a nobler exertion had, long before this, crowned with success; and I have now only to repeat the absolute necessity of undertaking the destruction of the ships or quitting the place.”
These pleadings proved as unavailing as former ones. The commodore was obstinate; he was determined not to risk any damage to his vessels, and many of the captains shared in his point of view, since most of the ships were private property, and there was, moreover, but little prospect of prize-money to offset possible losses. But since Commodore Saltonstall had from the outset insisted that the army should attack the fort before the fleet should enter the harbor, General Lovell made up his mind to assume the responsibility of moving against the enemy, trusting to Saltonstall’s co-operation when the crises was forced. This was a hazardous undertaking, simultaneous action by the fleet being essential to its success.
But Lovell had no sooner brought his troops to a point where he might operate with advantage on the fort than the commodore sent word of the appearance in the harbor of strange vessels which, he had discovered, flew the British flag! Nothing more was necessary to transform his inertia and crass temerity into genuine cowardly panic. He immediately deserted the cause of the army on shore, left the troops at the mercy of the enemy’s guns in the forts, and, hoisting anchor, beat a speedy retreat in good order and without loss.
Saltonstall’s disgraceful desertion rendered it foolhardy for the army to remain longer on shore, and so, dismantling the batteries which had been erected at such sacrifice and effort, the troops boarded the transports, and, within a dozen hours from the first sounding of the alarm, the whole expedition was on its way up the river.
One more effort was made by General Lovell, even then, to induce Commodore Saltonstall to make at least a stand against the enemy, but in vain. Conternation and confusion prevailed thenceforth. A stiff breeze carried the ships of war past the transports, leaving the troops on the latter helplessly exposed to the now rapidly advancing British vessels.
It was inevitable that the Americans, unless they took hot foot, should fall bodily into the enemy’s hands. Accordingly “nothing was thought of by the crews but as speedy escape as possible to the shore, and hardly an attempt was made to save anything. Some were run on shore, some anchored, some abandoned with all sails set, and most set on fire. Officers were dispatched by General Lovell to the shore to collect and take charge of the troops; but so great was the panic, so convenient the woods and the approaching night, that but a few could be found; the greater part, thinking that nothing further was expected of them, made the best of their way, singly or in squads, towards the Kennebec, where the most of them arrived after nearly a week’s fatigue, suffering greatly from exposure and hunger, some of them tasting no food for several days.” The British commander Sir George Collier, though he appreciated the fact that the provincial forces occupied the strategical advantage and possessed superior numbers as ell, could not also fail to perceive that his enemy was panic-stricken. Made of better stuff han his Yankee opponent, he at once opened fire. The effect of his boldness was at once seen. Such vessels as the Americans did not permit him to capture they blew up or set fire to. Lieutenant-Colonel Revere, in command of the artillery and the ammunition stores on board the ordnance brig, had already gone ashore at Fort Pownal, but the deserted brig managed to get clear of the rest of the fleet and made her way for several miles up stream before being overtaken; then she was burned with all her stores. “To attempt to give a description of this terrible Day,” wrote General Lovell, “is out of my power. It would be a fit Subject for some masterly hand to describe it in its true colours, to see four Ships, Transports on fire, Men of War blowing up, Provisions of all kinds, every kind of stores on Shore (at least in small quantities) throwing about, and as much confusion as can possibly be conceived.”
Lovell made his way up the river, quieted the Indians, who were becoming restless, settled the military affairs of the province of Maine as well as circumstances would permit, and then returned to Boston, arriving there about September 20. So great was the chagrin and excitement caused by the failure of the expedition that the General Court had already ordered an investigation. On September 9 a court of inquiry was appointed: General Ward was president of the court, and on October 7 a report was made very properly attributing the disaster to a “want of proper Spirit and energy on the part of the Commodore” and to his “ not exerting himself at all at the time of the retreat in opposing the enemy’s formost ships in pursuit” The report completely exonerated Generals Lovell and Wadsworth, and commended them for the exhibition of great courage and spirit.
A warrant for a court-martial to try Commodore Saltostall was issued September 7.
FReepers Doctor Raoul and kristinn held signs outside the 911 Commission meeting. The former held the classic "If Osama Were A Piece of Ass Clinton Would've Nailed Him" while the latter held the au courant "Jail Sandy Burglar".
I have seen today the video clip of former Senator Bob Kerrey rushing over to these two chaps and demanding their names, calling them @$$holes, puffing himself up in an-inflata-thug stance--
When Doctor Raoul removed his sunglasses and leaned into the hot air with an unflinching countenance--
Whereupon The Psychopathic Killing Machine threw it in reverse and whooshed into the building, all with his two blue-suited bookends--
Quite a display of fascist street tactics thwarted by two American citizens who would not cower before another blustering doyouknowwhoiam.
Kerrey: 'So Am I, (Expletive)' (New video of freep of Sen. Bob Kerrey.)
Don't tell me that's Beano?
Have you no shame!
The French and British versions also were not identical, since each country had imposed, for its own models, nationally-sourced equipment.
So what the french model has an automatic white flag dispenser?
Yes it is. I waited for the paperback model. I have a nice quote from a letter to John Quincy in my profile.
i, being a Liberty-LOVING SOUTHRON, want everyone to be both free & prosperous.
BUT i'm not at all sure what your response is to my post. what you said, while uplifting, has little to do with the subject at hand, which is the destruction of the seats of terrorism & Poland's part in that grand crusade.
.free dixie,sw
Sorry for the late arrival . . . we just now "wrapped" for my wife's birthday celebration . . . I'm wigged out on processed sugar.
I love the graphic. If it can be saved to your server, I'd love to keep it on my profile page when I update it. Pretty Please?
can you say, "REMEMBER THE ALAMO, REMEMBER GOLIAD", children???
sure you CAN!
those 2 LOSSES ultimately assured that TEXAS would WIN, despite the loss of Travis, Bowie, Crockett & 180 other brave fighters.
free dixie,sw
free dixie,sw
free dixie,sw
On the morrow then.
It's all yours and already on the Sam and Snippy Foxhole server. ;-)
LOL! I heard it'll dispence white flares and white chaff.
Evening Phil Dragoo.
Thanks for the additional info on the Penobscot Expedition. Not one of our finer moments.
Loved the video of Kerrey. Thanks for the link, worth watching a few more times. :-)
Sometimes I just can't understand what happened to the New England and Mid Atlantic States. They were the cradle of our Revolution. How'd they turn into Socialist "paradises"?
Yet another case of indecision and timidity among "leaders" causing failure.
Good story today Sam, thanks.
Yes it was. :-)
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