The FReeper Foxhole Revisits The Start of the Korean War (6/25/1950)

Operations

During 15-24 June 1950, the North Korean High Command assembled some 90,000 men- 7 infantry divisions, 1 armored brigade, 1 separate infantry regiment, 1 motorcycle regiment, and 1 Border Constabulary brigade- supported by 150 Soviet T34 tanks near the 38th Parallel. At 0400 on 25 June the North Koreans launched a coordinated attack on South Korea that ran from coast to coast. The assault began on the Ongjin Peninsula on the western extreme of the parallel, but the North Koreans concentrated half of their forces on the Uijongbu Corridor, an ancient invasion route that led directly south to Seoul. The ROK 1st, 2d, 7th, and Capital Divisions defended the area north of Seoul, but the suddenness of the North Korean attack and the shock of enemy armor rapidly pushed the ROK Army back toward Seoul. In the early hours of 28 June the South Korean vice minister of defense ordered a premature blowing of the Han River bridges, located on the southern edges of Seoul, to slow the North Korean advance. This was catastrophic for the ROK Army. Much of the Army was still north of the river and had to abandon transport, supplies, and heavy weapons and cross the Han River in disorganized groups. The ROK Army numbering 95,000 on 25 June could account for only 22,000 men at the end of June.

Two American soldiers with a North Korean prisoner of war, 5 August 1950 (National Archives)

The UN Security Council met on 25 June and passed a resolution that called on North Korea to cease hostilities and withdraw to the 38th Parallel. President Truman authorized ships and airplanes to protect the evacuation of American dependents in Korea and also use of American air and naval forces to support the Republic of Korea below the 38th Parallel. On 27 June the UN Security Council passed another resolution that recommended UN members assist South Korea in repelling the invasion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive that authorized MacArthur to assume operational control of all American military activities in Korea. MacArthur then sent the General Headquarters Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea (ADCOM), headed by Brig. Gen. John H. Church, from Japan to South Korea to administer KMAG and assist the ROK Army. On 29 June MacArthur personally inspected the situation at the Han River and urged the immediate commitment of American ground forces. President Truman then authorized the employment of Army combat troops to ensure a port and air base at Pusan, South Korea, and more importantly, approved sending two Army divisions from Japan to Korea and the establishment of a naval blockade of North Korea.

Following the breakdown of the ROK Army at Seoul, elements of the North Korean 3d and 4th Divisions captured the South Korean capital on 28 June. The North Koreans then repaired a railroad bridge over the Han River, and by 4 July these two divisions, with T34 tank support, were poised to resume their drive south. In Tokyo on 30 June General MacArthur instructed Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Eighth U.S. Army commander, to order the 24th Infantry Division, stationed on Kyushu, to Korea at once. Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, commander of the 24th, was to send immediately to Korea by air a delaying force of about 500 men, and the rest of the division would soon follow by water. General Dean would assume command of USAFIK, reinstated as a provisional headquarters, upon his arrival. Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith, commander of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, of the 24th Division, led the delaying force, called Task Force Smith. On 5 July he established a defensive position three miles north of Osan, assisted by elements of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion. Task Force Smith took on two regiments of the North Korean 4th Division and thirty-three T34 tanks. Badly outnumbered and without armor, effective antitank weapons, or air support, the U.S. force was overrun. The next day, Colonel Smith could assemble only 250 men, half his original force.

Medics evacuate wounded of the 5th Regimental Combat Team hit near Masan, 30 August 1950. (National Archives)

On 4 July General Dean assumed command of USAFIK and established his headquarters at Taejon. The 34th Infantry, another organic regiment of Dean’s 24th Division, and the rest of the 21st Infantry arrived in Korea during the first week of July. During that week General MacArthur ordered General Walker to deploy from Japan and assume operational control of the campaign in Korea. Walker set up his headquarters for the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea at Taegu and on 13 July assumed command of USAFIK. Shortly thereafter, he also took command of ROK ground forces. Walker’s objectives were to delay the enemy advance, secure the current defensive line, and build up units and materiel for future offensive operations. On 7 July the UN Security Council passed a resolution that recommended a unified command in Korea. President Truman then appointed MacArthur commanding general of the military forces under the unified command that became the United Nations Command. MacArthur’s strategy in the early stages of the Korean War was first to stop the North Koreans and then use naval and air superiority to support an amphibious operation in their rear. Once he realized that the North Korean People’s Army was a formidable force, MacArthur estimated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that to halt and hurl back the North Koreans would require four to four-and-a-half full-strength infantry divisions, an airborne regimental combat team, and an armored group of three medium tank battalions and reinforcing artillery.

After the defeat of Task Force Smith, General Dean employed the 34th and 21st Infantries in additional delaying actions against the advance of the North Korean 3d and 4th Divisions along the corridor that ran south of Osan toward Taejon. Fighting occurred at P’yongt’aek, Ch’onan, Chonui, and Choch’iwon. Dean sought to delay the enemy’s approach to the Kum River to support the ROK forces’ left flank that was retreating through the central mountains of South Korea. By early July the ROK Army, which became badly disorganized after the fall of Seoul, had re-formed to some extent. From west to east, the ROK Army line was held by the 17th Regiment; the 2d, Capital, 6th, and 8th Divisions; and the 23d Regiment of the 3d Division. The major part of the NKPA conducted a main attack on a wide front against ROK-defended territory, which was everything east of the main Seoul-Taegu railroad and highway. Five divisions moved south over the two mountain corridors, while a sixth, the 2d Division, followed the road from Ch’ongju through Poun to Hwanggan where it entered the Seoul-Taegu highway. The North Korean 1st, 13th, and 15th Divisions moved over one mountain corridor and across the Mun’gyong plateau, while the 8th and 12th Divisions came down the eastern corridor. On the east coast along the Sea of Japan, the North Korean 5th Division and the 766th Independent Infantry Regiment marched south and met virtually no opposition. The trackless mountains of the Taebaek Range effectively separated the east coast of Korea below the 38th Parallel from the rest of the country.

In mid-July 1950 General Dean’s 24th Division continued as the primary U.S. Army fighting force in Korea. Taejon, located 100 miles south of Seoul, served as an important road and communications center. The Kum River makes a semicircle to the north around Taejon that constitutes a protective moat. Dean placed his 24th Division in a horseshoe-shaped arc in front of Taejon—the 34th Infantry on the left, the 19th Infantry on the right, and the 21st Infantry in reserve. By positioning elements of the 34th at Kongju, located about twenty miles northwest of Taejon, Dean hoped to prevent the North Koreans from an early crossing of the Kum River and an immediate drive on Taejon. Since the division had only about 4,000 men at Taejon, the 24th could not effectively delay two enemy divisions. During 14–16 July the North Korean 4th and 3d Divisions, operating west to east, penetrated the 34th and 19th Infantries’ forward defensive positions on the south side of the Kum River and inflicted substantial casualties. Dean then pulled his regiments into a tighter defensive perimeter around Taejon, and the North Koreans launched their attack on Taejon on 19 July. The men of the 24th at Taejon enjoyed one positive development. They had just received a weapon that was effective against the T34 tank, the new 3.5-inch rocket launcher. The five-foot hand-carried launcher fired a two-foot-long eight-and-a-half-pound rocket with a shaped charge designed to burn through any tank then known. U.S. Army soldiers destroyed ten enemy tanks in Taejon on 20 July, eight of them with the 3.5-inch rocket launcher.

The superior numbers and relentless assault of the North Koreans forced the men of the 24th Division to abandon Taejon on 20 July and withdraw to the south. General Dean experienced one of the most dramatic adventures of the withdrawal. Moving down the road to Kumsan, Dean and a small party encountered an enemy roadblock. Forced back, Dean’s party, with some wounded, set out on foot after dark. While trying to fetch water for the injured, Dean fell down a steep slope, was knocked unconscious, and suffered a gashed head and a broken shoulder. Separated from his men, Dean wandered alone in the mountains for thirty-six days trying to reach the American lines and was betrayed by two South Koreans to the North Koreans. He would spend the next three years as a prisoner of war. Dean was awarded the first Medal of Honor for service in the Korean War for his leadership and personal bravery with the 24th Division at Taejon. The division suffered a 30 percent casualty rate there and lost all of its organic equipment. The unit had endured many deficiencies since its arrival in Korea. Among them were new subordinate unit commanders who were unfamiliar with their men, poor communications equipment, a shortage of ammunition, outdated maps, and large numbers of young soldiers in the ranks who were inadequately trained for combat. As for the North Koreans, in five days they had executed two highly successful envelopments of American positions, one at the Kum River and the other at Taejon. Each time, they combined strong frontal attacks with movements around the left flank to establish roadblocks and obstruct the escape routes.

Captured enemy weapons (National Archives)

The 24th Division would soon share the defense of South Korea with the rebuilt ROK Army and two newly arrived U.S. Army divisions, the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. On 24 July the ROK Army reorganized itself into two corps and five divisions. The ROK I Corps controlled the 8th and Capital Divisions, while the ROK II Corps controlled the 1st and 6th Divisions. A reconstituted ROK 3d Division was placed under direct ROK Army control. The ROK II Corps headquarters was at Hamch’ang with its 1st and 6th Divisions on line from west to east, and the I Corps headquarters was at Sangju with the 8th and Capital Divisions on line from west to east. The 3d Division operated on the east coast of South Korea. Large numbers of recruits and replacements had entered the ROK Army, which had regained its prewar strength of about 95,000. The U.S. 25th Division, with its three regiments—24th, 27th, and 35th—commanded by Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, arrived during 10–15 July 1950 at Pusan. General Walker ordered the 25th to bolster ROK defenses of the central mountain corridors. The 1st Cavalry Division, with its three regiments—5th, 7th, and 8th—sailed from Japan and landed at P’ohang-dong north of Pusan during 15–22 July. The unit assumed responsibility for blocking the enemy along the main Taejon-Taegu corridor. In late July both the 25th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division withdrew steadily in the face of aggressive North Korean attacks. On 29 July General Walker, with the support of General MacArthur, issued what the press called a "stand or die" order to the Eighth Army. Walker emphasized that the retreating must stop. The Eighth Army had been trading space for time and was running out of space.

One of the major problems of the retreat was the volume of refugees moving through Eighth Army lines. Their numbers were greater during July and August 1950 than at any other time in the war. During the middle two weeks of July about 380,000 refugees crossed into ROK-held territory. The North Koreans often exploited the situation by launching attacks that began with herding groups of refugees across minefields and then following up with tanks and infantry. The enemy also infiltrated U.S. Army lines by wearing the traditional white civilian clothing and joining groups of refugees, thus enabling him to commit a variety of surprise attacks on American soldiers. The commanders of the 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions attempted unsuccessfully to control the volume of refugees and enemy infiltration by searching displaced civilians and limiting the times and routes available for their movements. In late July General Walker, with the cooperation of ROK authorities, set explicit rules for the organized removal of refugees to the rear by the ROK National Police. By the end of July the ROK government had established fifty-eight refugee camps, most of them in the Taegu-Pusan area, to care for the homeless. But even with these efforts, refugees continued to hamper the movement of U.S. and ROK troops throughout the battlefield.

Today's Educational Sources and suggestions for further reading:

The FReeper Foxhole Remembers The Start of the Korean War (6/25/1950) - June 25th, 2003

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As the Eighth Army neared a natural defensive position along the Naktong River, the North Koreans accelerated their efforts to cut off elements of that army. After the fall of Seoul in late June the North Korean 6th Division had crossed the Han River and rapidly moved south over the western coastal roadnet. Eighth Army intelligence lost track of the 6th. The only UN forces situated at the time southwest of the Taejon-Taegu-Pusan highway were a few hundred ROK 7th Division survivors along with some scattered ROK marines and local police. On 21 July General Walker learned that a North Korean unit, presumed to be the 4th Division, was operating in the southwest area. Walker ordered the 24th Division, despite its deficiencies in manpower and equipment after the loss of Taejon, to serve as a blocking force in the area from Chinju in deep south central Korea northward to Kumch’on. Two battalions of the 29th Infantry, then stationed on Okinawa, and the ROK 17th Regiment would reinforce the 24th Division.

On 23 July the North Korean 4th Division moved south from Taejon with the intent of supporting the 6th Division in an envelopment of the United Nations’ left flank and driving to Pusan. The 4th pushed as far as the Anui-Koch’ang area, about fifty miles southwest of Taegu, by the end of July. During 25–28 July the two battalions of the 29th were driven back by elements of the 6th at Hadong, located about twenty-five miles west of Chinju. On 31 July the Eighth Army finally became aware of the 6th Division’s presence after the 6th took Chinju and forced one battalion of the 29th and the 19th Infantry of the 24th Division to withdraw to the east. Eighth Army rushed the 27th Infantry of the 25th Division, which had been in reserve, to reinforce American units in the Chinju-Masan corridor. The 24th and 25th Divisions, aided by the ROK 17th Regiment, finally managed to slow the progress of the North Korean 4th and 6th Divisions at what would become the southernmost sector of the Pusan Perimeter. By 3 August U.S. and ROK units had averted the immediate threat of a North Korean drive all the way to Pusan.

On 1 August the Eighth Army issued an operational directive to all UN ground forces in Korea for their planned withdrawal east of the Naktong River. UN units would then establish main defensive positions behind what was to be called the Pusan Perimeter. The intent was to draw the line on retreating and hold off the NKPA while the U.S. Army could build up its forces and wage a counteroffensive. The Pusan Perimeter assumed by U.S. and ROK forces on 4 August involved a rectangular area about 100 miles from north to south and 50 miles from east to west. The Naktong River formed the western boundary except for the southernmost 15 miles where the Naktong turned eastward after its confluence with the Nam River. The ocean formed the eastern and southern boundaries, while the northern boundary was an irregular line that ran through the mountains from above Waegwan to Yongdok. From the southwest to the northeast the UN line was held by the U.S. 25th and 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, and then by the ROK 1st, 6th, 8th, Capital, and 3d Divisions. From south to northeast the North Korean units positioned opposite the UN units were the 83d Motorized Regiment of the 105th Armored Division and then the 6th, 4th, 3d, 2d, 15th, 1st, 13th, 8th, 12th, and 5th Divisions and the 766th Independent Infantry Regiment. The 5th Regimental Combat Team from Hawaii and the phased arrival of the 2d Infantry Division from the United States augmented U.S. Army forces. A third major reinforcement arrived in Korea on 2 August, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, about 4,700 men. UN combat forces at this point actually outnumbered the North Koreans, 92,000 to 70,000.

The North Koreans had four possible avenues of advance leading to Pusan that could result in the defeat of U.S. and ROK forces, and in August they tried them all simultaneously. These approaches went through Masan south of the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers, through the Naktong Bulge to the rail and road lines at Miryang, through Kyongju and down the east coast corridor, and through Taegu. During the first week of August General Walker decided to launch the first American counterattack of the war in the Chinju-Masan corridor. One of his purposes was to break up a suspected massing of enemy troops near the Taegu area by forcing the diversion of some North Korean units southward. On 6 August the Eighth Army issued the operational directive for the attack by Task Force Kean, named for the 25th Division commander. Task Force Kean consisted of the 25th Division, less the 27th Infantry and a field artillery battalion, with the 5th RCT and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade attached. The Army plan of attack required the force to move west from positions then held near Masan, seize the Chinju Pass, and secure the line as far as the Nam River. Task Force Kean launched its strike on 7 August but ran head-on into one being delivered simultaneously by the North Korean 6th Division. After a week of heavy fighting, neither Kean’s troops nor their opponents had made any appreciable progress. Even so, the Eighth Army had launched its first offensive in Korea and successfully halted an assault by an enemy division.

Infantrymen helping a wounded comrade (National Archives)

Seven air miles north of the point where the Naktong River turns east and the Nam River enters it, the Naktong curves westward opposite Yongsan in a wide semicircular loop. This loop became known to the American troops as the Naktong Bulge during the bitter fighting there in August and September. On 6 August the North Korean 4th Division crossed the Naktong at Ohang with the intent of driving to Yongsan located about ten miles to the east. The 24th Division defended that sector and the 24th commander, Maj. Gen. John H. Church, who had succeeded General Dean as division commander, placed the defense of the Naktong Bulge under Task Force Hill. Task Force Hill consisted of the 9th Infantry of the 2d Infantry Division along with the 34th and 19th Infantries and a battalion of the 21st Infantry of the 24th Division. Despite the efforts of Task Force Hill, by 11 August the 4th Division had penetrated to the vicinity of Yongsan. General Walker then added to the fray the 23d Infantry of the 2d Division, the 27th Infantry of the 25th Division, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

General Church led the coordinated attack of Army and Marine Corps troops against the North Koreans that began on 17 August. By the eighteenth the American forces had decisively defeated the 4th Division, which had lost half its original strength of about 7,000 men.

Located about twenty miles south of P’ohang-dong on the east coast, Kyongju was an important rail and highway center situated within the Taegu–P’ohang-dong–Pusan triangle inside the Pusan Perimeter. The capture of P’ohang-dong and the nearby Yonil Airfield, used by the Far East Air Force, would open a natural and essentially undefended corridor for the NKPA to move directly south through Kyongju to Pusan. General Walker had only lightly fortified the east coast corridor because the enemy threat was more immediate on the western perimeter, and he doubted that the North Koreans could mount a major successful drive through the trackless mountains. In early August the enemy almost proved Walker wrong when three North Korean divisions—the 5th, 8th, and 12th—and the 766th Independent Infantry Regiment mounted strong attacks against the ROK defenders. By 12 August the North Koreans had pressed to P’ohang-dong and also threatened Yonil Airfield. The North Korean 5th Division cut off the ROK 3d Division above P’ohang-dong, and the 3d Division had to be evacuated by sea to positions farther south. General Walker reinforced the ROK units in the area with elements of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. By 17 August ROK units and the 2d Division had managed to check the enemy drive at P’ohang-dong. A primary factor in stopping the North Koreans was logistics, as the enemy had outrun his supply line during the difficult trek southward through the mountains.

The natural corridor of the Naktong Valley from Sangju to Taegu presented another principal axis of attack for the NKPA. The sizable enemy forces assembled in an arc around Taegu in early August from south to north consisted of the 10th, 3d, 15th, 13th, and 1st Divisions and elements of the 105th Armored Division. Opposite the North Korean divisions were the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st and 6th Divisions of the ROK II Corps. The North Koreans crossed the Naktong River in several places within the arc around Taegu during the second week of August. When several enemy artillery shells landed in Taegu on 18 August, President Rhee ordered movement of the Korean provincial government, then in Taegu, to Pusan. The North Korean 1st and 13th Divisions posed the primary threat as they pressed toward Taegu by overland routes from the north and northwest. General Walker moved up the 23d and 27th Infantries, both fresh from defensive action in the Naktong Bulge, to reinforce the ROK 1st Division, which confronted the North Korean 1st and 3d Divisions in its sector. Although the North Korean 1st Division pushed to within nine miles of Taegu, the combined efforts of the ROK 1st Division and the U.S. 23d and 27th Infantries frustrated enemy efforts to penetrate to Taegu.

Even though the North Korean People’s Army had seriously threatened the United States and ROK Armies within the Pusan Perimeter during August 1950, the defenders both successfully resisted the enemy attacks and continued the buildup of forces for a counteroffensive. The Far East Air Force had established air supremacy over the North Koreans early in the war and continued to influence the outcome of battles by multiple sorties in close support of ground troops, 4,635 in July and 7,397 in August. By late August there were more than 500 American medium tanks within the Pusan Perimeter. The tanks in tank battalions were equally divided between M26 Pershings and M4A3 Shermans, except for one battalion that had the newer M46 Pattons. On 1 September the United Nations Command had a strength of 180,000 in Korea: 92,000 were South Koreans and the balance were Americans and the 1,600-man British 27th Infantry Brigade. In August the North Koreans continued the plan and tactics begun at the Han River in early July with a frontal holding attack, envelopment of the flank, and infiltration to the rear. When the Eighth Army stabilized the line at the Pusan Perimeter, these tactics no longer worked and success could come only by frontal attack, penetration, and immediate exploitation. Generals MacArthur and Walker countered with classical principles of defense—interior lines of communications, superior artillery firepower, and a strong air force. By 1 September the North Koreans had assembled a 98,000-man army for a massive offensive against the Pusan Perimeter. However, they experienced substantial problems: a third of their ranks manned by forcibly conscripted and untrained South Koreans, a major shortage of small arms, and only enough rations for one or sometimes two meals a day.

Engineers probe for enemy mines ahead of a creeping tank

In early September as during August, General Walker faced dangerous situations in essentially the same places along the Pusan Perimeter: in the east at P’ohang-dong to include a potential severing of the corridor between Taegu and P’ohang-dong, north of Taegu where the enemy made disturbing gains, at the Naktong Bulge, and in the Masan area in the extreme south. Also as he had during the fighting in August, Walker continued his masterful tactics of shifting his forces from one threatened enemy penetration to another. In early September the ROK 3d, Capital, 8th, and 6th Divisions held the line farthest to the east against the North Korean 5th, 8th, 12th, and 15th Divisions. Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, newly appointed deputy commander, Eighth Army, assumed command of American units in the eastern sector and employed the 21st Infantry of the U.S. 24th Division and other supporting units to bolster the ROK divisions. On 7 September General Church replaced Coulter as American commander in the eastern sector after General Walker ordered the entire 24th to reinforce the ROK divisions. A combination of ground fighting, predominantly by the South Koreans, along with American close air support and naval gunfire from offshore inflicted serious losses on the enemy divisions. The North Korean 1st, 3d, and 13th Divisions pressed the attack north of Taegu against the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, which prompted Walker on 5 September to move the main Eighth Army headquarters from Taegu to Pusan. The 1st Cavalry Division essentially checked the thrusts of the North Koreans north of Taegu, but fighting continued there into mid-September.

At the end of August the North Korean People’s Army also planned a crushing blow against the U.S. 2d and 25th Divisions in the southern part of the Pusan Perimeter. The enemy’s 6th Division would attack through Haman, Masan, and capture Kumhae, fifteen miles west of Pusan. The 7th Division was to strike north of the Masan highway, wheel left to the Naktong River, and wait for the 6th Division on its right and the 9th on its left and then resume the attack toward Pusan. The 25th Division held the southernmost sector that ran from the confluence of the Naktong and Nam Rivers to the southern coast, while the 2d Division was positioned in the area across the Naktong River north of the 25th. The North Korean 9th Division faced the 2d Division at the Naktong Bulge and had the mission of capturing the towns of Miryang and Samnangjin, thereby cutting off the Eighth Army route of withdrawal between Taegu and Pusan. During the first week of September the 9th Division penetrated the Naktong Bulge as far east as Yongsan, but a counterattack by the 2d Division together with the U.S. 1st Provisional Marine Brigade pushed back the 9th almost to the Naktong River. The 2d Division’s 23d Infantry beat back the North Korean 2d Division six miles north of Yongsan at Changnyong. At the same time the 6th and 7th Divisions mounted strong attacks against the 25th Division. Despite enemy penetrations into the sectors of the 25th’s regiments—the 35th Infantry’s sector west of Ch’irwon and the 24th Infantry’s sector near Haman that was effectively stopped by the 27th Infantry—the 25th Division repelled the NKPA’s offensive in the south. The Naktong River line held, and the Pusan Perimeter was secure.

Analysis

Within the space of a few months in 1950, the United States had taken the big leap from attaching no strategic importance to Korea to active involvement there in a major armed conflict. Its active Army of 591,000 had been focused on Soviet intentions in western Europe and occupation duty in Europe and the Far East. The four divisions under MacArthur’s Far East Command in Japan were performing primarily occupation duties, and their actual readiness level for conventional combat was even lower than their marginal statistical ratings indicated. Each of MacArthur’s divisions was about 7,000 men short of its authorized strength of 18,900, and none of them had received any new equipment since World War II.

MacArthur had not fully supported development of the ROK Army, and in 1948 he had suggested merely expanding the ROK Constabulary. When the ROK minister of defense in 1949 requested M26 Pershing tanks from America, the KMAG argued that the Korean terrain and roads would not allow tank operations, a clearly inaccurate prediction of the Soviet T34 tank’s performance in South Korea during the war’s early stages. When USAFIK withdrew from South Korea in 1949, it did transfer to the ROK Army individual weapons and equipment sufficient for 50,000 men, but these small arms were incapable of repelling enemy armored attacks.

America failed to anticipate the North Korean invasion, and KMAG erred in concluding that the ROK Army could withstand an invasion if it happened. Nevertheless, when the attack came the United States decided to intervene on behalf of South Korea. President Truman authorized air and naval support early in the conflict and the progressive introduction of ground troops. The defeat of Task Force Smith underscored the importance of adequate prewar training along with armored and air support in combat operations. Further, MacArthur underestimated the skill and determination of the North Koreans but recognized his error when he concluded that more than four U.S. divisions were needed to defeat the enemy.

The combined efforts of the U.S. and ROK Armies led by General Walker, complemented by air and naval superiority, slowed the southward drive of the North Koreans and ended in a difficult but successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter. The fighting was intense as reflected in American casualties to mid-September 1950—4,599 battle deaths, 12,058 wounded, 401 reported captured, and 2,107 reported missing in action. The bitter weeks of retreat and death would soon change, however, with MacArthur’s "hammer against the anvil": the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter coupled with the landing at Inch’on by the 1st Marine Division and the Army’s 7th Infantry Division during the third week of September.

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You did such an excellent job last year on the anniversary I thought I'd post it again for the 54th anniversary of the start of the Korean War.

Good night Sam.

Thank you, Good night Snippy.

Good night SAM...Good Night Snippy

Foxhole bump for my DAD, a Korean War vet

Regards

alfa6 ;>}

Korea is the first war I remember, since I was born in '46. Studied it some.

The diplomatic stuff, where the USA cut Korea out of the American defense area, ensuring in those Stalin days an invasion of the south by the Soviet surrogate PRK, the superior T34-85, etc., the wonderful Inchon landing, MacArthur's masterpiece -

Mostly, those lads in Korea ran fifteen years older than me, odd to see them get so old when I remain so young - (all around laughter...)

Good morning Snippy.

Yesterday morning outside my house.

Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Foxhole.

Folks, I'm entertaining guests this weekend My brother and his family are coming back down from their visit with his mother-in-law.

The ROK Army numbering 95,000 on 25 June could account for only 22,000 men at the end of June

Holy moly!

Be steadfast . . . in the work of the Lord, knowing that your labor is not in vain. —1 Corinthians 15:58

The service that we give to Christ,
If steadfast we will be,
Is sure to reap a rich reward
That someday we will see

Failure is not defeat unless you stop trying.

Morning Alfa6. I thank your Dad for his service.

Good morning ladies. Flag-o-gram.

Morning Iris7.

Korea is a war that never really ended. We're paying for that today.

WOW! What a beautiful sunrise! Makes getting up very early worth it

Morning E.G.C. HAve fun with the family. My mom and sisters are leaving tomorrow.

Morning Samwise.

Korea was brutal. The Conmunist North Korean regime was and still is one of the most brutal on the planet.

Hi Sam. I told my bride "God sure knows how to paint scenery."