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Posted on 04/07/2004 12:00:08 AM PDT by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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| Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans.
Where the Freeper Foxhole introduces a different veteran each Wednesday. The "ordinary" Soldier, Sailor, Airman or Marine who participated in the events in our Country's history. We hope to present events as seen through their eyes. To give you a glimpse into the life of those who sacrificed for all of us - Our Veterans.
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"You ask what is our aim. I can answer in one word: Victory. Victory at all costs. Victory however long and hard the road may be. For without victory, there is no survival." --Winston Churchill  A portion of "doing the right thing" is the obligation officers have, as members of the profession of arms, to continually seek self-improvement as leaders through military schools, comprehensive unit leader development programs, staff rides and dedicated self-study. For me, the best historical insights came from the focused study of accounts of operational maneuver and tactics that contain vivid examples of the leadership required to lead soldiers successfully in combat on terrain similar to that which I would encounter as the operations officer of the 44th Engineer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division in Korea. One of the more interesting and useful of these accounts concerned the actions of the 23rd Regimental Combat Team (RCT) under the command of Col. Paul Freeman at the battle of Chipyong-ni. Col. Freeman's exploits deserve close study by all officers who may one day lead or support soldiers in combat at the organizational level. In military annals, the siege of Chipyong-ni is described as one of the most bitterly contested engagements of the Korean War. Amid the snow-covered hills encircling the small town of Chipyong-ni in the X Corps sector, Col. Paul Freeman's 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division made a decisive stand from February 13-15, 1951. In an extended period of brutal close combat, the battle-hardened 23rd RCT, consisting of the regiment's three organic infantry battalions, the well-respected french battalion, the 1st Ranger Company, a combat engineer company, heavy mortars, a battalion of 105 mm howitzers, a battery of 155 mm howitzers, a company of 14 tanks and 10 anti-aircraft Quad 50s inflicted tremendous casualties on elements of five Chinese infantry divisions. Chipyong-ni was the culminating point of the Fourth Chinese Offensive and the Chinese Communist Forces' (CCF) first operational defeat of the war. The fighting around the village of Chipyong-ni followed the United Nations withdrawal from Northern Korea after the Chinese Communist intervention at the end of 1950. Under the command of Gen. Matthew Ridgway, the Eighth Army launched a series of offensive operations starting with Operation Wolfhound on January 15, 1951 to restore the fighting spirit to the U.S. and U.N. forces. These operations ran full bore into the Fourth Chinese Offensive on February 11, 1951. The enemy attack was focused on the center of the Eighth Army front in the X Corps area of operations around Wonju. Chipyong-ni was seen as the key to the X Corps sector and Eighth Army's ability to stabilize the existing front.  2nd Infantry Division Patch Chipyong-ni is a small village located 20 kilometers due north of Yoju across the Han River. The mission of the 23rd RCT at Chipyong-ni was to dominate the road intersection at the center of the village and occupy the high ground ringing the town in order to protect the right flank of I Corps while also anchoring the left flank of the X Corps defenses around Wonju. Col. Freeman and the 23rd RCT moved into the Chipyong-ni area on February 5 after destroying the CCF's 125th Division at the battle of the Twin Tunnels a few miles to the southeast. As friendly units on his flanks were forced to withdraw by concentrated enemy attacks, Col. Freeman realized that the 23rd RCT now occupied a salient in front of the main defensive line. Col. Freeman requested permission to fall back and integrate his unit into the 2nd Infantry Division defenses around Wonju. Gen. Ridgway ordered the 23rd RCT to remain in place and fight. He was convinced that Chipyong-ni was the key to stopping the Chinese advance. Given those orders, Col. Freeman established a tight perimeter defense around the village and surrendered the surrounding hills which dominated the approaches into the town to the Chinese since his force was too small to properly outpost them all. At nightfall on February 13, 1951, the CCF attacked in strength behind a rare artillery prep with the brunt of the probing attacks coming in the north against the 23rd Infantry Regiment's 1st Battalion and in the south against 2nd Battalion. By dawn, the attacks had been repulsed and the CCF forces withdrew. During daylight on February 14, Col. Freeman checked his perimeter, adjusted positions, improved fortifications and redistributed ammunition. During the day, a shell fragment from a mortar round lightly wounded Col. Freeman in the left ankle. Lt. Gen. Almond, the X Corps commander, ordered Col. Freeman to leave the perimeter and sent Col. Chiles, his operations officer, to assume command. Col. Freeman refused the order because he felt the wound was minor and his unit was not yet out of danger.  On February 14th, the 23rd RCT received supplies via an airdrop to replenish ammunition expended during the previous night's fight. Unfortunately, the airdrop contained no heavy mortar ammunition, no illumination rounds and only loose rifle cartridges instead of clips. That same day, only three close air support (CAS) sorties were flown in support of the 23rd RCT as most planes were busy supporting the 38th RCT's desperate fight to the southeast in Wonju. That night, CCF forces conducted a deliberate attack against George Company, 2nd Battalion, positioned south of the town. Early in the morning on February 15, George Company fell back under significant pressure and the 155 mm howitzer battery behind their unit position had to be abandoned. All local counterattacks failed to regain the lost position despite illumination support from a C-47 flare ship. Col. Freeman committed elements of his regimental reserve, 1st Ranger Company along with parts of Baker Company, 1st Battalion, but was unable to restore the perimeter. Unlike previous engagements, the CCF continued their attack into the daylight hours. This decision turned out to be a significant mistake, as the 23rd RCT again had CAS priority and received over 130 sorties in support on February 15. By this point in the battle, unit ammunition stocks were running low and Col. Freeman decided to commit the last of his reserve to stabilize the perimeter near George Company's position. During the day, as fighting continued, another airdrop replenished dwindling levels of ammunition, food and water. In the afternoon, when the 23rd RCT no longer appeared in danger of being overrun, a helicopter took Col. Freeman to the mobile Army surgical hospital at Chunju. At 1700, Task Force Crombez, the armored relief column sent by the Eighth Army, built around the 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, lifted the siege at Chipyong-ni. During the battle, the 23rd RCT inflicted tremendous casualties on attacking CCF units while suffering a total of 404 casualties in return. For this action, the 23rd RCT received the Presidential Unit Citation, their second such award in a month of combat during which they were credited with destroying a total of six Chinese infantry divisions. According to the Army's leadership doctrine, effective leaders at the organizational level use a combination of skills and actions. Leader skills reflect personal knowledge while leader actions reflect personal participation. The most effective mix of skills and actions differs slightly at the direct, organizational and strategic leadership levels. Col. Freeman, as the 23rd RCT commander, made use of all of the direct leadership skills discussed in Field Manual (FM) 22-100 but drew upon additional interpersonal, conceptual, technical and tactical skills at Chipyong-ni.  Col. Freeman's interpersonal skills primarily addressed the human dimensions of soldiers in combat. Despite nearly four weeks of continuous combat prior to Chipyong-ni, all companies and sections maintained their fighting effectiveness even though the battalions were at roughly 75 percent fill in soldiers and equipment while the tank and air defense artillery companies were at 60 percent fill. He was able to motivate subordinates and encourage initiative in the face of being ordered to stay and fight while surrounded. A few days earlier, elements of the 23rd RCT had dug in, fought while surrounded and inflicted heavy casualties on the CCF's 125th Divisions at the battle of the Twin Tunnels. Col. Freeman used this success to boost the confidence of his soldiers. Supervision is another key facet of interpersonal leadership skill. Throughout the preparation of the defenses and the actual fight, Col. Freeman was able to effectively supervise his staff and subordinate commanders allowing him to properly gauge the timing of the most critical decision a commander can make in combat—when to employ his reserve. In fact, Col. Freeman never committed any portion of his reserves during the first night of fighting on February 13-14, and thus preserved his combat power until it was needed on the night of February 14-15.  Conceptual skills address the commander's ability to convey his vision and intent, his ability to filter information and the need to use a systems approach when assessing unit performance and determining causation. Having spent roughly 10 days in the Chipyong-ni area prior to the battle, Col. Freeman recognized the value of the low-lying terrain around the village and conceived of the viable perimeter defense. At first glance, relinquishing the high ground dominating the roads and railway in Chipyong-ni appears to be a critical error. Col. Freeman, though, saw that the CFF forces lacked the air superiority, heavy artillery and effective fire control communications to take advantage of the observation available from the ridgelines.
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I agree, and I'm enthused to hear that some of his Navy buddies are going to be coming out with some worthwhile questions regarding his three Purple Hearts. How can one man get three injuries worthy of Purple Hearts and never miss a day of work?! And is any man who uses those Purple Hearts to cut a year-long stint to four months really a hero at all?!
We've got seven months to get the the bottom of that mystery...MUD
Getting there. It will look like a flower garden when we're done.
Here's the beginning point.
After the "sky" has added.
The "Green Hills of Earth" have been added.
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... He has repeatedly claimed he'll create 10 million... The FReeper Foxhole Remembers Col. Freeman at The Siege at Chipyong-Ni (Feb, 1951) - Apr 7th, 2004. ...
www.freerepublic.com/focus/browse - 90k - Apr 7, 2004 - Cached - Similar pages
US Vets Commemorate Battle of Chipyong-ni
Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-Ni
The above emplacement is a 2nd Infantry Division position during the Korean War. Note the covered trenches and ammo pits, the empty charge propellant canisters and lids on the left and the stack of canisters on the right. The crates are likely containers for fuzes.
Lt Cliff Powell, 4.2 mortar, Hvy Mortar, 14th, 10/52
81mm Mortar Position, Kumsong.Korea 1952
M4 traverses icy Donner Pass to relieve Freeman and the 23rd RCT at Chipyong-ni
The 23rd RCTs M-16 fired 10,000 rounds, one for every three chicoms coming at them.
"Attention! Attention! Comrades! We have not enough bullets for each of you to get his own! Please to line up in files of three for close order charge! Thanking you!"
Vickers, 303in Mark 1 Water-Cooled Machine Gun.
M1919A4 .30 Caliber Air Cooled Machine Gun
Napalm mines and fougasse were first used in Korea in 1951. Napalm fougasse used metal tanks of 200-250 liters-filled with napalm mixtures and buried in the ground. Each tank was fitted with a white phosphorous hand grenade fitted with detonator cord or on occasion an 81 mm white phosphorous mortar bomb. A wire attached to the grenade detonator led from the tank across the ground. These tanks were set off by either pulling on the wire or by electric current sent over the wires by a detonator machine.
Here is a John Kerry for Glorious Leader poster in Pyongyang
Here is Jong Kerry with one of the foreign leaders who has endorsed his candidacy:
After Kerry is buried in a landslide in November, he will be outsourced as plant manager at the Pyongyang Heinz Bark Soup Factory.
Great job Phil, thanks for finding this plane for us.
Excellent read. What a mind.
His personal exploits as the 23rd RCT commander during the battle of Chipyong-ni are an epic of organizational leadership worthy of detailed study by all officers who seek to command battalions and brigades.
Yup.
Goodnight!
Hey! We're famous now!! ;-) LOL! on the Sherman in the Donner Pass, I bet Snippy would have prefered driving one of those over her Explorer.
We used Fougasse on our perimeter. Quite impressive show when it was detonated.
Oh sure, like you would have let me drive if we had a tank. LOL.
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