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Posted on 03/23/2004 12:00:11 AM PST by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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Historical Background  The War of Independence was, in effect, an infantry war. Operations of both Israel and the enemy were waged by infantry formations. The few tanks deployed played no decisive role. Israel at that time had 15 tanks, and the Arabs had 45. Mobile and armored forces in the War of Independence were mainly equipped with half-tracks, armored personnel carriers, and armored vehicles with light guns. Israeli forces had 280 half-tracks and 20 armored vehicles with guns. Arab forces had 620 armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers, of which 180 carried guns. The Sinai Campaign of 1956 was characterized by mobile, armored warfare. Israel deployed 200 tanks in Sinai, versus 150 tanks deployed by the Egyptians. Since the Sinai Campaign, the land war between Israel and the surrounding Arab nations has become a war of highly mobile and armored formations. A total of 2,500 tanks were deployed during the Six-Day War by Israel and the enemies. 6,200 tanks engaged in combat during the Yom-Kippur war. Since the Sinai Campaign, thousands of tanks have been destroyed in battle.  Today, the tank is central to the art of war, and is considered the primary decisive factor on the modern land battlefield. Prior to the Sinai Campaign Egypt received, within the framework of the "Czechoslovakian Arms Deal", 300 Soviet tanks and tank destroyers, including the Stalin-3 and T-34 tanks and SU-100 tank destroyers. This was considered an impressive addition to the Egyptian armored fleet, which at that time numbered some 430 western armored vehicles, of various types. Within the scope of the Middle-East arms race, Israeli weaponry was always inferior in both qualitative and quantitative aspects. We acquired Sherman tanks and AMX-13 tanks (not really tanks but rather light tank destroyers), while the Arabs obtained, with no problems, new and modern tanks from both east and west. We were forced to be satisfied with "junk": old and inoperable tanks, second world war vintage Shermans, British Centurions and American M48's (Magach). Not a single country agreed to sell new tanks to us. It is still not clear why some countries did allow us to occasionally buy new and modern means of battle, such as jet fighter planes, but persisted in their refusal to sell us new tanks.  Given the need, we were forced to learn the technologies of armor, in order to rehabilitate the obsolete metal hulks, which we had purchased through programs of rebuilding, regunning and engine replacements. The race between ourselves and the Arabs now became a direct confrontation between new Western and Soviet MBT's fielded by the Arab armies and old, rebuilt and improvised tanks fielded by Israel. In the 1960's the Arabs were about to obtain T-62 tanks from Soviet Russia. This was the most modern operational Main Battle Tank (MBT) of its time, equipped with a high-powered 115-mm cannon. It. was clear that no improvisations or rejuvenation to tanks of the 1940s and 1950s would suffice to ensure the continued security, and indeed the existence, of the State of Israel.  At that time, in 1966, Britain came forward with a dramatically historic proposal. The British needed money in order to complete the development of their new tank of the future, the Chieftain, with its 120-mm cannon. This tank was designed to be the strongest and most modern in the west. In view of their financial constraints they proposed a "package deal". According to this deal, we would buy hundreds of obsolete Centurion tanks. They, in exchange, would allow us to participate in the final stages of Chieftain development, would sell us Chieftains, and would help us build, in Israel, an assembly line for Chieftains. This was seen as an ideal solution to the unacceptable predictions regarding the middle-eastern armor balance from both quantitative and qualitative points of view. Our cooperation with the British lasted for about three years. Two prototypes of the Chieftain tank were delivered to Israel. Israel invested heavily in the improvement and final development of the Chieftain in close cooperation with British officers and engineers, who worked with us in Israel. However, Arab states intervened. They threatened Britain with sanctions, with pulling their monetary reserves out of British banks, and other actions. Demonstrations were held in Arab capitals and British embassies were attacked. In November 1969 Britain withdrew from its Chieftain deal with Israel.  The development, design and planning efforts of three years were wasted - and we were back at square one, with time lost which could not be retrieved. In view of this development, we considered the possibility of developing and manufacturing "made-in-Israel" tanks. It was clear that a weapon system of primary importance was at stake, vital to our security, but which had been refused, to Israel by all nations. No change in this attitude was foreseen. The question, which arose therefore, was not whether we should engage in development and manufacture of a homemade tank, but whether we would be capable of achieved the high levels of industrial and technological expertise required to succeed in such a project. To this was added the question of whether we would be capable of doing so at a reasonable price and without disrupting the Israeli economy.  In order to answer these questions, it was decided to conduct a study, presided by Major General Israel Tal. The study was conducted by experts of the Ministry of Defense and of the Ordnance Corps, and was designed to answer two essential questions: 1. Would Israel be capable of planning, designing and manufacturing a Main Battle Tank from the point of view of technological know-how and industrial infrastructure? 2. Is there any economic sense in such a project - does it ensure economic viability in the broad sense, to the economy of Israel? Findings of the study were positive. Israel would be capable of developing and establishing an infrastructure for the manufacture of tanks, which would be economically feasible from the point of view of the national economy. In addition, the proposed Israeli tank would compare favorably with others, would meet the specific requirements of the IDF and the specific needs of the middle-eastern theatre of war. In 1970 the decision was taken that the State of Israel would develop a tank for the IDF and for export in the future.  The original plan was for the development of a tank to be based primarily an existing systems and assemblies. But even from the first years of development the need arose, in view of know-how restrictions, technological reasons and operational requirements which developed over time, to develop an entirely new tank which would be based on both original and new assemblies. The development task was modified accordingly. The need to shorten development time gave rise to an abbreviated development process, while knowingly taking risks, which later became known as the "telescopic development" process. This method is characterized by the start of serial production, based on prototypes, before completion of all development and demonstration stages. This is prior to the finalizing of production files. In order to reduce the investments needed for the establishment and management of a tank, manufacturing industry, we decided not to form double organization, with the backup services required for such a project (procurement, inventories, legal and economic service units, etc.). It was decided that the Project Administration would utilize existing MOD/IDF infrastructures such as Equipment Center facilities, spare part inventories, procurement and manufacturing controls, MOD legal advisor staff, MOD economic advisor staff, and others.  It was further decided to utilize the industrial infrastructures existing in the IDF, the civilian and governmental military industries, and to expand the manufacturing potential of existing plant where necessary. To the extent possible inflated bureaucracies or the creation of new industries would be avoided. It was now decided that the existing IDF basic tank depot would be utilized as the tank's final assembly plant. In addition, two hundred industrial plants would be upgraded with new knowledge and capabilities, as required for the manufacture of the thousands of parts, assemblies and systems, needed for the Merkava tank. A policy of regional distribution of manufacturing facilities throughout Israel was evolved, including development regions, with maximum utilization of civilian enterprises and no monopoly for the military industries. It was decided that any technological knowledge, which was lacking would be acquired in part from abroad, and in part self-developed within the defense establishment, the industrial establishment and by Israeli research institutes.
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***I'd think it'd be interesting to fire the Main gun (remotely) just to see what happens. :-)
Your idea of *fun* and *interesting* might be considered peculiar in some circles.
Hardly surprising that among those who take their soldiering very seriously, you would find in their number those who take their Faith the same way.
-archy-/-
"Peculiar" is one of the kinder words used to describe my ideas. :-)
The Armoured Force has been well-discussed here; the origins of the Israeli Air Force are also of intrerest. In 1947-'48 with an attempt by their neighbors to drive those of the new nation into the sea and their stopgap air force just reaching the point where it needed a command structure, the Israelis wisely studied the air services of the world looking for similarities of size, mission, operating conditions, and equipment, looking for those operational controls and techniques they might adapt to their own use.
They found their prototype in Switzerland, which also offered the interesting difference that their air force managed to mostly remain outside the hostilities, Switzerland having fiercely maintained its neutrality. And their air service flew the Messerschmidt BF-109E, not too dissimilar from the reengined Czech Avia S199 BF-109 variants then operated by the Israelis.
And while they were at it, the Israelis also borrowed the structure and methods of the Swiss military reserve system, and Israel's resulting force of mostly experienced reservists who maintain their proficiency as citizen-soldiers has also served the Jewish state well. They got two for the price of one out of that deal....
YEEEEEAAAAAAAHHHHHH!!!!
Gotta wonder about how much powerplant 'oomph' it takes to get an MBT five foot or so off the ground.
And what speed it's going to do so?
I want one!
Remember it's not as heavily armoured as an American Abrams, counting on armour shape, mobility and getting off the first shot themselves to keep casualties down rather than trying to *absorb* enemy AT weapon hits, a philosophy I'm VERY much in agreement with. But with almost as much HP as an Abrams and less weight, their performance is indeed sporty, even in the older versions. How fast are they going? A bit over 40MPH, maybe 45. Downhill they'll hit 50+/80+ KPH, according to Israeli tankers I've talked with who *tried to sell me one.*
If you really want one and are willing to settle for a Merkava 2, something might be arranged....
If you really want one and are willing to settle for a Merkava 2, something might be arranged....
VBEG
Just thinking about how much fun one Merkava, 80 acres of gently rolling hills, and several T-72 chassis in interesting positions could be.
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