Always a clear-thinking man, even on a day when kinsmen were murdered and vengeful fellow Cherokees dogged his heels, Stand Watie knew that he had to maintain a straight face and stay calm if he wanted to remain alive.
The murders, which took place on the morning of June 22, 1839, pushed Watie into the leadership of a small and unpopular Cherokee faction for the rest of his life. The tribal majority blamed Watie and his faction for the removal of the Cherokees along what became known as the Trail of Tears. Watie's uncle, the prominent chief Major Ridge, Watie's cousin John Ridge and Watie's brother Elias Boudinot (also known as Buck Watie) all died that day in the new Cherokee Nation in the West. Stand Watie faced few worse days in his adventurous and violent life that saw him become a Confederate brigadier general. On the losing side twice in his life, he had intimate familiarity with dashed hopes and lost causes.
The Cherokees, linguistic kinsmen of the Iroquois, numbered about 30,000 in 1605 and lived in what is now Georgia, Tennessee and western North Carolina. Smallpox and other diseases struck often in the 1700s. By 1800, the Cherokee population was probably about 16,000. In the Georgia Compact of 1802, Georgia gave up the land that became Alabama and Mississippi with the understanding that the federal government would force the Cherokees west. The Cherokees refused, and Washington stalled. Most of the tribe decided that assimilation gave them the best hope to stay in their homeland. Cherokees began to take on white ways, seeking education, material profit and cultural interchange. Assimilation, though, didn't work as planned. Growing economic power on the part of the Cherokees enraged white Georgians, who redoubled expulsion efforts.
Among the most prominent slave-owning Cherokee aristocrats were the Watie and Ridge families. The faction of the tribe headed by the Ridges and Waties owned most of the estimated 1,600 slaves held by tribesmen. Cherokee slave owners tended to work side by side with their chattels, children were born free, and intermarriage was not forbidden. Only about 8 percent of tribal members (1 percent of full-blooded families) actually owned slaves. Because of the influence of mission schools, many Cherokees were intensely anti-slavery. Poorer than the Ridge-Watie faction, the traditionalists had neither the money nor the inclination to move West.
In 1827, the Cherokees created their first central government to better deal with the white world. At a convention the next year, John Ross was elected principal chief--a post he held until his death in 1866. Ross, born in 1796 in Tennessee, was mostly Scottish, having only one-eighth Cherokee blood. But he was Cherokee to the core and enormously popular.
Stand Watie was born in Georgia, probably in 1806; his early life is obscure. He was educated at a mission school, but less thoroughly than his brother Elias Boudinot, who was born Buck Watie but took the name of a white benefactor. Elias became a newspaper editor, and Stand held the job briefly during his brother's absence. Stand Watie married several times, losing a number of wives and children to disease. The family did not record dates and details.
Watie's rivalry with John Ross, whose bywords were unity and opposition to removal, slowly began to grow after 1832. Most of the Cherokees who had not moved West in the removal treaties of 1817 and 1819 continued to be against relocation, and Ross was their spokesman. The Ridge faction thought relocation to be in the best interests of the people. Major Ridge, a full-blooded Cherokee, and his son John Ridge felt that the educated and wealthy Cherokees could probably survive in Georgia but that the others would be led into drunkenness and then cheated and oppressed. War would be the inevitable result. Each faction thought the other was corrupt. The Ridge-Watie party allied itself with U.S. President Andrew Jackson and his supporters, and connived behind the backs of the Cherokee councilmen, who usually opposed them.
Then, in December 1835, the Ridge-Watie party committed what amounted to suicide. Major Ridge, John Ridge and the Watie brothers were the only prominent Cherokees to sign the Treaty of New Echota, in Georgia, on December 29. A free-blanket offer attracted some 300 to 500 people--probably 3 percent of the tribe--to the signing place. Only about 80 to 100 people eligible to vote were present. Ross and the legitimate council were nowhere near. The treaty was roundly denounced--even by such unlikely allies as Davy Crockett and Daniel Webster. Cherokees in the East had to leave the Southeast in return for a payment of $15 million and 800,000 acres in Indian Territory (in what would become northeastern Oklahoma and part of Kansas). The Cherokees were to be removed within two years. The Ridge-Watie faction ("treaty party") thought the terms generous--that they had gotten a good price.
Whether or not the terms were generous, the treaty was a disgrace, as it was opposed by some 90 percent of the tribe. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled the treaty invalid, but President Jackson refused to void it. The Martin van Buren administration did likewise. Ross and his "anti-treaty party" fought a losing court battle, and they were not well-prepared for removal when it began. In 1837, only about 2,000 Cherokees went West; most of the others held out, perhaps not believing they would be forced to leave their homeland.
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Rank | Location | Receipts | Donors/Avg | Freepers/Avg | Monthlies | |||
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52 | Hawaii | 20.00 |
1 |
20.00 |
44 |
0.45 |
45.00 |
3 |
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Today's classic warship, USS West Virginia (BB-48)
Colorado class battleship
displacement. 33,590 t.
length. 624'0"
beam. 97' 3 1/2"
draft. 30'6"
speed. 21.0 k.
complement. 1,407
armament. 8 16", 12 6", 8 3", 4 6-pdrs., 2 21" tt.
The USS West Virginia (Battleship No. 48) was laid down on 12 April 1920 by the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. of Newport News, Va.; reclassified to BB-48 on 17 July 1920; launched on 17 November 1921; sponsored by Miss Alice Wright Mann, daughter of Isaac T. Mann, a prominent West Virginian; and commissioned on 1 December 1923, Capt. Thomas J. Senn in command.
The most recent of the "super-dreadnoughts," West Virginia embodied the latest knowledge of naval architecture; the water-tight compartmentation of her hull and her armor protection marked an advance over the design of battleships built or on the drawing boards before the Battle of Jutland.
During the 1920s and 1930s, she served in the U.S. Fleet, taking part in "Fleet Problems" and other exercises as part of the continuing effort to develop tactics and maintain the Navy's combat readiness. With much of the rest of the Fleet, she deployed to New Zealand and Australia in 1925 in an important demonstration of the Navy's trans-Pacific strategic "reach".
West Virginia's base was moved to Pearl Harbor in 1940, and she was there on 7 December 1941, when the Japanese attacked with an overwhelming force of carrier aircraft. In that raid, the battleship was hit by two bombs and at least seven torpedoes, which blew huge holes in her port side. Skillful damage control saved her from capsizing, but she quickly sank to the harbor bottom. More than a hundred of her crew were lost.
With a patch over the damaged area of her hull, the battleship was pumped out and ultimately refloated on 17 May 1942, and docked in Drydock Number One on 9 June. During the ensuing repairs, workers located 70 bodies of West Virginia sailors who had been trapped below when the ship sank. In one compartment, a calendar was found, the last scratch-off date being 23 December. The task confronting the nucleus crew and shipyard workers was a monumental one, so great was the damage on the battleship's port side. Ultimately, however, West Virginia departed Pearl Harbor for the west coast and a complete rebuilding at the Puget Sound Navy Yard at Bremerton, Wash.
The battleship emerged from the shipyard in July 1944 completely changed in appearance, with a wider hull, and massively improved anti-aircraft gun battery. West Virginia arrived in the Pacific combat zone in October, and soon was participating in pre-invasion bombardment of Leyte, in the Philippines. On 25 October, as a force of Japanese battleships and smaller vessels attempted to make a night attack on the landing area, she was one of the ships that stopped them in the Battle of Surigao Strait, the last time in World history when battleships engaged battleships with their big guns.
Subsequently, West Virginia took part in operations to capture Mindoro, Lingayen Gulf, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, using her sixteen-inch guns to support U.S. ground forces. On 1 April 1945, while off Okinawa, she was hit by a Japanese Kamikaze plane but was able to remain in action, continuing her bombardment duties there into June. After Japan's capitulation, West Virginia supported the occupation effort until mid-September. She participated in Operation "Magic Carpet" during the last part of 1945, bringing home veterans of the Pacific war. Inactive after early 1946, she was decommissioned in January 1947. Following twelve years in the Pacific Reserve Fleet, USS West Virginia was sold for scrapping in August 1959.
West Virginia (BB-48), although heavily damaged at Pearl Harbor and missing much of the war, nevertheless earned five battle stars.
Air Power |
The Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) (formerly Hughes) AH-64A Apache is the Army's primary attack helicopter. It is a quick-reacting, airborne weapon system that can fight close and deep to destroy, disrupt, or delay enemy forces. The Apache is designed to fight and survive during the day, night, and in adverse weather throughout the world. The principal mission of the Apache is the destruction of high-value targets with the HELLFIRE missile. It is also capable of employing a 30MM M230 chain gun and Hydra 70 (2.75 inch) rockets that are lethal against a wide variety of targets. The Apache has a full range of aircraft survivability equipment and has the ability to withstand hits from rounds up to 23MM in critical areas. The AH-64 is air transportable in the C-5, C-141 and C-17.
The AH-64 Apache is a twin-engine, four bladed, multi-mission attack helicopter designed as a highly stable aerial weapons-delivery platform. It is designed to fight and survive during the day, night, and in adverse weather throughout the world. With a tandem-seated crew consisting of the pilot, located in the rear cockpit position and the co-pilot gunner (CPG), located in the front position, the Apache is self-deployable, highly survivable and delivers a lethal array of battlefield armaments. The Apache features a Target Acquisition Designation Sight (TADS) and a Pilot Night Vision Sensor (PNVS) which enables the crew to navigate and conduct precision attacks in day, night and adverse weather conditions.
The Apache program may eventually evolve to four different models in service simultaneously. The models are, the current AH-64A, an AH-64+ with product improvements applied, and an AH-64D Longbow Apache with glass cockpit display, advanced engines, wiring for Longbow systems, radar interferometer, and the Longbow missile system. Approximately 1/3 of the Longbow fleet will also be equipped with the Longbow millimeter wave fire control radar. Converting an A model to a D model costs about $10 million. The Longbow radar adds another $3.6 million to the price tag.
As part of the reduction in the planned buy of the Comanche in late 2002, the Army was directed to formulate a service life extension program for the Apache. Although DOD did not provide the Army a specific end-date for the Apache, the AH-64 Longbow could remain in service until 2030.
The Apache can carry up to 16 Hellfire laser designated missiles. With a range of over 8000 meters, the Hellfire is used primarily for the destruction of tanks, armored vehicles and other hard material targets. The Apache can also deliver 76, 2.75" folding fin aerial rockets for use against enemy personnel, light armor vehicles and other soft-skinned targets. Rounding out the Apaches deadly punch are 1,200 rounds of ammunition for its Area Weapons System (AWS), 30MM Automatic Gun.
An on-board video recorder has the capability of recording up to 72 minutes of either the pilot or CPG selected video. It is an invaluable tool for damage assessment and reconnaissance. The Apache's navigation equipment consists of a doppler navigation system, and most aircraft are equipped with a GPS receiver.
The Apache has state of the art optics that provide the capability to select from three different target acquisition sensors.
These sensors are:
Day TV. Views images during day and low light levels, black and white.
TADS FLIR. Views thermal images, real world and magnified, during day, night and adverse weather.
DVO. Views real world, full color, and magnified images during daylight and dusk conditions.
AH-64 aviators use the Integrated Helmet and Display Sighting System (IHADSS). The IHADSS helmet, at the time of its development, was lighter in weight and provided improved impact protection over the then-current SPH-4 series helmet. The IHADSS is the only helmet approved for the AH-64 and has been in use for over 20 years. A unique feature of the IHADSS helmet is that it serves as a platform for a Helmet Mounted Display (HMD). The HMD provides pilotage and fire control imagery and flight symbology. In order to view the HMD imagery, the helmet/HMD must be fitted such that the exit pupil of the HMD is properly aligned with the aviators eye each time it is donned. This makes the fit and stability of the IHADSS helmet critical considerations. Achieving a proper fit of the IHADSS helmet is complicated by its intricate system of straps and pads. A proper, customized, repeatable fit is required in order to maintain the exit pupil position and optimize the resulting full Field of View (FOV). Fitting of the IHADSS helmet typically takes several hours to complete. This fitting process must be repeated every time aviators are transferred to a new duty station, as they cannot take the IHADSS helmet with them. It is part of the AH-64 aircraft system and is unit property.
The Apache has four articulating weapons pylons, two on either side of the aircraft, on which weapons or external fuel tanks can be mounted. The aircraft has a LRF/D. This is used to designate for the Hellfire missile system as well as provide range to target information for the fire control computer's calculations of ballistic solutions.
Threat identification through the FLIR system is extremely difficult. Although the AH-64 crew can easily find the heat signature of a vehicle, it may not be able to determine friend or foe. Forward looking infrared detects the difference in the emission of heat in objects. On a hot day, the ground may reflect or emit more heat than the suspected target. In this case, the environment will be "hot" and the target will be "cool". As the air cools at night, the target may lose or emit heat at a lower rate than the surrounding environment. At some point the emission of heat from both the target and the surrounding environment may be equal. This is IR crossover and makes target acquisition/detection difficult to impossible. IR crossover occurs most often when the environment is wet. This is because the water in the air creates a buffer in the emissivity of objects. This limitation is present in all systems that use FLIR for target acquisition.
Low cloud ceilings may not allow the Hellfire seeker enough time to lock onto its target or may cause it to break lock after acquisition. At extended ranges, the pilot may have to consider the ceiling to allow time for the seeker to steer the weapon onto the target. Pilot night vision sensor cannot detect wires or other small obstacles.
Overwater operations severely degrade navigation systems not upgraded with embedded GPS. Although fully capable of operating in marginal weather, attack helicopter capabilities are seriously degraded in conditions below a 500-foot ceiling and visibility less than 3 km. Because of the Hellfire missile's trajectory, ceilings below 500 feet require the attack aircraft to get too close to the intended target to avoid missile loss. Below 3 km visibility, the attack aircraft is vulnerable to enemy ADA systems. Some obscurants can prevent the laser energy from reaching the target; they can also hide the target from the incoming munitions seeker. Dust, haze, rain, snow and other particulate matter may limit visibility and affect sensors. The Hellfire remote designating crew may offset a maximum of 60 degrees from the gun to target line and must not position their aircraft within a +30-degree safety fan from the firing aircraft.
Powered by two General Electric gas turbine engines rated at 1890 shaft horsepower each, the Apaches maximum gross weight is 17,650 pounds which allows for a cruise airspeed of 145 miles per hour and a flight endurance of over three hours. The AH-64 can be configured with an external 230-gallon fuel tank to extend its range on attack missions, or it can be configured with up to four 230-gallon fuel tanks for ferrying/self-deployment missions. The combat radius of the AH-64 is approximately 150 kilometers. With one external 230-gallon fuel tank the radius is approximately 300 kilometers. Both radii are dependent on temperature, pressure altitude, fuel burn rate, and airspeed. The addition of up to two wing tanks can further extend range; however, this configuration is currently authorized for ferry/self-deployment flights only. The Apache can attack targets up to 150 km across the FLOT. If greater depth is required, the addition of ERFS tanks can further extend the AH-64's range with a corresponding reduction in Hellfire missile carrying capacity (four fewer Hellfire missiles for each ERFS tank installed).
The Apache fully exploits the vertical dimension of the battlefield. Aggressive terrain flight techniques allow the commander to rapidly place the ATKHB at the decisive place at the optimum time. Typically, the area of operations for Apache is the entire corps or divisional sector. Attack helicopters move across the battlefield at speeds in excess of 3 kilometers per minute. Although dependent on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilian (METT-TC) considerations, typical planning airspeeds are 100-120 knots (185-222 km/hr) during daylight, and 80-100 knots (148-185 km/hr) at night. Speeds during marginal weather are reduced with respect to prevailing conditions.
The Russian-developed Mi-24 HIND is the Apache's closest couterpart. The Russians have deployed significant numbers of HINDs in Europe and have exported the HIND to many third world countries. The Russians have also developed the KA-50 HOKUM as their next generation attack helicopter. The Italian A-129 Mangusta is the nearest NATO counterpart to the Apache. The Germans and French are co-developing the PAH-2 Tiger attack helicopter, which has many of the capabilities of the Apache.
Apache production began in FY82 and the first unit was deployed in FY86. As of November 1993, 807 Apaches were delivered to the Army. The US Army ordered 821 aircraft (excluding prototypes), with the last Army Apache delivery was in December 1995. Thirty-three attack battalions are deployed and ready for combat. The Army is procuring a total of 824 Apaches to support a new force structure of 25 battalions with 24 Apaches for each unit (16 Active; 2 Reserve; 7 National Guard) under the Aviation Restructure Initiative. Army National Guard units in North and South Carolina, Florida, Texas, Arizona, Utah and Idaho also fly Apache helicopters. The Army has fielded combat-ready AH-64A units in the United States, West Germany and in Korea, where they play a major role in achieving the US Army's security missions.
The Army announced 05 November 1999 that all its 660 AH-64A and 83 AH-64D models must be inspected before their next flight. The hanger bearing assemblies fore and aft house the drive train, which passes turbine engine power to the tail rotor. A failure in the flange area will result in loss of tail rotor thrust and such a failure could be catastrophic. Army investigators had identified the bearing assembly problem while looking into a January 1999 accident at Fort Rucker, Ala., that destroyed an Apache and injured the two- man crew. Army officials said stress corrosion fractures resulting from a hardness heat-treat process used during manufacture may cause the bearing assemblies to fail. Hanger bearing assemblies produced after the Army changed the manufacturing process in 1993 do not have the potential for such fractures. Army officials determined that at least 400 of 743 AH- 64 Apache attack helicopters needed the new parts.
In December 2000 the US Army grounded its entire AH-64 Apache helicopter fleet as a precautionary measure, following the discovery of a faulty tail rotor swashplate assembly. Failure of a tailrotor swashplate assembly, which produces yaw control, could result in the loss of an aircraft and crew injuries. The Army ordered an inspection of all 742 AH-64A and D aircraft to locate specific swashplate assemblies identified as being potentially faulty, which will be replaced. This was the second time in just over a year that the Apache fleet had been grounded. In November 1999 crash investigators identified suspect rotor bearings and transmission units, and ordered the aircraft out of the skies until the problems were fixed.
In early 2001 the Apache community was operating under a shortage of M299 launchers and a Hellfire missile restriction. The M299 launchers, under contract to Boeing St. Charles, suffered a failure in recent testing and had been deemed unsafe. The power supply card must be redesigned, which was estimated to take 7-8 months to complete and qualify. Reverting to the old design was not an option; required components are no longer in production. DCSOPS had published a distribution plan. The PM-ARM is responsible for the development and fielding of the launchers and is working to correct the problems. The Hellfire restriction was driven by the new spacer in the motor impacting and damaging the stabilator and potentially the tail rotor.
Damage to 19 of 43 Apache Helicopters was detected following Hellfire missile firing during the USAREUR training exercise VICTORY STRIKE in Poland 06-18 October 2000. Damage to AH-64A Helicopter horizontal stabilators was initially attributed to ground debris then later to the Hellfire missile. Two Apache units fired 385 AGM-114C model missiles and numerous 2.75 inch rockets and 30MM rounds without incident. PEO Aviation System Safety Risk Assessment (SSRA) assigns a Category I-A risk (Catastrophic Probable) if missiles are fired from any position other than position number 4 on right outboard pylon. The SSRA applies only to the AH-64D Helicopter. SSRA for other helicopters is a "due-out" from PEO Aviation. AMCOM IMMC worldwide suspension of Hellfire missiles with the deficient Alliant/Hercules motors remained in place as of mid-2001. All Hellfire missiles with this motor were in CC-N, emergency combat use only. This included the entire inventory of the Longbow Hellfire Millimeter Wave (AGM-114L) missile, and nearly 90% of the latest Laser production assets (AGM-144 K &K-2). TURBO CADS (TC) is a TRANSCOM administered, JCS funded, MACOM supported, joint live ammunition containerization exercise. TC involves the relocation, retrograde, and call forward of theater ammunition stocks. TURBO CADS 01 arrived Chinhae Korea on 07 June 2001 and Hellfire missiles (720 Longbow Millimeter Wave (MMW) and 280 Laser Hellfire (HFII)) were off-loaded from the MAERSK ALASKA and were enroute to storage areas at Chunchon and Uijongbu. Missiles will support the FUE in EUSA for 1st BN/ 2nd AVN. The Longbow Hellfire MMW remained in Condition Code N (CC N) Emergency Combat use only, until modified by the PM ARM. EUSA will retrograde a total of 1,000 Laser Hellfire missiles (AGM-114 C) in CCA, which enables continuation of CONUS annual service practice training into FY02. PM ARM will design, develop and qualify a replacement ring grain spacer for Alliant-TECH/Hercules missiles. However, qualification and testing must be completed before the new design motors will be manufactured and inserted into the on-going Longbow Hellfire missile production line currently scheduled in Jan 02. An Unfinanced Requirement (UFR) of $35.718 million in FY02 Missile Procurement Army (MIPA) funds for retrofit of the ring grain spacer into extant inventory restricts the retrofit start date until 2QFY03. Only Longbow and HF II missiles will be retrofitted with a projected completion date for FY 05. This leaves some 45 percent of the remaining inventory of 12,000 missiles (AGM-114 A, C and F model) to remain unmodified for either consumption in training or to become DEMIL candidates. Commander 101ST AASLT Division is in process of requesting release of Longbow missiles for storage at FT Campbell, KY for the Division Ready Brigade aviation elements.
By the end of 2001 the crisis appeared to be over for the deliveries of the M299 Missile launchers. Deliveries were being accepted on schedule and the fielded units and units being fielded would have their full compliment of launchers by spring 2002. Lockheed Martin was being qualified to produce M299 launchers also. The current SDZ firing restriction on the Hellfire missile was being analyzed. AMRDEC was conducting limited testing on the system until sufficient funding is provided to go ahead full force. AMRDEC expected to complete the analysis by the end of February 2002. The hellfire motor retrofit effort is ongoing. Retrofitting of motor commenced in January of 2002 at the rate of about 60 missiles per month. A UFR has been submitted for the completion of 100% of all missiles requiring retrofit.
On 11 June 2001, an Israeli Air Force AH-64A experienced a catastrophic tail rotor failure in flight. The crew landed safely with no further damage to the aircraft. Investigation revealed that one of the four tail rotor blades had completely separated at the root area. Further investigation indicates that the blade failed due to metal fatigue cracking. Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) released Safety of Flight [SOF] message AH-64-01-04 on 15 June 2001. The SOF message established an interim 1,000 hour finite life (down from 6,201), for all AH-64A/D tail rotor blades (742 helicopters, four blades per helicopter). Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) released a follow up SOF message (AH-64-01-05) on 26 June 2001. This follow up SOF message established an interim recurring X-ray inspection of 125 hours. The X-ray inspection requires a specially trained technician certified to perform the procedure. This inspection is required before the next flight on tail rotor blades with 1000 hours or greater. For blades with less than 1000 hours, the X-ray inspection is due by 28 December 2001 or upon reaching 1000 hours, whichever comes first. AMCOM estimated that 51 percent of the blades required the inspection before the next flight. By July 2001 the Army was approaching 100 percent completion of inspecting all Active Duty, National Guard and Reserve AH-64 Apache tail rotor blades. As a precautionary measure, the Army deployed eighteen specially trained teams world wide to X-ray all Apache tail rotor blades. These teams have X-rayed over 99 percent of the over 3,000 tail rotor blades installed on aircraft and in the supply system, and have found none cracked. The teams proceeded to X-ray 100 percent of the tail rotor blades, to eliminate any possibility of a systemic problem. Although some Apache aircraft were grounded temporarily in the month of July, pending completion of tail rotor inspections, overall impact on the readiness of Army aviation was minimal.
Specifications |
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Contractors | Boeing McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems(Mesa, AZ) General Electric (Lynn, MA) Martin Marietta (Orlando, FL) |
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Propulsion | Two T700-GE-701Cs | |
Crew | Two | |
AH-64A | AH-64D | |
Length | 58.17 ft (17.73 m) | 58.17 ft (17.73 m) |
Height | 15.24 ft (4.64 m) | 13.30 ft (4.05 m) |
Wing Span | 17.15 ft (5.227 m) | 17.15 ft (5.227 m) |
Primary Mission Gross Weight | 15,075 lb (6838 kg) 11,800 pounds Empty |
16,027 lb (7270 kg) Lot 1 Weight |
Hover In-Ground Effect (MRP) | 15,895 ft (4845 m) [Standard Day] 14,845 ft (4525 m) [Hot Day ISA + 15C] |
14,650 ft (4465 m) [Standard Day] 13,350 ft (4068 m) [Hot Day ISA + 15 C] |
Hover Out-of-Ground Effect (MRP) | 12,685 ft (3866 m) [Sea Level Standard Day] 11,215 ft (3418 m) [Hot Day 2000 ft 70 F (21 C)] |
10,520 ft (3206 m) [Standard Day] 9,050 ft (2759 m) [Hot Day ISA + 15 C] |
Vertical Rate of Climb (MRP) | 2,175 fpm (663 mpm) [Sea Level Standard Day] 2,050 fpm (625 mpm) [Hot Day 2000 ft 70 F (21 C)] |
1,775 fpm (541 mpm) [Sea Level Standard Day] 1,595 fpm (486 mpm) [Hot Day 2000 ft 70 F (21 C)] |
Maximum Rate of Climb (IRP) | 2,915 fpm (889 mpm) [Sea Level Standard Day] 2,890 fpm (881 mpm) [Hot Day 2000 ft 70 F (21 C)] |
2,635 fpm (803 mpm) [Sea Level Standard Day] 2,600 fpm (793 mpm) [Hot Day 2000 ft 70 F (21 C)] |
Maximum Level Flight Speed | 150 kt (279 kph) [Sea Level Standard Day] 153 kt (284 kph) [Hot Day 2000 ft 70 F (21 C)] |
147 kt (273 kph) [Sea Level Standard Day] 149 kt (276 kph) [Hot Day 2000 ft 70 F (21 C)] |
Cruise Speed (MCP) | 150 kt (279 kph) [Sea Level Standard Day] 153 kt (284 kph) [Hot Day 2000 ft 70 F (21 C)] |
147 kt (273 kph) [Sea Level Standard Day] 149 kt (276 kph) [Hot Day 2000 ft 70 F (21 C)] |
Range | 400 km - internal fuel 1,900 km - internal and external fuel |
|
Armament | M230 30mm Gun 70mm (2.75 inch) Hydra-70 Folding-Fin Aerial Rockets AGM-114 Hellfire anti-tank missiles AGM-122 Sidearm anti-radar missile AIM-9 Sidewinder Air-to-Air missiles ![]() |
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Mission Equipment | Target Acquisition and Designation System / Pilot Night Vision System |
|
Reliability | The general objective of aircraft readiness is to achieve 75% Mission Capable. |
I can't tell the story of this fight in an email. It will take me at least an Infantry Magazine article, maybe a series of articles. The enemy at CURLEY turned out to be fanatical Syrian Jihadists, determined to die. They attacked incessantly for 12-14 hours, firing small arms and RPGs from buildings, trenches, bunkers, and rubble along side the cloverleaf intersection. They "charged" the US positions (the only word that fits), in taxis, cars, trucks with heavy machine guns mounted, and even in motorcycles with recoilless rifles tied to the side cars (not a war story, I saw one of them that the battalion captured). They drove cars loaded with explosives at high speed towards the US positions, hoping to take American with them in death when they exploded. The mortar platoon occupied the southern part of the objective with two tubes aimed north and two aimed south. They fired simultaneous indirect fire missions south and north, while the gunners on the .50 caliber machine guns fired direct fire to defend their positions. The mortar men continued to fire missions even while under ground assault and indirect fire. They fired over 20 direct lay missions against buildings housing enemy forces and against "Technical Vehicles" firing against the position. They supported the forces on the two other objectives with nine DANGER CLOSE missions, especially after the supporting FA unit fired a mission that struck US positions and wounded two soldiers. The Bn FSO was so angry at the FA that he ceased calling them and used the mortars exclusively for over 12 hours.
The Combat Engineers earned that title. They were magnificent both as Infantrymen and as engineers. They exposed themselves to incredible fire to blow light poles down to make Abatis to stop the suicide taxis. The ACE drivers went outside the perimeter, alone, to build berms and remove guardrails to allow movement between positions. They formed up scratch teams, along with radio operators and drivers, and cleared trenches and bunkers against fanatical defenders, at least one of who was a woman, armed and fighting to the death in the trench line.
Everyone fought! There was not choice, it is not overly dramatic to state that it was a case of "fight, or die". OBJ CURLEY had to be held. If it could not keep the MSR open, the rest of TF 3-15 and the two armor task forces further north would be cut off and isolated deep within the city. Already the BCT commander had ordered the tankers to shut off their engines in order to save the little remaining fuel. Everyone was critically short ammunition, but the company team fighting on OBJ MOE was "BLACK" on main gun, coax, and small arms ammo. If CURLEY fell, so would MOE, and TF 3-15 would face defeat in detail.
The Task Force commander called and asked the key question of CPT Hornbuckle..."Can TM Zan hold CURLEY and let the ammunition and fuel HEMMTs roll north to the other forces?" CPT Hornbuckle said that he thought he could hold, but the TF commander heard the stress and worry in his voice. He knew that CPT Hornbuckle was a fighter, but he worried that TM ZAN was facing a crisis and he needed to know for certain. He called the CSM and asked him, straight up, did the team need help? CSM Robert Gallagher, who had been wounded fighting with the 75th Rangers at Mogadishu, didn't hesitate. He told LTC Twitty that he needed to do something to help relieve TM ZAN, and he had to do it fast! At that time, CSM Gallagher was already wounded again, and he was standing on one leg beside his M88 firing his M4 carbine. The medics had armed themselves, and all the drivers and RTOs that could be spared were fighting to protect the company TOC against suicide attackers working their way through the rubble and along the off-ramps of the cloverleaf.
LTC Twitty had no other forces, but he did have the uncommitted elements of his last mech infantry Company, back a the FSB. Although they had been fighting a series of running fights themselves, they were ready to move. LTC Twitty called the Commander, CPT Ronnie Johnson, and told him get ready to send a platoon to CURLEY. CPT Johnson made a counter-recommendation. He wanted to take his entire company, the two mech platoons, the BFIST, and the Maintenance and 1SGS's M113s, all the armored fighting vehicles he could lay his hands on. This was probably the crucial decision of the battle. LTC Twitty agreed, and asked the BCT commander to release the company, which he did. B Co, 3-15 Infantry roared north, every gun in the convoy firing, to fight its way to Obj CURLEY. It arrived literally in the nick of time, although it lost a Scout HMMWV and one NCO KIA by an RPG. With the additional forces, CPT Johnson, who took over command at CURLEY, reinforced the defenders and pushed the perimeter further out, far enough that the vital re-supply convoy that was right behind him had a chance to make it through.
Even then, the situation was not secure. The sight of 20 heavy trucks loaded with ammunition and fuel reinvigorated the Syrian Jihadists attacking CURLEY. They opened up with renewed fury. In a moment, several trucks were burning, and the fire was spreading. A sergeant ran out into a hail of fire to try to start one of the trucks to move it away, but it was already too damaged to drive. At this time, LTC Scott Rutter, an old SGI from Fort Benning arrived with the lead elements of TF 2-7. He had been sent, with only an hour's notice, on a long circuitous route from his position near the airport to reinforce the 2nd BCT. He fought his way thru to the objective and assumed control at CURLEY. CPT Johnson moved the remaining re-supply trucks to MOE and LARRY with his forces, and then escorted them further north for the armored task forces, thus ensuring that they could stay in the city for the night and the next day. Scott had a hellava fight at CURLEY the next day, but after that, the heart had been cut out of the enemy forces, and the 3rd Infantry Division was in Baghdad to stay.
I have left out so much that I want to write, but there is only so much I can do. I have it in my notes, in my head, and in my heart. I have never in my life been more proud of the American soldier. I stand humbled before these men.
Hoo Ah!