The FReeper Foxhole Remembers The Battle of Savo Island - (8/9/1942) - Dec. 18th, 2003

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[SAMWolf]

Lord,

Keep our Troops forever in Your care

Give them victory over the enemy...

Grant them a safe and swift return...

Bless those who mourn the lost.
.

FReepers from the Foxhole join in prayer
for all those serving their country at this time.

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The Battle of Savo Island

The news of the landing on Tulagi and on Guadalcanal threw Rabaul into a frenzy of activity. Japanese 8th Fleet Headquarters, responsible for the defense of the Solomons, the Coral Sea, and the Rabaul area, prepared for operations against the American invaders. Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi, Commander, 8th Fleet, however, had a rather difficult operation before him. When the Admiral ordered his forces to assemble, he had no clear knowledge of his opposition, but a very clear view of his own strength. The main unit, and flagship, of his force was the heavy cruiser Chokai, a 13,000-ton behemoth with ten 203mm guns and 24 torpedo tubes plus reloads. Chokai was the ray of light in a force of old ships, and the only heavy cruiser available to Mikawa at this point, though four more heavy cruisers were under his command.

These four ships were part of the most capable of Mikawa's forces, Cruiser Division 6 under Rear-Admiral Goto Aritomo, consisting of heavy cruisers Aoba, Kinugasa, Furutaka, and Kako. All of these cruisers carried six 203mm guns, and eight torpedo tubes. They were anchored at Kavieng, on the north coast of New Ireland, out of range of the U.S. bombers flying from Port Moresby, New Guinea and Townsville, Australia. These were the primary forcesAdmiral Mikawa would take to Savo Island, but they would need several hours to arrive - for the moment, all that was on hand was Cruiser Division 18, light cruisers Tenryu and Yubari under Rear-Admiral Matsuyama Mitsuhara. In addition, there were two divisions of old destroyers deployed to Rabaul, but operations withheld all but Yunagi from Admiral Mikawa's strike force.

Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi, Commander Fourth Fleet, one of the ablest commanders in the IJN

On the Allied side, numerical strength and the naturally favorable position of forces was impressive enough. Off to the east of Guadalcanal, Vice-Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher commanded the three available U.S. carriers -- Saratoga, which flew his flag; Enterprise, and Wasp, a recent arrival and veteran of the Atlantic Ocean, including a sortie in the Mediterranean Sea. Her captain, Forrest Sherman, was widely regarded as a brilliant officer, and soon he was to be Admiral Nimitz' Chief of Staff. In attendance of these carriers was the battleship North Carolina, with Enterprise's Task Force, six cruisers, and sixteen destroyers. A fueling group of five oilers gave the Task Forces the ability to remain on sea for the duration of the landings.

Screening the landing forces, TF 62, under Rear-Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, was the Australian Rear-Admiral Victor A.C. Crutchley's combined support/escort force, eight cruisers and eight destroyers. Another seven destroyers were attached directly to Turner, but Crutchley's units were further split. Destroyers Ralph Talbot and Blue covered the western approaches to the bay soon to be called Ironbottom Sound. Savo Island split The Slot, the body of water between the eastern and the western Solomons, in two lanes of approach. To cover both, and the eastern approach from Indispensable Strait, Crutchley divided his unit into three parts. To the east, there were the light cruisers San Juan and HMAS Hobart, plus destroyers Monssen and Buchanan, under the command of Rear-Admiral Norman C. Scott, COMTG62.4. Covering the northern approach from the west, between Florida Island and Savo Island, was Captain Frederick L. Riefkohl's Task Group 62.3, with heavy cruisers Vincennes, Astoria, and Quincy, and destroyers Wilson and Helm. To their south, Crutchley commanded his own force, TG 62.2, with the Australian heavy cruisers Australia and Canberra, and U.S. heavy cruiser Chicago. Escort and support was provided by destroyers Patterson and Bagley. Crutchley's command arrangements within his thin-spread escort force was easy, his force dispositions out of necessity and in hindsight good. His own Southern Group was well-trained. Australia and Canberra had formed a team in the Royal Australian Navy, and Chicago had been with them ever since early 1942. The Northern Group was born out of necessity: as it made no sense to split the Southern Group's experienced team up, the three remaining heavy cruisers naturally went together, while the lighter forces of Admiral Scott remained in the east to safeguard the sound from enemy light forces.


From the flagship San Juan (CL-53), Rear Admiral Norman Scott commanded the group of Allied cruisers that included, the Chicago (CA-29), at Savo Island. He was killed later in the year by friendly fire during the night action off Guadalcanal on 13 November.

In the light of such opposition, naturally, there had to be at least one advantage playing in the Japanese Navy's favor, and indeed there was more than just one. First, there was the fact that Admiral Mikawa could hope to sortie with a complete division of heavy cruisers which had operated together often enough to be a working, powerful team. Second, his ships carried the 24", oxygen-driven, one-ton-warheaded Type 93 (called "Long Lance" in Morison’s History of United States Naval Operations in World War II) torpedo, the most devastating of all Japanese weapons. This torpedo, designed to give the Japanese ships a long-range punch, reached out to almost 40,000 yards, and could go as fast as 49 knots (though not both at the same time). Third, his units all had received the exceptional night training of all IJN forces (save, obviously, carriers), while US ships owing to the risks of night training and to the Neutrality Patrol's demands had little to no experience in this kind of fighting. These were just the advantages known to Mikawa, and there was a fourth one which he didn't know of.

U.S. command arrangements had been put into effect shortly after MacArthur's return from the Philippines. In its pre-Guadalcanal form, Admiral Nimitz commanded North Pacific, Central Pacific and South Pacific forces. The latter's boundary with MacArthur's South-West Pacific Command ran right through the Solomons and placed Guadalcanal barely within Nimitz' command authority. Realizing this error, the U.S. high command soon edited the placement of this boundary, and moved it several degrees to the west, thereby cutting the Coral Sea, and putting Guadalcanal under Nimitz' authority. This was still an unsatisfying arrangement, though there would be no more changes.

Overall coverage of the Coral Sea, and the approaches to Guadalcanal and Rabaul, was only possible with cooperation between the commands. Or to give a more telling example: if Admiral Turner desired an air search of Rabaul, he would first have to ask Fletcher to forward this request to Admiral McCain, Commander, Aircraft, South Pacific, who in turn would have to ask MacArthur's air commander to conduct the search. Such arrangements could have but did not totally prevent the search of Mikawa's route. But as we shall see, other problems did.


Heavy Cruiser Aoba, flagship of Admiral Goto, and one of the IJN's oldest heavy cruisers. She saw extensive service in the Solomons campaign.

For Mikawa, August 7th was busy enough even without him sortieing against the enemy. Submarines were detached to attack the shipping off Lunga Point, Guadalcanal. Two transports were loaded with a few hundred men to conduct a landing to reinforce Guadalcanal, and sent off the same day. At 1430, Mikawa's assembled forces set off with him aboard Chokai. His route would take him out of Rabaul's Simpson Harbor; around Cape St. George, the southern tip of New Ireland; through the Buka Strait, between the islands of Buka and Bougainville, down the eastern coast of Bougainville, and finally through the Bougainville Strait into the New Georgia Sound, aptly named "The Slot" by U.S. naval forces. If nothing unexpected was to happen, Mikawa's units would be off Savo Island by midnight, 8th August.

By daybreak on August 8th, Mikawa's forces were in a position off the northeastern tip of Bougainville. Mikawa worried about the presence of the enemy carriers known to be somewhere in the area, but Rabaul could not give him any positive hints of enemy carriers in range of his formation. Mikawa was told that there were no enemy carriers in range - a grave mistake, which now threatened to place Mikawa within range of some 140 attack planes on three US carriers.

Here one of the ironies and inconsistencies of history writing reveals itself . No account condemns Mikawa's decision to attack - this one here makes no difference - but it must not be forgotten that the number one factor in Mikawa's success, indeed his mere survival, was extraordinary luck on his part. If truly seen from Mikawa's perspective, indeed one can not help but to question the logic of his decisions and rate them as impulsive more than thoughtful.


USS Vincennes, flagship of the Northern Group

But in either way, Mikawa's seven cruisers and the sole destroyer were steaming through The Slot already when night stopped Allied reconnaisance. And as luck would have it, Mikawa remained an unknown factor for the defenders of the U.S. transports.

In support of the landings, a complex air search plan had been developed, involving many small elements from various bases in the area. One of the areas spared from air reconnaissance, however, was The Slot. Admiral Turner, noticing this gap in his all-important early warning system, demanded a search to be conducted on 8th August over The Slot and the waters to its immediate north. Additionally, MacArthur's SOWESPACCOM would dutifully conduct the appropriate searches over its own territory. However, despite the urgency of Turner's request, COMAIRSOPAC McCain failed to comply -- no air search would be conducted over The Slot other than some more or less coincidental patrols.

Some of these came from carrier Enterprise, having drawn search duty for August 8, and launching several SBD Dauntless dive bombers. They would barely miss Mikawa. Two planes did not miss Mikawa, however. It was a Hudson bomber from the Royal Australian Air Force,that, its patrol originating from Milne Bay, New Guinea, sighted Mikawa at 1025 on August 8th east of Bougainville. Immediately, the pilot reported the enemy ships to his base. However, no radio contact could be made with Milne Bay. The pilot decided not to follow Mikawa, and return to his base to report on the sighting as soon as possible. The Hudson's report, paraphrased, reached the invasion forces, and indicated to the Allied forces that three cruisers, two gunboats, and two seaplane tenders were proceeding south. Turner believed this force would establish a base in one of the islands to the north, from where to employ planes against the Allies. Neither he nor his captains appeared to consider the force a threat.

Turner's decision was partially justified. Seeing that the ships reported were as a force too weak to hurt his screen, and that given the large variety of vessels, especially the presence of seaplane carriers, it seemed unlikely that this was a strike force, Turner decided not to go to a higher alert. Nor did he specifically inform his subordinates of the presence of the enemy force, or of what he intended to do about them. Certainly Turner had his hands full with the events ashore and his own problems with unloading. Certainly, Turner could not be asked to see through the haze of the message, that in fact five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and a destroyer were part of this force. However, he could well have presumed that the reported cruisers would attack him, and that the gunboats might easily be something different; and alerted his commanders accordingly, while asking Fletcher to intercept the force. He did not do all of that; it would cost the Navy dearly.


USS Astoria

Whilst Mikawa was moving south, the Allies were compounding the failure of their intelligence by dropping their plans into the dustbin. Admiral Turner, realizing that his transports were not yet unloaded and would require another day, and that his Marines ashore would require the supplies which he could still land. However, there was a problem there: no-one had anticipated that beforehand, expecting only that five cargo ships, and not the entire 19-transport force, would remain off Guadalcanal. However, Admiral Fletcher, owing to poor radio communications, had no idea that Turner would retain his entire force (including himself) off Guadalcanal, and radioed Admiral Ghormley on the evening of the eight about his intention to withdraw. Ghormley, with no knowledge of Turner's intention either, gave his okay. Fletcher thus duly informed Turner and set about to retire, placing his refueling on the ninth within the radius of action of his fighters to Guadalcanal. He intended to cover the expected five cargo ships, and Crutchley's cover force, before withdrawing for good.

It was an unfortunate turn of events, and one for which only the Allies' inexperience in loading and unloading combat transports could be called responsible. Turner's miscalculation, and that of his subordinates, in presuming the correctness of the sighting report, and in attempting to analyze what the Japanese force would do, and not what it could do, added to the problem. As eighth turned into ninth August, all that stood between Mikawa and his prey was the thin and inexperienced screen of Task Group 62.6, under Crutchley. Or so it would have been, but for the unfortunate results of the misunderstanding between Turner and Fletcher.

It had dawned upon Turner that there were problems with his unloading when Major-General Alexander Vandegrift of the 1st Marine Division acknowledged that he needed additional supplies, and a clear view of the situation on Tulagi. Turner acceeded, gave Vandegrift a destroyer-minesweeper, Southard to head to Tulagi, and summoned him and Crutchley to a conference aboard his flagship for midnight, August 8th. Darkness prevented Crutchley from taking a floatplane, or small boat (which was inadvisable given the 30nm stretch of open water between the Southern Group and the transports), and he took his flagship Australia to the rendezvous, thus depriving the Southern Force of a heavy cruiser.



Upon leaving, Crutchley placed the senior officer, Captain Howard D. Bode of USS Chicago, in charge of the Southern Group. With Crutchley's departure, the entire western line of defenses had no flag officer with it. Furthermore, Crutchley did not inform either Admiral Scott of the Eastern Group nor Captain Riefkohl of the Northern Group of his absence. Bode meanwhile decided against placing Chicago in front of Canberra, unwilling to risk night maneuvering. Bode decided that instead of making the change immediately, he might do so if Crutchley did not return before the next turn in the pattern, when placing Chicago before Canberra would be less risky. Furthermore, Bode believed Australia to be back soon, and the conference to be short.

Bode was right in assuming the latter - Crutchley's conference with Turner was short lived, and by midnight, Crutchley was back aboard his flagship. However, he did not regard night-time maneuvers as a good idea, and stayed in with Turner's force, some twenty miles from his group, again without informing the hapless Bode, who went to well-deserved and needed sleep, or Admiral Turner. Two days of continous Condition One - the entire watch on duty - had not improved the combat readiness of the U.S. force either. By the evening, Condition Two had been declared, with only half the watch on duty. Everywhere about the force, tired Captains and men went to their bunks, to gain strength for the next day's hard work.

Admiral Mikawa's approach was made even easier when Rabaul signalled him that air strikes had already accounted for a good deal of the enemy forces in the sound, including eight transports (which may have been important in his later decision to leave the transports alone instead of going after them). At midnight on August 8th, Mikawa's forces went to battle stations. One of the most spectacular naval battles ever was commencing. Mikawa's units sighted the island of Savo at 0047, and three minutes later, lookouts spotted the destroyer Blue, on its southerly patrol leg, at a mere 10,000 yards. The destroyer had his radar operating, but failed to sight the Japanese force, coolly steaming at 22 knots, guns trained out on Blue, into the northern passage. Another false destroyer contact was made to the north, however, and Mikawa again eased his forces south, into the southern passage.

[Darksheare]

Interesting ship.
It seems to me that looking at it in the dark after just putting several rounds and a torpedo or two I'd think it's a battleship as well.
The tripod mast is odd for a cruiser.

[demlosers]

Good Morning back at ya Sam.

[GailA]

Good afternoon

[SAMWolf]

Morning GailA. Nice graphic today.

[Johnny Gage]

Air Power
North American F-107 "Ultra Sabre"

The F-107A was originally designed as a tactical fighter-bomber version of the F-100, with a recessed weapon bay under the fuselage. However, extensive design changes resulted in its redesignation from F-100B to F-107A before the first prototype flew. Special features included an all-moving vertical fin; a control system which permitted the plane to roll at supersonic speeds; and a system (Variable Area Inlet Duct) which automatically controlled the amount of air fed to the jet engine.

On Sept. 10, 1956, the No. 1 F-107A made its initial flight, attaining Mach 1.03 (The speed of sound, Mach 1, is about 760 mph at sea level). The aircraft first achieved Mach 2 (twice the speed of sound) in tests on Nov. 3, 1956. Three F-107As were built as prototypes and were test flown extensively, but the aircraft did not go into production, the Republic F-105 having been selected as the standard fighter-bomber for the Tactical Air Command. In late 1957, Nos. 1 and 3 were leased to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) for high-speed flight research. The F-107 also provided NASA with valuable flight-test information.

The F-107A on display is aircraft No. 2, and its first flight was on Nov. 28, 1956. It was used for weapons testing with both conventional and atomic bombs. On Nov. 25, 1957, it was flown to the USAF Museum.

Specifications:
Primary Function: Tactical fighter-bomber
Contractor: North American
Crew: One
Unit Cost: N/A
Powerplant: One Pratt & Whitney J75 at 23,500 lbs thrust with afterburner

Dimensions:
Length: 60 ft 10 in
Wingspan: 36 ft 7 in
Height: 19 ft 8 in
Weights: Empty: N/A - Maximum Takeoff: 41,537 lbs

Performance :
Speed: Mach 2+
Ceiling: 48,000 ft
Range: 1,570 miles

Armaments:
Four 20mm cannons,
108 2.75 in. rockets,
Up to 4,000 lbs. of bombs

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All information and photos Copyright of Global Aircraft

[Darksheare]

A truly strange aircraft.
Hear tell that the ejection system was unique and that it had to be since the pilot would have slammed into the large vertical fin otherwise.
But I don't remember the details of it.

[Mudboy Slim]

""I am the American Sailor!!"

"Hear my voice, America! Though I speak through the mist of 200 years, my shout for freedom will echo through liberty's halls for many centuries to come. Hear me speak, for my words are of truth and justice, and the rights of man. For those ideals I have spilled my blood upon the world's troubled waters. Listen well, for my time is eternal - yours is but a moment. I am the spirit of heroes past and future. I am the American Sailor. I was born upon the icy shores at Plymouth, rocked upon the waves of the Atlantic, and nursed in the wilderness of Virginia. I cut my teeth on New England codfish, and I was clothed in southern cotton. I built muscle at the halyards of New Bedford whalers, and I gained my sea legs high atop mizzen of Yankee clipper ships. Yes, I am the American Sailor, one of the greatest seamen the world has ever known. The sea is my home and my words are tempered by the sound of paddle wheels on the Mississippi and the song of whales off Greenland's barren shore. My eyes have grown dim from the glare of sunshine on blue water, and my heart is full of star-strewn nights under the Southern Cross."

"My hands are raw from winter storms while sailing down round the Horn, and they are blistered from the heat of cannon broadside while defending our nation. I am the American Sailor, and I have seen the sunset of a thousand distant, lonely lands. I am the American Sailor. It was I who stood tall beside John Paul Jones as he shouted, "I have not yet begun to fight!" I fought upon the Lake Erie with Perry, and I rode with Stephen Decatur into Tripoli harbor to burn Philadelphia. I met Guerriere aboard Constitution, and I was lashed to the mast with Admiral Farragut at Mobile Bay. I have heard the clang of Confederate shot against the sides of Monitor. I have suffered the cold with Peary at the North Pole, and I responded when Dewey said, "You may fire when ready Gridley," at Manila Bay. It was I who transported supplies through submarine infested waters when our soldier's were called "over there." I was there as Admiral Byrd crossed the South Pole. It was I who went down with the Arizona at Pearl Harbor, who supported our troops at Inchon, and patrolled dark deadly waters of the Mekong Delta.

"I am the American Sailor and I wear many faces. I am a pilot soaring across God's blue canopy and I am a Seabee atop a dusty bulldozer in the South Pacific. I am a corpsman nursing the wounded in the jungle, and I am a torpedoman in the Nautilus deep beneath the North Pole. I am hard and I am strong. But it was my eyes that filled with tears when my brother went down with the Thresher, and it was my heart that rejoiced when Commander Shepherd rocketed into orbit above the earth. It was I who languished in a Viet Cong prison camp, and it was I who walked upon the moon. It was I who saved the Stark and the Samuel B. Roberts in the mine infested waters of the Persian Gulf. It was I who pulled my brothers from the smoke filled compartments of the Bonefish and wept when my shipmates died on the Iowa and White Plains. When called again, I was there, on the tip of the spear for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

"I am the American Sailor. I am woman, I am man, I am white and black, yellow, red and brown. I am Jew, Muslim, Christian and Buddhist. I am Irish, Filipino, African, French, Chinese, and Indian. And my standard is the outstretched hand of Liberty. Today, I serve around the world, on land, in air, on and under the sea. I serve proudly, at peace once again, but with the fervent prayer that I need not be called again. Tell your children of me. Tell them of my sacrifice, and how my spirit soars above their country. I have spread the mantle of my nation over the ocean and I will guard her forever. I am her heritage and yours."

I AM THE AMERICAN SAILOR
Author unknown.

I am the American Sailor's son...MUD

[SAMWolf]

Thanks Johnny, weird looking plane.

[SAMWolf]

First Flight: September 10, 1956

After the F-100 Super Sabre was in production, the design was reconfigured to meet Air Force requirements for a fighter-bomber capable of delivering a nuclear payload at Mach 2 speeds. The first versions were designated F-100B, but when the U.S. Air Force ordered prototypes, the designation changed to YF-107A (NA-212).

The air intake was located behind the cockpit to permit installation of a fire control radar. The YF-107A was the last fighter North American Aviation built for the USAF, and it flew Mach 2 in its first all-out test flights during 1957.

The three YF-107As provided valuable data for advanced flight research. They were followed by the F-108 (NA-257) Rapier, which entered the design stage as a Mach 3 interceptor, but was never produced.

[SAMWolf]

Thanks Mudboy Slim. Great tribute to our Sailors.

[Mudboy Slim]

De nada...and thanks to you for today's FReeper Foxhole lesson...MUD

[Darksheare]

Now you got me curious as to what the F-108 looked like!

[snippy_about_it]

Thanks dewd and good afternoon to you from the Foxhole!

[snippy_about_it]

Good afternoon Gail. Nice poster!

[snippy_about_it]

(Variable Area Inlet Duct)

Johnny, is that what's on top of this thing?

[snippy_about_it]

oops. Never mind Johnny. I see from SAM's post that the Air intake is what's on top of this strange looking plane.

[SAMWolf]

[Darksheare]

Looks like an outgrowth of the XB-70 Valkyrie.

[Professional Engineer]

I got to see an F107 at the Pima Air Museum in Tuscon about 20 years ago. Vey interesting.

[SAMWolf]

I was thinking the same thing, it sure looks close