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Posted on 12/07/2003 12:03:16 AM PST by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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December 1941 It was just another Sunday, which had begun like all other Sundays in the previous year. It was not long until Christmas, and many had already planned for their spare time to go into Christmas shopping, no doubt. It was still warm, as usual for any month, and there could have been, on the Sunday in December, little to report that was out of the ordinary. Could have been, but for the plumes of oily smoke hanging low and piling high in sky. Could have been, but for the sputter of machine-guns and the crash of heavy guns and bombs, but for the water columns in the harbor, raised by the detonations of high-explosives. Could have been, but for the torn wreckage of proud warships, and the bleeding soldiers and seamen, and the dead, lying about the decks of their vessels and on the airfields and docks around the harbor.  This essay will not deal with the political aspects, huge as they were, of the raid; the Japanese road to war; the American public's sudden experience of the horrors of war at their own doorstep; or the political maneuvers in Washington leading to the outbreak of war. It will confine itself to the military aspects. It was early in 1940, with the outbreak of war still two years away, that the man most responsible for it first broached the idea to a subordinate. Just a few casual words, then uttered, led the foundation for a plan of grave importance later on. The man who said them was no common man. He was the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, Japan's naval force. He was Admiral Yamamoto Isoruku, and the man whom he confided his plan to was his Chief-of-Staff, Rear-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru. This short mention was all that Yamamoto led slip out of his plans, for the better part of the year.  Japanese Combined Fleet Staff The idea itself was hardly new. American forces had exhibited the possibility in two exercises in the 1930s, and the concept had featured in many Japanese studies as well. At every instance, however, it had been evaluated as a technical impossibility, for various reasons. With that background in mind, it seems natural that Yamamoto progressed slowly. It was in autumn of 1940, half a year after his casual suggestion to Fukudome, that Yamamoto again, in earnest, proposed to do something about the idea. He had just witnessed Japan's air arm in spectacular exercises. It seemed that here was a weapon capable of inflicting the telling blow which an attack on Pearl Harbor would require to be entirely successful. Soon thereafter, he proposed to Fukudome to address the issue to Rear-Admiral Onishi Takijiro, Chief-of-Staff of the 11th Air Fleet, whom he wrote a letter in December, at about the same time that the Naval General Staff began to draw up its plans for operations against the Dutch. Onishi received the three-page letter which Yamamoto wrote to him on that issue in early January. Shortly thereafter, he met the Commander-in-Chief on his flagship, the battleship Nagato, to discuss a number of questions with the Admiral himself. Whilst the two men were dealing with the outline of a tactical plan, there was already considerable effort going into making the plan technially feasible. At Yokosuka Air Station, technicians were working on an effort to modify aerial torpedoes for use in Pearl Harbor's shallow water. Whilst this problem was undergoing evaluation, Onishi settled back on his base, ticking off one by one his ideas and his opinions. On February 2nd, Commander Genda Minoru, Air Officer aboard the carrier Kaga, received a letter from the Admiral, requesting Genda to come to Kanoya to visit Onishi. Once arrived, Genda was handed Yamamoto's letter, and Onishi requested him to study the aerial aspects of the problem in detail. Genda returned to Kaga, returning to Onishi two weeks later with a study elaborating on what Genda thought were the main problems, the necessary tactical emphasizes, in five points. Onishi accepted Genda's scheme as his own proposal to Yamamoto. Onishi's part was the safe movement of the Task Force, which plans he added to Genda's air plan, and submitted to Yamamoto in March.  Nomura Kurusu In April, Yamamoto began preparations necessary for the operation. Following Genda's call for maximum carrier striking power, he assembled the available carrier strength of the Combined Fleet into the new First Air Fleet, commanded by torpedo specialist Vice-Admiral Nagumo Chuichi. Not by coincidence was Genda now appointed staff officer for air on Nagumo's staff - he would have a critical role to play. At the same time, Yamamoto's chief-of-staff Fukudome was transfered to be chief of the First Bureau (Operations) of the Naval General Staff. He could be an important ally in convincing the conservative NGS of the wisdom of the Pearl Harbor plan. Certain points of the plan were still open to debate. Onishi's draft had emphasized dive-bombing as the only reliable method of injuring the enemy fleet at Pearl Harbor. Torpedo-bombing seemed unlikely to be effective, given the space constraints of the harbor and the shallow waters. High-level bombing appeared to offer very little prospect of success, given the past record of the bombers. It was during the summer, the tentative plans having been accepted by Yamamoto, that the problems were worked out. Air units from the 1st Air Fleet continously practiced all that was asked of them in the upcoming operation, not even realizing why they were asked to do what they did. The accuracy of the horizontal bombers improved as bombardier and pilot became a better team; and the Yokosuka-based Air Technical Depot did its immense part in making working weapons. Under the guidance of the depot, 406mm shells from the battleship Nagato's stock were manufactured into armor piercing bombs; this was a feat by itself. But the real success of the depot was the creation of a torpedo capable of dropping safely into the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor and run accurately to its target without sinking into the mud.  Cordell Hull Simultaneously with the hard training and experimenting going on among the air units, the Combined Fleet staff was working on the details of its Pearl Harbor plan. The senior staff officer, Captain Kuroshima Kameto, and Yamamoto's favorite junior officer, Commander Watanabe Yasuji, were chosen to elaborate on Onishi's and Genda's draft. Whilst the two were working on the details of the plan, Kuroshima had another task before him: inform the Naval General Staff of the preparations the Combined Fleet was undertaking for the attack. The Naval General Staff, once filled in, was unenthusiastic, citing the myriad to problems, from fueling the ships to risking the entire naval air force in one battle, that spoke against it. It was just an initial briefing, and the issue never even left the realms of the First Bureau (Operations), and was not at first addressed to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Nagano Osami. But it was an auspicious start. At the end of April, Kuroshima and Watanabe being still well loaded with their share of the work, official word of the Pearl Harbor plan reached the 1st Air Fleet when its chief-of-staff Ryonosuke Kusaka was briefed on it (briefly) by Fukudome, with orders to study the plans more carefully. Kusaka informed his boss Nagumo, and then dropped the issue into the hands of the one man best suited to follow up on it: Genda. Kusaka would support him in the issues related to fleet movements and logistics, but it would be upon Genda to solve the air attack problems. And solve them he did. Not alone, certainly, for a great number of people helped him, especially among the staff and air crew of the 1st Air Fleet. While the First Bureau of the NGS was still non-comittal to another plea to include the Pearl Harbor plan in its general War Plan, Genda's fliers were steadily increasing their proficiency. And meanwhile, Kusaka was doing his best to work out a solution for the navigational problems of the journey.  Pearl Harbor 1941 There were many men who would have given their right hand and more for knowing the details of just what Genda and Kusaka were working out that summer, and the man who would certainly have been first to wish these plans revealed was Admiral Husband Kimmel, CinCUS. His fleet, anchored in sunny Hawaii, had been his since February. He had received command from Admiral James O. Richardson, "J.O.", which in itself was not a happy thing for him. "J.O." had lost his command because he had quarreled with Roosevelt about the relocation of the fleet to Hawaii, which he considered dumb, and then of all things to Pearl Harbor, which he found to be a "goddamned mousetrap". Kimmel shared these sentiments, but knew just as well that there was nothing for him to do but say "Aye, Sir", and get on with business. Not that Roosevelt was really making his tasks easy. He had been promoted over the heads of a great many seniors to the supreme command afloat that the Navy offered. That was a slight problem. And the major problem was, to Kimmel in any event, Washington's obvious reluctance to realize that they could not move the fleet to Hawaii to deter the Japanese, and then remove parts of his fleet and tell him nothing about what he was to do.  In May, Roosevelt had ordered Kimmel to transfer three battleships and a carrier, plus assorted supporting vessels, including oilers, to the Atlantic to strengthen Admiral Ernest J. King's Atlantic Fleet in its efforts to protect convoy lanes and assert U.S. neutrality. It was only natural that Kimmel would try to get the best for his command. He carefully noted the problems which his force had to contend with, and that he desired them solved as quickly as possible. He detailed what the situation was and what he needed, how he felt about Pearl Harbor as a base. In his correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, a curious trend was established. The forceful Kimmel demanded answers, and the careful Stark replied in diplomatic and non-commital wordings that left, to Kimmel, much to be desired. In June, Stark summoned Kimmel to Washington to talk about this and that problem. Kimmel also briefly met the President, who assured him that there would be no more transfers of heavy ships from his command. Pleased, Kimmel returned to Hawaii, to put his fleet in order.  Lord Louis Mountbatten, center, Lt. General Walter Short, left, Admiral Husband Kimmel, right. Back there, several others were also concerned with the safety of the fleet. These were, especially, Major-General Frederick L. Martin and Rear-Admiral Patrick N.L. Bellinger, respectively the commanders of the Hawaiian Air Force and the land-based Navy aircraft. The two officers were responsible for a report that in shocking openness showed one thing very clearly: for an attacker determined and clever enough, there was always a way of sneaking in an surprise air raid. Bellinger and Martin recommended an increase in strength in bombers and patrol planes to cover a 360° arc around Hawaii; and even then, they stated, it was entirely possible for an enemy to be out of range of the search planes on an evening and within range of their planes by the next morning. Since both realized that their role was to protect U.S. Fleet, this analysis was put them in a difficult situation; one in which their chance of successfully executing their mission depended entirely on the enemy failing to understand what they had understood. If this was Kimmel's situation as of the summer, sitting in a mousetrap of an harbor with a very good idea that if the enemy was capable of bringing his carriers over the Pacific, Kimmel stood no chance of intercepting him, then it must have seemed ironic enough that the Japanese were still unable to agree to bring it off.
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Now I see part of the reason you are so wise Matt. :)
Hello service men and women, past and present!
THANK YOU for serving the USA!
Those who lost their lives at Pearl Harbor that fateful day will not be forgotten. 
Life is getting back to normal once again and I finally have unfettered access to my workshop. One more night and I should have all the glass work finished....which means a bit more time to spend at FR. I've most certainly missed that!
I hope everyone has had a great weekend! *HUGZ* all 'round.
Woo Hoo radu!! Life is getting back to normal for you!! I was just thinking about you, and here you are!! WOO HOO, big party at SAMS place!
Happy Birthday Gator Navy!. 1961?? You're just a whippersnapper!!
"For extraordinary heroism, distinguished service, and devotion above and beyond the call of duty. During the first attack by Japanese airplanes on the Naval Air Station, Kanoehe Bay, on 7 December 1941, Lieutenant Finn promptly secured and manned a 50-caliber machine gun mounted on an instruction stand in a completely exposed section of the parking ramp, which was under heavy enemy machine-gun strafing fire. Although painfully wounded many times, he continued to man this gun and to return the enemy's fire vigorously and with telling effect throughout the enemy strafing and bombing attacks and with complete disregard for his own personal safety. It was only by specific orders that he was persuaded to leave his post to seek medical attention. Following first-aid treatment, although obviously suffering much pain and moving with great difficulty, he returned to the squadron area and actively supervised the rearming of returning planes. His extraordinary heroism and conduct in this action were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."
Medal of Honor citation of Captain Mervyn Sharp Bennion
"For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and complete disregard of his own life, above and beyond the call of duty, during the attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. As Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. West Virginia, after being mortally wounded, Captain Bennion evidenced apparent concern only in fighting and saving his ship, and strongly protested against being carried from the bridge."
Medal of Honor citation of Chief Boatswain Edwin Joseph Hill
"For distinguished conduct in the line of his profession, extraordinary courage, and disregard of his own safety during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, by Japanese Forces on 7 December 1941. During the height of the strafing and bombing, Chief Boatswain Hill led his men of the line-handling details of the U.S.S. Nevada to the quays, cast off the lines and swam back to his ship. Later, while on the forecastle attempting to let go the anchors, he was blown overboard and killed by the explosion of several bombs."
Medal of Honor citation of Ensign Herbert C. Jones
"For conspicuous devotion to duty, extraordinary courage, and complete disregard of his own life, above and beyond the call of duty, during the attack on the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, by Japanese Forces on 7 December 1941. Ensign Jones organized and led a party, which was supplying ammunition to the antiaircraft battery of the U.S.S. California after the mechanical hoists were put out of action, when he was fatally wounded by a bomb explosion. When two men attempted to take him from the area which was on fire, he refused to let them do so, saying, in words to the effect, 'Leave me alone! I am done for. Get out of here before the magazines go off.'"
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