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Posted on 10/27/2003 3:55:42 AM PST by snippy_about_it
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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 German 88mm FLAK FLAK - Its origin is the German phrase for antiaircraft defense cannon - FLiegerAbwehr Kanone. FlaK-Fliegerabwehrkanone (German) AA artillery; also sometimes given as Flugabwehrkanone or Flugzeugabwehrkanone World War II veterans who fought in the Mediterranean or European Theaters are far too familiar with the distinctive sound or “boom” of the German “Achtacht” or 88mm Flugzeugabwehrkanone (Flak) gun. Although originally designed as an anti-aircraft weapon and assigned to the Luftwaffe or German Air Force, during the Spanish Civil War and later, the North African campaign, the 88 earned a well-deserved reputation as a highly effective ground combat weapon used against tanks, troops and fortifications. This famous weapon did, in fact, have its origins during the first World War, when guns of this caliber were used in an anti-aircraft role.  These guns were mounted on a 4 wheel trailers towed on specially fitted army lorries. When in action arms with jacks were swung out to form a secure firing platform. For that time these guns were extremely mobile and could swiftly be ready to fire. The year was 1916 when these weapons entered service. They were manufactured by two factories, namely Krupps of Essen and Rheinmetall-Borsig. They were designated Geschütze 8.8 Kw Flak.  By the terms of the Versailles treaty in 1919, Krupps were forbidden to produce small caliber guns below 17 cm, and Rheinmetall were prohibited from making guns above this caliber. In order to overcome these restrictions by the Disarmament Commission, Krupp came to an agreement in 1921 with the Bofors Company in Sweden, whereby Bofors acquired the foreign rights for all Krupp gun designs in return for granting design and research facilities for Krupp`s design team at the Bofors Works.  By 1928, Krupp`s team, working in Sweden, had developed the plans for a new design of the 88 mm High Velocity Gun with the refinement of a semi-automatic breech which re-cocked the striker on ejection of the cartridge case. In 1931, a Krupp Designer took the finalized plans to Essen and production of the new 88 mm Gun began in Germany in 1933, by which time most of the Versailles Treaty Restrictions were being openly flouted by the Nazi Regime which gained absolute power in Germany that year. The new Gun was designated 8.8 Flak 18, and first used in action with the German backed Nationalist Forces in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39, where it was mainly employed in the anti-aircraft role for which it was designed. The Flak 18 was carried on a cruciform mounting with a wheeled bogie fore and aft for towing. Before firing it had to be lowered from the bogies and emplaced. Battle experience in Spain showed the need for a reduction in time taken to get the weapon into action, and provision for barrel changing after prolonged fire.  The famous German 'Eighty-Eight' in its original anti-aircraft guise. It later achieved fame as an anti-tank gun, but it remained the backbone of Germany's air defense throughout the war. In 1936-37, therefore, improvements were made on the basic design, and the revised model, the 8.8 Flak 36, had a multi-section interchangeable barrel and a new trailer/ mounting, designated Sonderanhaenger 201, with an improved cruciform platform and a simpler method of lowering it for emplacement. Lowering was effected by unwinding the winches on the two bogie/limber assemblies so that they tilted and thus lowered the platform to the ground. The bogie/limber assemblies were then wheeled clear and the cruciform side arms lowered. The mounting was leveled via the jacks on the end of each arm of the cruciform and spikes driven through the arms into the ground completed the emplacement of the weapon.  Most important improvement with the Sonderanhaenger 201, however, was the facility for firing the gun at a low angle against ground targets without the need for lowering the mounting to the ground. For firing from the traveling position, the side arms of the cruciform were lowered, the wheel brakes were applied by hand on the rear trailer, and chocks were placed behind the wheels. From 1938 many Flak 18s were retrospectively fitted on the Sonderanhaenger 201, and 50 of these were further modified so that one man could lay the gun for both line and elevation, though this feature was not continued.  Flak 37 mounted on the Sondergeschützanhänger (gun-trailer) 202. From 1940 onwards both the Flak 18 and Flak 36 on the Sonderanhaenger ( Trailer ) 201 were fitted with shields to give the crew protection when firing at ground targets. Late models of the Flak 36 were fitted with a an improved trailer mounting, the Sonderanhaenger 202, which was fitted with twin wheels. The towing vehicle used for both Flak 18 and Flak36 was the Sd.Kfz 7 Tractor, built by Krauss-Maffei. This well known type of half track vehicle had seating for the gun crew and lockers at the rear for ammunition and equipment.  Sd.Kfz 7 Tractor, built by Krauss-Maffei (Half-track) A similar weapon to the Flak 36 was the Flak 37 which was specifically produced for the anti aircraft role, and was fitted with a new data transmission system known as Übertragungser 37, suitable only for high angle engagements.  88mm Flak 37 on a special chassis Both the Flak 18 and Flak 36 had a high angle range of 35,100 ft. and a horizontal range of 16,200 yards. They could fire high explosive (HE), armor piercing (AP) or smoke shells. The weight of the projectile was 20 lbs. (HE) or 21 lbs. (AP and smoke). Muzzle velocity was 2690 ft. per second with HE and 2620 ft. with AP.  In traveling order on the special trailer 201, the Flak 18 and 36 weighed 7 tons. Rate of fire was 15-20 rounds per minute. The crew was 11 men, consisting of layer, trainer, breech worker, fuse setter, and five ammunition supply numbers, plus the detachment commander and the tractor driver. When firing against ground targets two ammunition numbers became the range and deflection setters respectively, and the fuse setter became an ammunition number. The senior ammunition number was in charge of ammunition supply and was the detachment second-in-command.  The famous 8.8 cm Flak 36 in action as anti-tank gun in Russia, 1942. Note the use of the stereoscopic range finder at right, which made possible for the 8.8 cm Flak 36 guns to hit targets at record ranges. There were three methods of fire control, by radar or predictor though a data transmission system for AA fire, direct laying through the sights for the anti-tank role, and indirect fire in conjunction with a range-finder. Flak 36s made their debut in the notorious anti-tank role at Halfaya during the Battle of Sollum, June 1941. Firing from concealed positions at short range, they destroyed 123 out of 238 attacking British tank. The Germans claimed a British tank for every 20 "88" rounds fired at Halfaya.  Deadly 88mm's were emplaced like this at Halfaya Pass on Rommel's orders. When dug in with their barrels only a little above ground they were difficult to detect and destroy. The white rings painted on its barrel, like notches on a gunslinger's revolver, tally the number of British tanks the formidable gun has destroyed. The Flak 18 and Flak 36 models were produced in by far the greatest numbers of all the 8.8 series of guns. However, there were several important derivatives, less well known now because the war situation when they appeared restricted production, and they were less often seen in action. Most important of all was the 8.8 cm Flak 41, developed and produced by Rheinmetall-Borsig as a true multi-purpose anti-tank/anti-aircraft weapon. It overcame the inherent disadvantage of the Flak 18 and Flak 36 in the anti-tank role by virtually turning the upright mount arrangement of the earlier models through 90 degrees to reduce the silhouette.  Flak 41 The barrel was lengthened and strengthened and the muzzle velocity increased to 3110 feet per second. Rate of fire was about 20 rounds per minute. The gun could be fired from the traveling position with the cruciform side arms extended, and the twin-wheeled Sonderanhaenger 202 was standard with this weapon. The cruciform was wider than that of the Flak 36. The Flak 41 entered service in 1943 and saw some service in the last stages of the North Africa campaign. Krupp had been developing a similar multi-purpose 8.8 cm gun, but the Rheinmetall design, the Flak 41, was ready first, so it was decided to keep the Krupp model specifically as an anti-tank ( Pak ) and tank gun, since the use of the "88" in the anti-tank role in the desert and on the Russian Front had shown the desirability for a purpose-designed weapon of this caliber. Designated Pak 43, the Krupp gun had muzzle brake and was mounted on a field platform transported on single-wheel bogies similar to those of the Sonderanhaenger 201.  Pak 43 This weapon was lower than the Flak 41 but, of course lacked high angle elevation. The gun could be either lowered and emplaced for firing or it could be fired from the traveling position so long as the traverse was kept within 30 degrees either side of the longitudinal girders of the field platform. The barrel of the Pak 43 was 21 feet 7¼ inches long and the muzzle velocity with AP40 shot was 3705 feet per second. With APCBC, the MV was 3280 fps, and with HE, the MV was 2460 fps. With APCBC, it could penetrate 130 mm of armor at 1500 yards. This weapon entered service also in 1943. Due to the urgency of the war situation at this time - and the scarcity of materials - many of the Pak pieces were mounted on a single axle field carriage, in which guise they were designated Pak 43/41. The carriage was of the split trail type and was of composite construction. The trail legs were the type used on the carriage of the 10.5 cm Model 18 howitzer and the solid disc wheels were of the type used with the 15 cm medium field howitzer. Weight of this weapon was 9600 lbs.  Pak 43/41 The tank and panzerjager guns in the 88 mm series had approximately the same performance, and fired the same ammunition as the Pak 43 and Pak 43/41. Some of the barrels were of the monobloc piece construction, others of the divided monobloc barrel type. The third model was also a divided monobloc barrel construction but the length of the rifling was increased. This was the gun that formed the armament of the Royal Tiger, Elefant, Panzerjager and the Jagd Panther.  Two Tigers w/Porsche turrets  Elefant  Two 'Ferdinands'      |
Barely though, it wasn't quite the slaughtering I took on the first game. Lots of fun anyway!!
The Me210 was a disappointment as a replacement fighter for the ME110. The Germans never got the twin Engine fighter concept to work properly. The P-38 was probably the best twin engine fighter.
Of course, I didn't lose 3 PSW 221, 5 PZ IIC, 10 Pz38t, 2 PzIVd, 4 SPW 251 and 105 men either to my losses of 1 Charb1, 2 H-39's and 33 men. ;-)
G'morning people .... :)
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"The Era of Osama lasted about an hour, from the time the first plane hit the tower to the moment the General Militia of Flight 93 reported for duty." 
Toward FREEDOM
Michael Wittman Knights Cross
World War II would prove to be the greatest tank war of them all. And during the brief period in history that tanks would serve as a determining factor on the battlefield, the greatest of all tank unit leaders would come from this war. This man would be Michael Wittman.
Michael Wittman was born in rural Germany to a farm family in August of 1914. After completing his mandatory RaD labor service in 1934, he returned to his father’s farm, where he would continue to work in between stretches of military service until 1937, whereupon he joined the elite LAH division, the SS unit which bore Hitler’s name. In 1939, Wittman saw combat in both Poland and Western Europe. Again in the thick of combat at the outbreak of the Russian Campaign, he gained instant recognition with the 14th Corps after knocking out six tanks out of an eight-tank entourage in a skirmish in the south sector of the front line. By November of 1941, he had received the Iron Cross, Second Class, the Wound Badge and the Close Combat Badge. His superiors recognized an obvious prodigy in their midst, and sent him off to an officer school in Bavaria. By December of 1942, Wittman was commissioned as a lieutenant in the 13th Korps of Panzer Regiment 1, and was back on the front lines with the new Panzer tank. He displayed his incredible skills at the Battle of Kursk, where he knocked out 30 Soviet tanks and 28 artillery pieces. In another single day of combat over the same summer, he claimed 10 more tanks, bringing his total somewhere in the vicinity of 60 tanks. In January of 1944, Wittman led his Panzer unit in an amazing battle that halted an entire Soviet tank brigade. For this Wittman received the Knight’s Cross, then shortly afterwards, the Oakleaves to his knight’s cross, coming along with it a telegraph from Hitler, giving more than the usual round of praise. Wittman was once again promoted and given command of Panzer Troop 501.
It so happened that his division, licking its wounds from the devastating combat on the Eastern Front, were stationed in Normandy during the summer of 1944. The chaotic conditions preceding the Allied landing meant that it was a full day before Wittman’s unit were in the thick of combat, but their late arrival on the front lines were quickly made up for. Leading only a small detachment of armor, he met up with a British tank unit at a small village, where he quickly knocked out the four opposing machines. Regrouping with the main force, he then struck out to find a column of 25 armored units. By knocking out the front and the rear tank, Wittman bought enough time to destroy the remainder of the entire column. Support units would capture 230 British soldiers from the melee, who were largely disoriented from the amazing battle. Though his tank was destroyed during the subsequent retreat, Wittman and crew managed to escape. Shortly thereafter, he was awarded Swords to his Knight’s Cross. Single-handedly, Wittman destroyed the bulk of the British 22nd Armoured Brigade and saved his own division from sure destruction.
At this time Wittman had destroyed nearly 140 tanks and almost as many anti-tank pieces. He was promoted to captain and offered a position at a tank school, but preferred to stay with his unit. So far-reaching was his fame that even Allied soldiers were frightened at the thought of going up against any Panzer, let alone one under the command of the German farmer. But Wittman’s life would not last much longer.
By August 8th, the situation in France had turned desperate. His tank unit, now regrouped with the impressive 12th SS Division, met up with Canadian armor at Cintheaux. Though the town itself was recaptured and the Canadians, (unsurprisingly) sustained heavy casualties, the German high command considered the battle a tremendous blow, for Wittman was lost. Like a knight making his last stand, Wittman perished in a combat engagement with a detachment of the 4th Canadian Armored Division against overwhelming odds. Five tanks caught the ace’s Panzer in the open on August 8th, 1944 in the French countryside. and in the ensuing match that followed, Wittman and his entire crew were killed. Wittman was reported missing the following day, a demoralizing defeat for his division and the entire German army. The whereabouts of his body would remain a mystery for over 40 years, until an accidental discovery by a French road crew led to the exhumation and identification of Wittman’s corpse.
Unlike many German tank men, whose reputation was that of arrogance and overconfidence, Wittman was known for his quiet, mild-mannered behavior, even under fire. It is true that Michael Wittman’s overwhelming success during the tooth-and-nail fighting in Normandy partially came from the gross imbalance of tank quality. The Tiger tank, while a mediocre offensive weapon, proved to be excellent for the defensive strategy of the German army, with its powerful cannon and heavy armor. The American Sherman and the British Cromwell proved to be too light-armored for such heavy close-range fighting, and its firepower was no match against German guns. What had given these two machines a distinct advantage in North Africa became a crux in Western Europe. It should also be remembered that the German tank crews were seasoned veterans almost to a man, whereas many of the American crews had never been in combat before. These advantages would be helpful in the hands of most tank commanders. In the hands of Michael Wittman, he was practically invincible. Michael Wittman was permanently laid to rest at a military cemetery in La Cambe. Balthus Woll, his former gunner and another Knights Cross recipient, lived long enough to see the body discovered and given a proper burial.
As do I, but not the resources I need. I'm looking for figures regarding tank losses (Tiger/Panther vs. T-34 if possible). I don't buy what I saw on the tube. :)
Hetzers?
As long as you don't have any FT-17s to worry about, it sounds like in some scenarios the French are actually right in the ballgame.
The Fifth Guards' arrival at the Psel set the stage for the Battle of Prochorovka. Prochorovka is one of the best-known of the many battles on the Eastern Front during World War II. It has been covered in articles, books and televised historical documentaries, but these accounts vary in accuracy; some are merely incomplete, while others border on fiction. In the generally accepted version of the battle, the three SS divisions attacked Prochorovka shoulder to shoulder, jammed into the terrain between the Psel and the railroad.
A total of 500 to 700 German tanks, including dozens of Panzerkampfwagen Mark V Panther medium tanks with 75mm guns and Panzerkampfwagen Mark VI Tiger heavy tanks with deadly 88mm cannons, lumbered forward while hundreds of nimble Soviet T-34 medium tanks raced into the midst of the SS armor and threw the Germans into confusion. The Soviets closed with the panzers, negating the Tiger's 88mm guns, outmaneuvered the German armor and knocked out hundreds of German tanks.
The Soviet tank force's audacious tactics resulted in a disastrous defeat for the Germans, and the disorganized SS divisions withdrew, leaving 400 destroyed tanks behind, including between 70 and 100 Tigers and many Panthers. Those losses smashed the SS divisions fighting power, and as a result Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army had no chance to achieve even a partial victory in the south. While it makes a dramatic story, nearly all of this battle scenario is essentially myth. Careful study of the daily tank strength reports and combat records of II SS Panzer Corps; available on microfilm at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.--provides information that forces a historical reappraisal of the battle.
These records show, first of all, that Hausser's corps began with far fewer tanks than previously believed and, more important, that they suffered only moderate losses on July 12, 1943. As those reports were intended to allow the corps commander to assess the combat strength of his divisions, they can be considered reasonably accurate. Considering that information, it seems that the Germans may have been near a limited success on the southern flank of the salient. The number of SS tanks actually involved in the battle has been variously reported as high as 700 by some authorities, while others have estimated between 300 to 600. Even before the Battle of Kursk began, however, the II SS Panzer Corps never had 500 tanks, much less 700.
On July 4, the day before Operation Citadel was launched, Hausser's three divisions possessed a total of 327 tanks between them, plus a number of command tanks. By July 11, the II SS Panzer Corps had a total of 211 operational tanks: Totenkopf had 94 tanks, Leibstandarte had only 56 and Das Reich possessed just 61. Damaged tanks or tanks undergoing repairs are not listed. Only 15 Tiger tanks were still in action at Prochorovka, and there were no SS Panthers available. The battalions that were equipped with Panthers were still training in Germany in July 1943. On July 13, the day after the Battle of Prochorovka, Fourth Panzer Army reports declared that the II SS Panzer Corps had 163 operational tanks, a net loss of only 48 tanks. Actual losses were somewhat heavier, the discrepancy due to the gain of repaired tanks returned to action. Closer study of the losses of each type of tank reveals that the corps lost about 70 tanks on July 12.
In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long assumed to be moderate, were actually catastrophic. In 1984, a history of the Fifth Guards Tank Army written by Rotmistrov himself revealed that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to repairable damage. He gave no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for salvage. Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks lost. Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to mark and count the huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the Leibstandarte sector alone. Other Soviet sources say the tank strength of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of about 650 tanks. Those losses brought a caustic rebuke from Josef Stalin.
Subsequently, the depleted Fifth Guards Tank Army did not resume offensive action, and Rotmistrov ordered his remaining tanks to dig in among the infantry positions west of the town. Another misconception about the battle is the image of all three SS divisions attacking shoulder to shoulder through the narrow lane between the Psel and the rail line west of Prochorovka. Only Leibstandarte was aligned directly west of the town, and it was the only division to attack the town itself.
The II SS Panzer Corps zone of battle, contrary to the impression given in many accounts, was approximately nine miles wide, with Totenkopf on the left flank, Leibstandarte in the center and Das Reich on the right flank. Totenkopf's armor was committed primarily to the Psel bridgehead and in defensive action against Soviet attacks on the Psel bridges. In fact, only Leibstandarte actually advanced into the corridor west of Prochorovka, and then only after it had thrown back initial Soviet attacks.
Early on July 12, Leibstandarte units reported a great deal of loud motor noise, which indicated massing Soviet armor. Soon after 5 a.m., hundreds of Soviet tanks, carrying infantry, rolled out of Prochorovka and its environs in groups of 40 to 50. Waves of T-34 and T-70 tanks advanced at high speed in a charge straight at the startled Germans. When machine-gun fire, armor-piercing shells and artillery fire struck the T-34s, the Soviet infantry jumped off and sought cover. Leaving their infantry behind, the T-34s rolled on. Those Soviet tanks that survived the initial clash with SS armor continued a linear advance and were destroyed by the Germans.
When the initial Soviet attack paused, Leibstandarte pushed its armor toward the town and collided with elements of Rotmistrov's reserve armor. A Soviet attack by the 181st Tank Regiment was defeated by several SS Tigers, one of which, the 13th (heavy) Company of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment, was commanded by 2nd Lt. Michael Wittmann, the most successful tank commander of the war. Wittmann's group was advancing in flank support of the German main attack when it was engaged by the Soviet tank regiment at long range. The Soviet charge, straight at the Tigers over open ground, was suicidal. The frontal armor of the Tiger was impervious to the 76mm guns of the T-34s at any great distance. The field was soon littered with burning T-34s and T-70s. None of the Tigers were lost, but the 181st Tank Regiment was annihilated.
Late in the day, Rotmistrov committed his last reserves, elements of the V Mechanized Corps, which finally halted Leibstandarte. Das Reich began its attack from several kilometers southwest of Prochorovka and was quickly engaged by aggressive battle groups of the II Tank Corps and II Guards Tank Corps. Fierce, somewhat confused fighting broke out all along the German division's axis of advance. Battle groups of 20 to 40 Soviet tanks, supported by infantry and ground-attack planes, collided with Das Reich regimental spearheads.
Rotmistrov continued to throw armor against the division, and combat raged throughout the day, with heavy losses of Soviet armor. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward, advancing into the night while suffering relatively light tank losses. Meanwhile, on the left flank, Soviet First Tank Army elements unsuccessfully tried to crush Totenkopf's bridgehead. The SS division fought off the XXXI and X Tank Corps, supported by elements of the XXXIII Rifle Corps. In spite of the Soviet attacks, Totenkopf's panzer group drove toward a road that ran from the village of Kartaschevka, southeast across the river and into Prochorovka. The fighting, characterized by massive losses of Soviet armor, continued throughout July 12 without a decisive success by either side - contrary to the accounts given in many well-known studies of the Eastern Front, which state that the fighting ended on July 12 with a decisive German defeat.
These authors describe the battlefield as littered with hundreds of destroyed German tanks and report that the Soviets overran the SS tank repair units. In fact, the fighting continued around Prochorovka for several more days. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward in the area south of the town until July 16. That advance enabled the III Panzer Corps to link up with the SS division on July 14 and encircle several Soviet rifle divisions south of Prochorovka. Totenkopf eventually reached the Kartaschevka-Prochorovka road, and the division took several tactically important hills on the north edge of its perimeter as well. Those successes were not exploited, however, due to decisions made by Adolf Hitler.
After receiving the news of the Allied invasion of Sicily, as well as reports of impending Soviet attacks on the Mius River and at Izyum, Hitler decided to cancel Operation Citadel. Manstein argued that he should be allowed to finish off the two Soviet tank armies. He had unused reserves, consisting of three experienced panzer divisions of XXIV Panzer Corps, in position for quick commitment. That corps could have been used to attack the Fifth Guards Tank Army in its flank, to break out from the Psel bridgehead or to cross the Psel east of Prochorovka. All of the available Soviet armor in the south was committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the Soviet defenses.
Manstein correctly realized that he had the opportunity to destroy the Soviet operational and strategic armor in the Prochorovka area. Hitler could not be persuaded to continue the attack, however. Instead, he dispersed the divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps to deal with the anticipated Soviet diversionary attacks south of the Belgorod-Kharkov sector. On the night of July 17-18, the corps withdrew from its positions around Prochorovka.
Thus, the battle for Prochorovka ended, not because of German tank losses (Hausser had over 200 operational tanks on July 17) but because Hitler lacked the will to continue the offensive. The SS panzer divisions were still full of fight; in fact, two of them continued to fight effectively in southern Russia for the rest of the summer. Leibstandarte was ordered to Italy, but Das Reich and Totenkopf remained in the East. Those two divisions and the 3rd Panzer Division, which replaced Leibstandarte, were transferred to the Sixth Army area, where they conducted a counterattack from July 31 to August 2 that eliminated a strong Soviet bridgehead at the Mius River. Without pause, the three divisions were then transferred to the Bogodukhov sector in early August 1943. Under the command of the III Panzer Corps, they were joined by another unit, the Fifth SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking. During three weeks of constant combat, the four divisions played a major role in stopping the main Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive, Operation Rumyantsev.
They fought Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank Army, rebuilt to 503 tanks strong, and major portions of the First Tank Army, now at 542 tanks. By the end of the month, Rotmistrov had less than 100 tanks still running. Katukov had only 120 tanks still in action by the last week of August. While at no time did any of the German divisions have more than 55 tanks in operation, they repeatedly blunted the thrusts of the two Soviet tank armies, which were also reinforced by several rifle corps. Totenkopf repeatedly cut off and defeated all of the First Tank Army's thrusts toward the Kharkov-Poltava rail line.
Exerpted frpm Kursk Revisited:<br. George M. Nipe, Jr., has conducted extensive research on the war on the Eastern Front.
MOI??
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