[LogicWings]

Putting you into the same category as Kant was just my way of poking some gentle fun at my worthy correspondent. :^) I meant "no harm," and so I'm truly sorry if I've offended you.

No offense taken. I don't think you could offend me if you tried. You don't have it in you.

Notwithstanding, we definitely seem to be pretty much agreed on one point, dear LogicWings: For I gather you, like me, generally have little use for German Idealist philosophers (e.g., Kant), and perhaps even less use for German Transcendental Idealist philosophers (e.g., Hegel). It seems to me they are "system-builders," not "system-describers." And generally, I deplore that sort of thing....

Won't get any argument from me there.

But that is not to say that these men did not have profound insights about the relations between mind and world of inestimable value and influence on the evolution of human thought. For instance, Kant's radical distinction of phenomenon and noumenon.

Well, that is a matter of opinion. Since, by Kant's definition noumenon is that it is 'unknowable' then it is a concept without any function or use to human beings. It is the first piece of Kantian sophistry I reject, followed by a priori. Thus I will skip your following exposition, not because there is anything wrong with it, rather because the whole line of thinking is fallacious.

Your James quote:

but about the inner nature of these facts or what makes them what they are, I can say nothing at all.

Pardon me, but yet again, this Begs the Question that there is an inner nature. I read and respond to these posts in the order in which they come, and rarely read ahead, so I found your next comment apropos since I had already referred to it.

Which — to me — is just more evidence for the truth of Alfred Korzybski's observation: “The map is not the territory.”

That kind of is, exactly my point, what I have trying to say. I read most of James' work many years ago. I should probably revisit him but where do I find the time?

My favorite James quote is:

There are no differences but differences of degree between different degrees of difference and no difference.

But that might have been the nitrous oxide talking.

On the question, "do you make a distinction between psyche and consciousness?" I'd have to answer: Not much of one. To me at the most basic level they are effectively synonymous.

See, I do make a distinction. I see consciousness as the vessel and psyche as the mechanism, for lack of a better metaphor. A person has one psyche at his or her disposal but there varying states and/or modes of consciousness. How the psyche views and interprets its surroundings is predicated upon the current state of consciousness.

for our reasonings have not established the non-existence of the Soul, they have only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes.

. . .you yourself seemingly confess cannot be "obviated" by scientific/empirical methods....

We had these discussions before. What, I'm supposed to make a hypocrite out of myself and attempt to Prove a Negative? There is a difference between “There is no evidence for . . .” and “Asserting positively the non-existence of something."

As James said: "Through feelings we become acquainted with things, but only by our thoughts do we know about them."

Well, I disagree with him on this point, but this is a quote taken out of full context. As this quote stands we don't become acquainted with things through feelings but through perception. We evaluate their meaning to us through feelings.

Which insight seems to suggest a possible resolution of any "dispute" between you and me, dear LogicWings, regarding "abstractions from Reality" and Reality Itself — the fullness of the latter of which is as incomprehensible to me as it is to you. (I suspect.)

Yes, I agree. I think we have ironed out the differences between "abstractions from Reality" and Reality Itself. The Korzybski quote means basically we are on the same page in that regard. The Universe is ultimately still mostly mystery no matter what we do think we know about it.

I must say that my experience with the human mind and what I know about it is that it is as mysterious as the Universe and we don't know near as much about it as we think we do. It has capabilities that far exceed our capacity to imagine. But life is in the discovering, traveling, exploring, investigating and seeking to understand.

"My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will."

Interesting, he exercised it before be believed in it.

Thanks for the wonderful conversations. I always learn something conversing with you two.

Until next time. . .

[betty boop]

bb wrote: But that is not to say that these men did not have profound insights about the relations between mind and world of inestimable value and influence on the evolution of human thought. For instance, Kant's radical distinction of phenomenon and noumenon.

LogicWings replied: "Well, that is a matter of opinion. Since, by Kant's definition noumenon is that it is 'unknowable' then it is a concept without any function or use to human beings. It is the first piece of Kantian sophistry I reject, followed by a priori. Thus I will skip your following exposition, not because there is anything wrong with it, rather because the whole line of thinking is fallacious."

Jeepers, now I'm really confused, dear LogicWings. First you reduce Kant's noumenon to merely his "opinion." That is, as possibly bearing no correspondence to "objective" reality whatsoever. Then you suggest we can just dispense of the crittur out-of-hand, because dealing with the problem of the "unknowable" has no "utility" for human beings anyway. You accuse Kant of "sophistry." [What on earth do you mean by that?] You reject the philosophical concept a priori out of hand. Then essentially tell me that it's worthless to discuss my "exposition," "not because there is anything wrong with it, rather because the whole line of thinking is fallacious."

The difficulty I have: If there's nothing "wrong" with it, then how can it be "fallacious?"

All the "sophist" Kant is saying is that natural objects are not completely "reducible" to the terms of human sense perception. We are not entitled to believe/expect that what the senses "report" and the mind "processes" in some "mysterious" brain/mind [i.e., physical/psychic] transformation can entirely "capture" all possible information about the object as it is "in itself." All that is "captured" is what the senses can report to the cognitive subject....

To be reminded of the existential importance of the "unknowable" strikes me as a salutary thing.... You seem to regard it as a distinctly NEGATIVE, inutile one....

But then as James wrote: ...about the inner nature of these facts or what makes them what they are, I can say nothing at all.

To which LogicWings replied: "Pardon me, but yet again, this Begs the Question that there is an inner nature. I read and respond to these posts in the order in which they come, and rarely read ahead, so I found your next comment apropos since I had already referred to it.

"[Korzybski's observation: “The map is not the territory”] is exactly my point, what I have trying to say...."

And on that point, LogicWings, we definitely agree. But that "Begs the Question": What is the "territory?"

As James said: "Through feelings we become acquainted with things, but only by our thoughts do we know about them."

To which LW replied: "Well, I disagree with him on this point, but this is a quote taken out of full context. [What is the "full context?"] As this quote stands we don't become acquainted with things through feelings but through perception. We evaluate their meaning to us through feelings."

And thus you stand James "upside down": In his empirical studies, he determined that feeling (including the meaning of "sensing," but not reducible to it) is prior to perception.

bb wrote: On the question, "do you make a distinction between psyche and consciousness?" I'd have to answer: Not much of one. To me at the most basic level they are effectively synonymous.

To which LW replied: "See, I do make a distinction. I see consciousness as the vessel and psyche as the mechanism, for lack of a better metaphor. A person has one psyche at his or her disposal but there [are] varying states and/or modes of consciousness. How the psyche views and interprets its surroundings is predicated upon the current state of consciousness."

On the basis of this statement, I gather/infer you have come up with a splendid model of "machine 'consciousness'." But to me, such a thing is an oxymoron.

In a certain way, though, your approach resembles James': It seems clear to me that he recognized the [unnamable] psyche as somehow involving a spatiotemporal succession of "states and/or modes of consciousness" and their "interpretation."

Unlike you, however, on the basis of the "phenomenal" evidence, he seems to suggest (to my ear) that there must be an ulterior "organizing principle" (as it were) "judging" the sequence of "states." In other words, a "central" cognitive Self, fundamentally organized by (or reflecting) the single, undivided, continuous primal feeling in which our own enduring sense of "self-identity" continuously inheres over time. It is our fundamental "ground and organizing principle" as conscious thinkers. Otherwise, the succession of states would be utterly meaningless, now and always....

James said: for our reasonings have not established the non-existence of the Soul, they have only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes.

Which seems pretty plain to me: James is saying the Soul (under the aspect of its Judeo-Christian and classical meaning) cannot be "obviated" by scientific/empirical methods.... He is saying science does not need to concern itself with this "problem"; for

"My final conclusion, then, about the substantial Soul is that it explains nothing and guarantees nothing. Its successive thoughts are the only intelligible and verifiable things about it, and definitely to ascertain the correlations of these with brain-processes is as much as physiology can empirically do."

In saying this, I did not hear James say that, because empirical science cannot exhaust a problem, therefore the problem does not exist. He's just handing it over to the philosophers and theologians to deal with.

For again, as James said: "for our reasonings have not established the non-existence of the Soul, they have only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes."

James said: "My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will."

And LW replied: "Interesting, he exercised it before be believed in it."

It's interesting to me that James wrote that line in a personal journal he kept as a young man. I disagree with your interpretation of it, LogicWings. For before one can "act" on something, there must first be a "felt" need to act; and then comes the "perception" part: (1) What is required to qualify and quantify the "felt" threat (or benefit)?" and (2) what logistics specify successful action necessary to either defend against it, if perceived as a threat; or to draw it closer to oneself, if perceived as a benefit — in either case by rational means?

James gets down into the weeds, seeking the intersection of physiology and psychology. But it seems to me he also probes the very root of rationality itself, wonderfully clarifying the epistemological roots of empirical science in the process.

Well, must leave it there for now, dear LogicWings. Thank you oh so very much for writing! Hope to see you on the flip side!