Just to begin with, let's address the term "random," as it really ought to be used. A "random" event need be neither "extremely unusual," nor "extraordinary." For an event to be "random," requires only a couple of conditions:
1) There must be more than one possible outcome2) The outcome of any particular instance of the event is not deterministic; i.e., the result cannot be completely predicted beforehand.
We're quite familiar with the idea of randomness as it's manifested in coin tosses or rolls of the dice -- the results of which can hardly be classified as extraordinary or unusual.
But we also note that these are really only "quasi-random" phenomena -- physical analogs to a mathematical ideal. For example, the results of a dice roll are affected by the velocity of the dice at the time they were tossed; the characteristics of the table (e.g., friction of the surface, length of table, etc.), the shape and composition of the dice, and so on.
We can say that results are "effectively random," but really that's only because we do not have the means to properly measure the initial conditions, nor account for all of the physical variables that affect the roll.
And this takes us to the original point about "randomness" vs. "knowing the system" in which the event takes place. If we talk about physical random events, we're really talking about events that are "effectively random" from our perpective. We often have no way of gathering information sufficient to describe the physical processes that led to the outcome we observe. Lacking that knowledge (which may be, per Heisenberg, intrinsically unavailable to us), we can still deal with effective randomness through mathematics, via statistics -- we can grapple with probabilities, even if deterministic answers elude us. And it works very well. (As an aside, many important theories of modern statistics are due to one William S. Gosset, who was employed as a statistician by the Guinness brewing company. Further proof that beer is good.)
Now on to a broader topic. The essence of the argument here boils down to the efficacy of the "materialist" worldview as an explanation for what we can observe -- in this context as an explanation for biological processes, but really it's a more general question.
According to Wikipedia (yes, I know...), "the theory of materialism holds that the only thing that exists is matter; that all things are composed of material and all phenomena (including consciousness) are the result of material interactions." The source of matter and the means by which interactions first began are carefully avoided.... and there is a great deal of controversy over the exact scope and definition of "matter."
It's easy to get bogged down in those sorts of discussions (as seems to be the case on this thread). But there's another piece of the puzzle, which has been touched on several times on this thread, but it hasn't really been addressed in any depth.
To begin with, one thing that appears to be the case, is that "meaning" is not part of a truly materialist universe. Material interactions cannot "mean" anything -- they just happen. For a phenomenon to have "meaning," implies "purpose," or at least awareness, that at some level necessarily exists outside the materialist universe.
Thus, if there is "meaning" in any phenomenon, materialism pretty much has to collapse.
So let's look at that.
When we observe a supposedly materialist universe, we realize that it operates according to "rules." (And here, already, materialism begins to totter -- what is realization, if not evidence of awareness?)
When we describe those rules, modern science generally does so by means of logic and mathematics, and deductions and conclusions drawn from them. We can create tools that measure -- assign quantitative values -- to phenomena, based on our understanding of the rules governing the phenomenon we're trying to measure.
But note: we live in a universe that can be described, including predictively, through mathematics, logic, "rules," quantitative systems ... and "universals" such as pi, e, and so on. These have all the appearance of being based on ideals, as opposed to physical phenomena.
And we make deductions -- if this happens, it implies something else. This is not just an exercise of mind -- though it is that, as well. We are also an inventive lot, so that we use our deductions to create tools by which we control the material interactions of the universe in order to achieve some desired end; and "desired end" implies meaning. Materialism looks pretty shaky by now, but it's still possible (one supposes) to assert that these are all just byproducts of the physical, material process called consciousness.
The key to the problem of materialism, really depends on the nature of these apparently non-material concepts. The principles of mathematics, for example, appear to be discovered, as opposed to invented. And mathematics is at root a descriptive discipline -- might it not embody a form of meaning?
Beyond that, let us suppose that our consciousness is nothing but a material process, and even our own understanding of a problem might be described that way. But we also pass on our understanding to others -- we have the ability to communicate, through purposeful action, the understanding in our own mind, to other minds. We have language, and the means of describing concept.
It becomes extremely difficult, at that point, to exclude "meaning" from the universe. And the materialist worldview seems as a consequence to be fatally flawed.
Flacid pseudo-intellectualism
is the best folks can do
who deny God and His Creation.
As Scripture says . . . the fool has said in his heart, there is no God.
Which are all purely physical considerations. Yet the outcome of the dice roll may possibly be affected by yet another physical condition, which is actually the result of the intervention of a mind: Are the dice "loaded?" Have they been tampered with, so to increase the probability of a favorable outcome from the point of view of the dice tamperer?
I agree with this:
We can say that results are "effectively random," but really that's only because we do not have the means to properly measure the initial conditions, nor account for all of the physical variables that affect the roll.And this:
And this takes us to the original point about "randomness" vs. "knowing the system" in which the event takes place. If we talk about physical random events, we're really talking about events that are "effectively random" from our perspective. We often have no way of gathering information sufficient to describe the physical processes that led to the outcome we observe. Lacking that knowledge (which may be, per Heisenberg, intrinsically unavailable to us), we can still deal with effective randomness through mathematics, via statistics — we can grapple with probabilities, even if deterministic answers elude us. And it works very well. (As an aside, many important theories of modern statistics are due to one William S. Gosset, who was employed as a statistician by the Guinness brewing company. Further proof that beer is good.)...especially the part, "beer is good." :^) [But don't forget Bayes!]
Seriously, you point to the essence of the problem with your words, "from our perspective." Which is why to me, stupid simple and intellectually flaccid as I am, that the use of the word "random" is simply an indicator of something which we do not, in fact, know. And per Heisenberg, maybe cannot know — from our observational perspective. Statistics can bring some tractability to problems of this kind, allowing them to be manipulated in technically productive ways. But statistics can never (in my opinion) elucidate deep truths about the natural world per se.
And I really liked this, a lot:
The key to the problem of materialism, really depends on the nature of these apparently non-material concepts. The principles of mathematics, for example, appear to be discovered, as opposed to invented. And mathematics is at root a descriptive discipline — might it not embody a form of meaning?I definitely believe it does! But then I'm a Platonist — one who believes mathematics is "discovered" — and not a formalist, like, say, David Hilbert, who believed mathematics is "invented," i.e., constructed by human minds.
Also I so agree with your observation that "...one thing that appears to be the case, is that 'meaning' is not part of a truly materialist universe. [Nor can it be without invoking a fatal self-contradiction.] Material interactions cannot 'mean' anything — they just happen. For a phenomenon to have 'meaning,' implies 'purpose,' [final cause] or at least awareness, that at some level necessarily exists outside the materialist universe."
It seems pretty clear to me that the material universe operates according to "rules" — just as you say — and that these rules are themselves immaterial. So another self-contradiction in the materialist view.... Mathematics and logic are also immaterial; but what science, materialist or other, can proceed without mathematics and logic?
You wrote, "we use our deductions to create tools by which we control the material interactions of the universe in order to achieve some desired end; and 'desired end' implies meaning." It moreover implies purpose — an end, goal, limit; a telos — a final cause. Which Francis Bacon effectively banished from science a long time ago....
But it seems to me, without final cause — without the question "Why?" — science is reduced to technical manipulation — which can indeed be purposive. But at the same time the "purpose" in question is not directed at truth, but at utility.
In conclusion, I don't disagree with anything you wrote. And I certainly do agree with your conclusion!
Thank you for your superb analysis, dear r9etb!