Posted on 03/13/2008 6:34:12 PM PDT by hanfei
Abstract Eurasianism as a concept emerged among Russian émigrés in the 1920s, with the premise that Russia is a unique ethnic blend, primarily of Slavic and Turkic peoples. Its geopolitical implications for Russia include gravitation toward mostly Turkic Central Asia. Alexander Dugin, one of its best-known proponents, believes that the demise of the Soviet Union was simply a tragic incident. The people of the former USSR should again be united in a grand Eurasian empire, with Russia a benign and generous patron, providing its “younger brothers” clients economic largesse and defense, mostly against the predatory USA. The “orange revolutions” and the rise of Russian nationalism, for whose proponents a restored imperial presence is rather marginal, indicate that Eurasianism—along with the dream of the resurrection of the USSR—is becoming less viable.
Keywords: Eurasianism; Dugin; Central Asia; Anti-Americanism; Geopolitics
Article Outline Introduction Other proofs for American strive for power. The orange revolution and Central Asia Orange revolution in Kyrghyzstan as sunset of imperial dream NGOs are an American agent European implications of “orange revolutions” in Central Asia Orange revolutions in Central Asia and implications for Russia Central Asia: Eurasian dream or its graveyard Building an Eurasian Empire in Central Asia Central Asia and a change of paradigms: the Turkic people as “older brothers” The Uzbekistan false dawn Kazakhstan: special attention The problem of Russian nationalism and a new challenge for the Eurasian cause Conclusion References
Introduction Eurasianism is an intellectual and quasi political trend which emerged in 1920s among Russian émigrés. The point of Eurasianism is the assumption that Russia belongs neither to the Eastern nor to Western Europe but constitute the civilization in its own right as mixture of Slavs and Muslims of Russia/Eurasia who have different ethnic, mostly Turkic, background. The earlier Eurasianists regarded Europe, mostly Western Europe, as the major geopolitical opponent of Russia/Eurasia. The new version of Eurasianism has emerged in late Soviet-early post-Soviet Russia with Alexander Dugin as its major representative. In contrast to early Eurasianists Dugin did not regard West Europeans as the enemies of Russia/Eurasia. West Europeans could be seen as an ally or at least as a neutral force. It is rather the USA which is seen as an emerging archenemy of Eurasia and of the entire humanity. The USA's major crime is not so much in their desire to hold over natural resources (oil and gas) but to remodel the entire global community according to their own pattern. In fact Dugin implicitly accepted neocon explanation of the USA foreign policy. However, in order to withstand encroaching Americanism and preserve own cultural identity the global community should create a cluster of empires with Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS), especially countries of Central Asia, playing crucial role in it. These empires/states might have only one unifying force: their opposition to the USA.
The Eurasianists' fears of the U.S. strive for global dominance are not groundless. Many Eurasianists explain American operations in former Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan and Iraq as a proof of the U.S. grand plans. For example, Pavel Zarifullin, chairman of the International Eurasian Movement (IEM) and a trusted Dugin's lieutenant, believes the USA will not stop until it has destroyed all regimes not directly ruled by Washington. Today, Washington destroys such a regime in Ukraine. The next will be in Central Asia, probably Kazakhstan and Kyrghyzia; Zarifullin, like Dugin, predicted the 2005 revolution in Kyrghyzstan. On removing all regimes in Central Asia that are not directly subservient, the USA will try to do the same in Minsk and Moscow.
Fabrizio Vielmini, an Italian political scientist/journalist who spent considerable time in the former USSR, expressed his vision of global events and American posture in an article that Dugin placed on his website (Vielmini, 2004). Vielmini pointed out that the American foothold in Central Asia has nothing to do with terrorism. Its purpose is to spread American influence in the area, by destabilizing Central Asia and Russia. A major goal is to control the sources of oil and prevent access by competitors such as Europe, China, India, and Japan.
The implications of the American imperial plan are many. It is true, Vielmini asserted, that America could be a mortal danger for the people of Central Asia and Russia. Placing U.S. bases all over Eurasia is a clear sign of America's drive for global dominance and will alarm the countries it has defined as the “axis of evil.” These countries—North Korea, Iran, and Syria—have taken important steps to protect their independence and will, indeed, turn to weapons of mass destruction as the only way to prevent American aggression. Thus brazen and reckless U.S. aggression would, Vielmini implied, stimulate the creation of groups and possibly alliances of nuclear states that would complicate the American position considerably in the long run.
Moreover, Vielmini questioned the wisdom of Central Asian bases even from a short-term perspective. Americans in general are “poor soldiers” and could hardly win in the long run unless they enjoyed absolute technological superiority. The war they most likely will face in these areas would be guerrilla-type activities in which technological preponderance would hardly provide the upper hand. And the very presence of bases in Central Asia will destabilize situations and create magnets for terrorists who regard the fight against American forces as their major goal. Thus, American expansion in Central Asia will actually speed up the collapse of the American empire.
But for Vielmini, the fact that the American empire will fail in the long run does not mean that it could not create serious problems for several countries. The elites of Russia and Kazakhstan do not understand the danger they face. Kazakhstan should be especially worried, for the USA clearly regards it as a part of the plan to dominate Eurasia and, in particular, Central Asia.
Some of these regimes have started to understand that they are in mortal danger from the West. In Zarifullin's view, Putin himself seems to be aware of the danger and is attempting to build a defense against the coming “orange” problem. He has traveled all over the world to seek allies in China, India, Japan, Turkey, and Brazil. Zarifullin believes the major reason for these trips is to find allies to confront a wave of future “orange revolutions” destined to engulf the territory of the former USSR and finally strike Russia itself.
Zarifullin argued that Nazarbaev, president of Kazakhstan, understands that he is the next target for an “orange revolution,” and has engaged in consultations on how to prevent the collapse of his country. The pressure of a “pitiless enemy” has led leaders of Russia and Central Asian countries to engage in “Eurasian integration and eliminate the agents of foreign influence inside the country.” But these regimes are weak, and “Byzantine intrigue” will not save them and their countries from U.S. pressure. Only authoritarian Eurasian regimes can do so.
Other proofs for American strive for power. The orange revolution and Central Asia The democratic revolutions that happened first in Georgia and then in Ukraine and Kyrghyzstan, alarmed Dugin and his supporters and became for them another proof of the U.S. meddling into world affairs with the purpose to gain unlimited domination. After the “orange revolution”1 in Georgia, there was extreme concern among Dugin and those who share his major premises that what they saw there and especially in Ukraine was the beginning of a process that would install pro-American regimes all over the post-Soviet region, including Central Asia.
Ukraine was the second country to experience an “orange revolution.” It was a serious jolt for Dugin and others who believed that the election of a pro-Moscow candidate in Kiev would begin the long process of integration of the post-Soviet states. When it became clear that this would not happen, The Ukrainian debacle instilled Dugin with gloomy thoughts. During a conference which included Dugin and Dmitry Korchinsky, leader of the Ukrainian Bratstvo party, the latter described the events as just the beginning of a process that would spread all over the former USSR. Dugin supported Korchinsky and added that without an appropriate ideology (Eurasianism, of course) as the “Northern Lights” for these grassroots organizations, “orange revolutions” instigated by the USA would continue (Evraziia, 2005b).
Dugin reduced “orange revolutions” in Central Asia exclusively to an American conspiracy, seeing no objective reasons for social upheaval. In one public discussion after the revolution in Ukraine, a certain Iakovenko pointed out that it would be over-simplistic to regard the “orange revolution” as just the product of a conniving West. Lenin had received money from the Germans, but that did not make the Bolshevik Revolution a German creation. Dugin disagreed, implying that only a naïve person could not see the direct foreign manipulation, and that the U.S. goal of detaching Ukraine from Russia is easily seen in Zbigniew Brzezinski's (1997) work. Complete domination over Eurasia requires “orange revolutions” in the entire post-Soviet space. In Dugin's view, “orange-type” revolutions will be organized in Moldova and Kyrghyzia. The same will be done in Kazakhstan and Belorussia, and finally, an “orange revolution” will be launched in Russia and lead to the country's disintegration. Zarifullin also pointed out that the “orange revolution” in Ukraine was not spontaneous but pre-arranged by the West (Zarifullin, 2004).
The populace carrying out an “orange revolution” designed by the USA might believe they would be rewarded generously by their new patrons. This, however, will not happen because the USA wishes to achieve its geopolitical goals without payment. Thus, the people of the world, including those of Central Asia, should not help the USA in building its global domination and expect rewards they will never receive, but stand firmly against American hegemony (Dugin, 2004).
Dugin and those who follow him predicted a wave of “orange revolutions” in Central Asia soon after the revolution in Ukraine. They were hardly cheered by such a prospect but they believed that American attempts to spread global influence through “orange revolutions” would lead to appropriate responses. The people of Eurasia would now see clearly the American drive to global predominance, and this awareness would lead to a backlash. It would lead not just to the forging of an anti-American alliance but—this was especially important—to a transformation of Putin's regime. Putin would finally wake up, shake off pro-Western advisors, and transform himself into a true Eurasian leader who would boldly face the USA. There would be other important implications: Putin, upon dismissing pro-Western advisors, would invite Dugin and similar thinking folks to advise him on foreign and domestic policies.
Dugin and those who followed his views were absolutely right in predicting the outbreak of “orange revolutions” in Central Asia. Yet the revolutions have not led to spreading anti-American alliances, nor, and this was especially important for Dugin, has Putin radically changed policy. In this context, in Dugin's view, the revolution in Kyrghyzstan (March 2005) revealed Russia's geopolitical weakness and was another step in its retreat. Dugin and other Eurasianists became extremely apprehensive and elaborated at length on the implications of these events, though they failed to see any real internal reasons for the events to happen. Whatever the reason for that “orange revolution,” it was a clear catastrophe and Dugin anticipated with dread the continuation of the process.
Orange revolution in Kyrghyzstan as sunset of imperial dream Dugin's belief was that even after the collapse of the USSR there was a tacit agreement that Russia would exercise influence on the territory of the former USSR. The events in Kyrgyzstan showed clearly that this informal agreement was no more (Izvestiia, 2005). In the view of Dugin and his supporters, the Kyrghyz revolution was just preparation for onslaughts against the other regimes in Central Asia that Washington did not regard as subservient to its will. And Dugin believed that Russia could do nothing to prevent these events from unfolding. About events in Kirghizia, he was actually desperate. In his view, Russia had lost all influence in the former USSR, and he mocked the Putin regime's pretensions that Russia is once again a great power with influence in global politics. Kyrghyzstan proved that Russia's power is close to nothing: a Potemkin type of imperial splendor. Powerless, Russia can do nothing but engage in trade in oil and gas and proclaims itself great and powerful, which, in Dugin's view, is nothing but wishful thinking. The USA will inevitably take advantage of Russia's apparent weakness (Evraziia, 2005d).
While similar to Russian/Ukrainian Eurasianists, Tagi Dzhafarov, an Eurasianist from Baku, has a peculiar flavor in his approach to the problems of “orange revolutions.” He pointed out that the USA has increased its pressure on Russia. It has already accomplished this pressure in Ukraine and Georgia and plans to do the same in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. However, he assumed that “orange revolutions” would not be limited to Central Asia but spread to Moldova and Belorussia and into the Caucasus, to such countries as Armenia and Azerbaijan. In fact, “orange revolutions” would spread all over the former USSR. In Dugin's view, America uses different techniques to achieve its goals.
It is not only belief in the global extent of “orange revolutions” that makes Dzhafavor different from Dugin and other Russian and Ukrainian Eurasianists. He actually sees no way that Russia, or perhaps any other country, will be able to withstand them. Indeed, he points out that Russia's attempt to prevent the installation of pro-American regimes did not work because of lack of political will: the Putin regime's unwillingness to engage in direct confrontation with the USA. Every time that the Russian Defense Minister visits Peking, he also always visits Washington (Dzhafarov, 2005). Alternatively, some regimes might conclude that Russia was not a reliable partner and adopt a pro-American policy.
NGOs are an American agent In analyzing the revolutionary upheaval, poverty and the corruption of the elite as a major reason for popular dissatisfaction are not mentioned. The revolutions are considered just a result of the skillful manipulation of NGOs—actually U.S. agents—or grassroots organizations. For example, the event in Kyrgyzstan demonstrated that America could use youth organizations to achieve its goal (Dugin, 2005a).
Dzhafarov believes that “orange revolutions” have nothing to do with spontaneous outbursts of the populace upset with corruption and low living standards but come from outside sources. Americans were behind the revolutions in Ukraine and in Georgia (Dzhafarov, 2004). He traced U.S. involvement in undermining stability in the territory of the former USSR since the revolution in Ukraine. He stated that the real “orange revolution” in Ukraine was launched by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These NGOs were not from Ukraine only but from all over the former Soviet Union and even from the foreign countries. It would be naïve to assume that these organizations have engaged in undermining the situation in Ukraine on their own; they were all supported by American money and manipulated by Washington. The NGO goal was not just to ensure the victory of pro-Western candidates in Ukraine but also to train for future similar activities elsewhere, especially in countries that do not follow Washington's dictates.
European implications of “orange revolutions” in Central Asia In spring 2005 Dugin went on a trip to Italy. Elaborating on international events in his lectures on this trip, Dugin pointed out that American power can and should be confronted by the creation of several empires that would prevent it from global domination. The USA understands the danger of such alliances and tries to create regimes that serve American interests, such as the buffer zones between Russia and Europe in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. In Dugin's view, Europeans made a horrible mistake in supporting these regimes, for they actually are U.S. tools. Europeans should not be deceived; pro-American regimes would be directed against Europe as well as Russia. The regimes in Georgia and Ukraine would prevent “Eurasian oil and Eurasian gas” from being delivered to European markets (Pliev, 2005). The Americans are trying to do the same in Central Asia, where they organized an “orange revolution” in Kyrghyzia and attempted “orange type” coups in Uzbekistan.
Compliance with American plans would have devastating implications for Europeans, Dugin implied. Cut off from Central Asian and Russian oil and gas, Europeans would be once again a marginalized, powerless appendix to the American empire. In this situation, Europeans, especially those Dugin has regarded as friendly Eurasian powers, Germany and France, would be unable to build grand Eurasian empires together with Russia and other states of the former USSR.
Orange revolutions in Central Asia and implications for Russia Dugin's concern with “orange revolutions” was not just due to the feeling that “orange regimes” in Central Asia would make an Eurasian empire impossible. They are the beginning of the end of Russia proper. Dugin and those who share his views have envisaged two basic scenarios: transmission of the “orange” virus to Russia to destroy the country from within, and combining destruction from within with a preventive nuclear strike.
The first scenario seems to be the most likely in Dugin's mind. After the events in Kyrghyzstan, Dugin believed that “orange revolutions” in Central Asia would be just a prelude to similar events in Russia by 2008 (Dugin, 2005b). Americans would use pro-American regimes in Central Asia and other post-Soviet space, for ideological penetration to destroy Russia from within by the Russians themselves. The resulting “orange” regime would not hold long, and would lead to the disintegration of Russia and its integration into the American empire (Trud, 2005).
In the second scenario, the traditional way of ending Russia's independent existence, a military strike is usually not seen as an option, despite the fact that a score of Russian nationalists are convinced that the American elites are patiently waiting for Russia to be weak enough to be easily decapitated by a “shock and awe” preventive strike. Dugin does not regard this way of dealing with Russia as popular among the American elites, and usually discards this option. But he has implied, especially after Kyghyzstan, that stimulation of internal opposition to the Putin regime could indeed be combined with a military strike.
On Dugin's “Evraziia” website it is possible to read the view of one pundit who soon after the events in Kyrgyzstan described the second scenario for how “orange revolutions” in Central Asia could lead to Russia's demise. According to this view, the revolution in Kyrgyzstan was directly organized by the USA, who invited members of the Kyrgyz opposition to the USA for training. The Americans regard the Kyrgyz revolution not as an isolated event but as the first of similar events in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and, it was implied, China, all countries that have almost been labeled outcast nations by the USA. The Americans need these Eurasian revolutions as a springboard for “orange-type” revolutions in Russia.
These revolutions would be absolute disasters. The people the Americans would install would actually be enemies of the country. They would be completely cynical and would not hesitate if they believed the direct force was needed to suppress enemies of their regime. In 1993 pro-American liberals shelled the Russian Parliament building (Evraziia, 2005c). If internal subversion were not sufficient to destroy the country, direct military force would be applied. In fact, the quoted author believed, the American drive to destroy Russia would be a combination of internal subversion and military strike. The importance of the “orange revolution” in Kyrgyzstan is seen here as indirect preparation for a direct military strike. From Kyrgyzstan, Americans could easily attack the Russian strategic bases in South Russia and Siberia.
Central Asia: Eurasian dream or its graveyard Taking into consideration the above described events, it becomes clear why Alexander Dugin together with a considerable number of the Russian elite considers Russian control over Central Asia important to a Russian/Eurasian empire. There are at least two purely pragmatic reasons. One is control of Europe; and those who control Central Asia with its oil will control Europe. The present situation in Europe makes it easy for Russia to use oil as a geopolitical weapon. Unified Europe makes the task easier and means that a friendly relationship with just a few dominant countries is sufficient to control the rest EU countries. Germany—the key economic engine of the European Union and a truly Eurasian country,—is the most important. Elaborating on Eurasianist beliefs, Justin Cowgill wrote: “While seeking German diplomatic support and trade, Moscow is also promoting European dependence on Russian-controlled Central Asian energy resources”. Another pragmatic reason why Russia needs Central Asia and its alliance with Eurasian empire to prosper is to confront and defeat their archenemy, the United States.
Building an Eurasian Empire in Central Asia Almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR, its former states showed interest in an opposite trend, aiming for a new form of integration. Several organizations and treaties tightened the bonds among some states, apparently substantiating Dugin's assumption that Central Asia could be firmly integrated in a Eurasian empire under Russian control. Some of the former states of the Soviet Union that had moved away from Russia in the early post-Soviet period, seem to be returning to the Russian orbit.
In May 1991, the Treaty for Collective Security (Dogovor o Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti, DKB) was signed by nine states, later reduced to six: Armenia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Russia, and Tajikistan. In 2003 the group was organized into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Organizatsiia Dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti, ODKB), similar to the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation (Shankhaiskaia Organizatsiia Sotrudnichestva) and the Central-Asian Economic Union (Tsentral'no Aziatskii Ekonomicheskii Soiuz). The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was strengthened, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was created, giving Moscow “a new sphere of economic influence” ([Cowgill, 2005] and [Evraziia, 2005e]). Some pundits assume that these organizations were launched under Dugin's direct influence.
Russia has been able to preserve some military influence in Central Asia as well, “by creating a regional rapid reaction force under Russian command, which gives Russia the leading role in forming security policies for the region” ([Cowgill, 2005] and [Evraziia, 2005e]). Uzbekistan, for example, after violently suppressing a popular uprising in May 2005, began to look to Russia as a major patron. This influence, along with the trend toward integration provided an argument for Dugin's belief that Central Asia could be incorporated into a larger Eurasian imperial web. In fact, Dugin apparently believes a union of Central Asian countries with Russia would be a nucleus of a new Eurasian empire that would replace the USSR.
Central Asia and a change of paradigms: the Turkic people as “older brothers” Dugin's vested interest in Turkic Central Asia has led him and some of the Russian elite to change important aspects of the Eurasian model, in particular, the leading role for the Russian people and the Orthodox religion in a future Eurasian empire. The founding fathers of Eurasianism had discarded racism, arguing that common history, space, and mentality unites people. In Dugin's view, Russian openness to people of different races and cultures meant that its expansion was based on incorporation rather than on the European tradition of conquest, which sharply demarcated conquerors and conquered. But for some time he still held the view that Russians should lead.
The notion of Russians as “older brothers” of Eurasia led to resentment among leaders of some Russian Federation minorities, such as Tatars. They asserted that Dugin's supposedly all-embracing Eurasianism is just traditional Russian nationalism, relegating minorities to subjects of Russian rule. They would accept Eurasianism only in a drastically different version in which Muslim minorities are “older brothers,” or at least equal to Russians. This approach characterizes the Eurasianism party created by Niazov, formerly known as Medvedev, an ethnic Russian converted to Islam.
Dugin and Niazov are sharply at odds, because of personal rivalries as well as views on the role of Muslims and Orthodox Russians. In most cases, Dugin has rejected the notion that Muslim minorities should share much power with ethnic Russians, and especially the idea that the former may play the role of “older brothers.” However, in some cases Dugin and some members of the Russian elite doubted ethnic Russians' ability to fulfill the mission to lead “Eurasia,” especially in the territory beyond of the former USSR. So he has changed the design for the Eurasian empire, which in his new view might indeed be built up by Muslims, most likely Turkic people.
Dugin elaborated this position further in a discussion organized by Moscow Radio (Radio Ekho Moskvy, 2004). He stated that Russians should not be arrogant in approaching Turkic people, who can provide Russians with important values, such as “big families,” and toyed with the idea that in case of Russians' failure in their imperial mission, Muslim people should take the lead. He did not exclude the possibility of Russians to be dissolved in the Turkic culture, if needed, in order to build up the great Eurasian empire. Thus, Turks, including the Turks of Central Asia, are extremely important in Dugin's geopolitical designs with Russia and Kazakhstan becoming a nucleus in a new Eurasian union; while Russians and Kazakhs blended into one great Eurasian quasi-nation, with ethnic differences playing no role.
The Uzbekistan false dawn In 2005, after the events in Kyrghyzstan, Sergei Markov stated that Uzbekistan and Tajikistan would be the next stage in American-sponsored “orange revolutions” (Pravda, ru., 2005). One could question the logic of undermining a regime such as Karimov's in Uzbekistan, which is friendly to the USA. But the widespread view among the Russian elite is that the American elite does not think in terms of real politics. The neocon ideologists who rule Washington are inspired by schemes of instilling American-type democracy all over the world. Karimov's regime does not follow the Anglo-Saxon political rules, so he should be replaced by a government that would be even friendlier to Americans. The fact that Karimov has helped them means nothing. Contrary to Eurasian rules, the American elite have no sense of gratitude and easily depose friends they no longer need.
The popular revolt in Uzbekistan was brutally suppressed by Karimov. Hundreds, if not thousands, perished. Dugin was apparently pleased to see the revolt thwarted, apparently considering Karimov as more or less pro-Russian. But Karimov could hardly to stabilize the regime by sheer force. Successful confrontation with the USA requires radical changes in the thinking and activities of the Central Asian elite, in fact, of the entire post-Soviet space, and only conversion to Eurasianism would accomplish this task (Pronin, 2005). Since there was no sign such a conversion had taken place, and Karimov definitely did not indicate belief in the Eurasian creed, he was doomed, and Dugin believed an “orange revolution” was inevitable in Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan: special attention The importance of Kazakhstan in Dugin's design can be seen in his approach to the country's leader, Nursultan Nazarbaev. Originally, Dugin had great expectations of Putin, and has continued to proclaim himself a staunch supporter of the Russian President. But Putin's image started to tarnish in the past few years because of his flirtation with the USA. Thus Dugin put all his aspirations in Nazarbaev whom he has met several times (Dugin, 2005d), and perceived him as indispensable to the Eurasian cause.
In Dugin's view, Kazakhstan will play a crucial role in the unification of the former USSR. Kazakhstan's presence will prevent the process of Eurasian integration from going awry and becoming harmful for Russia. At the conference in Astana in June 2004 on “Eurasian Integration: Tendencies of Current Developments and Challenges of Globalism,” attended by leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belorussia, Tajikistan, and Armenia (Evraziia, 2005a), Dugin outlined two basic scenarios of global development. The first presented a world government that would result in loss of the identities of the countries of the former USSR and lead to a clear disaster. The second scenario presented a more viable solution—the creation in Eurasia of grand new types of empires. Dugin saw two such centers: greater Asia, with China in the leading role, and a unified Europe.
Nazarbaev calls for a Eurasian empire/union with Russia and Kazakhstan as its nucleus. Dugin implied that this new entity would be strong enough that the power centers around China and Europe would not be able to crush. The other empires in the area, rather than being dangerous, would complement the Eurasian empire and ensure it as an independent center of power. Because economic cooperation is crucial to geopolitical cooperation, Dugin believes Russia should cooperate with Kazakhstan in selling oil and gas: cooperating in the broad economic realm is the only way their goods can be competitive (Dugin, 2005c).
Nazarbaev's Eurasianist policy and the maintenance of Kazakhstan integrity are seen as inseparable. Artur Platonov has stated that without Nazarbaev the country would be plunged into chaos (Evraziia, 2004b). Since Nazarbaev is seen as a crucial player in forging the Eurasian empire, Dugin spares no effort in promoting his numerous publications and presenting him as a great thinker who tries to make Eurasian ideology known to the general public. He extolled Kazakhstan in general, and Nazarbaev in particular, as crucial for the Eurasian cause at the 2004 Astana conference and at a conference on Kazakh–Russian cooperation.
That same year, as part of a major conference in Kazakhstan, Dugin visited the Eurasian University, named after Lev Gumilev, and read a paper on the role of Gumilev in the development of Eurasian ideas. At a meeting attended by several leaders of the former USSR, Dugin presented his vision of global development and the role Kazakhstan should play in it, praising Nazarbaev as a theoretician and practitioner who turns Gumilev's ideas into political reality. He has gone so far as to credit Nazarbaev for inventing the doctrine of Eurasianism before and independently of him, Dugin. At the conference, “Eurasianism at the Beginning of the Millennium: Tendency and Perspective,” part of the “Year of Kazakhstan” (God Kazakhstana) in 2004, Dugin praised Nazarbaev for the “resurrection of the Eurasian idea and its realization in real life”.
Dugin also extolled Nazarbaev during numerous interviews. On 19 January 2005, Nazarbaev made an official visit to Russia. In an interview for Kazinform (Kazinform, 2005), Dugin praised Nazarbaev for having already in 1993 put forward the idea of a Eurasian Union (Evraziiskii Soiuz), noting that Kazakhstan was first in the Union of Independent States (SNG) to finalize its borders with Russia. It was implied that the absence of border tension between Russia and Kazakhstan would help the two countries engage in a harmonious symbiosis in the Eurasian Union. Finally, Dugin's, 2004 book, Eurasian Mission of Nursultan Nazarbaev, and many articles argue why Nazarbaev is to be seen as the cornerstone for his Eurasian project.
This praise is accompanied by intense contacts between members of Dugin's Eurasian movement and Kazakhstan's political elite. For example, in Almaty, representatives of the Eurasian movement had a discussion with leaders of the “Party of Patriots of Kazakhstan” (Kazinform, 2005). Dugin and his supporters praised Kazakhstan and Nazarbaev, while Nazarbaev made several statements that included “Eurasia/Eurasianism”.
Some Kazakh intellectuals also seem to be fascinated with Eurasianism. At a press conference for Dugin's book Na Evraziiskom Iordane at Zapadno-Kazakhskii University in the Urals (Evraziia, 2004a), Al'bert Shakirov, the producer, pointed out that Kazakhstan was the first country to attempt to implement Eurasianism in real life. He added that Eurasianism is the only viable alternative for the survival of Kazakhstan as a state. Otherwise it would be just the raw materials adjunct to China or the West. Worse yet would be the extremist version of Islam, which, Shakirov implied (following Dugin's theoretical framework), is nothing but a product of the Atlantic-U.S. civilization and absolutely incompatible with wholesome Eurasian civilizations of Kazakhstan and Russia. Eurasianism, in the views of some Kazakh pundits, should also provide a clear framework for economic cooperation. For example, at the December 2004 meeting of the “Eurasian Club,” the Kazakhstan ambassador pointed out that Kazakhstan and Russia are economically interconnected (Evraziia, 2004c). These ideas are wholeheartedly supported by Dugin.
The problem of Russian nationalism and a new challenge for the Eurasian cause Dugin envisages a Eurasian empire in which Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan, playing a key role. Russia would be the benign patron that would generously provide for its allies/clients. Dugin, as noted above, has even implied that he would not mind seeing this empire led by Turkic people. Indeed, some states of Central Asia, such as Kazakhstan, have occasionally entertained the idea of moving closer to Moscow. This feeling has, however, not been shared by several republics of the former USSR. Fear of imperial domination led to the creation of GUUAM, an alliance hostile to Russia that originally included Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (Uzbekhistan left the organization in 2005).
However, there seems to be yet another scenario. In this instance, Dugin does not promote unification with Kazakhstan but attaches the northern part of the country, populated mostly by ethnic Russians, to the Russian Federation. Instead of all-embracing universalistic Eurasianism, Dugin has started to preach Russian nationalism, which, instead of seeing in Kazakhstan fellow Eurasianists, approaches them as hostile Asiatics. This plan has been opposed by those who do not agree with Dugin and who are anxious to demonstrate that his theory is actually Russian nationalism in disguise, which would lead Russia and its neighbors to trouble. This was, for example, the case with S. Butman, who engaged in discussion with Dugin when Dugin publicly elaborated on the possibility of detaching the region of Kazakhstan populated by ethnic Russians. Butman argued that Dugin's idea about unifying parts of other republics populated by Russians or Russified groups with Russia is dangerous. For example, Astrakhan province is populated almost exclusively by Kazakhs. If Russians who live in Kazakhstan demand unification with Russia, Kazakhs who live in Astrakhan could well unification with Kazakhstan (Radio Ekho Moskvy, 2004).
Dugin's occasional splash of Russian nationalism is, of course, not jus his personal problem but a reflection of the problems of the Russian elite. Even the segment of the elite who have espoused Eurasianism's all-embracing internationalism are not foreign to Russian nationalism, which regards Russia as the master in the former USSR. An opponent to Dugin's Eurasian empire opposed the design in which Turkic people would be its leading force, the capital would be Istanbul, and the majority would speak Turkic languages. He did not like such a scenario, preferring that his children speak Russian, Ukrainian, or German (Radio Ekho Moskvy, 2004).
Despite the occasional Freudian slip, Dugin has rightly seen Russian nationalism as a force that would prevent Russians and other people of Eurasia from building a great Eurasian union where family-type arrangements would downplay the divisions of “older” and “younger” brothers. It is a force that could endanger the very existence of Russia as a unified state. For this reason, he has been quite apprehensive about Russian nationalism's rise in its xenophobic, often isolationist, implicitly anti-imperial variation. Some ideologists of these groups proclaimed that Russia should not only have no imperial ambitions but actually shed areas of the Federation that ethnic Russians could not dominate completely. Dugin has expected that Putin would put the spread of nationalistic propaganda to an end. But he does not. Russia's January 2007 demand that friendly Belorussia pay the same price for oil and gas as regimes hostile to Russia, shook Dugin, for this action, though possibly pleasing some Russian nationalists, makes integration of Eurasian space under a benign Russian leadership virtually impossible.
Conclusion Eurasianism has become quite popular in post-Soviet Russia, with Alexander Dugin the best-known representative. One of his major ideas is the integration of the republics of the former USSR in a new Eurasian union, an empire of sorts, with the countries of Central Asia an essential element. Dugin's dream in a way reflects the views of members of the Russian elite who believe that the USSR was not lost for good and that Russia could again be a leading power, a geopolitical patron or “older brother.” The rise of “orange revolutions” and of self-centered and pragmatic Russian nationalism has made this scenario less and less viable. Indeed, Russia could hardly dominate any part of post-Soviet space exclusively. Central Asia might increasingly be the area of the contest of powers, most notably the USA and China. In fact, China might be seen as the ultimate beneficiary of Russia's retreat. Another alternative could be increasing chaos and terrorism in this part of the world.
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1 Though in Georgia it was “revolution of roses” and in Kyrghyzia “tulip revolution” I chose to use term “orange revolution” which took place and became a symbol of democratic revolution aimed to change the authoritarian and corrupt regime in Ukraine, for all revolutions of this type.
--N. Bonaparte
If they want a Eurasian Empire, put ‘em back under the Khans.
ping
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