Posted on 06/26/2004 3:18:20 AM PDT by ultima ratio
September 1999 No. 34
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This issue of the Angelus English-Language edition of SISINONO is the second part of a series of two studies - one theological and one canonical - regarding the "state of necessity" invoked by Archbishop Lefebvre to justify his consecration of four bishops on June 30, 1988. These remarks are for those who admit the existence of an extraordinary crisis in the Catholic Church but do not know how to justify the extraordinary action of Archbishop Lefebvre on June 30, 1988 when, lacking permission from Pope John Paul II, he transmitted the power of episcopal orders to members of the Fraternity founded by him.
THEOLOGICAL STUDY – PART II. SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE POPE’S “NO”
A. The Pope's "No"
We saw in the first installment of this article (SISINONO, "The 1988 Consecrations: Part I," The Angelus, July 1999) that a bishop who experiences a state of grave general necessity of souls and consecrates another bishop "given that he has the power of Order" (St. Thomas Aquinas, Supplement, Q.20, A.1, op.cit. in, "The 1988 Consecrations: Part 1") is not questioning the primacy of jurisdiction of the pope. We have seen that he has every right to presume support for such an act required by extraordinary circumstances "in order that adequate provision be made" (ST, op. cit. in Part 1) for the salvation of souls and for the common good. The salvation of souls is in fact the supreme law of the Church and it is certain that the Church "supplies" the jurisdiction lacking whenever it is a question of providing for the "public and general necessity of the faithful" (F.M. Cappello, SJ ., Summa Juris Canonici, vol. I, p.258, n.258, §2, op. cit. in Part 1).
It makes no difference to what we have just said if recourse to the pope is made materially impossible by external circumstances, as in the historical cases recalled by us [in Part 1].
But it is the pope himself who is favoring or promoting a course for the Church infected by neo-Modernism which threatens the goods fundamental to souls, goods indispensable for the salvation of souls, e.g., faith and morals. If the pope himself is the cause or partial-cause, and even, given his supreme authority, the ultimate cause of the grave and general spiritual necessity in which there is no hope of help from the lawful pastors, then what effect will recourse to the pope obtain in such circumstances? He will be physically accessible, but morally inaccessible. Recourse to him will be certainly physically possible but morally impossible, and if it be attempted, it will result naturally in the pope's saying "No" to the act which the extraordinary circumstances require "in order that adequate provision be made" (ST, op. cit. in Part 1) for the grave general necessity of souls. Any different behavior on the part of the pope presupposes, in fact, repentance and a humble admission of his own responsibility given that the act in question - i.e., the consecration of bishops -would not be required if the pope himself was not in some measure co-responsible for the state of grave and general necessity.
Therefore, it remains for us to ask if the subject in such circumstances is bound to obey the "No" of the pope despite the harm threatening so many souls. In other words, does the "No" of the pope exonerate him from the duty under pain of mortal sin imposed by divine law upon whomever has the possibility to provide help for souls in the state of grave and general necessity where there is no hope of help from lawful pastors? This is the question that finds its answer in the Catholic doctrine on the state of necessity. This will become clear as we explain the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh principles of the Church's teaching on this point. [The first, second, and third principles were discussed in Part l-Ed.]
1. 4th Principle: In necessity the duty to help is independent of the cause of the necessity and hence is binding be it the superior himself who is placing souls in the state of necessity
In the state of necessity the duty to provide help arises independently of the cause of that necessity, because "charity does not look where the necessity comes from, but is only interested in the fact that there is necessity."1 Thus, in the example we gave above in the sphere of natural law, the wife has the duty to supply for her husband even if it be the husband himself who is placing the family in the state of necessity (SiSiNoNo, "The 1988 consecrations: Part 1," p.20).
Likewise, the duty sub gravi [under pain of mortal sin- Ed.] of helping souls in the state of grave necessity is binding even if it is the bishop of the diocese who is spreading or favoring Modernism, or, similarly, if it is the pope promoting or favoring Modernism in the universal Church. On the contrary, as we have already seen, it is precisely this circumstance that gives rise to the grave duty of charity because then the state of necessity of souls is without any hope of help from those who ex officio should be providing for people's ordinary and extraordinary needs.
These circumstances, however, will have the effect of rendering the duty of help more difficult and perhaps even heroic on account of the easily foreseeable consequences. It will be denied that there is any state of necessity! The rebuke implied in the act of helping the people will draw down upon whoever does so revulsion and unjust accusations. And, since we are dealing with the person of the pope himself, the subject runs into "even graver danger" because "from the abuses of lesser prelates recourse can always be had to the pope,"2 but against the pope the only recourse is to God (St. Catherine of Siena).
2. 5th Principle: It is the character of the state of necessity to suspend the superior's power of binding, and if, nevertheless, he attempts to bind, what he commands is not binding
Further applying the example already given regarding natural law, this principle is illustrated by the case of a husband who not only placed his children in necessity or failed to provide for them, but, who, moreover, prevented his wife from providing for them as far as was in her power. It is obvious that in such a case the husband's power to bind would be suspended, and if he attempted to bind, his command would not be binding upon his wife.
The fact that in the case of Archbishop Lefebvre the superior is the pope does not nullify this principle. The Vicar of Christ first and foremost has the duty to provide for the needs of souls, and if he does not provide for them (or, worse, if he himself is the cause or part-cause of the grave and general state of spiritual necessity), that does not entitle him to prevent others from providing as far as they can for the needs of souls. This is especially applicable if the duty to supply is rooted in their own sacerdotal or, still more, episcopal state.
The authority of the pope is indeed unlimited, but from below, not from above. >From above, papal power is limited by divine law, natural and positive. The authority of the pope is "monarchical...and absolute within the limits, however, of divine law, natural and positive" and for that reason "the Roman Pontiff himself cannot act against divine law or disregard it."3 Now, in the state of necessity, divine natural and positive law imposes a duty of charity under pain of mortal sin upon whoever is able to provide help, and in the state of spiritual necessity it imposes this duty above all on bishops and upon priests {as well as on the pope). The pope, as like any other superior, does not have the power to oppose this duty {Suarez: " deest potestas in legislatore ad obligandum" De Legibus, L. VI, cap. VII, n.ll).
That is why it is said that "the state of necessity carries its own dispensation with it because necessity is not subject to law" {SI; I-II, Q.96, A.6). This is not to mean that in the state of necessity it is lawful to do whatever one wishes, but that "the action otherwise prohibited is rendered lawful and permitted by the state of necessity ."4 This is in order to safeguard higher interests than obedience to the law or to the Superior. In such a case it is not within the power of any superior to demand the observance of the law in the usual way, because to no superior {and still less to the pope) is it granted to exercise authority harmful to anyone else, especially if that harm is spiritual and involves many souls and violates one's duty of state, especially that of a priest or bishop.
Not even God, the Supreme Legislator, is bound in the state of necessity ."That is why Christ Himself excuses David, who in grave danger ate the breads of proposition which the laity were forbidden to eat by Divine Law."5 According to this principle, not only do human laws cease to oblige in a state of necessity, but even divine-positive and affirmative divine-natural law cease (e.g., "Honor thy father and mother"; "Remember to keep holy the Sabbath Day"). The only law binding in the state of necessity is negative divine-natural law {e.g., "Thou shalt not kill," etc.) . This is because negative divine-natural law prohibits actions that are intrinsically evil and hence forbidden because they are evil, as opposed to actions which are evil only because they are forbidden, such as the consecration of bishops without pontifical mandate.
3 .6th Principle: It is the character of necessity to place the subject in the physical or moral impossibility of obeying
It is certain that God binds nobody in a state of necessity, but the human legislator "can say 'no' without reason and in violation of natural and eternal law"6 and therefore they can in fact forbid an action required by the state of necessity. But, since the pope's "No" is powerless to do away with the grave general necessity of souls and hence the associated duty sub gravito go to their help, the subject, especially if he is a bishop or priest, then finds himself in the moral and absolute impossibility of obeying, because he could not obey without himself sinning and harming others. Hence, it is the character of the state of necessity "to create a sort of impotency whereby it is impossible to do something commanded or not do some- thing forbidden."7
This is not, in fact, the case of authority not being bound to oblige because" summum ius summa iniuria," or one which issues an inopportune command lacking in prudence, but which nevertheless people could be bound to obey all the same in view of the common good. This is, on the other hand, the case of authority that cannot oblige, because its command is opposed to a precept of divine and natural law "more grave and obliging."8 In such a case to obey the law or the legislator would be "evil and a sin" (Suarez, De Legibus, L. VI, c. VII, n.8). St. Thomas calls obedience in such a case "evil" (SI; 11-11, Q120, A.1). Cajetan refers to it as a "vice" (Cajetan in 1.2, q.96, a.6). Hence, refusal to obey becomes a duty (i.e" inoboedientia debita).9
The reality of such a case is not that the subject is disobeying. It is better said that he is obeying a higher and more compelling command issuing from divine authority, which "commands us to regard higher interests."10 Human authority , in fact, "is neither the first nor the only rule of morality ."6 Earthly authority is a" norma normata, "that is to say, a rule itself regulated by divine law, and hence when human authority, "contrary to natural and eternal law,"6 says "No," then disobeying man in order to obey God becomes a duty."11
4. 7th Principle: He who, constrained by the state of necessity, does not obey, is not questioning the lawful exercise of authority
For there to be disobedience, the command or prohibition must be lawful. This is the case when the Roman Pontiff or the Ordinary have the power to make the command or prohibition and, at the same time, the subjects are bound to obey the command or prohibition.12 But, we have seen: 1) that even for the pope the principle holds that, when the application of a law "would be contrary to the common good or to natural law [and in our case even divine-positive law-Ed.]...it is not in the power of the legislator to oblige,"13 and, 2) that the state of necessity, especially the necessity of which we are speaking, creates in the subject "a condition of impotency or impossibility [in this case morally and absolutely-Ed.] of doing a thing commanded or not doing a thing forbidden."7
Therefore, the command or prohibition of a superior which, by reason of extraordinary circumstances, results in harm to souls and the common good, as well as being contrary to the state of the subject (cf. Suarez, De religione, LX, cap.IX, n.4), loses its character of lawfulness and absolves the subject from his duty to obey, "...nor are those who behave in such a way, to be accused of having failed in obedience, because if the will of leaders is repugnant to the will and the laws of God, these leaders exceed the measure of their power."14
We have already quoted St. Alphonsus that in the state of necessity there is imposed a "divine and natural law to which the human law of the Church cannot be opposed," and hence not even the command of the pope. The primacy of jurisdiction of the pope, therefore, is not in any way called into question by a violation of a jurisdictional law (as we have already seen), nor is it called into question by disobedience motivated by a state of necessity. In fact, the priest or bishop who, constrained by necessity, does not obey the pope is not thereby denying his own subordination to the pope outside the case of necessity, and so he is not refusing authority in its lawful exercise. Similarly, a wife is not denying the authority of her husband outside of the case of necessity, in which she has the duty to supply for him against his unreasonably opposed will.
St. Thomas says that whoever acts in a state of necessity "is not setting himself up as a judge of law" or of the legislator, nor is he even claiming that his point of view is better than that of authority, but he is merely "judging the particular case in which he sees that the words of the law [and/or the command of the legislator - Ed.] must not be observed," because their observance in this particular case would be gravely harmful. Hence, the state of necessity frees the subject from the accusation of arrogating to himself a power that does not belong to him (ST, I-II, Q.96, A.6, ad. 1,2). G. Gerson, for his part, reminds us that "contempt of the keys must be evaluated on the basis of legitimate power and the legitimate use of power."14
Hence, a priest who does not obey the pope forbidding him to absolve in a state of necessity, or a bishop who does not obey the pope forbidding him to consecrate bishops required by the grave spiritual necessity of many souls threatened in their faith and morals and without hope of help from their lawful pastors, cannot be accused of "contempt of the keys." This is so because the pope's action against divine law (natural and positive) is not making "lawful use" of his authority.
The primacy of the pope means blind submission "without examination of the object" exclusively "in matters of faith and morals," and when the pope expresses himself at that level on which his authority is infallible; otherwise, submission to the pope would be subject to the moral norms which regulate obedience. Hence, if the pope exceeds the "measure" of his power, the subjects who obey "God rather than man" are not to be accused of having failed in obedience (cf. Leo XIII, Diuturnum Illud, available from Angelus Press. Price: $0.75).
In the case we are considering, Archbishop Lefebvre did not question the right of the Vicar of Christ to exercise control, by virtue of his primacy, over the power of the episcopal order. He simply questioned whether the papal control over episcopal consecrations was able, in the present extraordinary circumstances, to be respected without grave harm to many souls and without grave fault on his own part. These are circumstances in which, as Pope John Paul II himself recognized, "ideas opposed to the revealed and constantly taught truth are being scattered by handfuls," when "true and genuine heresies are being spread in the realm of dogma and morals," and when Christians "in large part...lost, confused, perplexed, while being tempted by atheism, by agnosticism, by a vaguely moralistic humanism, by a sociological Christianity without defined dogmas and without objective morals,"11...are generally without hope of help from their lawful pastors.
Likewise, Archbishop Lefebvre did not question the Pope's power to command bishops in the interests of the Church and of souls, but he simply questioned whether in the present extraordinary circumstances he could obey the Pope without grave harm to the Church and to souls, and without himself committing a grave sin, since he was under the grave duty of supplying, a duty imposed by charity and rooted in his episcopal state. And, in materially violating the disciplinary norm and the command he had received, he took care to affirm the dogmatic foundation of the primacy of the Holy Father and confine himself strictly within the limits of Catholic doctrine on the state of necessity. This was done in such a way that Cardinal Gagnon himself announced that "Archbishop Lefebvre has not in fact made the claim, 'I have the power to act in this realm.'"15
To maintain that by resisting the Pope's "No" Archbishop Lefebvre was denying the primacy of the Pope, one would have to claim that whoever resists a harmful command on the part of authority is denying authority itself, which is false.
These things having been said, we may now judge the position of those critics of Archbishop Lefebvre who would agree that the pope ought never to forbid an action necessary to save a man in peril of physical death, yet who simultaneously claim the pope has power to forbid an action necessary to help souls exposed to danger of eternal spiritual death. They defend his power [to prohibit an action] in order to safeguard the very primacy that is granted to the pope to save souls, not to damn them.
Gerson says that they are "weak-hearted" who think "that the pope is a god who has all power in heaven and on earth,"2 but the critics of Archbishop Lefebvre make the pope - or so it seems to us - more than a god, because not even God issues any command harmful to souls, nor does He insist on being obeyed when souls are being harmed. In reality, these unjust critics are making the primacy of Peter into the supreme law of the Church, which it is not, because that primacy has for its purpose the saving of souls. These critics are bringing papal primacy down to the level of a tyranny and the obedience due to the pope to the level of slavery, and they are making obedience the greatest of all virtues, which it is not, at least according to Catholic doctrine, for which obedience, even to the pope, is subordinate to the exercise of the theological virtues, charity being in the first place.16 St. Thomas, answering the objection that "sometimes to obey we must omit doing what is good," replies that "There is a good which a man is bound to do necessarily, such as loving God or other similar things. And that good may in no way be neglected out of obedience" (ST,II-II, Q.I04, A.3, ad.3) [emphasis added]. Among these "other similar things" there are in the first place the duties of one's state of life (especially if one is a Catholic bishop) and the love of neighbor, contained as a secondary object within the love of God. In fact, everything in the Church, with its hierarchical constitution, the primacy of Peter and the laws that control the power of Order, have charity as their final purpose, and if "necessity is not subject to law" (ST, cit.), it is because it is subject to the supreme law, which is charity. To the law of charity are subject even the Vicars of Christ who have, yes, the primacy of jurisdiction and hence the right to control all other jurisdiction within the Church, but:
...by the divine, indeed even natural, precept of charity, they are bound in this to provide sufficiently for the needs of the faithful (Suarez, De poenitentiae sacramento, disput. XXVI., Sect. IV, n.7).
1. Suarez, De caritate disp. IX, sectio II, n.3.
2. G. Gerson, De contemptu clavium et materia excommunicationum et inrregularitatum, considerations VII-XII, Opera, Basilea 1489, prima pars, f33, quoted in La scomunica di Girolamo Savonarola of Fr. Tito Centi, O.P., ed. Ares, Milano.
3. P. Palazzini Dictionarium moral et canonicum under "episcopus."
4. Enciclopedia Cattolica under "stato di necessita."
5. H. Noldin SJ., Summa Theologiae moralis, vol.I, De Principiis L.III, q.8, 203.
6.Robert-Palazzini, Dizionario di teologia morale under resistenza al potere injuisto.
7. Dictionnaire, Droit Canonique"#28>under "nécessité " col.,991
8. Suarez, De Legibus, L. VI, c. VII, n.12.
9. P. Palazzini, Dictionarium morale et canonicum under "oboedientia."
10. Tito Centi, O.P., La Somma Teologica, ed. Salani vol.XIX, nota I, p.274.
11.Roberti-Palazzini, Dizionario cit. Resistenza al potere inguisto; v. Leo XIII, Libertas
12.P. Palazzini, Dictionarium, cit. under "inoboedientia."
13. Naz, Dictionnaire Droit Canonique under “epikie.”
14.Leone XIII, Diuturnum Illud.
15. Interview in 30 Days, March, 1991.
16. P. Palazzini, Dictionarium cit. under "oboedientia."
17.F. Suarez, De Legibus, 1, VI, c.VIII, n.1
18. V. Roberti-Palazzini, Dizionariao di Teologia morale, ad. Studium, under "equita." See also: "aequitas canonica" cit., and Naz, Dictionnaire Droit canonique under "equite."
19. Naz, Dict. cit. "epikie," col.366.
20. Naz, loc. cit.
21. Suarez, De Legibus, L.VI, c.VII, n.11.
22. Suarez, op. cit. n.4.
23. Suarez, op. cit. n.6.
24. Suarez, De Legibus, L. VI, c. VII, n.11.
25. Ibid. L. VI, c. VIII, n.8.
26. Ibid. L. VI, c. VIII, n.1.
27. ST, I-II, Q.80.
28. Suarez, De statu perfectionis/De voto oboedientia, L.X, c.IV, n.15.
29. Ibid.
30. Suarez, De statu perftctionis/De voto oboedientia, L.X,c.IV,n.15.
31. Suarez, De Legibus, L.VI, c.VIlI, n.1.
32. Suarez, op. cit. n.2.
33. Naz, Dictionnaire Droit Canonique under "epikie," col. 369ƒƒ.
34. De Rome et d'ailleurs, Sept.-Oct., 1991, p.17.
35. La Somma Teologica, ed. Salani, vol. XIX, nota 1, p.247.
36. Naz, Dict. Droit Canonique under "excuse," col.633.
37. P. Palazzini, Dictionarium cit. under "iurisdictio suppleta."
The 1988 Consecrations: Theological Study Part I, Part II Canonical Study Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V Index
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Courtesy of the Angelus Press, Kansas City, MO 64109 translated from the Italian Fr. Du Chalard Via Madonna degli Angeli, 14 Italia 00049 Velletri (Roma)
(Excerpt) Read more at sspxasia.com ...
These circumstances, however, will have the effect of rendering the duty of help more difficult and perhaps even heroic on account of the easily foreseeable consequences. "It will be denied that there is any state of necessity! The rebuke implied in the act of helping the people will draw down upon whoever does so revulsion and unjust accusations. And, since we are dealing with the person of the pope himself, the subject runs into "even graver danger" because 'from the abuses of lesser prelates recourse can always be had to the pope,'2 but against the pope the only recourse is to God (St. Catherine of Siena)."
And, of course, this is exactly what happened. Having precipitated the crisis, Rome then denied there was a crisis and immediately launched a smear campaign against the Archbishop.
All this is put in greater perspective if we realize that Archbishop Lefebvre did not actively seek to found a traditional seminary. He was brought out of retirement to train seminarians because orthodox young men from all over Europe were being deprived of the traditional faith in their seminaries; they pleaded for him to train them properly, eventually coming to Econe from all over the world. So he was fulfilling a spiritual necessity that the conciliar Church itself was no longer supplying. No wonder Rome denies a state of necessity! To admit it existed would be to condemn itself!
1. Is the Novus Ordo Mass valid?
2. Is Vatican II a valid and binding Ecumenical Council?
3. Is Pope John Paul II a valid pope?
Unfortunately I do think that self-described "traditionalists" often want to play a sort of sub-conscious "game" of (in effect, or logical reduction of their position) seeing how close they can get to the "edge" (schism) without going over it (like a wobbly tightrope walker).
If one affirms these three tenets they would not be formally or canonically schismatic, as far as I understand (which is why I never say that a "traditionalist" who isn't in the SSPX is not a Catholic), yet they could very well (and often do, in my experience) possess what I call a "quasi-schismatic mentality." This allows one to criticize pope, Mass, and Council alike all day long, with never-ending moaning and groaning and breast-beating, sometimes in conspiratorial, apocalyptic, Chicken Little proportions. I don't think that is very helpful for the life of the Church, and in some respects it is as bad or worse than being a schismatic, for it is still within the Church, adversely affecting the faith and outlook of others, in my opinion.
Dietrich von Hildebrand and Legitimate Catholic Traditionalism
1. Yes, but so what? Validity doesn't prevent it from being deceptive and destructive.
2. Yes, but it was pastoral only, which means nothing it declared was binding or divinely protected.
3. Yes, but the Pope's not God--for Neo-Catholics a difficult distinction, I know, but a real one.
The Catholic faith is not about obeying popes. It's about the depostit of faith. Papal authority only exists to protect that deposit. If it acts to endanger the faith itself, it must be resisted. As for quasi-schismatic mentalities--that's like being a little bit pregant. You either are schismatic or you aren't.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
As long as pedophiles, criminals and their protectors celebrate Mass in the NO Church all the while 'making up' a new religion as they go along (and often concelebrating with heretics, pagans and open sinners -- Jesse Jackson leaps to mind) with the tacit permission of the hierarchy, I'll continue taking my family to the VALID Catholic Sacraments offered by SSPX priests.
Ping
The rest of the things which the sacred Council sets forth, inasmuch as they are the teaching of the Church's supreme magisterium, ought to be accepted and embraced by each and every one of Christ's faithful according to the mind of the sacred Council. The mind of the Council becomes known either from the matter treated or from its manner of speaking, in accordance with the norms of theological interpretation. (Proceeding Note to Lumen Gentium)
In this way the doctrine which the Ecumenical Council Vatican I had intended will be completed ... It is proper for this solemn Synod to settle certain laborious theological controversies about the shepherds of the Church, with the prerogatives which lawfully flow from the episcopate, and to pronounce a statement on them that is certain. We must declare what is the true notion of the hierarchical orders and to decide with authority and with a certainty which it will not be legitimate to call into doubt. (Paul VI, Opening Speech to the Third Session of the Council)
In view of the pastoral nature of the Council, it avoided any extraordinary statements of dogmas endowed with the note of infallibility, but it still provided us teaching with the authority of the ordinary Magisterium, which must be accepted with docility. (Paul VI, General Audience of Jan. 12, 1966)
Discredit is cast upon the authority of the Church in the name of a Tradition to which respect is professed only materially and verbally. The faithful are drawn away from the bonds of obedience to the See of Peter and to their rightful Bishops; today's authority is rejected in the name of yesterday's. And the fact is all the more serious in that the opposition of which We are speaking is not only encouraged by some priests, but is led by a Prelate, Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, who, nevertheless, still has Our respect. It is so painful to take note of this: but how can We not see in such an attitude -whatever may be these people's intentions -the placing of themselves outside obedience and communion with the Successor of Peter and therefore outside the Church? For this, unfortunately, is the logical consequence, when, that is, it is held as preferable to disobey with the pretext of preserving one's faith intact, and of working in one's own way for the preservation of the Catholic Church, while at the same time refusing to give her effective obedience. And this is said openly. It is even affirmed that the Second Vatican Council is not binding ... that the faith would also be in danger because of the reforms and post-conciliar directives; that one has the duty to disobey in order to preserve certain traditions. What traditions? Is it for this group, not the Pope, not the College of Bishops, not the Ecumenical Council, to decide which among the innumerable traditions must be considered as the norm of faith! As you see, Venerable Brethren, such an attitude sets itself up as judge of that divine will which placed Peter and his lawful Successors at the head of the Church to confirm the brethren in the faith, and to feed the universal flock, and which established him as the guarantor and custodian of the deposit of faith. The adoption of the new Ordo Missae is certainly not left to the free choice of priests or faithful ... In no different way did Our Holy Predecessor Pius V make obligatory the Missal reformed under his authority, following the Council of Trent. (Paul VI, Address to the Consistory of Cardinals on May 24, 1976)
Is that "mind of the council" that infamous "Spirit of Vatican II", that fourth person of the "Holy" Quaternary?
No, it is the exact opposite of the "spirit of Vatican II" - the "mind of the Council" is what the Council actually meant.
So it's what Bugnini meant? That must be why the Council was only declared to be considered "pastoral".
"...the "mind of the Council" is what the Council actually meant."
Did the "mind of the Council" want:
Altar Girls?
Latin removed from the Mass?
The Tabernacle removed from the Altar?
Concelebration with Protestants?
Communion in the hand?
A complete revision of the Liturgy?
An end to the Tridentine Mass?
Fr. Bugnini wasn't even a member of the Council, and Bl. John XXIII fired him from his position.
No.
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