Looks like I missed the call on Bork.
But if natural law reasoning belongs to the Legislature, should not the courts adopt similar reasoning in determining Constitutionality of legislation?
Good question. Here's how one of the theorists I mentioned would reply:
"[...] preoccupation with judicial appeals to natural law can easily fall into the trap that Aquinas himself discussed. Recall that in the passage cited earlier Aquinas pointed out that insofar as a judge proceeds case by case the laws are apt to be disconnected. The business of a judge is litigation, and, on the whole, litigation is not the best context for taking stock of what the natural law requries: (1) litigation gives the judge little time for reflection; (2) it moves along according to adversarial procedures, which are not the best way to develop a systematic position on the moral quality of laws; and (3) the interests of the various parties are usually narrowed so drastically that it is difficult to find generalizable principles for the common good. -Russell Hittinger, "Natural Law in the Positive Laws," The First Grace