The article reads quite well until the author veers off into discussing countermeasures. There is a disconnect here between his discription of the new "leaderless resistence" and the "root causes" tatics he recommends in response.
I am suprised the author did not discuss several avenues of counter attack. There would seem to be great vulnerability as the terrorists are forced gin up recruitment to replace attrition in Al Quaida. Equal vulnerabilty would appear to offer itself wherever these groups form alliances. Leaders, as they become careerists, have interests rapidly diverging from true believers who make up the rank and file.
As it appears now these groups cannot communicate efficetively, finance safely, or recruit with confidence. Under these conditions I can forsee a scenerio where they begin to sell each other out.
I concede that isolated cells can cause huge disruptions but these should be isolated, uncoordinated and unrelated to a greater goal of the terror rendering it unproductive to the larger motivating cause.
Under these conditions I can forsee a scenerio where they begin to sell each other out. That's certainly possible, but unfortunately, I think they're still in the coalescing phase, where their differences matter less to them than their common desire to destroy the US.
Many old-line terrorist groups, for example, are forming new alliances with Islamic militants. The head of the Basque terrorist group ETA in Mexico (long one of the fund-raising headquarters for ETA) converted to Islam a while back, for example, and Islamic "missionaries" are busy among the more traditional left-wing Mexican Indian groups in Chiapas.
I think you're right about the author's problematic response. Much of it(emphasis on "American right wing" groups and "root causes") seems to reflect Clinton-era thinking.