There are times when I just want to rip a reporter's lungs out. This report should be a major embarassment to NASA employees, but the management structure and "some" engineers, their lack of professional attention to the matter of the foam strikes on the shuttle are the problem here, not the rank and file NASA employees.
We have a serious issue here. Instead of talking about it in adult terms, we see this nitwit reference "space workers", a term clearly used to place the whole of NASA into an admired untouchable group, almost angelic and clearly incapable of being judged too harshly should the report actually warrant it.
These are NASA employees. That's the way we have referenced them for thirty years, or at least since the name change, whenever that took place. That's the way they should be referenced here. No need to coin a new manipulative term.
Already this morning I've seen reference to the families of the lost crew, saying above all else they support the continued presence of men in space. Well shezam, there's a news flash. This isn't about that. This is about making sure people are held accountable for their negligence and the example is set so that this level of complacence never again costs the lives of seven "space workers".
The manipulators will be out in full force today.
Well...I'm looking for something apart from the 'Plasma eat the wing out from the inside' thingy...and behold it appeared.
It appear in comment for less than 10 seconds..and at the last minute of the video...interesting.
What was this **important point..that NASA included..yet seem to slide it in sideways with some smoke so the viewer would not notice before final credits started rolling.
The 10 second comment...."Columbias RCS packs failed...Columbia tumbled..and came apart"
On several Columbia threads on FR..myself posted history problems with the RCS packs..and possible failure of **This aspect..being more the reason Columbia disintergrated..over the wing burn.
On several previous STS missions..significant RCS thruster failures occured ..bypasses were effected from cockpit...in one case..a failure occured in an STS mission 2002 During final status check prior to de orbit burn cycle.
Article:
The earliest know "off nominal" external event during Columbia's reentry occurred at 13:51:19 GMT. After this the reentry flight was plagued by ever increasing off nominal yaw and roll aero-moments. The shuttle attempted to correct these errors using the RCS. The basic operation of the OMS and RCS are described in figures A7 thru A12. Fig. A5 Fig. A5 details the off nominal roll and yaw trend from the first event to LOS. Fig. A6 lists all of the RCS jet firings for the same time period. Fig. A5 indicates that there was a significant increase in both the roll and yaw moment after the 13:56:00 point. The roll moment appears to go positive causing the shuttle to roll to the right while the yaw moment goes negative causing the shuttle to turn towards the left. Fig. A6 also shows a tremendous increase in RCS jet firings after the 13:56:00 point as well. However, the increase in RCS jet firings does not appear to be in an effort to correct the yaw and roll moments that were happening. Only the left and right RCS yaw jets were firing and only in an alternating sequence for about the same duration. The only real attempt to correct the negative yaw moment was at the end when the right hand RCS jets began firing continuously until it appears the RCS engines failed. Event Time (GMT) Duration (Sec.) RCS Thruster Remarks 1 13:51:45.38 0.24 L2L Earliest known off nominal external events detected by remote sensors 2 13:51:45.36 0.24 L3L Earliest known off nominal external events detected by remote sensors 3 13:52:08 - R2R Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Event 6) 4 13:52:08 - R3R Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Event 6) 5 13:52:24 - R2R Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Events 7, 8 and 9) 6 13:52:32 - R3R Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Events 7, 8 and 9) 7 13:54:33 0.24 R3R Orbiter envelope brightens for approximately 0.3 sec. 8 13:54:33 0.24 R2R Orbiter envelope brightens for approximately 0.3 sec. 9 13:56:17.28 0.24 R3R Left main gear brake line temperature rise. 10 13:56:17.30 0.24 R2R Left main gear brake line temperature rise. 11 13:56:17.52 0.24 R3R Left main gear brake line temperature rise. 12 13:56:17.54 0.24 R2R Left main gear brake line temperature rise. 13 13:56:54.71 - L2L Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Events 13 and 14) 14 13:57:01.12 - L2L Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Events 13 and 14) 15 13:57:46.35 - L2L Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Events 13 and 14) 16 13:57:53.12 - L2L Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Events 13 and 14) 17 13:56:54.66 - L3L Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Events 13 and 14) 18 13:57:01.07 - L3L Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Events 13 and 14) 19 13:57:46.33 - L3L Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Events 13 and 14) 20 13:57:53.10 - L3L Jet firing occurs during data loss (See Fig. A3 Events 13 and 14) 21 13:57::43.94 0.48 R2R Left upper wing skin temperature OSL (Off Scale Low) 22 13:57:44.42 0.48 R2R Left upper wing skin temperature OSL (Off Scale Low) 23 13:57:43.92 0.48 R2R Left upper wing skin temperature OSL (Off Scale Low) 24 13:57:44.40 0.48 R2R Left upper wing skin temperature OSL (Off Scale Low) 25 13:59:30.68 7.40 R2R Start of R2R yaw firing 26 13:59:30.68 7.40 R3R Start of R3R yaw firing 13:59:32 LOS (Followed by 32 seconds of additional flight data from the OEX data recorder) 27 13:59:36.80 0.60 R4R Additional jet required to counteract increasing aerodynamic moments 28 13:59:37.30 0.10 R1R Additional jet required to counteract increasing aerodynamic moments 29 13:59:52.114 - - PASS Fault Message L RCS LEAK 30 14:00:01.540 - - PASS Fault Message L RCS LEAK 31 14:00:01.900 - - PASS Fault Message L RCS LEAK 32 14:00:02.654 - - PASS Fault Message L RCS LEAK 33 14:00:03.637 - - PASS Fault Message L RCS PVT Data taken from STS-107-Timeline-Rev15.xls Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS): The shuttles OMS (Orbital Maneuvering System) is used to boost the shuttle into orbit after the ET falls away during launch and ascent and adjust the shuttles inclination in orbit, if necessary. The OMS is also used for braking and maneuvering the shuttle during the deorbit burn procedure. A detailed description of the OMS is contained in, "Shuttle Systems OMS.pdf", from the Kennedy Space Center web site. Fig A7 shows the locations of the left and right OMS engines and the OMS pods. Fig. A8 shows the inner workings of the left OMS pod. The OMS pod also holds the components for the aft portion of the RCS and is then referred to as the OMS / RCS pod. In addition to housing the RCS, if one or both of the OMS engines were to fail, the RCS can make up for the missing OMS thrusters. Reaction Control System (RCS): Upon reentry the shuttle adjusts its attitude, (yaw angle, roll angle and pitch angle), using the RCS (Reaction Control System). From Entry Interface (EI) at 400,000 feet the shuttle controls the yaw, roll and pitch using the RCS thrusters only. The gradual switchover to controlling the air craft using the aerodynamic surfaces is as follows. When the dynamic pressure reaches 10 PSF the ailerons become active and the RCS roll thrusters are deactivated. When the the dynamic pressure becomes 20 PSF the elevons are activated and RCS Pitch thrusters are deactivated. The rudder is activated at Mach 1 and the RCS yaw thrusters are then deactivated. This final step occurs at Mach 1 and 45,000 feet. Yaw Angle, Yaw Rate and Side Slip
Roll Angle Pitch Angle and Angle of Attack
deciphers the OMS / RCS jet firing terminology. The NASA reentry timeline gives the time and duration of OMS / RCS jet firings. When the shuttle is traveling in atmosphere it is difficult to determine how much motion the maneuvering jets provide. In space the jets are good for about 3° of rotation per second of jet firing.
General Purpose Computer (GPC) Failures
Nothing is mentioned in either the STS-107 Timeline or STS-107 Ground Track documents about failures of the General Purpose Computers (GPC's) on board the Columbia. However, based on the intervals of communication interruptions closely related to the events of RCS jet firings during reentry, it can be deduced that the GPC's were failing rapidly. The space shuttle has five general purpose computers that are all identical. Four of the computers are loaded with the same software for guidance, navigation and control. The fifth computer is loaded with software produced by a different company referred to as Backup Flight Software (BFS). This software is only used in the event of loss of control of the orbiter and can be initiated either by another GPC or manually by the pilot. At 13:58:40 GMT the STS-107 Timeline Rev. 15 makes a reference to BFS. This means that by that point, within 14 minutes of Entry Interface (EI), all four of the other GPC's had taken themselves off line due to faulty data readings or other errors. There are no reports of the BFS being used in any previous shuttle mission. When the timeline indicates a communication interruption / data loss, followed closely by a short duration firing of the RCS jets, that is more than likely a computer going offline and another one resetting itself to take over the operations. The following web page from the Kennedy Space Center web site gives a detailed description of the operation of the space shuttles avionics systems, Shuttle Avionics. All five GPC's are located in the forward fuselage and therefore should not have been affected by any damage to the left wing. See page, Overview of the Space Shuttle Orbiter, for locations of GPC's and other critical components.
Events just prior to LOS
*** Article body in whole with diagrams at:
http://www.columbiassacrifice.com/reentry.htm
*** Nasa is still not comming clean ...are they.
The space workers - e.g. contractors - work for a living. NASA is like the officer corps, more worried about promotions and retirement than getting the job done.
I always laughed at the press when I was at KSC. The local press always called us "NASA engineers" when we did something good. But when we screwed up, it was "United Space Alliance engineers".
The media are a bunch of miserable whores. Your best bet is to read the CAIB report yourself and draw your own conclusions. (What I have read so far indicates that it's pretty much a whitewash.)