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Trading the Pure QQQ PCR
Zeal Research ^ | uly 11, 2003 | Adam Hamilton

Posted on 07/12/2003 3:10:01 PM PDT by sourcery

The narrow QQQ-only Put/Call Ratio behaves quite differently from its headline PCR cousin. We take an initial look at this intriguing trading indicator.

As we plunge into the second half of this year, the alleged home of the die-hard bulls? fabled Second Half Recovery, one grand question continues to perplex index speculators. Have we just witnessed yet another doomed bear-market rally or the birth of a new cyclical or secular bull market?

While the new long-term secular-bull-hypothesis case is unbelievably weak due to the stellar

overvaluations still rampant today, strong arguments exist for both the bear rally and medium-term cyclical-bull theses.

Although no mere mortal can know for sure which kind of market we are sojourning through these days until after the fact, the crux of the index-speculation game today involves weighing the odds and making a decision between short-term bear rally or medium-term cyclical bull.

If we have just witnessed a particularly potent bear rally, odds are the best short-term plays at the moment are to the short side as it fails. On the other hand if we are still in a maturing medium-term cyclical bull the markets could run yet higher before the secular Great Bear primary downtrend reasserts its crushing dominance with a vengeance.

As we ponder these strategic speculation questions at Zeal, I have been examining an intriguing subset of the famous Put/Call Ratio. As I mentioned a month ago in ?Trading the Put/Call Ratio 2?, in addition to the headline PCR everyone follows there are also pure narrow index-specific PCRs for the elite indices. Can these pure PCRs help speculators execute superior index trades?

The usual PCR, or the ?headline? PCR, is calculated by dividing the total put volume traded in a given trading day by the total call volume traded on the

Chicago Board Options Exchange. This headline number includes all of the CBOE-traded options contracts, including stock options and stock-index options. While I continue to believe that the headline PCR is a very valuable contrarian sentiment indicator for all speculators to monitor, it is not without issues.

Stock-index speculators, naturally, only really care about the collective options trading activity directly related to the major stock indices. For example, what do bond-yield options, foreign-stock-index options, or oil-stock-index options really have to do with trading the primary American indices? Not a lot! Wouldn?t it be nice to drill down on a pure PCR that only reflected options directly relevant to index traders?

Granted, the headline PCR is utterly dominated by various flavors of options on the major US stock indices, but speculators often choose to specialize in trading only a few of these. Some folks including me like the

QQQ options for index speculations, others like Dow 30 options, and still others play the game primarily in S&P 500 options.

The headline PCR lumps all these different types of index-options activity together into one grand summary number. This is fine most of the time since the major stock indices tend to be very highly correlated to each other through time, but occasionally it would be nice to focus exclusively on one specific type of index-options activity.

For example, in the recent rally the tech darlings have seen far greater advances than the blue-chip Dow 30. Rather than combining both the hyper-risky NASDAQ 100 and conservative Dow 30 into one single headline PCR number, wouldn?t it be interesting to know how options speculators are playing each individual index? Can aggressive indices combined with conservative indices obscure what is really happening under the surface in each? Will valuable insights be revealed looking at pure PCRs that are not evident in the summary headline number?

After examining pure PCR data for various indices for several weeks now, I know the answers to these questions are definitely yes. The headline PCR is a wonderful indicator and will always be rightfully revered by speculators, but there is a whole other world of great insights available by digging deeper and analyzing the pure index-specific PCRs as well.

This week I would like to begin our official explorations into this arena by taking an initial look at the pure QQQ-only PCR as well as its potential implications today for index speculators.

Just as the headline PCR is calculated by dividing total put volume by total call volume, the pure QQQ PCR is computed by dividing total QQQ put volume by total QQQ call volume on any given trading day. Please realize that these are volume-based calculations, not open interest!

For some unknown reason I have seen quite a few people confuse this lately, trying to calculate a PCR based on OI instead of volume, which is absolutely wrong. While volume is a simple turnover measure, the number of contracts traded in a given day, open interest is an entirely different beast. OI is the total number of contracts outstanding at any given time, very different from daily trading volume. OI is a strategic snapshot frozen in time of all open positions while volume is a measure of contracts traded over one trading day.

We included Put/Call Open Interest Ratios (PCOIRs) in the graphs below to help contrast them with the true PCRs. Unlike the PCR, the PCOIR is calculated by dividing put open interest by call open interest. PCOIRs, which only change slowly over time, are also vastly less volatile than the PCRs. The PCOIRs are interesting and probably useful, but they are very different from the PCRs and shouldn?t be confused as such.

Before we delve into the pure QQQ PCR and its implications for speculators, it is important to take a few minutes to do a quick review of the headline PCR itself. As always we are using the 21-day moving average of the headline PCR in these graphs to help smooth out the raw ratio?s phenomenally wild volatility. The pure QQQ PCR is most illuminating when contrasted with the headline PCR that so many speculators are already intimately familiar with today.

The headline PCR is famous as a contrarian sentiment indicator. It reflects the overall greed and fear of options speculators as a whole and helps signal when one emotion or the other is getting out of hand. One of the oldest and most irrefutable principles of the markets is that the majority is almost always wrong. The most successful long-term way to trade is to take the opposite position from the majority most of the time as a contrarian and ride the inevitable mean-reversions back towards emotional neutrality.

As you can see above the headline PCR tends to move opposite to the indices. A high PCR, which indicates more general fear than greed as folks load up on puts, is only witnessed near market bottoms. At the very pits of popular despair when folks should generally be bullish, like the contrarians, is when they start expecting The End of the World and put buying soars. So a prudent contrarian speculator fights the crowd and throws long by buying calls when everyone else is buying puts.

Conversely a low headline PCR signals that popular greed is far greater than fear as folks rush to buy calls. These very moments of glowingly rosy expectations and smug complacency are only witnessed near market tops. After a major rally most people eventually expect the markets to rise into infinity, so they load up on call options. A prudent contrarian speculator, however, bucks this sheep-like behavior and throws short via put options when everyone else is buying calls.

As I mentioned at the beginning of 2003 in ?Trading the NASDAQ Bust 2?, the headline PCR?s best signals tend to be the shorting ones marking major interim market tops. The vertical white arrows in the chart above mark these moments in time when the PCR fell to the bottom of its uptrend channel and signaled speculators to go short in the face of unsustainable popular greed and complacency.

Interestingly these shorting signals were absolutely perfect until Washington annexed Iraq in March and unleashed a massive rogue sentiment wave of unbridled greed. Since mid-March, the headline PCR has touched the bottom of its long-term uptrend channel three times and each failed to be a good shorting signal. These recent PCR anomalies, along with the reasons behind the overarching strategic PCR uptrend, are discussed in much more detail in ?Trading the Put/Call Ratio 2?.

While most of this graph is necessary review, the yellow Put/Call Open Interest Ratio line rendered above is totally new. Rather than showing a 21-day moving average of the volume-based PCR, the PCOIR instead illustrates the ratio between outstanding puts contracts and outstanding call contracts. Since open interest changes slowly and isn?t very volatile, it doesn?t require moving-average smoothing. While quite a different animal from the PCR, the PCOIR also offers some revealing insights for speculators.

Like the PCR 21dma the PCOIR is gradually rising throughout this primary bear market. Slowly but surely the Great Bear is relentlessly doing its thing and gradually knocking it into the thick skulls of investors that valuation matters, that buying any stock at any price is foolish. I suspect the PCOIR will continue to increase all the way into the ultimate Great Bear bottom, as the ratio of bears to bulls is steadily growing as people gradually begin to understand what financial horrors a supercycle bubble and bust truly entail.

While the general strategic upslopes of the PCR 21dma and PCOIR are similar, it is important to note the huge differences in these loosely related datasets as well. While the PCR has tradable troughs and peaks, the PCOIR is just a series of static snapshots of outstanding puts and calls held by the bears and bulls. It is no doubt interesting to look at occasionally, but the smooth PCOIR is certainly not a fantastic tactical trading tool like the PCR. Don?t confuse these ratios!

With the benefit of an overview of the headline PCR and its strong contrarian nature under our belts, we can now begin exploring the pure QQQ PCR. The pure QQQ PCR, as its name suggests, is calculated solely by dividing QQQ put volume by QQQ call volume traded in any given day. It offers a valuable untainted glimpse into the psychology and bets of QQQ NASDAQ 100 stock-index traders alone.

Following convention, we used a 21-day moving average of the pure QQQ PCR to smooth out its extraordinary volatility. The yellow QQQ PCOIR shown is raw though as it doesn?t change fast enough to require smoothing. The dark gray line is the usual summary headline PCR 21dma from the graph above, drawn in for comparison purposes to help highlight the enormous QQQ PCR volatility.

Before I saw this graph, I had assumed that the pure QQQ PCR would track the headline PCR relatively closely. I also assumed that it would be a similar contrarian indicator, that prudent speculators would have to do the opposite of the QQQ herd in order to have a high probability of realizing successful trades. Boy was I wrong! The QQQ-only PCR has a totally different character than the headline PCR, a big surprise. These revelations are causing me to reassess my perceptions of who the majority of QQQ-options speculators really are.

It?s certainly hard to believe, but amazingly enough the pure QQQ PCR is more of a concurrent indicator than a contrarian indicator! Rather than moving in virtual lockstep opposition to the underlying QQQs like the headline PCR, this QQQ-only PCR managed to track the NASDAQ 100 and QQQs remarkably well. The implications of this surprising revelation are startling.

Instead of trading against the QQQ-options-trading majority, speculators will note that the best gains have usually been made trading with this particular crowd. The pure QQQ PCR tends to be highest near major interim tops and lowest near major interim bottoms! Strange.

The low QQQ PCR ahead of major interim bottoms means that relatively more calls were being traded than puts, driving the ratio down. One possible interpretation of this observation is that QQQ-options traders, as a whole, were

anticipating the interim bottoms due to the rapidly plunging stock markets, distinctly contrarian behavior! Unlike the headline PCR, the QQQ PCR wasn?t lowest near the tops, but near the bottoms!

Conversely, the QQQ-only PCR peaked after major interim tops, also implying that the majority of QQQ-options traders were anticipating a coming downleg! For some reason the QQQ PCR has tended to move with the QQQs instead of opposed to them like the headline PCR. This general behavior is quite evident in the entire history of the detailed QQQ options trading data available from the CBOE, which is all graphed above.

I have been pondering this for a couple weeks now and I still don?t quite know what to conclude about the QQQ PCR. Obviously the majority of QQQ-options players understand the nature of the game quite well and they are more than willing to buy puts when the markets are high and buy calls when the markets are low, definite unmistakable contrarianism at work!

This really challenges my perceptions about what kinds of speculators and hedgers are actually at work in the QQQ options arena.

While I have long thought that QQQ-options land was dominated by individual speculators, who are collectively notorious for trading with the mainstream crowd and ignoring contrarian discipline, perhaps this isn?t the case. If small speculators were the driving force, the QQQ PCR should look much more like the headline PCR, with the small speculators generally taking the exactly wrong positions at major interim topping and bottoming extremes. This certainly isn?t happening in the chart above constructed with the data direct from the CBOE!

Instead of playing QQQ options, maybe the majority of usually wrong small speculators are playing the underlying QQQ stock and other tech darlings directly. If you are a tech bull today who believes that it is perfectly normal and even intelligent to buy mature companies at 40x+ earnings, you probably are buying tech stocks outright or leveraged via margin accounts. Buying stocks directly is much easier and vastly less risky than playing call options, so perhaps heavy small-speculator influence is relatively absent from QQQ options trading.

Maybe more sophisticated speculators are playing the QQQ options, willing to leverage their capital with options because they fully understand the large risks involved. Once a speculator has paid his or her dues long enough to amass serious capital, odds are that he or she has made most of the typical mistakes and has already learned the hard way to trade opposite to general market sentiment. The QQQ PCR line above seems to reflect a sophisticated understanding of the nature of markets that we would expect to see from large speculators.

Another possibility is hedger dominance of the QQQ PCR. If a large institutional investor has heavy long exposure in the NASDAQ 100 or major companies anchoring it, the institution may want to hedge its bets in case it is wrong

on index direction. The way to hedge long positions is to buy puts. These puts allow the institution the comfort of being able to sell its NASDAQ 100 investments at set prices for set periods of time in the future regardless of prevailing market conditions.

If this is the case, we would expect to see high putting activity when the NASDAQ complex is high and low putting activity when it is already low. And indeed, the graph above shows exactly this phenomenon. Institutional players like tech hedge funds with large long positions in tech stocks may be hedging their macro bets by layering on huge QQQ puts positions to protect their profits after the periodic rallies in tech-land.

While this is all conjecture and I don?t know who is dominating QQQ options trading, I can see in the graph that they are good at what they do. Put volume soars near interim tops and call volume soars near interim bottoms, exactly the way contrarians play this grand game. While these signals aren?t precise enough to trade like the headline PCR, they offer great strategic insight into what the sophisticated QQQ options players expect to transpire in the markets next.

The QQQ PCR is also vastly more volatile than the headline PCR, shown above in dark gray. While the headline PCR?s range is generally between 0.5 and 1.0, the QQQ PCR has been all over the map, plunging under 0.5 and even challenging 3.0, an incredible level where the QQQ PCR 21dma indicates that three puts contracts are trading for every one call contract! The QQQ PCOIR also mirrors the enormous range of the QQQ PCR, utterly dwarfing the headline PCOIR. If you are a speculator who craves volatility, the QQQs are the place to play!

Provocatively, today the QQQ PCR 21dma is challenging its highest levels in history. While general stock-market sentiment is overwhelmingly greedy and complacent, whoever it is playing the QQQ options directly appears to be expecting an enormous downleg approaching. Past interim market topping zones in the QQQs have been marked by abnormally high putting activity driving the QQQ PCR higher. This latest QQQ PCR topping zone towers so much higher above the preceding ones that it is scary. What on Earth is approaching?

These QQQ-options players, maybe large speculators and maybe institutional hedgers, have amassed an impressive track record over the last couple years of QQQ options trading. They are heavily weighted to the long side near interim bottoms with calls and they load up to the gills on puts near interim tops expecting to profit or protect on the inevitable downlegs. With this level of market insight and performance apparent, today?s index speculators ought to carefully consider the implications of these massive puts positions being accumulated in QQQ options.

For whatever reason, these sophisticated QQQ-options players are positioning themselves for an enormous downleg in the next six months or so, the rough expiration time limit of non-LEAPS QQQ options purchased in the past couple months. Regardless of whether these are large speculators hoping for a short profit or large hedgers trying to protect their huge tech portfolios from downside risk, they are immensely skeptical of the recent equity rally.

In terms of the great bear-market-rally versus cyclical-bull-market debate, it certainly appears that the majority of QQQ-options players buy the short-term-bear-rally hypothesis versus the medium-term cyclical-bull-market-within-a-Great-Bear thesis. They have plowed an extraordinary amount of capital into QQQ puts in recent months betting that the bear rally is almost over and a major downleg is approaching.

Since they have been right on in the past when they chose to amass enormous puts positions and drive up the QQQ PCR ahead of a downleg, odds are they know what they are doing this time around too. They apparently expect the miraculous tech rally since mid-March to not only fail and roll over, but to fail hard and fall sharply. These large speculators and hedgers are apparently preparing for the worst.

Like the majority of QQQ-options speculators, I also believe that the short-term bear rally is topping and the next downleg will be vicious. We are patiently awaiting some specific technical shorting signals to add some aggressive new QQQ puts positions to our current options-speculation portfolios.

I discussed these approaching signals along with crucial passive and active risk management strategies for options speculators in the new July issue of our acclaimed Zeal Intelligence newsletter published last week. If you wish to join us, new e-mail PDF edition subscribers will be promptly e-mailed a complimentary copy of this current issue after subscribing. As this major top and subsequent downleg unfolds, our new QQQ options trades and always-evolving options strategy will be detailed in future issues of Zeal Intelligence for our subscribers.

Fortunes will be won and lost based on whether the markets are now topping after a major bear rally or still heading higher in a cyclical bull. While the general headline PCR shows great complacency and greed today, no worries, the pure QQQ PCR shows an extraordinarily high degree of pessimism on the NASDAQ complex.

And since the history of the QQQ PCR has shown that it is much more of a concurrent rather than a contrarian indicator, index speculators ought to pay attention and get ready. The majority of QQQ-options players have usually been right near the extremes and odds are they will be proven right again this time.

Adam Hamilton, CPA

July 11, 2003



TOPICS: Business/Economy
KEYWORDS: putcallratio; qqq

1 posted on 07/12/2003 3:10:01 PM PDT by sourcery
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To: Tauzero; Starwind; AntiGuv; arete; David; Soren; Fractal Trader; Libertarianize the GOP; ...
FYI
2 posted on 07/12/2003 3:10:33 PM PDT by sourcery (The Evil Party thinks their opponents are stupid. The Stupid Party thinks their opponents are evil.)
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To: sourcery
read later
3 posted on 07/12/2003 3:13:18 PM PDT by LiteKeeper
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4 posted on 07/12/2003 3:13:51 PM PDT by Support Free Republic (Your support keeps Free Republic going strong!)
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To: sourcery
My brother is trading the QQQ right now. I bought some and then sold it after chickening out.
5 posted on 07/12/2003 3:18:01 PM PDT by tkathy
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To: sourcery
Although no mere mortal can know for sure which kind of market we are sojourning through these days ....

Jim Cramer says its a Bull - and all the Bears are busting their asses playing catch-up. He's right....again.

There are many more reasons to be a Bull these days - it takes a lot of work to find enough excuses to be a Bear.

DOW goes Higher, NASDAQ goes Higher, S&P 500 goes higher .....

Short sellers have screwed themselves - The Bears are SOL.

6 posted on 07/12/2003 3:25:39 PM PDT by rface ( Ashland, Missouri - Missouri's Democrat Gov. Holden is a POS)
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To: sourcery
Interestingly these shorting signals were absolutely perfect until Washington annexed Iraq in March and unleashed a massive rogue sentiment wave of unbridled greed. Since mid-March, the headline PCR has touched the bottom of its long-term uptrend channel three times and each failed to be a good shorting signal. These recent PCR anomalies, along with the reasons behind the overarching strategic PCR uptrend, are discussed in much more detail in ?Trading the Put/Call Ratio 2?.

In "Trading the Put/Call Ratio 2", Hamilton goes to heroic and well intentioned efforts to explain this anomaly, but oddly overlooks (or is silent on) the distinct possibility that 'mysterious large S&P 500 futures contract purchases' (as they've been alluded to elsewhere) were executed deliberately to squeeze shorts and lift the cash market - the result being this anomalous failure in the PCR short signal.

I don't know who would make such purchases, but the CME realtime reports of S&P futures contract price increases coincide well with heavy SPDR trading volume and the S&P index rises, offsetting and negating what were falling futures contracts. This happens often at the open and close.

Friday 7/11/03 was the most recent example. S&P 500 futures were falling on GE's results announced at 6:30 AM EDT and at 5:30 AM CDT, the S&P futures prices started falling. They started back up around 7:00 AM CDT and fell again at 7:30 AM CDT with the PPI & Trade releases. Then reversed sharply and rose around 7:45 thru open at 8:30 CDT. Futures prices started falling again sharply around 1:00 PM CDT (not sure what the catalyst was for this) and reversed again at 1:45 and closed out at 3:00 PM CDT near the days highs.

Neither fundamental nor technical analysis will serve when hidden variables distort heretofore predictable patterns. I wonder if and how Sornette deals with this possibility.

Thoughts?

7 posted on 07/12/2003 7:38:49 PM PDT by Starwind
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To: sourcery
Meant to add the same pattern and timing is evident with the NASDAQ 100 futures contracts and the NASDAQ 100 index.

I don't track any other futures contracts.
8 posted on 07/12/2003 7:47:32 PM PDT by Starwind
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To: Starwind
And what should be said of those cases where there have been "mysterious large S&P 500 futures contract short sales?" Both have been happening. If we ascribe one to external manipulation, what about the other? If the action since March 2003 is manipulation, what of the action since March 2000? And what of the action from 1995 to 2000?

To differentiate market actors into "natural traders/investors" and "unnatural external manipulators" is to make the same philosophical error as those who differentiate life on Earth into "natural actors" (such as plants, animals, microbes, etc) and "unnatural" actors (meaning homo technologensis, or "techical man.") The actions of human beings are just as much a part of nature as is dam-building by beavers. Similarly, the actions of "the manipulators" are just as much part of the natual behavior of the markets as mid-morning short selling by day traders.

I don't pretend to know whether any PPT is attempting to manipulate the market. I don't think it matters. The PPT, if it exists and is attempting to prevent a market crash, is subject to the same psychosocial influences as all other market participants, has the same motivations as any investor with large long positions, and affects the system the same way that any market participant would who made the same plays.

There are always those with large long positions who would like to either a) protect the market price of the securities in their porfolio, or b) manipulate the market higher in order to be able to sell at a higher price, or c) manipulate the market lower in order to be able to buy at a lower price. One such group is the "commercials," whose membership includes the NYSE "specialists" and the NASDAQ market makers. The "commercials" are usually right, and are usually very quick to correct whatever mistakes they happen to make. They don't waste any time when the market moves against them (which it sometimes does.)

I have access to statistics that compute the relative net long or short positions of the commercial, large (institutional/professiona) and small (general public) futures traders, scaled so that the numbers are computed as a percentage of where net positions fall within the range of maximum long to maximum short over the preceding 156 weeks (3 years.) In other words, a reading of 100% indicates that the commercials are net long to the same extent they have ever been within the preceding 3-year period, and a reading of 50% indicates that their net long-short position is exactly between their maximum net long and maximum net short position within the preceding three years.

Since the middle of March, the position of the "commercials" in S&P 500 futures contracts has been scoring at or near 100% on this scaled index. That changed as of the first week of July, when their score fell to about 55%. The current reading for the general public is %52. As for the NASDAQ 100, the commercials position index shot up to about 95% in mid March, stayed there until the first week of May, and then declined uniformly to a score of 0% by the first week of July. It went up slightly to 6% as of last Friday. The current reading for the general public is 75%.

9 posted on 07/13/2003 2:41:41 PM PDT by sourcery (The Evil Party thinks their opponents are stupid. The Stupid Party thinks their opponents are evil.)
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To: sourcery
What do you make of or deduce (if anything) from the very high levels of insider selling during the second quarter?

Richard W.

10 posted on 07/13/2003 2:47:47 PM PDT by arete (Greenspan is a ruling class elitist and closet socialist who is destroying the economy)
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To: arete
What do you make of or deduce (if anything) from the very high levels of insider selling during the second quarter?

Earnings reports will likely be disappointing to Wall Street.

11 posted on 07/13/2003 2:55:18 PM PDT by sourcery (The Evil Party thinks their opponents are stupid. The Stupid Party thinks their opponents are evil.)
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To: sourcery
Since the middle of March, the position of the "commercials" in S&P 500 futures contracts has been scoring at or near 100% on this scaled index.

Can you disclose what those commercial & public positions were for the week prior to March 12th and the week after? Especially on the 11th, 12th & 13th?

12 posted on 07/13/2003 4:05:09 PM PDT by Starwind
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To: Starwind
For the S&P 500 Commercial COTs: The preceding low was reached on 14 Feb 2003 at 41%. On 21 Feb, it increased to 42%. On 7 March it increased to 52%. On 14 March it increased to 53%. On 21 March, the reading came in at 90%. On 28 March, the reading increased to 100%. The reading stayed at or above 90% until 7 July.

Note: the numbers are only available once a week (on Frdiay after the close, unless that's a holiday, in which case the numbers become available on the following Monday.)
13 posted on 07/13/2003 5:58:12 PM PDT by sourcery (The Evil Party thinks their opponents are stupid. The Stupid Party thinks their opponents are evil.)
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To: sourcery
I do not disagree with the points you make about the commercials, their behaviour or motivations. I especially agree they are very quick to correct and they don't fight the tape - they in fact exploit a trend (up or down) for maximum profit within whatever risk they're willing to assume. But therein lies the difference. The commercials behaviour is effect, not cause. They follow and exploit what they observe is a trend initiated (caused) by a successful 'manipulator'.

Similarly, the actions of "the manipulators" are just as much part of the natual behavior of the markets as mid-morning short selling by day traders.

In the hypothetical case of the PPT, I would argue there is an important difference.

The PPT does not have a profit motive - it has a political motive. It is not deterred by risk (of financial loss) - neither loss of profit nor reputation, nor job is a factor. And lastly, relative to other actors it has unlimited financial resources and probably access to all information it wants.

I question if there are any 'traders' with the attributes I just ascribed to the PPT. While it's (hypothetical) trades make it appear as any other large trader, it's political motivation, resources and lack of risk enable it to be a cause unlike any other cause the market has known - whether the Hunt brothers, Soros, etc. They all had profit motives and were limited by resources and risk.

The data seems to indicate the commercials follow a move instigated by someone or group, an instigation no one else has the motive or resources to initiate or reinvigorate.

The PPT, if it exists and is attempting to prevent a market crash, is subject to the same psychosocial influences as all other market participants,

Agreed, todate it's resources seem less than that of the entire market combined as there are obviously days when the attempt to move the futures market up fails to override the selling pressure in the cash market.

But your data suggest to me the commercials (for the motivations you list) are following - not causing. Contracts expired in June and the commercials risk and profit motives have them short now in early July, but perhaps beginning to go longer. But they don't care - they'll go short or long wherever the profit lies without too much risk. If the 'PPT' is able to prevent the cash market from falling - by squeezing shorts and mitigating declines, I would expect the commercials to again (as they did in March) exploit the trend and go long again.

But the market long/short signals that used to work (Bull/Bear ratio, PCR, etc) haven't been as reliable lately - and that I contend is the signature of a new differentiated actor heretofore unaccounted in market models. Profits can be made going up or down. Why, in absence of fundamentals and inspite of technical resistance, is someone seemingly fixated on being long futures contracts?

Sincerely, can you explain the rationale of commercials that would take a long position in a falling market (March 11th) and reverse it, and push it thru all resistance levels, in absence of fundamentals? Why in a falling market initiate long when one can simply continue short? You may argue but the market reversed and shorts were squeezed, and my question remains what was the cause of that reversal?

14 posted on 07/13/2003 8:08:35 PM PDT by Starwind
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To: Starwind; AntiGuv; Tauzero; arete
The PPT does not have a profit motive - it has a political motive. It is not deterred by risk (of financial loss) - neither loss of profit nor reputation, nor job is a factor. And lastly, relative to other actors it has unlimited financial resources and probably access to all information it wants.

Everyone has a profit motive. The motivation of a PPT would be to prevent a loss of market value in the porfolios of investors (and just which investors matter the most in this regard would be a political issue within the PPT.) The PPT "profits" when the positions of the investors they care about are protected (or even enhanced in value.)

The assets available to the PPT are not infinite. Yes, the FED can create money out of thin air. But there are many practical constraints:

  1. Every dollar that gets created due to FED "open market operations" a) either becomes a debt obligation of the Treasury, or is derived from some existing Treasury debt obligation, and b) increases the money supply. Of course, when the FED buys an already-existing Treasury bond, it's the bond holder who gets the newly-created cash. There can also be money created due to fractional reserve banking, but all such money comes into existence as a loan to some debtor--who is the one who gets the newly-created cash. There are limits to the amount of market manipulation that any sane entity would undertake using borrowed money, and there are limits to the amount of money the Treasury can borrow from the FED without exceeding the debt limit, let alone clandestinely. And there are limits to the rate at which the money supply can be increased without causing the market to crash in spite of one's attempts at manipulation.
  2. There is a limit to how much money can be spent (regardless of source) on market manipulation by officials--because it's legality is at least highly questionable--and the political ramifications would be severe, were it to be fully exposed. Obviously, the more money spent to clandestinely manipulate markets, the greater the risk of exposure. Exposure would put both the jobs and the assets of the PPT (and its political backers) at high risk;
  3. If the PPT can throw money away for the purpose of market manipulation--and get away with it--then they could just as easily directly channel that money into their own pockets. Which would you do, given the chance? Unless you are trying to protect your own portfolio, and its size is substantially larger than the money you are losing to manipulation, you'd be far better off just taking the money for yourself.

As for access to information, that's true. But insiders (such as market makers) have always had such advantages--and the insiders are selling.

The PPT would look to the market like a very large trader, with very large long positions, who "buys the dips" for one or both of the two classic reasons: 1) the trader thinks "dips" are a good buying opportunity, or 2) the trader wants to "psych" the market into bidding up the price of one or more of the securities in his portfolio. An example that comes to mind would be the attempt in the early 80's by the Hunt brothers to corner the silver market. Note that the attempt ultimately failed in that case. But let me come back to this example later.

Note also that if manipulation were a surefire preventative against crashes and depressions, then none would ever occur. The occurrence of crashes and depressions proves that manipulation can not be relied upon to make the world safe for irrational exuberance.

Typically, manipulation is undertaken in order to enable someone with a large position to unload his shares at the best possible average price per share. Anyone with a really large position (e.g.. Bill Gates' position in MSFT) has a real problem converting his shares to cash. Any attempt to do so in volume would collapse the price of the stock. The usual technique is to manipulate the share price as high as possible, and then distribute it to the public as the price falls--as it will inevitably do eventually. Let's examine how this is done in detail:

There are two parties that matter: the position holder, who has a large position in some stock that he wants to liquidate, and the manipulator, who is the expert trader who will actually manipulate the market and distribute the shares. It's best if the manipulator works through a set of floor brokers in whose discretion he can trust. Since floor brokers don't trade for their own account, this blinds the market to the fact that all the increased volume has the same source. In the modern world, the manipulator would usually be a market maker or investment banker. We assume that the position holder and the manipulator are different people. If they are not, then the scenario can be somewhat simplified.

The manipulator buys from the position holder (or is granted as a fee) call options on the stock to be distributed. The position holder is the option writer, so he will be obligated to deliver some of his stock to the manipulator at the graduated strike prices of the option contracts. The strike prices of the options will range from a little below current market to about twice current market price.

The manipulator starts by raising the transaction volume of the stock. To do this, he simply makes frequent large (but not unusually large) trades--both buys and sells--using limit orders at or near the last trade price (usually somewhere between the bid and ask prices.) Increased volume catches the attention of the market, especially those who make their living off of volume. And good volume makes the issue appear to be relatively liquid, which will also attract some traders to it (whether as longs or shorts doesn't matter.) In other words, the increased volume draws the attention of floor traders and speculators.

Note that the covered calls keep the position holder in line. He won't sell his stock if the price shoots up, because then those calls he sold or gifted to the manipulator would no longer be covered. Note also that the typical position holder in a case like this has a very large position, which reduces the likelyhood of intense selling pressure developing from other sources. These conditions mean that, on balance, there should be more buying pressure than selling pressure. The prediliction of most "investors" to only have long positions is a key factor in this phenomenon.

The manipulator doesn't lead the market by bidding up the price. He lets the floor traders, momentum traders and speculators do that. The general public will naturally follow--by coming in as buyers. This is a key point. Savvy market participants could eat the manipulator's lunch if he gave his game away by actually submitting excessively large market orders and bidding up the price openly.

The manipulator sells the stock into the rally--enough to meet demand, but not enough to affect the price negatively. The manipulator should be able to sell significantly more stock than he previously had to buy during this rally. If the rally is powerful, the manipulator will often have to help meet demand by selling the stock short--as will the official market maker, if he is not the same entity as the manipulator.

Note the following:

  1. The principal reason that "the commercials" go short near the end of a rally is because they have no other way of meeting demand, something which they must do as market makers! Of course, the commercials will hedge this short position somehow, using some combination of options and futures.
  2. The manipulator is not using the shares of the position holder to manipulate the market, which means that no "insider trading" issues arise (no reporting, and no legal constraints.)
  3. The manipulator's shorts in this case are actually covered by his calls.

Eventually, of course, the rally will peter out. The manipulator then watches and waits. Perhaps the rally resumes after a consolidation period. In that case, the manipulator continues as before. Otherwise, if the trend has clearly reversed, the manipulator comes in as a buyer. He gives the stock the support that it ought it to have if "the insiders" actually had a rosy view. Note that these stock purchases by the manipulator would usually not require him to spend any of his own money, because he would simply be covering the shorts he accumulated during the rally! Neat, huh?

The support of the stock by the manipulator during the selloff tends to check reckless short selling by professionals, and to prevent panic liquidation by frightened holders--which is precisely the situation that develops when the requisite support is lacking. Sooner rather than later, the "correction" peters out and the uptrend resumes--perhaps with a little help from the manipulator (the volume technique again.)

As the stock rises, the manipulator sells into the advance--always being carefull to keep selling pressure below buying pressure. The more stock that the manipulator sells while the rally proceeds in an orderly fashion, the more the conservative speculators will be encouraged by the resilience of the stock (and of course the liquidity implied by the volume.) And the more stock the manipulator sells, the larger the short position he can accumulate as ammunition for the next "correction." By shorting the stock as much as possible, the manipulator puts himself in the best possible position to provide buy-side support for the stock as required, without any risk to himself.

When the stock price has reached the manipulator's target (or when it becomes clear that it's not going to ever get there,) the manipulator starts selling the stock. He sells it to whomever will buy--perhaps to professional short sellers who decide to cover their short positions, but more often to the general public, who are always so eager to buy the dips. At this point, instead of covering his shorts, he exercises his calls and sells the position holder's shares. He covers his shorts (at a substantial profit) once all the position holder's shares have been liquidated.

  1. If the PPT intervenes during a selloff by opening new long positions, instead of by covering its short positions (as the canonical manipulator would be doing,) then a) it may easily end up just providing a useful counterparty to the shorts, b) it may easily end up just providing a useful counterparty to savvy traders who are "taking profits," c) it substantially increases its risk of huge losses, which would be hard to hide indefinitely, and d) it must eventually liquidate the long position so accumulated, which will necessarily put just as much downward selling pressure on the market as the initial buying exerted upward pressure.
  2. If the PPT just starts buying (opening long positions,) how does it liquidate them without crashing the market? Liquidating one's long positions puts considerably greater downward pressure on the market than selling short does (because selling short is like obtaining a loan in a fractional reserve banking system.) Such huge long positions would put it into the same tough spot as the position holder in the example above. If the PPT can just keep these securities indefinitely, then it can just "take the money" for itself with far less risk and bother.
  3. How would the PPT hedge the short positions it would have to accumulate in order to manipulate the market with the same sophistication and low risk as our canonical manipulator? It can't go to the "position holder" and negotiate the purchase of call options! It would have to buy call options or futures on the open market--at it's own expense. Options might expire worthless. And futures could result in a massive margin call, if the trade doesn't go well. On the other hand, if the options (or futures) expired "in the money," then those who wrote them would suffer huge losses in the aggregate--negatively impacting the system. And if the manipulation is successful, the options (or futures) would definitely expire "in the money."
  4. Manipulating the market as described requires a) great skill, such as only few traders actually ever have, b) a market that is agreeable (when a market is determined to crash, no amount of manipulation can save it,) and c) some amount of luck. Manipulation attempts often fail (e.g., the Hunt brothers' attempt to corner the silver market.) It's easy to miscalculate. The manipulator may easily sell too much stock during the rally. The manipulator's efforts to support the market price during a sellof may backfire: he may easily end up encouraging even greater selling pressure by a) providing liquidity to the market, b) raising the price just enough so that traders see a "last chance" to close their losing positions, and c) providing more time for more longs to decide to liqudate (as a consequence of greatly prolonging a selloff.) Finally, the market is fickle. Sometimes it's in a "rational" mood, where it rises on good news and sells off on bad news. Other times, it interprets all news through rose-colored glasses. Or it sees all news in a negative light. Or it may rise on bad news and sell off on good news ("buy the rumour, sell the news.") The same is true of the market's reaction to large buying or selling volume. The market may react to a manipulation attempt differently depending on its current mood. When it's being negative, it may interpret the manipulator's buying volume as a great selling opportunity (just like it sometimes interprets selling pressure as a great buying opportunity.) The point is that buying and selling by just a few traders, regardless of volume, cannot change the fundamental market mood.

15 posted on 07/20/2003 4:08:18 PM PDT by sourcery (The Evil Party thinks their opponents are stupid. The Stupid Party thinks their opponents are evil.)
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To: sourcery
Awesome post.
16 posted on 07/20/2003 9:01:10 PM PDT by Tauzero (please return your stewardess to her original upright position)
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