Iranian Alert -- DAY 30 -- LIVE THREAD PING LIST [Riots erupt]

Today is July 9th. The day Iranians have been waiting for. The next 24-72 hours may be the most important in Iran's history.

It is noon there, at the time of this post, and already we are hearing of people in the streets. The regime's security forces are out in force. This is very encouraging as most of the demonstrations thus far have been at night to take advantage of the cover of dark.

We have heard of riots in the Pars region of the city of Tehran. We have yet to hear of strikes. We are receiving phone calls from Iran but they are few. The regime is cutting off the calls to the United States as soon as they find them.

We are continuing to hear of the regime’s jamming of the broadcasts in much of Iran and Europe. But apparently the signals do get through from time to time.

The people of Iran have chosen July 4th because four years ago, the regime brutally attacked peaceful student demonstrators while in their dorms. The result was the loss of life and liberty of hundreds of students, many of which are still unaccounted for.

Iran is a country ready for a regime change. If you follow this thread you will witness, I believe, the transformation of a country. This daily thread provides a central place where those interested in the events in Iran can find the best news and commentary.

Stratfor on Iraq:

The greatest threat the United States faces in Iraq is not the guerrillas. It is the guerrillas combined with a rising among the Shiites south of Baghdad. If the guerrilla rising combines with an intifada -- a mass rising that might not use weapons beyond stones, but that could lead to a breakdown of U.S. controls in the south -- it would represent a most untenable situation. An intifada, apart from its intrinsic problems, could complicate logistics. Demonstrators likely would clog the supply routes from the south. Suppressing an intifada not only is difficult, it has political and psychological consequences as well.

It is imperative that the United States prevent a rising among the Shiites. It is also imperative that the United States find a native faction in Iraq that is prepared to take on some of the burden of suppressing the primarily Baathist guerrillas. The United States is afraid of a Shiite uprising, but could use the Shiites in suppressing the Baathists. The Shiites are the center of gravity of the situation.

Shiite leaders have made it clear that they want to dominate any new Iraqi government -- and that they expect the United States to create such a government. The United States has been concerned that Iran influences and even might control the Shiites and that handing over power to the Iraqi Shiites would, in effect, make Iran the dominant force in Iraq and ultimately in the Persian Gulf. That is a reasonable concern. Indeed, it violates the core U.S. strategy. The United States invaded Iraq, in part, to coerce Iran. To argue that the only way to stay in Iraq is to strengthen Iran makes little sense. On the other hand, if the United States continues to refuse to create a native government in Iraq, the probability of a Shiite rising is substantial.

The key to a U.S. strategy in Iraq, therefore, rests in Iran. If regime change in Iran could be rapidly achieved or a substantial accommodation with the Iranian government could be negotiated, then using the Iraqi Shiites to man an Iraqi government and bear the brunt of the counterinsurgency operation would be practical. The key is to reach an agreement with Iran that provides the United States with substantial assurances that the Iranian government would neither support nor allow Iranians to provide support to al Qaeda.

The regime in Tehran has no love for the Sunnis, nor do the Sunnis for the Shiites. The events in Pakistan show how deeply sectarian religious violence is rooted in the Islamic world. The United States cannot supplant Islamic fundamentalism. It can potentially manipulate the situation sufficiently to control the direct threat to the United States. In other words, if the United States can reach an understanding with Iran over al Qaeda and nuclear weapons, then the Shiites in Iraq could become a solution rather than a problem.

If there is to be an agreement with Iran, the United States must demonstrate to Iranian hardliners first that it has the ability to destabilize the Islamic Republic, and second that it is prepared not to do so in return for Shiite cooperation. Without this, any alliance with Iran over Iraq rapidly would spiral out of U.S. control, and Iran would become uncontrollable. The key for the United States is to demonstrate that it has leverage in Iran. The United States does not want to overthrow the Iranian government. It simply wants to demonstrate its ability to destabilize Iran if it chose to. If it can do that, then other things become possible.

It follows that the United States likely shortly will work to reignite the demonstrations in Iran -- in all probability in the next few days. The purpose will not be to overthrow the Iranian government -- that is beyond U.S. capabilities. Instead, it will be designed to persuade Iranian leaders -- including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- that some form of cooperation with the United States over issues that matter to the Americans is in their interest, and could result in something that the Iranians have longed dreamed of: a Shiite-dominated Iraq.

This strategy is extraordinarily convoluted and fraught with difficulties. But the prospect of fighting a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, alone, without indigenous support, is equally fraught with danger. So too is attempting an Afghan solution -- packing forces into air bases and army camps and allowing the insurrection to evolve. There are few good choices in Iraq at the moment. Alliance with the Shiites is extremely difficult and risky, but the other choices are equally difficult. If the Iranian/Shiite play fails, then it will be time to choose between counterinsurgency and enclaves.

excerpt from THE STRATFOR WEEKLY 7 July 2003
by Dr. George Friedman
U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategies in Iraq

COMMENT: I was wrong in the date (i.e. before today) for the extradition of the al Qaeda from Iran. But I think that it will be done soon.

I was out to view some places in Tehran this morning.
I am in downtown now in a Cyber Cafe.It is 3.25 PM,
It is not near the University campus but I can hear Helicopters and sirens very loudly. I m writting about what I have seen and whatever possible to be seen.
Internet connections are slow and one of my friends in an ISP confirmed it for me that it has happened since yesterday. Most Mobile Phones can not be accessed.
This is an old way which regime has done since 1997 uprisings and they close Phone Lines in order to prevent fast and distant connections.
They are feared of directing demonstrations by Phone calls from outside of Iran or to stop students from reporting of hazardous points and locations.
I am not sure if there is any uprising in any part of the city, I still hope to see some activities today or tonight.
Night is better because Security forces can not distinguish the demonstrators. The main sites in times of uprisings are University of Tehran in City Center, Kuye Daneshgah in North.
I will try to get closer to view as much as possible.

Islamic Vigilantes Seize Three Iran Student Leaders
Wed July 9, 2003 07:13 AM ET
By Jon Hemming
TEHRAN (Reuters) - Armed Iranian Islamic vigilantes seized three student leaders on Wednesday as they left a news conference where they announced they had canceled protests to mark the anniversary of 1999 university unrest, witnesses said.

Authorities have banned off-campus rallies, closed campus dormitories, postponed summer exams and vowed to deal strictly with any unrest after arresting 4,000 people during 10 nights of sometimes violent protests across the country in June.

"After the news conference when some of our friends wanted to leave, armed plainclothes men in three cars attacked the students and kidnapped three members of the Office to Consolidate Unity," Matin Meshkini, a student leader, told Reuters.

Other witnesses said some 15 people armed with handguns and with the trademark beards, walkie-talkies and untucked shirts of Islamic vigilantes pushed aside uniformed police who tried to intervene as they bundled the three into waiting cars.

"We cannot call it arrest, it was a kidnapping," Meshkini said.

Remaining student leaders barricaded themselves in the Office to Consolidate Unity, Iran's main student organization, and said they would not come out until reformist parliamentarians arrived to guarantee their safety.

Students said they canceled protests in front of the Tehran United Nations headquarters and a campus sit-in, fearing a backlash from security forces and after an appeal for calm from five reformist parliamentarians close to the student movement.

The plainclothes militiamen are fiercely loyal to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's most powerful figure, and are outside the control of the elected government of moderate President Mohammad Khatami and the official police hierarchy.

A number of student leaders have been seized by unidentified assailants in recent weeks and their whereabouts are still unknown, another student leader said.

ANNIVERSARY OF CLASHES

The canceled demonstrations had been planned to mark the day four years ago when hardline vigilantes fiercely loyal to conservative clerics attacked a Tehran University dormitory, killing one person and sparking five days of mass protests.

Many ordinary Iranians, frustrated by Khatami's failure to advance reforms in the face of hardline opposition, pledged to join any student protests on Wednesday.

The June demonstrations, though dwarfed by official marches, went one step beyond previous pro-reform protests. Chants broke the taboo against insulting Khamenei and also condemned reformist leaders.

The United States strongly backed the demonstrations and was accused by Iran of blatant interference in its internal affairs.

Witnesses said police and military units were posted outside the Tehran U.N. headquarters on Wednesday and photographers and camera crews were prevented from taking pictures of the scene.

Khatami has remained largely mute on last month's protests, limiting himself to words of support for the democratic right to protest, while praising the actions of security forces.

The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance told foreign news organizations not to go to any demonstrations.

"It is expected that you do not attend any possible illegal gatherings," a faxed statement said.

http://reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=3059789

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