America's consistency problem

Jerusalem Post ^ | Jun. 29, 2003 | Yossi Olmert

[yonif]

The behavior of the United States since the end of the war in Iraq proves one has to know how to win a war not only on the battlefield but also politically and psychologically. This is a problem that is generally typical of Israel's wars because we are experts in victory on the battlefield and defeat in every other possible arena.

In this, it turns out, we are not that different from the Americans. Three Middle-Eastern arenas illustrate the US's problematic policy in the aftermath of the war in Iraq.

First, the approach toward Syria. Colin Powell went to Damascus where he upbraided his Syrian hosts. While still on the plane he leaked the news that he was coming with a stick only, no carrot. Anyone familiar with the Middle East knows such a statement is an insult that calls for reckoning. Powell seems not yet to have realized the potency of the US victory in Iraq and the options it opens to American policy. Syria's behavior before Powell's arrival showed weakness, nervousness and fear. But after his visit the Syrian press all of which is government-controlled voiced the impression of Bashar Assad and his people that what they had gotten from the US was an extension, possibly an indefinite one, to negotiate over US demands.

The Americans demanded the absolute cessation of Hamas and Jihad activity in Damascus, as well as the beginning of an effective dealing with Hizbullah. Enough time has passed for the Syrians to have taken determined action to destroy the terror infrastructure on their soil; but it has not happened yet.

Perhaps US policy toward Syria should not be so surprising considering the US's strange attitude to Palestinian terrorism. Even Israelis who had deluded themselves into thinking President Bush could be a member of the Likud Central Committee (as Tzahi Hanegbi remarked following the Bush's June 24 speech) now understand that on essential political matters the Bush Administration is not that different from previous ones. Considering America's passionate anti-terrorism rhetoric and its actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, one might have expected the administration to adopt a consistent and determined policy of supporting Israel on the elimination of Palestinian terrorism.

It is inconceivable that someone who genuinely wants to fight terrorism would support the temporary cease-fire or hudna between the PA and the terrorist organizations.

Most Israelis believe far-reaching political concessions will be possible only when Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the other terrorists are defeated. (The only party with an opposing interest is Yasser Arafat, who continues supporting terror as best he can.) Then in comes the Bush Administration with its commitment to the war against terrorism but failure to formulate a coherent policy on the issue. The resulting pressure on Israel, though inconsistent, has caused immeasurable damage.

Complaints may be leveled too at the Sharon government, which has a huge supply of friends in the US, inside and outside the administration, who should be mobilized to support Israel's war against Palestinian terror.

THE MAIN problem lies in the administration's failure to understand that the internal logic of the Iraq war and of the US's whole policy requires Bush to lead the war against Palestinian terrorism, giving Israel a green light. There is no important party in the Middle East that can endanger America's current status in the region. A door of opportunity has opened for the Americans, but they are behaving as if they are facing a narrow window.

Today the Americans confront another arena, their handling of which will testify to how much they have adjusted to their victory in Iraq. In Iran thousands of brave and idealistic young people are fighting a dark, terrorist, anti-American and anti-Israeli regime, the last remaining bastion of such forces in the Middle East.

The timing of this uprising is not a coincidence. The excuse may have been some grievance over study conditions at the universities, but the fundamental reason is disenchantment with the Islamic Republic and the belief that after Iraq the days of the Teheran regime are numbered. Here the US has an obligation to help in every way. After all, it was President Bush who defined Iran as part of the "axis of evil." And, to Bush's credit, it must be said that his actions do not always lag behind his rhetoric. But even Bush has yet to comprehend the significance of America's strength and new status in the Middle East.

US consistency and determination in the fight against terror may, not so far off, shape a truly new Middle East. Only in such a Middle East is there a chance of realizing any road map. But in our region the kind of opportunities that have opened up to American policy may not recur for a long time.

[yonif]

The US has destroyed two terrorist regimes and now is supporting the establishment a new one right in Israel's backyard.

[yonif]

Considering America's passionate anti-terrorism rhetoric and its actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, one might have expected the administration to adopt a consistent and determined policy of supporting Israel on the elimination of Palestinian terrorism.

It is inconceivable that someone who genuinely wants to fight terrorism would support the temporary cease-fire or hudna between the PA and the terrorist organizations.

[LarryM]

The Bush Administration doesn't want to fight terrorism; they want to appease it. The way they do this is to let the terrorist organizations know they can kill as many Jews as they want, as long as they don't hit US targets prior to November 2004. We can call this the "Jewish Corollary" to the Bush Doctrine, which is a reason I will never vote for the oil-stained wussy ever again.