Soldiers Lives in Jeapordy

Recently it has come to my attention that there were several instances of personal weapons failing on the front lines of Iraq, which lead to the injury, capture and deaths of our service men and women. I first read about this problem on the website of a company called Militec, which makes a metal conditioner/lubricant for firearms. I also just recently read about this problem in Lt Col David Hackworths column on World Net Daily.

The problem, as I understand it, is the weapons in question are jamming up due to the harsh desert conditions the soldiers are facing. As a firearms enthusiast I know how important it is to keep your weapons clean, it can be a difficult task in the best of conditions. From the information provided by Militec the failure to keep the weapons clean and jam free is a function of the milspec CLP (cleaner/lubrication/protectant) lube that is currently issued to the troops. The milspec CLP is not doing it's job of lubricating the weapon under desert conditions, otherwise the soldiers would not be having these problems.

According to Militec, they've gone through official channels to bring this problem and a solution to the attention of the military. They seem to be running into nothing but roadblocks and red tape. What is particularly interesting in this case is that a number of Federal agencies are currently using their product to avoid the precise failures the Army troops are encountering. In addition to this fact it seems several commanders have personally requisitioned this product for the use of their troops in Iraq.

That front line troops are being put in harms way with less than the best equipment, when the problem and a solution have been identified, is a tragedy. It is my hope that we can contact enough people to bring this problem to the light of day and start an investigation this problem and bring about a quick resolution to it. I'd hate to see one more American serviceman die as a result of bureaucratic paper shuffling.

Following are links to Militec's website, and the articles and letters that address this issue.

http://www.militec-1.com/ http://www.militec-1.com/Congress1.html http://www.militec-1.com/RPRep1.html http://www.militec-1.com/PTRep1.html http://www.militec-1.com/LetterAMC.html http://www.militec-1.com/Thompson11.html http://www.militec-1.com/Thompson21.html http://www.militec-1.com/Thompson31.html

they're still notorious for getting jammed.
Really? That doesn't help explain why the M16 series is the most popular western military rifle in history.
Also, the 5.56NATO round sucks.
The experience in OIF seems to indicate otherwise.
I know a lot of soldiers who want the M14 brought back into wider service

A lot of soldiers who apparently don't know any better.

The ones who've recently earned their new Combat Infantryman's Badges seem to have a pretty good idea of what they want. And those in the 101st Airmob seemed awfully glad they'd brought those nasty old obsolete M14s along.

They're not at all a rifle for everyone. But as a part of the mix, they turned out to be quite useful.

Small Arms and Individual Equipment Lessons Learned
Editor's Note: The following "lessons learned" report from Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on soldier weapons and equipment was provided to DefenseWatch. It has been slightly edited and reformatted for ease of reading.
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
Small Arms and Individual Equipment Lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom Source is USAJFKSWCS, Army Special Operations Battle Lab.
Note the lessons on M9 ineffectiveness (again), M4 round's lack of range (again), and XM-107/M-82A (Barrett .50 cal semi-auto) effectiveness (again). Lessons noted have certainly not been turned into lessons acted upon in the cases of the M9 and the 62-gr. 5.56 NATO round.

The following is a gathering of lessons learned on items of equipment either within the PEO Soldier domain or closely related to current or planned PEO programs. I gathered these lessons while serving as the PEO Soldier Liaison to the ASA(ALT)-SWA Operations Cell. I accompanied a team from the Science and Technology community conducting a similar mission for GEN Kern, Commander, AMC, and MG Doesburg, Commander, RDECOM, consisting of Mr. Bill Andrews, MAJ Rob Johnston and SFC Sam Newland.
The lessons were gathered from 5 through 10 May 2003 from soldiers serving in the Baghdad sector during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Comments came from Brigade Commanders down to riflemen. The following units were interviewed:
* HHC/1-187 IN, 101st ABN (5 MAY)
* 2d BCT, 82d ABN (6-7 and 10 MAY)
* 3-325 PIR (7 MAY)
* 2-325 PIR (7 MAY)
* 3-7 CAV (8 MAY)
* FSB (8 MAY)
* 1st BCT, 3 ID (9 MAY)
* 3-69 AR (9 MAY)

We informed brigade headquarters and requested permission to conduct interviews at the company level. The brigade issued a FRAGO to subordinate units and arranged link up times. Once we arrived in company areas of operations we would gather available soldiers, typically 7 to 10, and conduct interviews for approximately 90 minutes.
An effort was made to capture observations from soldiers with a wide variety of MOS's and experiences. We questioned airborne, air assault and mechanized infantrymen, armored soldiers from both armored battalions and cavalry squadrons, and clerks, mechanics, and medical personnel in the support battalion.
The timing was very fortuitous. In almost all cases, we were the first external visitors to the unit. Soldiers were fresh off combat operations and were just beginning the stability and support phase of the operation.
They were very interested in relating their experiences and thoughts on how equipment could be improved. They recognized that the equipment provided significant combat overmatch against the combatants they encountered enroute to and in Baghdad. However, all soldiers know there is always room for improvement. In this spirit, this document will capture their feelings on what worked well and what can be improved as well as their ideas on how the deficiencies can be corrected.
Covering every item of equipment in the PEO Soldier inventory is a daunting task. I do not claim to be a subject matter expert on each item. I have recorded the soldier's comments as accurately as possible. It may be that a subject matter expert could have addressed their concerns on the spot or thought of additional questions that would get closer to the heart of the issue. I was unable to do so and the respective PM's are encouraged to conduct the follow-up work required to address these observations if necessary.
Lethality
9-mm. Beretta: There was general dissatisfaction with this weapon. First and foremost, soldiers do not feel it possesses sufficient stopping power. They desire a modification to allow for more accurate firing during limited visibility - tritium on the sight posts was a specific recommendation.
The 9-mm. magazine performed very poorly. Soldiers were stretching the spring in order to provide sufficient force to feed rounds into the chamber. Soldiers were not satisfied with the guidance from higher to not stretch the spring and only load 10 rounds in the 15-round magazine.
The issued 9-mm. holster is not used. Most soldiers/units purchased thigh holsters because of comfort, access and availability. If the 9-mm. is your personal weapon, you don't want to have to always wear your LBV in order to have your weapon with you. The leather shoulder holsters did not hold up well in this environment. The thigh holsters came from a number of different commercial sources such as Blackhawk.
M-4 carbine: Soldiers were very satisfied with this weapon. It performed well in a demanding environment especially given the rail system and accompanying sensors and optics. As one Brigade Commander said, "The M-4 with PEQ and PAC provided overmatch over our threat equipped with AK-47s and RPGs." The general consensus is that every rifleman wants the M-4 vice the M-16A2.
The most significant negative comment was reference the M-4's range. In the desert, there were times were soldiers needed to assault a building that may be 500+ meters distant across open terrain. They did not feel the M-4 provided effective fire at that range. The 82d Airborne soldiers wished they had deployed with M-14's at the squad level as the 101st did.
There is also a significant safety issue that bears further investigation. Apparently when the M4 selector is in the "Safe" position and the bolt is allowed to ride forward, the firing pin still makes contact with the bullet primer. A CSM in the 101st related a story of a soldier who had an accidental discharge while his weapon was in the safe position - the CSM personally witnessed this incident. Numerous soldiers showed us bullets in their magazines that had small dents in the primer. There may be a "Safety of Use" message out on this issue but it is not well known at the battalion-and-below level.
The flip-up sight on the M-4 allowed the soldier to engage targets out to 600 meters. However, the plastic grommet that formed the small aperture was prone to falling out. Soldiers "super-glued" the aperture to the sight.

*additional material *here*

-archy-/-

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.