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Posted on Tue, Jun. 10, 2003 |   |
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In post-Sept. 11 world, threat of Iraqi weapons had to be defused The Kansas City Star So now we're told President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, not to mention a host of officials in both governments, hyped the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. It's instructive to turn back the clock a bit. Last year about this time, the hysteria du jour was a CBS report saying Bush had been told -- before Sept. 11 -- that al-Qaida planned to hijack several airliners. He wasn't told the terrorists intended to fly the planes into buildings, but that didn't do much to curb the ensuing rush to judgment. The New York Post ran a headline saying, "Bush knew." The president, in other words, supposedly knew about Sept. 11 and didn't take the necessary steps. The suggestion was ridiculous, but it illustrates the president's awesome responsibilities. If the nation is revealed as vulnerable, the president is blamed. Given the shadowy threat posed by terrorism, it's hard to fault the administration for acting on evidence less compelling than, say, what's required in American courts. As the diplomatic offensive against Iraq intensified last year, here's what we knew: • Hussein had used chemical weapons in his war against Iran, and he had used them against his own people, killing thousands in the process. • In 1991, United Nations inspectors were surprised to discover that Hussein's nuclear-weapons program was more advanced than previously believed. • U.N. inspectors established that Iraq had built up large stockpiles of banned material, including chemical-weapons precursors, growth media, VX chemical agents and artillery rounds for delivering them. Some of this material was destroyed. But after the inspections regime broke down in 1998, no one outside Iraq knew how much remained in Hussein's hands. No one had any idea what happened to it. After Sept. 11, Hussein's continued defiance of the United Nations took on new meaning. Few doubted that if Hussein's chemical weapons material got into the hands of terrorists, they would not hesitate to use it, causing who knows how much suffering and mayhem. Yes, the notion that Hussein would slip weapons of mass destruction to some al-Qaida operative seemed improbable. But what's more improbable -- Hussein attacking U.S. interests through terrorists or people using box cutters to hijack commercial airliners? In a changed world, old threats must be seen in a new light. Let's not forget that the Bush administration's case against Hussein wasn't much different from that made by the Clinton administration. Even the French never denied Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Many other governments arrived at similar conclusions. Last week, U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix didn't say weapons were never there. He said the "long list of proscribed items" remains "unaccounted for..." Resolution 1441 gave Hussein a "final opportunity" to turn over his banned material or account for it, and he responded with a disclosure statement that revealed little. He was playing for time, as he had in the past. He knew that the troops being deployed on his borders could not be kept in place indefinitely. Perhaps Hussein did destroy his stockpiles. But if so, the enduring mystery is why he didn't provide hard evidence and prevent the war. And if he destroyed them earlier, why didn't he document their destruction and put an end to U.N. restrictions on Iraqi oil sales? Sanctions cost Hussein billions in lost revenues. Some believe he refused to cooperate because that would have been seen by his own people as weakness. But it's more likely, given the price he was paying, that he had something to hide. After Resolution 1441, Hussein's refusal to account for his weapons made war inevitable. Going back to the status quo was never an option; Hussein could always wait until any "containment" strategy broke down. Knowing what we knew, we did the right thing. To reach E. Thomas McClanahan, call (816) 234-4480 or send e-mail to mcclanahan@kcstar.com. |
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