Test Results Back Columbia Foam Theory

SAN ANTONIO - A chunk of foam fired at high speed cracked a space shuttle wing panel Friday, offering what investigators said was the most powerful evidence yet to support the theory that a piece of the stiff, lightweight insulation doomed Columbia.

The test was the latest and most crucial in a series of firing experiments meant to simulate what investigators believe happened to the shuttle during liftoff.

During the test, the 1 1/2-pound piece of foam cracked the reinforced carbon panel and knocked it out of alignment, creating a gap of less than one-tenth of an inch between the panel and an adjoining seal. The crack was at least 3 inches long.

"We demonstrated for the first time that foam at the speed of the accident can actually break" reinforced carbon wing pieces, said NASA (news - web sites) executive Scott Hubbard, the member of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in charge of the testing.

"To me, that's a step forward, maybe even a significant step forward, in our knowledge and we need to complete the test series ... to understand the whole story."

He said more analysis would be needed to show that the damage would have allowed hot atmospheric gases to enter the wing during re-entry, as investigators believe happened to Columbia.

A suitcase-size piece of foam broke off the shuttle's big external fuel tank during the January liftoff. Investigators suspect it damaged the leading edge of the left wing enough to cause the ship's destruction. Seven astronauts died when the shuttle broke up over Texas on Feb. 1.

Friday's outdoor test was conducted at the independent Southwest Research Institute. To recreate the conditions at Columbia's launch, the foam was fired at 525 mph through the 35-foot barrel of a nitrogen-pressurized gun normally used to shoot debris at airplane parts. The key pieces tested were taken from another shuttle, Discovery.

Nearly 100 observers were on hand, including two shuttle astronauts. Twelve high-speed cameras documented the experiment, six of them inside the wing, six of them outside. Some of the footage was later played back in slow motion.

The foam skidded across the 22-inch-long panel and shattered — which is also what happened to the chunk that hit Columbia.

"If such a crack had been found on an inspection, you would not fly with it. You would not take a piece that is this damaged into space," Hubbard said.

The test, originally planned for Thursday, was delayed twice, first by thunderstorms and then by a brief electrical problem Friday.

The investigation board plans to complete its report by the end of July, and some elements of the latest draft outline were reported in Friday's Orlando Sentinel. Among the board's concerns were poor risk management, questionable policy decisions and constant budget battles.

Board spokeswoman Laura Brown declined to provide any copies of the draft, and emphasized that the outline was "a work in progress" and probably would change. She said the draft, dated May 23, was already the sixth revision and stressed that it had no findings or recommendations.

Friday's test on the shuttle panel was the first in which the foam was shot at the panels and seals that form the leading edge of shuttle wings.

Last week, a similar-size piece of foam was fired at a wing replica made up of fiberglass panels and seals taken from the never-launched shuttle prototype Enterprise (news - web sites). The parts that took the brunt of the impact were deformed by the foam.

But reinforced carbon is more brittle than fiberglass. And Hubbard predicted before the test that the foam might even shatter the reinforced carbon.

Reuters article

Shuttle Wing Cracks in Test by Columbia Crash Probe

Jim Forsyth

SAN ANTONIO, Texas (Reuters) - A test firing of insulation foam at a space shuttle wing panel like the one on the doomed Columbia caused a crack that would have been too dangerous to fly with, a NASA (news - web sites) investigator said on Friday.

The test results gave credence, but not final confirmation, to the theory that Columbia broke apart on Feb. 1 because flying foam from its fuel tank damaged the left wing and allowed the intense heat of re-entry to penetrate the orbiter's protective shield.

"We don't know the structural or thermal implications of this crack yet, but I can say if such a crack had been found on inspection, you would not fly with it. You would not take a piece that is this damaged into space," said Scott Hubbard, director of NASA's Ames Research Center in California and member of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Columbia disintegrated over Texas as it flew toward landing in Florida, killing the seven astronauts on board.

The leading theory is that the 3,000 degree Fahrenheit (1,650 Celsius) gases generated by re-entry into the atmosphere leaked into the shuttle through a breach caused when loose foam struck the left wing shortly after takeoff on Jan. 16.

To test the theory, a briefcase-size piece of foam weighing 1.67 pounds was fired at 530 miles per hour -- the approximate speed of the actual foam strike -- by a giant gas-pressurized gun into a wing panel from the shuttle Discovery.

Hubbard said the foam caused a narrow three-inch long crack in the panel, but it would take several days to determine if it could have caused the shuttle's demise.

The test was the latest and most critical of a series being conducted at the Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Foam shot into a fiberglass replica of a shuttle wing last week caused a 22-inch (55.88 cm) long gap. More tests are scheduled next week and the board hopes to complete its report on the accident in late July.

On Friday, the Orlando Sentinel said an outline for the report showed the board will point to NASA's poor risk management, questionable policy decisions and constant budget battles as some of the root causes for the Columbia tragedy.

Article from the Orlanco Sentinel

COLUMBIA INVESTIGATION - Report on shuttle accident to slam NASA decisions, culture

Michael Cabbage

HOUSTON -- NASA's poor risk management, questionable policy decisions and constant budget battles were among the root causes of the shuttle Columbia accident, according to an upcoming report by the board investigating the mishap.

A detailed 10-page draft outline of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report obtained by the Orlando Sentinel presents a sweeping, hard-hitting review of the technical, organizational and political factors that resulted in America's second space-shuttle disaster. The report traces the accident's causes from the program's origins in the late 1960s to Columbia's breakup over central Texas on Feb. 1.

"It is intended to be the base line for a very serious public-policy debate on the future of the safety of the shuttle program and its role in the manned spaceflight program," retired Navy Adm. Harold Gehman, the investigation board's chairman, said recently.

The report's outline suggests investigators will identify a debris strike on the shuttle's left wing during launch as the "probable cause" that triggered the mishap. However, as the 13-member board consistently has pledged, the report goes far beyond an engineering analysis of Columbia's final moments to examine the bigger institutional and historical issues that allowed the disaster to occur.

Many of the issues covered in the outline come as no surprise after being discussed repeatedly in the board's hearings and news conferences during the past four months. Others, however, have received little public mention.

The report remains a work in progress and some parts likely will change. But according to a May revision of the report outline, major concerns include:

How repeated debris strikes on the orbiters became an accepted risk over time.
The system the National Aeronautics and Space Administration uses to identify, track and dispose of in-flight problems.
Communication breakdowns and the performance of shuttle managers during Columbia's flight.
Schedule pressures created by building and resupplying the international space station.
Management turmoil caused by flip-flopping shuttle-program authority between the agency's headquarters in Washington and Johnson Space Center in Houston.
NASA's indecision in recent years on whether to replace the fleet or upgrade it and concerns the shuttle program was being "managed as if nearing its end."
How budget pressures and the transfer of oversight responsibilities from NASA to private contractors affected safety.

The planned 10-chapter report -- described as "voluminous" by Gehman -- will include a number of specific recommendations. The study also will contain a section on general "conditions necessary for return to flight" that discusses items such as management reforms and recertification of aging shuttle components to make sure they remain in good condition.

After interviewing more than 250 witnesses, board members are relocating from Houston to Washington as the investigation winds down and the writing picks up. The target date for the report's release is July 24, the day before Congress leaves on its summer recess.

"I believe it's attainable," Gehman said recently. "But if it turns out to be too hard for us to do a good job, then we'll miss that goal. It's much more important that we get it right."

In the beginning

The report's first three chapters will largely be a straightforward narrative of the origins of the shuttle program, events leading up to Columbia's launch and the orbiter's final flight. The chapters set the stage for the rest of the report.

Chapter 1, titled "The Evolution Of The Space Shuttle," discusses how the project "emerged from the post-Apollo space flight program, its design tradeoffs resulting from political and budgetary decisions made in the early 1970s, its development, testing and initial flights, the Challenger accident and the shuttle's current role."

The report's second chapter describes preparations before liftoff. And Chapter 3, "Columbia's Final Flight," documents the shuttle's launch, activities in orbit and re-entry.

The report's next three chapters detail the board's findings on the direct, contributing and root causes of the accident. The mechanics of Columbia's breakup while returning to Earth are explained in Chapter 4, which begins with a "statement of probable cause."

In recent weeks, the board has adopted a scenario that says a breach in the protective heat armor on the leading edge of Columbia's left wing allowed blowtorchlike gases to destroy the shuttle as it re-entered Earth's atmosphere. A chunk of foam estimated to weigh about 2 pounds broke off the ship's external fuel tank and smacked into the leading edge 82 seconds after Columbia's liftoff on Jan. 16.

So far, investigators have been reluctant to conclude publicly that the foam strike was the cause of that breach. That could be changing. A recent impact test at Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio appears to suggest the strike could have created an opening between the reinforced carbon-carbon panels that line the wing's leading edge.

"I think it moves us a significant step toward establishing that as an initiating event," board member Scott Hubbard said Wednesday.

A more definitive impact test scheduled for Thursday was canceled because of bad weather in San Antonio. It has been rescheduled for today.

The report rules out other possible causes considered early in the investigation. Among them: Shuttle system failures. Willful damage. Crew error. Columbia's onboard science laboratory. Micrometeorites and space-debris strikes. An unusual re-entry triggered by a rough wing surface on the shuttle.

NASA decision-making

A key part of the report is Chapter 5. According to the outline, the chapter is "a discussion of the factors that combined to destroy Columbia" beyond the direct causes that tore the ship apart.

Those factors primarily are NASA decisions made before and during the 16-day mission. The beginning of the chapter deals with the Mission Management Team's performance and the group's quick dismissal of concerns about the debris strike.

Here, the report critiques engineers' questionable use of a computer database called Crater to predict Columbia's damage. The section also recounts the internal e-mail debate among engineers on the foam impact and their unsuccessful requests for images of Columbia in orbit using spy satellites or military telescopes. This communications breakdown led the board to issue an interim recommendation April 17 asking that NASA reach agreements with intelligence agencies to make such photos a standard requirement for future flights.

"What seems to have evolved is that higher-level decision-makers came to the conclusion that there wasn't a safety-of-flight issue, in part, based on an analysis done by analysts who sort of wanted the pictures," board member Steve Wallace said recently. "It's a difficult and frustrating story to try to put together."

A chapter subsection, titled "The Machine Was Talking, but NASA Failed to Separate Signals From Noise," addresses the pivotal issue of how managers became comfortable with events once considered problems.

Specifically, foam strikes on the orbiter occurred almost every launch and violated flight rules. Nevertheless, missions continued as NASA officials grew confident over time that the impacts were only a maintenance issue and no threat to safety.

"You've heard NASA use the terminology 'in family' and 'out of family,' " said Air Force Gen. Kenneth Hess, a member of the investigation board. "Well, the family of foam loss just kept getting bigger and bigger. So you never got to a point where you could make a real hard distinction that something was unusual."

The outline draws a comparison to the 1986 Challenger accident, when shuttle managers ignored concerns about a critical seal in the ship's solid rocket boosters and proceeded with the launch. The comparison is accompanied by an analysis of NASA's system for identifying, tracking and dealing with in-flight issues.

The chapter ends with a discussion of shuttle processing issues, including questions about how the ships are certified as ready for launch. NASA's inability to gauge the effects of shuttle aging is examined, along with the lack of nondestructive tests to adequately measure wear on the heat-resistant panels that line the wings' leading edges. The board already has made an interim recommendation to NASA to improve those inspections.

Root causes

The underlying historical and institutional problems that led to Columbia's breakup are outlined in Chapter 6, "Root Causes of the Accident."

The chapter goes back to the shuttle's birth in the 1960s to trace the political, budgetary and organizational pressures that shaped the program. A common thread is the never-ending drive to slash the shuttle's budget.

Before Challenger, budget pressures forced concessions in the shuttle's design, limited the number of orbiters that were built and prompted an unrealistic goal of 24 flights per year. Since Challenger, budget issues have reduced the program's spending power by 40 percent during the past decade, led to shuttle job cuts and limited planned upgrades to the fleet and its infrastructure.

"I'm not going to tell you that our conclusion necessarily will be that you need more money," Gehman said. "But we clearly are going to attempt to have specific, direct and unequivocal recommendations on the relationship of budgets and what it costs to operate a program like this."

The chapter also examines the relationship between NASA and shuttle contractors.

A subject of particular interest is whether NASA's 1996 shuttle-operations contract with United Space Alliance -- a partnership between aerospace giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin -- helped erode safety by offering incentives for meeting schedules and cutting costs. In the process, some safety checks were shifted from government to industry. Others were eliminated entirely.

"There's two issues here," Gehman said. "One is contractor performance, which we are looking at, along with all the other performance matters. . . . The second is whether or not the contract is suitable for the purpose of this program."

Chapter 6 analyzes three other major issues as well: turmoil caused by the shift of shuttle management from Washington to Johnson Space Center in 1996, then back to Washington in 2002; the creation of a "Shuttle-International Space Station Complex" and concerns that station resupply duties "prompt reluctance" to delay shuttle launches to the outpost; and work-force problems caused by transferring shuttle jobs from Southern California to Texas and Florida.

Looking forward

The report devotes a full chapter to how NASA manages risk.

Chapter 7 -- "Managing Risky Technology" -- compares shuttle operations to other high-risk enterprises, including offshore oil rigs, aircraft carriers and nuclear reactors. The outline draws a parallel between the aging Concorde supersonic jet and the shuttle.

"Like the shuttle," the outline says, "[the Concorde is] a small fleet of old aircraft that are emblematic of national pride."

Much of the chapter scrutinizes NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance division, including its budget, size and independence. The section also investigates how management decisions and technical information are communicated up and down the chain of command, and whether NASA headquarters is "increasingly disengaged from the shuttle program's technical management."

Chapter 7 concludes by examining if NASA has learned anything from countless reports, studies and shuttle assessments in the past.

Parts of the report's final three chapters focus on the future. Chapter 8, "A Look Ahead," discusses conditions necessary for return to flight, as well as whether a more realistic method of assessing shuttle safety or a new space vehicle are needed.

Chapter 9 contains board observations gleaned during the investigation that aren't necessarily related to the accident. Those observations include paperwork lapses in certifying flight controllers and work-force morale issues. Chapter 10, the final section, summarizes the report's findings and recommendations.

The report will give shuttle managers an unprecedented road map for the future that goes well beyond the specifics of the Columbia accident. How far NASA and Congress go in following that road map remains to be seen.

"We can do NASA and the shuttle program a world of good if we take a very broad and complex view of this and go after multiple causes and multiple flaws and shore them all up," Gehman said. "We would not be doing the nation a service if we only got 40 percent of the problem."

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