I believe that military aircraft should have guns.
The aircrew should have immediately landed the aircraft just as they were taught in the simulator and just as the NATOPS manual is written instead of repeatedly pressing the FCS reset switch which exacerbated the software anomalies.
The deadliest crash was blamed on an aerodynamic condition called "vortex ring state" that happened during an unusually rapid descent. Nineteen Marines died in that April 2000 crash near Tucson, Ariz.
That crash was a result of pilot error. Major John Brow improperly flew the aircraft. Any rotary winged aircraft will enter VRS when improperly flown. Brow proved that you can't execute a 2000+fpm descent from an altitude of 200 feet at less than 40 knots ground speed and survive.
Brownout testing
Since the V-22's small rotors produce three times more downwash than helicopters, many pilots have expressed concern about "brownouts", which occur when dirt and dust fill the air blocking all vision. (note the water in the photo above) The U.S. military has damaged several helicopters in Afghanistan when hard landing occurred due to brownouts. The extent of this problem with the V-22 appears serious, but according section 3.2.6.2 of the Report to Congress: "The planned development testing does not include unimproved site ops where brownout is typically encountered..." The reports suggests that brownouts can be avoided by using "non-hover landings".
The Osprey is unarmed
Even if a new device allows a V-22 to safely and SLOWLY descend into a combat landing zone; this is where 91% of combat losses occur. Transports have a "door gunner" on each side who shoot a rapid-fire machine gun (called mini-guns, right) at enemy positions below to "suppress" enemy fires. When several helicopters land in formation, the volume of fire pouring down is impressive. However, the V-22 will have no door gunners because the tandem rotor design blocks half their view and field of fire. No one wants a door gunner attempting to shoot around a massive rotor and wing sticking out the side of an aircraft; the rotor wash would affect his accuracy anyway.
The V-22 program has dodged this issue. The original explanation was that it could be added later in the program. In the 1990s, they convinced marine corps leaders that a gun could make the pilot too aggressive, thus endangering his passengers. When General Jones become Commandant in 1999, he insisted the V-22 must have a gun to provide suppressive fire. As a result, Jones was told a rapid fire GAU-19 .50 caliber machine gun would be mounted on a turret under the nose and fired by the co-pilot. (similar to the 20mm gun on the Cobra attack helo at left) This is not a simple task since the 608lbs GAU-19 with several hundred rounds of ammunition and the electric pivoting nose chin will take a lot of space under the crowded cockpit. The extra of weight and bulbous chin will also reduce speed and performance.
The past 16-month delay for the V-22 redesign was the ideal time to add the gun into the test aircraft. This is important because the gun's weight and vibration while firing will affect aircraft performance. Since the GAU-19 is a proven gun, there is no reason to delay. However, testing will resume without the GAU-19. In fact, the current plan delays adding the gun until the very end of testing in 2008. The Bell-Boeing team may imply the GAU-19 is something which can just be bolted on at the very end. If its that simple, why not bolt it on now? Obviously, there is a major problem with adding the GAU-19, so Bell-Boeing will continue to dodge this issue until it goes away. As a result, if a safe V-22 is ever developed, it will fly into combat completed unarmed. Since the V-22s are much faster than the Cobra attack helicopters that escort transports, they will have to fly as slow as helicopters and negate their only advantage.
The Tilt-rotor may Tilt sideways aboard ship
While in flight "the location of the engines, gear boxes and rotors at the wing tips causes relatively high roll and yaw inertia". This is a direct quote from NATOPS section 9.2. This also causes serious problems aboard ship. The roll of a ship or gusts from nearby aircraft can cause a V-22 on ship to tilt over on the deck and squash sailors and Marines nearby. A NAVAIR report by Kurt Long -pdf states this danger is "VERY significant" and "...could prohibit ALL shipboard ops." This problem was ignored in the redesign because no solution exists.
Fewer V-22s can fit on ship
Few people realize the V-22 weighs almost as much as the powerful CH-53E, which can carry twice as much. The V-22 can automatically perform a contortionist routine to save space, although maintenance officers cringe when shown the photo at right. They know that after a few years of wear and countless automatic folds, every moving part eventually breaks.
Nevertheless, Navy ships can only carry so much weight before they become unstable. This is particularly important for objects high on ship, like on the flight deck. As a result, some Marine leaders have just discovered the Corps cannot deploy twelve V-22s aboard ship with a standard MEU composite squadron. So assuming that V-22s ever become safe, a MEU can deploy with no more than eight V-22s, instead of today's twelve smaller CH-46Es. Actually, the CH-46E has more internal cargo space than the V-22, it just weighs much less.
This is why the LHA/LHD Replacement program recently emerged. Some people want to spend billions of dollars to design a new class of bigger flattop amphibs just to carry a MEU composite squadron with twelve V-22s, rather than continuing to buy modern LHDs. The LHDs are already larger than any World War II aircraft carriers, and larger than any foreign aircraft carriers. Even if this expensive idea for larger ships is adopted, it will be ten years before the first appears in the Fleet, and 35 years before the last "undersized" LHD retires, along with the last V-22s.
The Navy MH-60S is superior
Recently, Congress began asking about alternatives to the V-22. The marine corps dodged this issue, then offered the European EH-101 as a possibility, knowing that Congress would never support the purchase of a foreign aircraft. The Corps ignored the new Sikorsky S-92 helicopter, which has been sold to Ireland and Communist China. It claimed it would take years to develop a "navalized" version of the Army Blackhawk, ignoring the Navy HH-60H Seahawk, which has been in service for years, and an advanced version, the MH-60S Knighthawk, which just entered Navy service. The Knighthawk can carry a crew of four and 13 passengers or 10,000lbs of cargo, which is twice the payload of the older CH-60A "Blackhawk in service with the U.S. Army.
The marine corps can simply sign a production contract to join in the Navy buy for Knighthawks in FY2003. Navy H-60 spare parts and training programs have been functioning for years, and the Corps already operates eight VH-60s as part of the Presidential helicopter squadron. If the marine corps joined the Army, Navy, and Air Force by adopting the Sikorsky H-60 series for basic transport, all services would save money and improve interoperability. This year, the Navy bought 17 MH-60S for $17 million each, they would cost even less if purchased at a higher rate with a joint marine corps buy. The MH-60S can carry almost as much as the MV-22, at one-sixth the price. The Navy is impressed with the MH-60S and will use them to replace their CH-46D helicopters, rather than buying 48 HV-22s.
Adopting the H-60 design would allow the marine corps to add a new capability by modifying some MH-60S as EH-60E electronic warfare or MH-60Q Medi-vac helicopters, using components already in service with the Army. The Corps can also buy some MH-60Ks (right), which have larger fuel tanks and refueling probes which allow it to fly much farther than the MV-22. Another advantage is that the MH-60S is equipped to carry 16 Hellfire anti-tank missiles. This would quadruple the airborne anti-tank firepower of the marine corps. For example, MEU composite squadrons which the Corps maintains forward-deployed include four Cobra attack helicopters which could be supported by twelve MH-60S carrying Hellfires and machine guns.
Osprey fails key tests of performance Weight, Balance Issues Put Program Further Behind, but Marines Say V-22 Is Still Their Top Aviation Priority
By JOSEPH NEFF, Staff Writer
The Marines fought in Iraq with Vietnam-era helicopters, and they'll likely fly the 40-year-old aircraft when they fight next. The replacement, the V-22 Osprey, is years from being battle-ready -- and it may never be. Internal program documents obtained by The News & Observer show that the groundbreaking tilt-rotor aircraft -- 20 years and $14.7 billion in the making -- is failing two critical tests it was supposed to have passed several years ago:
* carrying a 5-ton cannon, an essential part of its mission; and
* keeping its balance with the maximum load of fuel necessary for making 2,100-mile trips across the Atlantic.
The two tasks -- lifting 5 tons and flying 2,100 miles -- are essential, said*** Bill Lawrence of Fort Worth, Texas, a pilot and former V-22 test program manager. In military jargon, they are known as key performance parameters. Failure to meet them can cause a program to be canceled, although that is rare in expensive weapons systems developed over decades.
"If we don't get a machine to do the key performance parameters, then it won't do the missions we need it to do," Lawrence said. "That raises the question: Why are we buying this aircraft?"
The Marines want to buy 360 Ospreys, and the Air Force and Navy plan to buy 98. A joint program of Bell Helicopter and Boeing, the Osprey program has steadily increased in price; it is now estimated to cost $48.3 billion if all the planned planes are built. Each aircraft will now cost more than $105 million.
The aircraft has been troubled on several fronts. Four Ospreys have crashed, killing 30, including one near Jacksonville in 2000 that killed four Marines. A scandal at Marine Corps Air Station New River in Onslow County, home of the first Osprey squadron, resulted in two Marine officers' being disciplined in 2001 for doctoring maintenance records.
The Osprey can roll over and lose control when descending too rapidly at low forward speeds. Unlike helicopters, it cannot autorotate, or land safely if it loses power. And problems continue to plague the hydraulic system, computers and firefighting system.
Col. Dan Schultz, the V-22 program manager at the Patuxent River Naval Air Station in Maryland, did not answer questions for this report. Ward Carroll, spokesman for the V-22 program, said engineers are identifying risks and acting so that the key requirements won't be missed. The internal documents were "pre-decisional and proprietary," he said.
"We are not at a place to comment publicly," Carroll said. "We can't run a program like this in public."
The Osprey remains the Marines' top aviation priority, Lt. Gen. Emil R. Bedard told a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 9.
"The MV-22's increased range, speed, payload and survivability will generate truly transformational tactical and operational capabilities," Bedard said in a written statement.
Great expectations
The Osprey's design is unlike that of any other flying machine. It takes off like a helicopter, then tilts its huge rotors forward and flies like an airplane. That combination of maneuverability and speed has led to bold expectations.
The Marines tout the Osprey's ability to fly to any trouble spot on the globe within hours, quickly responding to the seizure of an embassy or the evacuation of civilians. Helicopters, by contrast, must be folded up and transported by ship or cargo aircraft.
They also think the Osprey will transform the movement of Marines and weapons into battle. Its greater range means that the V-22 can fly from a ship around the enemy's positions and drop off Marines to attack from the rear, they say.
Yet those expectations require missions that the Osprey now struggles to perform: flying 2,100 miles with one aerial refueling, and lifting a 5-ton load in a sling and carrying it 50 nautical miles.
The 5-ton load was designed with artillery in mind. Marines dropped on the ground need bigger guns than the weapons they carry on their backs. Marines need artillery that kills, slows or stops the movement of enemy forces, suppresses their weapons system and demoralizes them.
The Marines, in conjunction with the Army, are developing a new 5-ton howitzer, Lt. Gen. Robert Magnus explained to a House Armed Services subcommittee meeting March 20.
And, Magnus said in prepared testimony, it will be lighter, "allowing the howitzer to be rapidly air-delivered by the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor."
Yet it's doubtful the Osprey can carry the cannon at all.
Not 'rocket science'
Two weeks before Magnus spoke to Congress, lifting the howitzer was on the agenda at a meeting of V-22 program managers at Patuxent River Naval Air Station. At that meeting, Mike Merritt of Jahn Corp., an Osprey subcontractor, outlined the "increasing level of technical issues" facing the program, internal documents show.
More titanium hydraulic tubes were failing in testing. There were more mission computer failures, in which the "root cause is elusive." There were failures in the fire suppression system, of which the long-term suitability is in doubt. Merritt wrote that the aircraft was at high risk of being late and not able to carry the 5-ton load.
The reason: The Osprey is getting heavier. The craft now weighs 33,400 pounds and will grow heavier as more demands are added. The need for stronger floors and an on-board gun, for example, will add a thousand pounds or more.
The Osprey cannot afford the extra pounds. The weight growth, combined with overstated projections about the Osprey's performance, means that the craft cannot carry enough fuel to lift the cannon and fly it 50 miles.
"They may have enough fuel to start the engine, they might even taxi, but they aren't going to pick up that howitzer," said Harry Dunn of Merritt Island, Fla., a retired Air Force colonel and engineer who is one of the program's biggest critics. "The low fuel lights will come on when you're still on the ground."
In fact, the Osprey has never carried the lightweight artillery piece. In 1999, it lifted a 9,300-pound prototype off the ground. The aircraft never flew anywhere and set it down after hovering for 25 minutes.
To pass the tests for external lift, the V-22 program had the Osprey lift a concrete slab weighing 11,300 pounds, at sea level, and fly around the New River Marine Air Station. The concrete slab test was unrealistic, said Carlton Meyer of Richmond, Calif., a former Marine officer and publisher of the online warfare magazine g2mil.com.
The concrete slab has much less aerodynamic drag than the howitzer, which almost doubles the drag of the aircraft, experts say.
Lifting the howitzer and carrying it 50 miles is not a complicated test, Meyer said. Other flight tests are complex or more involved, such as determining how fast the aircraft can descend without losing control, or testing the Osprey aboard a ship.
"Either you can do it, or you can't," Meyer said. "This isn't rocket science. Obviously, they are avoiding it. If they did 10 or 20 loads in one day, from point A to point B, I'll be very happy."
Program officials say the external lift tests are scheduled to be conducted in late 2004.
How many Marines fit?
Some doubt that the Osprey can accomplish another core mission: carrying 24 fully-equipped Marines into battle. The inside of the Osprey is smaller than the CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter, which has room for 24.
The close quarters drew some critical comments from crew members during test flights in 1999 and 2000, according to excerpts from a database maintained by the Commander Navy Operational Test and Evaluation Force:
* "Knees are intertwined together. Backpacks are on top of knees. ... In my opinion, egressing in the water will be an absolute disaster."
* "Not enough room for 24 combat ready troops and air crew."
* "Crowded cabin conditions and unfriendly design of seat belts eats up an unacceptable amount of time in loading troops."
Philip Coyle, the Pentagon's chief weapons tester during the 1990s, said even the Marines' grit and can-do spirit can't make the cramped cabin fit 24 Marines with their rucksacks and weapons.
"They may have come close, but they can't do 24," Coyle said. "They may have done 18."
The General Accounting Office, Congress' watchdog, says 15 to 18 combat Marines might be the limit.
Fuel tank falls short
The Marines plan to send the Osprey into trouble spots anywhere in the world, on its own, within hours. To gain this global reach, Marines will install an auxiliary fuel tank inside the V-22 to allow it to fly 2,100 nautical miles with one aerial refueling.
The Osprey performed this flight in 1999, but with an auxiliary tank likely to leak or explode in a crash landing. Since then, the program has been unable to develop an effective, crashworthy fuel tank.
The extra tank throws the Osprey out of balance, Merritt's presentation said.
Even without the auxiliary tank, the small center of gravity requires delicate movements in the plane. When fast-roping out the back ramp, Marines must move methodically in small groups, waiting for each to hit the ground before the next group leaves its seats.
Without a suitable auxiliary tank, the Osprey falls about 400 miles short of its 2,100-mile self-deployment mission, according to Merritt's report. The shorter range puts the Osprey closer in league with helicopters and makes two refuelings necessary to reach Europe or Hawaii from the United States.
Meanwhile, the Marines will keep using the CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter. Most are older than the pilots flying them. When the last one rolled off the assembly line in February 1971, it could carry 24 Marines or 5 tons in a sling.
Time has has taken its toll. Combat, crashes and age have whittled the original fleet of 600 down to 228.
The Marines have overhauled the Sea Knights with new parts and systems, but the basic frame remains. Decades of structural and metal fatigue have limited the Sea Knight to 14 passengers or 2 tons externally.
Still, the Sea Knight flies on. Marine pilots flew several earlier this month as part of the Special Forces rescue of Pfc. Jessica Lynch, who was held captive in an Iraqi hospital. One helicopter snagged a heavy support cable on a radio antenna near the hospital and almost crashed. The pilot regained control after 15 seconds and was able to deliver a squad of Army Rangers to the hospital.
The Marines began planning to replace the Sea Knight in early 1978. The first contract for the tilt-rotor was awarded in 1983. Even program officials acknowledge that the V-22 may be the longest developmental program in military history.
Congress has the final say whether a weapons system gets money. From year to year, the Department of Defense proposes the programs it wants funded. The Defense Acquisition Board will meet May 20 to decide whether the Osprey program should receive an additional year's funding of $1.8 billion.