Save The Apache, Lose The Gold Plating (AH-64D Performance During Gulf War II)

Soldiers For The Truth ^ | April 29, 2003 | David Hackworth

[JudgeAmint]

Save the Apache, Lose the Gold Plating

By David H. Hackworth

As our magnificent warriors return from Iraq, they will tell the folks who sweated them out at home what really went down during their bold march to Baghdad and will catch them up on all the inside skinny concerning the war's winners and losers.

             

At first glance, one of the big equipment losers is the U.S. Army's crown jewel, the Longbow Apache helicopter gunship (AH-64D model). Especially since a Longbow squadron got ventilated March 24 over the city of Karbala when 34 of these $24 million birds – developed to knock out Soviet tanks during the Cold War – were shredded by a sky full of mainly small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire. One Longbow was shot down – its two-man crew captured – but most of the rugged birds managed to limp home on a shot-up rotor blade and a prayer. Yet almost a month later, 27 of the choppers were still rated "not fit to fly."

            

After this disaster – which got little press because of the Pentagon's daily cover-up drills – the brass no longer considered the much-hyped Longbow the aircraft of choice to lead the aerial battle charge. Instead, caution prevailed, and the U.S. Air Force's thick-skinned A-10 Warthog became the undisputed Close Air Support (CAS) champ of the war.

            

Now a chorus of self-appointed experts who wouldn't know a helicopter gunship from a flying saucer is telling the Pentagon to "deep-six" the Apache and give the prime CAS mission to the A-10.

            

They argue that the Apache not only didn't cut it in Iraq but screwed up big-time in fights last year in Afghanistan and during the 1999 Kosovo War, when it couldn't even get into the game because of training accidents and the concern that Serb missiles would channel "Black Hawk Down." Even though a less fancy, earlier model proved itself in spades during Desert Storm and, contrary to so-called expert claims, remains the favorite of our grunts – past and present – in Afghanistan.

            

But a closer look at the March 24 Little Bighorn reveals that the overconfident – some say even rash – commanders of the 11th Aviation Regiment fell for a classic Iraqi helicopter ambush of the sort perfected by Vietnamese guerrillas in the 1960s and refined by Somalian rebels in the 1990s. Eyewitnesses and Apache pilots say we're talking leadership fault here rather than the failure of a formidable fighting machine. And if so, the 11th Aviation skippers and their flawed planning should wear the blame, not this great CAS aircraft.

            

As it proved in Iraq by not crashing and burning when it became Swiss cheese over Karbala, the Apache is unbeatably rugged. A blistering machine capable of pounding the enemy right on the deck – in their face or standing off at five miles. Not to mention how, unlike a fast-moving fighter jet, it can also stay on station – low and slow – long enough to zap the bad guys and deliver close-in, enormous firepower directly in front of our grunts' foxholes when and where they need it. 

            

But the ultra-expensive Longbow system – a sure winner on the open plains of Europe against Soviet armor that became obsolete the day the Berlin Wall tumbled down – makes the Longbow-equipped Apache too heavy to fly in 21st-century high-altitude trouble spots such as Afghanistan. And since its clever congressional cheerleaders have made sure that its parts are made in almost every state, killing this platinum-plated porker won't be quick and easy.

            

Too bad. The money saved could be used to improve the proven AH-64A model, increase Apache pilot training, update attack helicopter doctrine to include the lessons learned in both Afghanistan and Gulf War II – and for training senior commanders on how to use these vital war-fighting assets correctly.

            

As for the A-10: Great airplane that belongs to the wrong service – the U.S. Air Force – where the top brass treat it like Cinderella with wings. These trusty flying machines should be transferred to the Army and the Marine Corps for use alongside their AH-64A Apaches and AH-1 Super Cobras as part of an awesome, well-rounded CAS fleet that would support our ground troops with the best combination of the right stuff.  

[MEG33]

That's what they should do..assess and correct.

[Beck_isright]

"Is this a accurate portrayal of the Apache?"

Yes. The older Cobra's the USMC use are much more durable and reliable. Tech does not always mean effectiveness.

[mikegi]

I agree somewhat with Hack, for a change. Can someone explain to me the problems our Apaches had in Afghanistan and Iraq? I've never been in the military and don't know a whole alot about helicopter tactics and all my info comes from the media. Having said all that, here's my understanding of the two problem encounters:

1) In Anaconda, something like 9 out of 10 Apaches sent in to support the troops got kicked out of action (no losses, just shot up with small arms and RPGs). They apparently had trouble in the high altitude. A bunch of Super Cobras were rushed in to make up for the damage and performed well because they had better power at altitude. Is this just a case where the Cobras had the advantage of coming second so they knew what NOT to do? Or were the Cobras actually better suited for the particular fight?

2) In the disastrous Karbala raid, 30 out of 32 Apaches were shot up and their mission aborted. Again, we see a huge percentage of Apaches knocked out of action. Altitude wasn't a problem. Was this a case of the wrong tool being used for the job? I would assume that helos are designed to be in conjunction with ground forces so that each offers protection for the other. In Karbala, the Apaches were used far out front of our troops for low-level, nitty gritty, attacks on enemy forces. Isn't that the realm of the USAF's A-10s.

Is there a problem with the Apache, or with its usage, or has the media simply blown out of proportion a few bad encounters? The facts are indisputable, in these two engagements more than 90% of the Apaches were knocked out of action. Why?

[Beck_isright]

Cobras sacrifice alot of the bells and whistles for armor and armament. Nothing fancy, just a belt in the mouth with good protection. No helicopter is ever 100% safe because of the slow speeds. But I'll take a dozen Cobra's over Apaches any day.

[mikegi]

Actually, after getting a one-on-one debrief yesterday from a returning A-model pilot, attached to 11th REG during the last two months, and from other methods and sources, I would assure you that Hack is actually a bit more optimistic than I am on what the fallout will be.

I assume you mean that the Apache will "deemphasized". If so, can you give a little more detail? Do the actual pilots think that there's a problem (either tactics or mechanical/design) or are they just worried that Anaconda/Karbala will be blown out of proportion by the media?

[ChiefKujo]

Just having a nice big knife, doesn't make you a knife fighter.

The difference between the USMC (by the way, my son just graduated from Parris Island on Friday and is visiting here this week before MCT) and USA helo tactics can be summed up like so: High energy -v- Low enery tactics.

When there is a limited SAM and AAA threat, climb high (think Vietnam, prior to the introduction of the SAMs) out of small arms range. If you go low, you do it with speed (high energy) not by relying on standoff hover shots (low energy) because the guy with a rifle is EVERYWHERE (ie, you can never be assured of standoff unless you know where the enemy is and isn't.

[ChiefKujo]

Not a problem with either in the general, just in the specific (some units are way out front with this and some are not).

[3LostLegions]

Well, isn't the basic problem political? The Army and USMC should have their own A-10's, but they are prohibited from doing so because of the Air Force?

[Flyer]

I refuse to listen to a word Hackworth says until he changes his wardrobe. The black thing is getting old.

[Arkinsaw]

Is this a accurate portrayal of the Apache?

My understanding is that they sent the Apaches in as an armed probe or recon in force. Thats really not how to use them. My understanding is that you first do air defense suppression with MLRS or air dropped clusters and then send in the Apache to take care of the armor which no longer has soft air defense or infantry support.

I had heard that they left some MLRS batteries at home because they didn't think they would need all of them. So the Apache was being used incorrectly because we underestimated the enemy.

I have my doubts that it was scattered infantry that chewed up the Apaches. I am betting that it was ZSU fire that did it. Those things are real pains. They were saying that the Iraqis had ZSU's hidden in barns and such.

This was what I pieced together out of several reports. But those reporters know about as little as I do so anyone familiar with the real deal can straighten me out if I am off base.

[Newbomb Turk]

Last I read from Hackworth we were MIRED down in Iraq. Out running our supply lines and we were loosing the momentum to the enemy.

My how things change in a few days.I admire Col. Hackworth for his service but I think some of these retired people have lost pace with the Same services they served in. New day New ARMY.

[Travis McGee]

My understanding is that Cobra's and Huey's are still high altitude champs. If you want to fight or do rescues in high mountains, you send Hueys and Cobras, even in 2003.

[Travis McGee]

The Karbala battle was done over "suburbs", mixed rural and structures, so for the most part MLRS and CBUs were ruled out. The Apaches had to go in and put eyeballs on targets, which were firing from apartments, etc.

[Arkinsaw]

The Karbala battle was done over "suburbs", mixed rural and structures, so for the most part MLRS and CBUs were ruled out. The Apaches had to go in and put eyeballs on targets, which were firing from apartments, etc.

That makes sense in regard to using MLRS. Doesn't sound like Apache was ever designed for that sort of mission. I know I would hate to go in at low level against a low-tech ZSU hidden in an alley.

[Rokke]

Once again Hack proves he's full of crap. The development of the Longbow had nothing to do with Soviet tanks. The Soviet Union was history 5 or 6 years before the Longbow was in its earliest testing phases. Unlike Hackworth, the Army has figured out that they will be fighting in more environments and facing more challanging enemy than skinny Iraqis in the desert. They have to plan for all contingencies, not just the desert.
With regard to getting shot up. This will come as a seriously newsflash to all the "experts" who claim you have to get in the weeds to kill tanks, but when you get in the weeds you expose yourself to everything from slingshots to artillary rounds. Guess what. You're going to get shot up. Not only that, but while you are getting shot from every direction, it is nearly impossible to shot back. That is why we saw 30 fully armed Apaches go in, and almost all limp back without hardly firing a shot. Remember the pictures of the one the Iraqi's were dancing all over. It was fully loaded. The Air Force had similar results the day several A-10's decided to fly low over Baghdad. We lost one and had the rest barely make it home.
Meanwhile, the true CAS experts (the Marine Corps, and I am not a Marine) don't want aircraft like the A-10. They have figured out the best way to provide CAS is with accurate weapons system fired with lethal precision outside the enemy's firing range. A good laser targeting pod is a better tool for identifying tanks than the eyeball, whether it's from 30,000' or 500'. The best CAS happens when the tank blows up, and the aircraft that dropped the bomb flies home to rearm and return to blow up more tanks. The Army is learning the hard way that flying your CAS assets into the meatgrinder does nothing more than give the bad guys something different to shoot at.

[El Gato]

I'm not a chopper pilot, or any other kind, but I am an engineer, FWIW, and I'll give it a try.

Ground effect, which affects fixed wing as well as rotary wing aircaft, simply menas the interaction of the downwash from the wing/rotor with the surface cannot be neglected. Once the aircraft is a wing/rotor span or three above the surface, it's "out of ground effect". Closer than that and there is an "air cushion" effect, which effectively translastes into more lift with less power required. A fixed wing would fly at a lower AOA, and have more engine thrust available for accelleration, while the same is true of rotary wing, it's often expressed as the ability to maintain a hover at maximum power. In this case the hover can be maintained at a higher pressure altitude, if the aircraft is hovering near the ground surface (as on a mountain) than if the aircraft were well above the surface.

[El Gato]

Hack doesn't like anything more complicated than a Ka-Bar. If we where fighting someone with even semi modern tanks, especially if we were outnumbered, and in shitty weather, our tankers would be more than happy to have Longbow around. Think ChiComs in Korea for example, but that's only one possible scenario.

[El Gato]

I am betting that it was ZSU fire that did it. Those things are real pains. They were saying that the Iraqis had ZSU's hidden in barns and such.

I don't doubt it. Take a look at the pictures of the A-10 that female Captain limped back to base with. That weren't small arms that did that, the holes in the aircraft are too big for that. It also might have been a SAM, with a "rods" or "metal cubes" type of warhead. It looks as if a very high rate of fire weapon swept accross the tail section, where and just in front of the horizontal stabilizers meet the fuselodge. It knocked out the (redundent) hydrolics, tore a good sized chunk out of the leading edge of starboard horizontal stab and holed one of the vertical stabs pretty good too.

[El Gato]

I know I would hate to go in at low level against a low-tech ZSU hidden in an alley. the A-10 could do it, it's gun outranges the ZSU's 23 mm. Even the Apache's 25mm chain gun should be a fair match for the ZSU, but then again, who wants "fair"? ;)