Save The Apache, Lose The Gold Plating (AH-64D Performance During Gulf War II)

As our magnificent warriors return from Iraq, they will tell the folks who sweated them out at home what really went down during their bold march to Baghdad and will catch them up on all the inside skinny concerning the war's winners and losers.

At first glance, one of the big equipment losers is the U.S. Army's crown jewel, the Longbow Apache helicopter gunship (AH-64D model). Especially since a Longbow squadron got ventilated March 24 over the city of Karbala when 34 of these $24 million birds – developed to knock out Soviet tanks during the Cold War – were shredded by a sky full of mainly small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire. One Longbow was shot down – its two-man crew captured – but most of the rugged birds managed to limp home on a shot-up rotor blade and a prayer. Yet almost a month later, 27 of the choppers were still rated "not fit to fly."

After this disaster – which got little press because of the Pentagon's daily cover-up drills – the brass no longer considered the much-hyped Longbow the aircraft of choice to lead the aerial battle charge. Instead, caution prevailed, and the U.S. Air Force's thick-skinned A-10 Warthog became the undisputed Close Air Support (CAS) champ of the war.

Now a chorus of self-appointed experts who wouldn't know a helicopter gunship from a flying saucer is telling the Pentagon to "deep-six" the Apache and give the prime CAS mission to the A-10.

They argue that the Apache not only didn't cut it in Iraq but screwed up big-time in fights last year in Afghanistan and during the 1999 Kosovo War, when it couldn't even get into the game because of training accidents and the concern that Serb missiles would channel "Black Hawk Down." Even though a less fancy, earlier model proved itself in spades during Desert Storm and, contrary to so-called expert claims, remains the favorite of our grunts – past and present – in Afghanistan.

But a closer look at the March 24 Little Bighorn reveals that the overconfident – some say even rash – commanders of the 11th Aviation Regiment fell for a classic Iraqi helicopter ambush of the sort perfected by Vietnamese guerrillas in the 1960s and refined by Somalian rebels in the 1990s. Eyewitnesses and Apache pilots say we're talking leadership fault here rather than the failure of a formidable fighting machine. And if so, the 11th Aviation skippers and their flawed planning should wear the blame, not this great CAS aircraft.

As it proved in Iraq by not crashing and burning when it became Swiss cheese over Karbala, the Apache is unbeatably rugged. A blistering machine capable of pounding the enemy right on the deck – in their face or standing off at five miles. Not to mention how, unlike a fast-moving fighter jet, it can also stay on station – low and slow – long enough to zap the bad guys and deliver close-in, enormous firepower directly in front of our grunts' foxholes when and where they need it.

But the ultra-expensive Longbow system – a sure winner on the open plains of Europe against Soviet armor that became obsolete the day the Berlin Wall tumbled down – makes the Longbow-equipped Apache too heavy to fly in 21st-century high-altitude trouble spots such as Afghanistan. And since its clever congressional cheerleaders have made sure that its parts are made in almost every state, killing this platinum-plated porker won't be quick and easy.

Too bad. The money saved could be used to improve the proven AH-64A model, increase Apache pilot training, update attack helicopter doctrine to include the lessons learned in both Afghanistan and Gulf War II – and for training senior commanders on how to use these vital war-fighting assets correctly.

As for the A-10: Great airplane that belongs to the wrong service – the U.S. Air Force – where the top brass treat it like Cinderella with wings. These trusty flying machines should be transferred to the Army and the Marine Corps for use alongside their AH-64A Apaches and AH-1 Super Cobras as part of an awesome, well-rounded CAS fleet that would support our ground troops with the best combination of the right stuff.

Flying CAS is the most challenging mission in a jet, and I've flown CAS, deep strike, air-to-air, etc (former A-10 and F-15E pilot, Gulf War I FAC with 101st). The Air Force did not care much for the A-10 when the Soviets were the threat, beleiving the A-10 had no survivability when facing Soviet IADS. However, with Gulf War I and Gulf War II, they are coming around.

Are they? I thought one of the bigger lessons from both ANACONDA and IRAQI FREEDOM is that with GPS targeting (backed up with some laser designation) the world of CAS is opened up to just about every kind of aircraft in the inventory. If you had told a B-52 jock in 1972, or hell, in *1992*, that his bird could be a CAS platform, he'd have thought you were nuts. Now the BUFF can lay down supressive munitions on the order of a hundred yards or so in front of advancing US troops, all from the safety of six miles or more up in the air. And with as much if not more hang-time as an Apache or an A-10 (B-52s carry tons of fuel). I'm wondering if Hackworth is underestimating the extent to which the war is forcing a major re-evaluation of CAS strategy, with BOTH the Apache and the A-10 being faced with obsolesence in the eyes of Pentagon planners.

(One of the failings of a radar like Longbow, or most any radar, of course is the ability to reliably distinguish between a ZSU and a Toyota pick-up)

Actually, one of the big advantages of the Longbow Radar was it's ability to use its millimeter wave resolution and sophisticated digital signal processing algorithims to classify targets as tracked or wheeled, and in some cases even friendly vs. hostile based on the radar signature. The system priortized detected targets as to friend/foe and threat level. Now, having said that, it did have its problems with reliability and making correct decisions.

Also, the Longbow Apache (AH-64D) is capable of firing a mix of both Radar guided hellfires (the RF Hellfire) and/or the original laser guided SAL (semi active laser) Helfire.

There is a lot of other stuff happening in the Longbow Radar processer that we can't talk about here, and Hack probably doesn't know about, either.

(I was a member of the test team for the Operational Test of the AH-64D in Jan 1995 at Fort Hunter Liggett.)

Well, I will correct you...

Rokke: "Sorry, I'm not buying it. The first AH-64A's didn't start flying with the army until 1984. The first Longbows weren't flown until 1996."

During the development of the Hellfire missile they quickly learned that the laser guidance had serious shortfalls and had begun research into improvements even before it was deployed. Namely they researched millimeterwave sensors to replace the Hellfire and other missile seekers. STARTLE was one of the early research programs on-going at Night Vision Labs for imaging mmw sensors, when I was briefing there in the mid 1980's. I was involved in developing infra-red (FLIR) detection and recognition systems.

The semi-active laser guidance began development in the 1960's for various missiles. The laser-guided Hellfire missile was chosen for the attack helicopter in 1976 and the first Hellfire was fired in 1978.

The millimeter wave missile seeker program had begun in the early-mid 1980's.

The Longbow Hellfire formally began development in 1985 and achieved Initial Operational Capability in 1998. It took 13 years. The Hellfire mmw (Longbow) hit it's first target in 1986! It was primarily designed for SOVIET threats. source: GAO/NSIAD-98-28

.
.
Rokke: " Now I will believe the A-10 was designed with the Fulda Gap in mind. Back in the early 70's."

The A-10 requirements were intially motivated by the VIETNAM war in the 1960's according to Globalsecurity

A need arose during the Vietnam conflict for a specialized aircraft capable of giving close air support to troops operating in the forward battle area. Needed was a heavily armed aircraft that could respond rapidly to a call for help and had the ability to destroy tanks, artillery batteries, and other types of enemy strongholds. Neither a fast aircraft nor one with long range was required; good maneuverability, extended loiter time in the battle area, and a lethal weapons load were needed. Low cost, easy maintenance with minimum turnaround time, and high survivability in the face of enemy ground fire were other characteristics desired.

.
.Rokke: "Furthermore, how can a Longbow missile relying on a radar seeker for guidance be inferior to a TOW missile in low visibility? Since a TOW missile is obviously Optically tracked, it is obviously inferior to a radar guided missile in low visibility conditions."

No I did not say the TOW was better than the Longbow Hellfire in poor weather. It is better than the standard Hellfire missile.

We are talking about 3 different missiles. The semi-active laser (SAL) Hellfire (original), the millimeter wave (MMW) Longbow Hellfire; and the TOW.

Both the original Hellfire and the TOW are optically guided using either FLIR, TV or direct view optics. The Hellfire requires a laser to be bounced off the target and the missile seeker will home in on the laser spot. The TOW has a xenon beacon flashing at the back of the missile so as it flies to the target the optics track BOTH the missile and the target and fly the missile automatically to the target.

In low visibility the Hellfire has difficulty "seeing" the reflected laser spot (it may actually see many, many spots bouncing off the mist, fog, snow etc); whereas the TOW missile projects a very intense beacon back to the optics and penetrates poor weather much better.

The rule of thumb is if you can detect a target and it is within range then you can hit the target with a TOW, no matter the weather. That same rule does not apply to the Hellfire. It is not enough to simply detect the target, additional criterion must be evaluated to ensure the conditions are suitable for the laser.

The Hellfire-Longbow with the mmw seeker can hit a target that cannot be seen with the optics, but the problems which have delayed its development so long is that it is difficult to "identify" a target with the radar and ensure that the target is indeed of military value and not collateral.

For reference a TOW2 missile costs about $25k, a Hellfire F model (laser) about $45K; a K model (laser) about $75k; and a Longbow model (mmw) about $200k.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.