Posted on 04/28/2003 11:51:01 AM PDT by knighthawk
Kim Burger JDW Staff Reporter, Nick Cook JDW Aerospace Consultant, Andrew Koch JDW Washington Bureau Chief, Michael Sirak JDW Staff Reporter
With the regime of Saddam Hussein soundly defeated by overwhelming military force, coalition leaders are analysing what initial lessons can be drawn from Operation 'Iraqi Freedom'.
A high-level Pentagon team is already sifting through the data. The team-members will be aware that their conclusions will be leapt upon by proponents of two quite disparate camps: those who will use the war to bolster the process of the military's transformation from a Cold War-era fighting force to one that is lighter, more flexible and technology-reliant; and those who believe that transformation in a highly uncertain global security environment is as much a threat to the military as it is a positive force for change.
Arthur Cebrowski, a retired vice admiral and director of the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Force Transformation, said he expects analysis of operations in Iraq will reveal a "new air-land dynamic: the discovery of a new 'sweet spot' in the relationship between land and air warfare and a tighter integration of the two. The things that compel that are good sensors networked with good intelligence disseminated through a robust networking system, which then yields speed. Speed turns out to be a very, very important factor," Cebrowski said.
The war was also notable for how 'psyops' - psychological operations - was brought to bear on the enemy in new and unusual ways. Psyops against the Iraqi military included the dropping of more than 40 million leaflets prior to hostilities and during the conflict itself. These leaflets, which urged Iraqi commanders not to use weapons of mass destruction and for front-line troops to desert, appeared to have had the desired effect.
Vice Adm Timothy Keating, head of US naval forces in the Gulf, said on 12 April that the fact that Iraq launched no 'Scud' surface-to-surface ballistic missiles during the war may have been directly attributable to this aspect of the campaign. Others state that it may simply have been because Iraq had no 'Scuds' or that the regime was dissuaded from launching them by the persistence of coalition 'eyes and ears' in the air and on the ground. Psyops also involved the direct 'piping' of propaganda into Iraq via platforms like the US Air Force's (USAF's) EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft.
Special operations forces (SOF), like those who shape psyops strategy, traditionally remain in the shadows, but the degree to which SOF operated in the open in 'Iraqi Freedom' was also unprecedented.
US special forces and intelligence paramilitary forces have been more vital to the overall success of 'Iraqi Freedom' than in any other large-scale conflict, US defence officials say. They were also used in considerable numbers: as many as 10,000 are thought to have been deployed during the course of the war. Their tasks ranged from gathering intelligence on Iraqi troop positions to directing airstrikes and severing enemy lines of communications - a factor, along with the disruption caused by coalition airstrikes, that proved critical in isolating Iraq's heavily centralised command structure from front-line commanders.
Air power proved crucial to the outcome of the campaign. The USAF will write three reports on the Iraq conflict. These will focus on preparations for 'Iraqi Freedom', shaping the battlefield/decisive operations and the post-hostilities situation.
According to Air Force Secretary James Roche, greater flexibility means "we don't have to have set pieces the way we've had in the past". Coalition air forces, for example, struck more than 500 targets based on dynamic re-targeting during the operation in support of the ground campaign, one senior US military official in the theatre told Jane’s Defence Weekly.
Technology has also moved on apace. The air-tasking order, for example, used to have to be flown out to aircraft carriers; it is now web-based. During 'Iraqi Freedom', Roche added, the USAF was always ready to switch from attacking fixed-point targets to supporting ground forces and working with the army to wear down "those [enemy] forces that are far ahead of the army, rather than having them in a set artillery battle".
Indeed, the degree to which all the branches of the armed forces worked well together emerged as a major plus point of the war. "You have seen in Iraq the power of that teamwork," said Lt Gen Robert Magnus, US Marine Corps (USMC) Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources.
The air picture was dominated by a largely unseen presence of highly integrated command, control, communications and computer-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets.
With their ability to 'persist' in the air for long periods of time unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are likely to emerge as big winners from 'Iraqi Freedom'. They also fall very much in line with Rumsfeld's vision of a high-tech military. One unusual use of older-model RQ-1A Predators stripped of their expensive sensor systems saw them flown into Iraq in the initial phase of the campaign in order to draw out Iraqi surface-to-air missile (SAM) installations for subsequent targeting by coalition ISR and suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) assets.
Iraq's supposedly integrated air-defence infrastructure proved less than effective in the face of overwhelming US and UK air power and years of attrition through allied northern and southern no-fly zone operations. The lack of closely co-ordinated Iraqi air defence allowed coalition war planners to make good use of their strategic bombers.
It was a B-1B armed with GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) that was the instrument for an audacious second attempt to 'decapitate' the Iraqi leadership during a purported meeting of Saddam Hussein, his two sons and other senior Iraqi leaders at a restaurant in Baghdad on 7 April. The strike was especially noteworthy for the way it saw information on the whereabouts of the Iraqi dictator, which emerged at very short notice, transmitted rapidly to allied air planners and then to the B-1B. This short-duration 'sensor-to-shooter loop' is a key component of 'net-centric warfare': the ability to transmit, receive and view data in real time across the coalition spectrum. Net-centric warfare was practised in an embryonic capacity in Afghanistan and honed in Iraq - as the B-1B mission demonstrated.
"We confirmed the co-ordinates and then it took about 12 minutes to fly to the target and release the weapons," said Lt Col Frank Swan, the weapons systems officer on the aircraft.
Although net-centric warfare has a long way to go, the way in which it is spreading across the warfighting spectrum was visible in Iraq. Gen Magnus specifically cited wearable squad-level radios deployed among US and UK ground troops as a key innovation.
Despite the relative ease of the air campaign, Roche said that the Iraqi operation still showed the need for the F/A-22. Aside from the ageing nature of the F-15C fleet, he highlighted the F/A-22's ability to carry its weapons internally, "which means a lot less drag, which means a lot fewer tankers".
This issue touched on a raw nerve because aerial tanking was identified early on as a specific shortfall during the campaign. Resultant action could see a plan by the USAF to lease around 100 tankers gaining ground very quickly. Stealth would have helped the F/A-22 roam unchallenged over Baghdad in the early phase of the war and supercruise - the ability to cruise supersonically without afterburner - would have allowed it to be retasked quickly in support of coalition ground troops.
Lastly, Roche said, the aircraft's superior sensor suite would give the F/A-22 a significant capability against 'movers' - time-critical targets like 'Scud' launchers and SA-6 mobile SAM batteries. While these did not materialise as an issue in Iraq, the Iraqi military were deemed to have both and they remain a priority for choice of targets.
In view of the disparate views espoused by proponents of a faster, more agile force and the 'old guard' who support the need for quantity as well as quality, a particularly keen eye will be cast on the land-war campaign.
For anyone who thought the M1 Abrams main battle tank (MBT) was only for the Cold War era, the Abrams-equipped US Army 3rd Infantry Division and units of the 1st Marine Division showed that heavy armour can contribute mightily to modern warfare.
Army officials, however, are not ready to scrap plans for lighter combat systems. To the contrary, operations in Iraq generated more examples of why they are pursuing a force that can be deployed quickly and by air when necessary.
The army is still stinging from the absence of the 4th Infantry Division - its most modern heavy force - from the major battles of the war after Turkey refused to grant base access, blocking a northern ground assault. The new Stryker medium-armoured vehicles, which are going through final testing to be certified for battle, could have been flown into northern Iraq or the south of country to protect vulnerable supply lines, officials said.
The army's planned Future Combat System (FCS) would be even more effective in such scenarios because, while also lightweight and capable of airlift deployments, it is envisioned as featuring a combination of sensors and advanced lightweight armour protection that officials say will make it as powerful as the M1. Furthermore, it is being designed to require less logistic support, such as being able to produce its own water through engine condensation. However, since the FCS may not enter the force in large numbers until at least 2012, the Iraq operation has revived questions about whether more should be invested in modernising the army's existing heavy force. Many of those projects have been cancelled to pay for the advanced system and the army's Objective Force concept, including the elimination of the M1A2 Abrams System Enhancement Program upgrade and M2A3 Bradley upgrades in the army's Fiscal Year 2004 budget request.
Even without the upgrades, the army intends to have MBTs in its forces for several decades and will continue to rely on pre-positioning of its equipment close to the world's hotspots, on US Navy ships or at bases, to help speed its delivery into theatre. The service will look at "smarter" repackaging of the afloat stocks so that there is enough room to conduct maintenance of equipment on the ships, one army official said. There also are plans to include more combat support and combat service support assets with the equipment stored.
The rapid crumbling of Saddam Hussein's rule under attack from just one mechanised army division might seem a boon to 'transformational' concepts that focus on precision strike and airpower over the commitment of substantial ground troops. However, while officials praise the role of close air support in many missions, they say it was the combination of tactical air strikes with tanks, infantry, artillery and psychological operations that produced the greatest effect.
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(Excerpt) Read more at janes.com ...
I doubt any lighter weight vehicle could be "as powerful as the M1." Maybe I don't know enough about this new vehicle.
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