Posted on 04/20/2003 5:21:01 PM PDT by sourcery
Does a Falling Money Stock Cause Economic Depression?
By Frank Shostak
[Posted April1 18, 2003]
Despite the aggressive lowering of the federal funds rate target from 6.5% in December, 2000 to the current level of 1.25%, U.S. economic activity remains subdued. Faced with a lackluster response to this aggressive monetary stance, it is tempting to draw parallels with the 1930's economic depression.
Most economists hold that such comparisons are not warranted. Following the writings of Milton Friedman, they are of the view that the policy makers of the Fed have learned the lesson of the Great Depression and know how to avoid a major economic slump.
In his writings Milton Friedman blamed central bank policies for causing the Great Depression. According to Friedman the Federal Reserve failed to pump enough reserves into the banking system to prevent a collapse in the money stock (Milton and Rose Friedman's Free To Choose). In response to this failure, Friedman argues, money stock, M1, fell by 33% between late 1930 and early 1933 (see chart).
According to Friedman, as a result of the collapse in the money stock economic activity followed suit. Thus by July 1932 year-on-year industrial production fell by over 31% (see chart). Also, year-on-year the consumer price index (CPI) had plunged. By October 1932 the CPI fell by 10.7% (see chart).
However, a close examination of the historical data shows that contrary to Friedman the Fed was extremely loose and pumped reserves into the system in its attempt to revive the economy (on this see Murray Rothbard's America's Great Depression). The extent of monetary injections is depicted by changes in the Fed's holdings of U.S. government securities. Thus on January 1930 these holdings stood at $485 million. By December 1933 they had jumped to $2,432 million—an increase of 401% (see chart). Moreover, the average yearly rate of monetary injections by the Fed during this period stood at 98%.
Also, short-term interest rates fell from almost 4% at the beginning of 1930 to 0.9% by September 1931 (see chart). Another indication of a loose monetary stance on the part of the Fed was the widening in the differential between the yield on the 10-year T-Bond and the yield on the 90-day Bankers Acceptances. The differential rose from -0.51% in January 1930 to 2.37% by September 1931 (see chart).
The sharp fall in the money stock between 1930 to 1933, contrary to Friedman, is not indicative of the Federal Reserve's failure to pump money. Instead it is indicative of a shrinking base of investable capital brought about by the previous loose monetary policies of the central bank. Thus the yield spread increased from -0.9% in early 1920 to 1.9% by the end of 1925 (an upward sloping yield curve indicates loose monetary stance). The reversal of the stance by the Fed from 1926 to 1929 burst the monetary bubble (see chart).
In addition to this, at some stages monetary injections were massive. For instance, the yearly rate of growth of government securities holdings by the Fed jumped from 19.7% in April 1924 to 608% by November 1924. Then from 0.3% in July 1927 the yearly rate of growth accelerated to 92% by November 1927. Needless to say that such massive monetary pumping amounted to a massive exchange of nothing for something and to a severe depletion of the pool of real funding, that is, the essential source of current and future capital needed to sustain growth.
As long as the pool of real funding is expanding and banks are eager to expand credit (credit out of "thin air") various nonproductive activities continue to prosper. Whenever the extensive creation of credit out of "thin air" lifts the pace of real-wealth consumption above the pace of real-wealth production the flow of real savings is arrested and a decline in the pool of real funding is set in motion. Consequently, the performance of various activities starts to deteriorate and banks' bad loans start to rise. In response to this, banks curtail their lending activities and this in turn sets in motion a decline in the money stock.
The fall in the money stock begins to further undermine various nonproductive activities, i.e. an economic depression emerges. In this regard after growing by 2.7% year-on-year in January 1930 bank loans had fallen by a massive 29% by March 1933 (see chart).
How is it possible that lenders can generate credit out "of thin air" which in turn can lead to the disappearance of money? Now, when loaned money is fully backed up by savings, on the day of the loan's maturity it is returned to the original lender. Thus, Bob—the borrower of $100—will pay back on the maturity date the borrowed sum plus interest. The bank in turn will pass to Joe, the lender, his $100 plus interest adjusted for bank fees. To put it briefly, the money makes a full circle and goes back to the original lender.
In contrast, when credit is created out of "thin air" and returned on the maturity day to the bank this amounts to a withdrawal of money from the economy, i.e, to a decline in the money stock. The reason for this is because there wasn't any original saver/lender, since this credit was created out of "thin air."
It follows then that the sole cause behind the wide swings in the stock of money is the existence of fractional reserve banking, which gives rise to unbacked-by-savings credit. (In the Mystery of Banking Murray Rothbard showed that it is the existence of the central bank that enables fractional reserve banking to thrive).
Observe that economic depressions are not caused by the collapse in the money stock (as suggested by Milton Friedman), but come in response to a shrinking pool of real funding on account of previous of loose money. Consequently, even if the central bank were to be successful in preventing the fall of the money stock, this would not be able to prevent a depression if the pool of real funding is declining. Also, even if loose monetary polices were to succeed in lifting prices and inflationary expectations (as suggested by Paul Krugman), this would not revive the economy as long as real funding is declining.
Again, note that contrary to popular thinking, depressions are not caused by tight monetary policies, but are rather the result of previous loose monetary policies. On the contrary, a tighter monetary stance arrests the depletion of the pool of real funding and thereby lays the foundations for economic recovery. Furthermore, the tighter stance reveals the damage that was done to the capital structure by previous monetary policies.
Have we learned the lesson of the Great Depression?
Do central banks have all the necessary tools to prevent a severe economic slump similar to the one that occurred in the 1930's? Most economists are adamant that modern central banks know how to counter the menace of a severe recession.
But if this is the case why has the central bank of Japan failed so far in reviving the Japanese economy? The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has used all the known tricks as far as monetary pumping is concerned. Thus interest rates were lowered to almost zero (see chart) while BOJ monetary pumping as depicted by its holdings of government securities increased by 323% between January 1990 and March 2003 (see chart).
It is likewise in the U.S. For over two years the Fed has been aggressively lowering interest rates and yet economic activity remains subdued (see chart). For instance, in relation to its long-term trend industrial production remains in free fall (see chart). The Fed's holdings of government securities have increased by 189% between 1990 Q1 and 2002 Q4. The yearly rate of growth of these holdings jumped to 14.1% in Q4 2002 from 9.8% in Q1 (see chart).
Moreover, a steep fall in the personal income to personal outlays ratio indicates that the pool of real funding is under pressure (see chart). Note that during the 1930's the fall in this ratio wasn't as steep as now (see chart).
We suspect that there is a strong likelihood that if the economy does not rebound soon, the Fed will lower interest rates further and will intensify its monetary pumping. This, however, will only further prolong the economic misery.
you reach a point where aggregate debt service by government, business and individuals consumes so much of periodic liquidity that the entity involved can no longer afford to make additional purchase commitments. Buyers disappear.
Not only this but the bubble and re-bubble going on by the FED cause dollar devaluation and with more bucks being lent out, lenders will want higher interest rates when they know they will be getting back dollars that buy less because inflation has set in. That $1 hamburger & fries is now $6.75. This added activity leaves the economy no where to turn.
If we could get the government officials to even consider that American jobs were important then it might work. How do we change the Socialists in the government?
Debtors of any class, government, business, or individual, have limited liquidity. That is why the debt (borrowed liquidity) was needed in the first place. Debtor liqudity may come from tax revenues, business earnings, or monthly earned income--but it is limited. First off, every thing in the universe is limited, however unimaginable those limits might be. Second, government revenues, business earnings, et. al. are indeed limited when speaking in context of the here and now. We borrow-- for a car, a house, whatever-- and the banks lend us money on the carefully considered assumption that we will be worth more tomorrow,or next year, than we are today. Businesses and governments borrow and are loaned money, via stocks and bonds, on basically the same assumption.
There is no reliable data on what the real limits are--how much of current income can be paid on residential mortgage debt, or credit cards or whatever without creating a deflationary economic environment. Speaking in the vast macro-economic sense, yes that is true; but, in reference to individual, business and, yes, even government "debtor liquidity" there are, of course, available,.e.g. Moody's, Morningstar, etc.
Point is that in the macro economy, you reach a point where aggregate debt service by government, business and individuals consumes so much of periodic liquidity that the entity involved can no longer afford to make additional purchase commitments... Again, this is based on the assumption of a static condition: That he who has $5 today, will have $5 tomorrow and $5 next week, maybe less but never than a penny or two more.
In the business environment, pricing power disappears and prices begin to drop; so do profits. True enough, to a point. Prices drop simply because they must in order to the company to maintain it's place in the market- but prices can only drop to a point. When profit derived from these lower, unsubstantiated price cuts (Spacely's Sprockets cut prices not because they found a better,cheaper way to make sprockets but simply because they had to) reach a certain point the company simply stops making the products. Only the federal government can continue to make something, be it goods or services, at a loss.
Deflation becomes imbedded--because new debt is incurred, not to buy additional assets but instead to make payments on existing debt. Which can not be lowered-either by fiat or allowed to drift downward. The cause of this is, in a word: contracts. No matter if it is in re: a union pay agreement, a purchasing order for a business, or a 30 year mortgage.
So we have skipped payments; interest only months; rising default rates and mortgage foreclosures. Monthly payments are made with additional credit card debt. A general decline in market prices is probably not too far ahead. This is because, as the old saying goes, "water seeks its own level". If, for whatever reason, real estate/housing prices are out of wack with reality the Free Market, if allowed to work, will bring them down (or raise them up) to their true level.
This is a fair summary of the current economic environment. As Shostak points out, the historical experience is that additional lending has been counterproductive No doubt, no doubt, but then you come to the sticky question of "additional lending", according to whom? by whose standards? By whose defination?" etc., etc., but that, as they say, is for another day.
How do we get out of this mess? Well you have to see how people get additional liquidity other than through the debt process. You have to expect new jobs to be created and employment to go up; compensation has to go up; business income has to go; tax receipts must go up. If anybody sees any positive signs on any of these items, or if anybody can see any reason why any of these things might happen, they should post immediately. I don't. IMHO, it's call "politics". Elections are not too far off and it is to the benefit of not a few to make sure the kettle stays hot and well stirred
...that's a good point, and the corollary to it is...If Wal-Mart were to implement a MADE IN USA only policy, would the American economy be able to keep them supplied?.....for example, I'm not sure there's enough textile capacity left in this country to keep Wal-Mart in soft goods.....
Good luck to everyone!
Stonewalls
Yes, but what was happening BEFORE "December 2000"? The Fed was tightening the screw to fight imaginery inflation even after the shares started to fall.
Bump
That must have been just the whiplash needed to start the next presidency off with a record economic slump.
Richard W.
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